Malê Rising

Update a bit delayed; a story while you wait

Charleston, November 1899

It was a warm day, Congress was in recess, and it was a good time to sit and read on the veranda and drink lemonade. There was a novel in Harriet Tubman’s hands, but she’d been on the same page for the last twenty minutes, content to enjoy the feel of the late-afternoon sun and contemplate the future.

She woke to the sound of footsteps on the walk and realized she’d been dozing – an occupational hazard, at her age. No doubt it was one of the neighbor girls who came in sometimes and helped take care of the house. Too much house, if you asked her – some days she still regretted letting her staff talk her into buying a place south of Broad. But if she was in Congress, she needed a place fit to receive callers, and the neighbors were sweet about helping out.

When she opened her eyes, though, she saw it wasn’t a neighbor girl – oh no, not that. There was a man on the walk not far short of her own age, standing just below the stairs waiting for permission to climb them, and she’d know his face anywhere.

“Afternoon, ma’am,” he said.

“Same to you, General Longstreet. Can’t say I was expecting you, but come on up and sit down.”


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He did so, and as he took a seat on the other side of the table, she tried to remember what she’d heard about him. He’d settled in New Orleans after the war and turned scalawag – the number one scalawag, in fact, until Memminger gave the redeemers a bigger target. After they’d run him out of Louisiana, he’d trained militia in the Mississippi Black Belt, been a postmaster somewhere and served as commissioner to the Ottoman Empire; he’d brought some strange ideas back from there, or so people said. He’d fought in the war, too, commanding British colonial troops, and now he was back on a farm in Georgia.

He held up the pitcher of lemonade and, at Harriet’s nod, filled her glass and poured one for himself. He sat and drank, and the silence lengthened.

“So what brings you here, General?” she asked at last.

“Georgia isn’t suiting me very well, so I thought I’d move back to South Carolina. See home before I die.” He did look like hell – he’d lost a lot of weight, if his old pictures were anything to go by, and the rough life he’d led in the war probably hadn’t done him any good.

“Your home’s up Edgefield way. Long way from here.”

The old man laughed. “All right, you got me. I did want to stop by and see you on the way up there. Congratulate you on the Tubman Act, and talk about some things.”

“The Tubman Act? That’s what they’re calling it?” It was certainly the thing she was proudest of about her second term, but she hadn’t known people were putting her name on it already.

“In Georgia they are. Usually, they spit when they say it. They’re sure the Supreme Court will strike it down – how can lynching be a federal crime even if it all happens in one state?”

“Wish I could say they’re wrong. Teddy says it’ll pass under necessary and proper, but with this court I’m not so sure.” She put her glass down on the table for emphasis. “Not everyone in Georgia’s against it, though – Becky voted for it, if you can believe that.”

“I’m still not sure I can.”

“I am. I saw it happen.”

“Well, Becky’s got a big blind spot when it comes to you – or should I say, she’s got one where it comes to every… Negro but you.”

“No, it wasn’t that.” It hadn’t been admiration for Harriet that got Rebecca Felton to sign on, or at least it hadn’t been just that. And it wasn’t that much of a mystery, when you thought about it; Rebecca might have her views about what the Negroes’ place was, but she’d come around to opposing lynching for the same reason she opposed slavery: that it corrupted the morals of the whites.

“Regardless, I think Teddy’s right. With the two new justices, I don’t think it’ll be struck down.”

“Maybe the court’ll let it pass,” she allowed, “but enforcing it is another story.” She lapsed into silence. Federal courts set their own qualifications for jurors, so blacks couldn’t be kept off Federal juries the way they were in places like Alabama or Florida, but that didn’t stop people from terrorizing the ones who did report for jury service, or making sure they knew what would happen if they returned a guilty verdict. She’d been thinking about that problem for a while, and wasn’t sure she had an answer that the government would actually follow.

“Anyway,” the general was saying, “it was a good piece of work. But that’s not the only reason I’m here, not that it isn’t nice to pass the time with such a fine-lookin’ lady. You see, when I was in Turkey, I became what you’d call a Malian. I learned that I’ve got to make amends, renew the world – spread freedom. I’ve learned that what I demand from the world, I need to give to others.”

“Now that’s good to hear,” Harriet answered, as noncommittally as she could. She recognized the old general’s words as a jumble of Abacar, Bello and Abay Qunanbaiuli. Evidently, his adoption of Catholicism in the seventies hadn’t been his final religious conversion, and just as evidently, he’d had an eclectic group of teachers in Stamboul and wherever he’d been afterward. No doubt he’d picked up his faith from soldiers and coffee-house owners rather than scholars, though that surely didn’t make it any less sincere.

“I was hoping that you might put in a good word for me – help me find something to do here. I can still train militia, or if you don’t need me for that, I don’t mind teaching, or working with my hands.”

“Work with your hands at your age, and you’ll be in your grave.” She sipped her lemonade carefully, and thought. Longstreet wouldn’t be the first old Confederate to look for a place in South Carolina – hell, Memminger had even been governor, there at the end, with a mostly-black cabinet that met in his home every morning. But things here were a lot more established now than they were then, and it was mighty late in the day to start over…

She leaned forward over the table. “We’ve got our militia pretty well in hand, but if you mean what you say, there’s something you can do. Not here, though, and it won’t be easy. We need you back in Georgia, for the underground railroad.”

Longstreet looked like he’d been poleaxed; whatever words he’d expected her to say, it obviously hadn’t been those. “Underground railroad? That went out with the war, didn’t it?”

“The hell it did. It went out of business for a while, but when the redeemers began taking over, it started right up again. Only now it’s two ways. We still take people out – people who are wanted, or who’d be lynched else – but we also send things in. Money, books, letters – things to help people organize and keep some freedom alive down there. Guns, too. We sometimes send those.”

The old man nodded his head. “And you want my farm to be a stop?”

“That’s right. We need white folks who are willing to help. They can get away with a lot more than we can, down in those states.”

Now it was Longstreet’s turn to sit and think, and decide if he had really meant what he said. Harriet watched him carefully, and she saw the answer in his eyes a moment before he spoke it.

“Ma’am, you’ve got a recruit. You’ll tell me what to do?”

“Oh no, not me. I’ll put the word out, and when you go back to Georgia, someone will come meet with you. I don’t even know who it’ll be, but they’ll give you your marching orders.”

“Fair enough.” His arms stiffened on the chair, and he began to push himself up.

“No need to leave so fast,” she said, waving him back down. “The lemonade isn’t finished, and it’ll be time for supper in an hour. A couple of the neighbors are coming by to help cook, and I think they’d like to meet you.”
 
I am personally quite far from Eco's approach scientifically, and I found some things he wrote extremely questionable, while others are good and enjoyable; but my warning was about not taking uncritically his narrative work as historically accurate ( have "The Name of the Rose" in mind; I have not read "The Cemetery of Prague" indeed).

EDIT: I am probably not very objective about him. Some recent remarks of his on Italian press have really upset me, but this should not detract from the good he did in his career.

I LOVED The Name of the Rose, a very, very mediæval novel in some ways. I wouldnt be at all surprised if there were considerable literary license with facts in it, as tjats mediæval, too.

How it ever got on the best seller lists, I'm sure I dont know. Those people were clearly reading a different story than the one I read. Or the one Eco thought he was writing, afaik.

I guess the movie gave a reasonable impression of the book that made it to the bestseller lists, even, or especially, when it didnt match the book.
 
Elgar might actually serve as an officer in the war - as a British aristocrat in his 30s, he'd be expected to do so

Just stepping into pedant's corner to point out that Elgar was lower middle class.

The 'Sir' bit only came as a reward for his work.

Regarding ex Confederates - what happened after the Civil War to Lee, Jackson and Forrest. Assuming they survived that is.

Forrest in TTL might be particularly interesting considering his changing views in OTL.
 
I LOVED The Name of the Rose, a very, very mediæval novel in some ways. I wouldnt be at all surprised if there were considerable literary license with facts in it, as tjats mediæval, too.

How it ever got on the best seller lists, I'm sure I dont know. Those people were clearly reading a different story than the one I read. Or the one Eco thought he was writing, afaik.

I guess the movie gave a reasonable impression of the book that made it to the bestseller lists, even, or especially, when it didnt match the book.

If you don't take as a picture of the real life in the Middle Ages* it's a fairly good novel and I think Eco knew pretty damn well what was needed to create a best-seller (it's supposed to be sort of his job after all).

* Someone online wrote a comment to the effect that Eco described the conflict between spiritual and conventual Franciscan trends like it was the political infighting between leftist groups in Italian universities in the late sixties/early seventies. I don't know enough to say whether this is true, but I suppose it makes sense.
 
I'll leave Eco alone except to say that I enjoyed Baudolino and Foucault's Pendulum, I was underwhelmed by The Name of the Rose, and I haven't read Prague Cemetery. Also, the origin of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion is a major plot point in Foucault's Pendulum, so it's plainly a topic that interests him.

Jonathan, what's been going on in Hispaniola and Central America at this time?

Have plans for a canal been draw up yet?

Haiti is somewhat more stable than OTL due to the remaining French debt being forgiven and investment coming in from South Carolina. I haven't really worked out Central America, although a canal is at least being talked about.

While it might develop, I very much doubt it'd become popular or widespread, IOTL Arab Nationalism primarily came about initially because of the way the Ottoman Empire developed in the 1880-1916 period

The Arabs don't have the same grievances that they had during 1880-1916 in OTL, but they have different ones - systemic corruption, high taxes, inadequate political representation and lack of national investment. Forerunners of Arab nationalism existed well before 1880 - for instance, the Arab revolt of 1834 - and Arab identity provides common ground to organize against those grievances. Arab nationalism will take a different course from OTL, and it may be focused on equitable treatment within the empire rather than independence, but it will exist.

Jonathan, I know this sounds a bit nitpick-y, but will post-colonial Irian Jaya (West Papua) be joined with with German New Guinea ITTL? Also, are there any plans for the Moluccas (the south of which declared independence as a republic in 1950) ?

I've also just found out that the last sultan of Ternate instigated a rebellion in 1896 in OTL. What would the outcome be in this timeline, in your opinion?

West Papua/Irian Jaya is notionally Dutch, although control was very loose at this stage.

I hadn't really thought much about Ternate. Given that some of the other Indonesian princely states rebelled during the Great War in TTL, it's reasonable that the Sultan of Ternate might join them, and if so, he'd probably get a similar deal (i.e., the equivalent of what the larger Indian princely states got from Britain).

Is Sun Yat-sen butterflied in this timeline? He was pretty much a walking butterfly-maker all round the Asia-Pacific from birth.

I don't think he exists. He was a younger son, and I believe his parents were born before the POD, but his father traveled a good deal as a young man, and even modest changes in Chinese history might lead to him marrying someone else.

There might be others who fill Sun's role as a reformer, though.

Did Lincoln (surviving the ACW) ever get to visit Jerusalem?

Yes, he went there in the 1870s, and died in 1879 a few years after coming home.

Longstreet on the railway? Seems plausible given his record.

In OTL, he was one of the few prominent Confederates who not only became a Republican but stayed one after the Redeemers took over. He was ostracized by many of his fellow Confederate veterans for doing so.

He really was the American minister to the Ottoman Empire in 1880-81; in TTL, he held the office longer, picked up some ideas there, and added to them as an officer in an Anglo-Omani regiment during the Great War. Maybe it's a bit of a stretch, but he was something of a seeker in his later years, and I don't think it's impossible.

Just stepping into pedant's corner to point out that Elgar was lower middle class.

Fair enough, although that still might get him commissioned as a junior officer if he decides to answer the bell.

Regarding ex Confederates - what happened after the Civil War to Lee, Jackson and Forrest. Assuming they survived that is.

Forrest in TTL might be particularly interesting considering his changing views in OTL.

Forrest led guerrilla resistance in Alabama and Mississippi, and was killed in battle in 1866, so he never got the chance to change his views.

I haven't said much about Lee or Jackson except to mention that Lee was there at the final Confederate surrender. I'd guess that he retired much as in OTL. If Jackson survived the war, I could see him becoming a populist given his background; maybe he'd undergo a change of views similar to Forrest's in OTL, but he also might not.
 
Just finished reading the portions about southern Africa. Am I right to conclude there's a more liberal element in the Afrikaner society than in OTL, despite the conservative opposition? It seems quite plausible to me, after all in OTL there were also a lot of political differences within Afrikaner society.
 
I can't wait to see the start of the twentieth century, its a whole new ball game!
You did offhandedly mention what occuring in the white dominions, but when are we going to see that?
I'm curious as to see if there was any backlash against French in Canada, or what the repurcussions in Ireland will be.
I know you did mention large portions of South America, but left the Andean Nations and Mesoamerica relatively untouched. How have the new ideologies and butterfly affects changed the other regions of the Americas (Chile, the Andes, Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, US outside S.C., and Canada)?
I don't think the British Empire will remain stable much longer but we shall see.
Is there a post were you described Australasia, because I've only heard haresay on it to date.
Please keep up the amazing work that is this TL
 
You know, I was thinking and so far you've actually done stuff with or atleast mentioned what's going on in all of my favourite countries, which is itself impressive as while I do like several of the major countries, half of them are smaller ones like Slovenia and Uruguay.

Also, keep up the good work, as this is by far among the Top 3 Timelines I've ever read and to be quite honest is probably going to be #1.
 

Hnau

Banned
I really like the idea of Harriet Tubman running a different kind of underground railroad to the southern states. :) What I want to know is, because we've got the South Carolina freedmen mobilizing blacks throughout the Deep South, did the Exoduster movement involve more freedmen moving to the west and has the First Great Migration to the northern cities started earlier and with more numbers? What does black migration from the southern states look like compared with OTL?
 
Just finished reading the portions about southern Africa. Am I right to conclude there's a more liberal element in the Afrikaner society than in OTL, despite the conservative opposition?

After a fashion. The Afrikaners are still a deeply religious and conservative rural society. In TTL, though, some of them, impelled by political necessity, have rethought their religious views on the issue of race relations, and have discovered that they've got a lot in common politically with the Cape Coloureds and (to a lesser extent) the Cape Malays. Also, many of them have fought in Europe and other parts of Africa during the Great War, and the experience has broadened their horizons. The combination of the two has given the more liberal element in their society (which did exist in OTL) somewhat more influence than it would otherwise have had.

Don't get me wrong, though - there are a lot of Boers who don't like the alliances the Afrikaner Bond has made, and the hard-line party that split off from the Bond during the early 1890s gets a lot of votes.

You did offhandedly mention what occuring in the white dominions, but when are we going to see that?
I'm curious as to see if there was any backlash against French in Canada, or what the repurcussions in Ireland will be.

I know you did mention large portions of South America, but left the Andean Nations and Mesoamerica relatively untouched. How have the new ideologies and butterfly affects changed the other regions of the Americas (Chile, the Andes, Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, US outside S.C., and Canada)?

You'll hear more about the white dominions during the 1900-10 and 1910-20 cycles, as their relationship with the empire develops. Ireland will be center stage at times; the relationship between the Anglo-Canadians and French-Canadians will be more offstage, although I'll mention it as it affects imperial politics.

The Andean nations... hmmm. Bolivia is stronger in TTL - it still has a coastline and it kept the rubber-rich Acre region - but it's very class-ridden. Right now the main political fault line is between criollos and mestizos; as in OTL, the indigenous people are late in developing a political consciousness. Chile is a maritime/mining country that has fared somewhat worse in its conflicts with Bolivia and the Mapuche but has prospered during the war due to the nitrate trade. Peru and Ecuador are similar to what they were in OTL.

At this point Japanese and Arab immigrants are starting to reach the Andes and Chile, though, and there's also Balkan and Central European immigration to Chile as in OTL, all of which will shake up the social order. I'll visit them during the twentieth century although I can't say exactly when.

I've mentioned American politics in a few updates, most recently here and here, (see also part 1 and part 2 of the United States just prior to the war) and will probably do so again in the 1910-20 cycle (I visit the United States every 20 years or so unless something important to the story is happening there).

Is there a post were you described Australasia, because I've only heard haresay on it to date.

I haven't said a great deal about it but it's described in footnote 3 to this update.

You know, I was thinking and so far you've actually done stuff with or atleast mentioned what's going on in all of my favourite countries, which is itself impressive as while I do like several of the major countries, half of them are smaller ones like Slovenia and Uruguay.

The small countries where cultures meet are often the most interesting. I'm the anti-Eurofed, I guess. :p

I really like the idea of Harriet Tubman running a different kind of underground railroad to the southern states. :) What I want to know is, because we've got the South Carolina freedmen mobilizing blacks throughout the Deep South, did the Exoduster movement involve more freedmen moving to the west and has the First Great Migration to the northern cities started earlier and with more numbers? What does black migration from the southern states look like compared with OTL?

Harriet Tubman isn't the only one who runs the new underground railroad - she got it organized, but many of the Freedmen's Circles are involved, and it's an open secret that the South Carolina government is in it up to its ears.

There's been a good deal of migration from the Jim Crow states - basically, all the South except SC, NC, MS and to some extent Texas - and most of the migrants have gone to the west or the industrial north, although some have moved to Mississippi or the Carolinas. The African-American communities in Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma exist much as in OTL, and migration to the northern cities is picking up steam about now.

We haven't heard the last from Miss Harriet, BTW. She'll have one more role to play at the very end, in the early 1920s.

Same here! I can't wait to see what's happening in Africa! :D

You shouldn't have to wait much longer - I'm just about done with this week's deadline convergence, and hope to have the update posted sometime tomorrow.

BTW, thanks for completing the list of updates on the wiki.
 

Deleted member 67076

How have the new ideologies and butterfly affects changed the other regions of the Americas (Chile, the Andes, Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, US outside S.C., and Canada)?
I'm quite interested in hearing what has happened in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Mexico.
 
I am personally quite far from Eco's approach scientifically, and I found some things he wrote extremely questionable, while others are good and enjoyable; but my warning was about not taking uncritically his narrative work as historically accurate ( have "The Name of the Rose" in mind; I have not read "The Cemetery of Prague" indeed).

EDIT: I am probably not very objective about him. Some recent remarks of his on Italian press have really upset me, but this should not detract from the good he did in his career.

Well, I still yet to read his other works. The only one I've read, and it's quite a bit confusing to read, is Foucault's Pendulum. :)
 
Ismet Yücel, Belloism: The History of an Idea (Stamboul: Tulip Press, 2001)

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… With its lands devastated and a sixth of its population dead in the war, Bornu faced an immense task of reconstruction. Villages throughout the empire had been depopulated and their people scattered so thoroughly that it was impossible to return them to their homes. Rather than try to recreate lost communities, the state took the communities that had formed during the war – companies of soldiers, labor battalions, encampments of refugees – and sent them off to restore the land to use and build the villages anew.

The new settlements were founded on wartime camaraderie, and drew inspiration from the original Belloist communes of the 1840s and 50s: frontier villages that worked, prayed and taught together and were driven by a will to improve the world. They were a return to roots. The state Belloism that prevailed in the capital [1] had become ossified; its trappings had overwhelmed the substance, and it had become supremely political while pretending that there was no such thing as politics. Some of its traits, such as consensual decision-making and weekly communal labor, had taken root in urban society, but its imamate had also become an instrument of the state, and their rulings were dictated by the Sultan’s priorities and by political expediency. It was this that the settlers rejected, returning to the purer Belloism that the state Belloists had driven into exile.

In one way, the settlers realized that it was impossible to return to the founding days: it was no longer practical for a village to exist independently of the state. The world had become interconnected and dependent on foreign trade, and communities of people could not be divorced from the larger communities of provinces and nations. So while the people of the new villages rejected any attempt to politicize their faith, holding strictly to Bello’s teaching that the search for religious truth could never be free if it became enmeshed with politics, they recognized a secular sphere in which they could act as citizens of the state. They paid taxes, served in the organized militia, and participated in the multiple layers of councils that debated issues of law and policy.

Even in this secular realm, though, they retained the Belloist teaching ethic: just as they would study divine law together and teach it to their neighbors, they would also search for and teach the ideal way of civic life. This would be felt most strongly in the villages near the border, in which, consistent with early Belloist tradition, the people of other nations were invited to visit and study. The Tuareg tribes of the Kingdom of the Arabs came to them for judgment as they did to the Toucouleur, and some of the oasis settlements began to adopt Belloist ways. So did people from Gobir and, most critically, Adamawa, where the Labor Belloism of the cities was now joined by a communal Belloism of the villages…

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Ahmadu Odubogun, Faith and Ferment: The Sahel and Sudan in the Nineteenth Century (Ibadan Univ. Press 2005)

… In 1897, the Abacarist Party of Ilorin found itself, for the first time in a quarter-century, without a leader from the main branch of the Abacar family. Many had expected Usman Abacar to return as prime minister, but instead, after accepting a knighthood from Queen Victoria, he stayed in London to act as Ilorin’s unofficial ambassador and promote his projects of a Niger Valley confederation and a federal British Empire. His wife and daughter joined him at Ilorin House, and his son Paulo the Younger was still in East Africa fulfilling his British and Omani diplomatic commissions.

Several other descendants of Paulo the Elder and Aisha lived in Ilorin, but all of them were professionals or businessmen with no interest in political office. Muhammadu Abacar, who would play such an infamous role in the events of the 1910s and 1920s, was still an obscure industrialist in Jebba; his cousin Umaru, who would one day be numbered among his opponents, was a back-bench rural deputy with no pretensions of leadership. The families of Paulo the Elder’s other wives were mostly in Sokoto and Adamawa, and although several were active in the labor movements of those countries, they had become divorced from the politics of Ilorin.

In the absence of an Abacar, the party, and the country, reverted to the collective leadership that had existed in the 1850s and 60s. The postwar cabinet, made up of ten Abacarist ministers and two independents, shared executive power much as Paulo the Elder had once envisioned. But the Malê founder would likely not have been pleased with this government, because the Abacarists had lost their revolutionary roots and become a comfortable establishment party. The party platform still supported social welfare and workers’ rights, and the postwar government was capable of occasional progressive legislation (such as the reduction of the working day from ten hours to nine, enacted to reduce unemployment among returning veterans), but wartime industrial policy and cooperation between factory owners and the government had increased the industrialists’ influence. More and more, the party was dominated by the commercial elites that had been in the opposition a decade before, and since Ilorin’s history of protective labor legislation had preempted the growth of a militant labor movement like those in Sokoto and Adamawa, the industrial workers were slow to organize against them.

By 1899, the ruling party was unofficially divided into three factions. The minority True Abacarists wanted to return to their revolutionary roots and to the doctrines of Paulo the Elder’s Thawra [2], and to restore participatory institutions such as the assembly-field. Opposing them were the industrialists and their allies who favored a more conservative economic policy and professional government. The majority still preferred the status quo, but they had no clear leader or ideological program, and at century’s end they were clearly losing ground…

… The end of the wartime contracts hit West African industry hard. War loans and investment had enabled Malê factories to modernize to the point of being competitive with European imports, but had left them heavily indebted and, in many cases, partly British-owned. A substantial part of the wartime profit had been expatriated, and with the end of the fighting, many of the British partners withdrew their investments. Those who had not put money away during the fat years lacked the resources to retool for consumer production, and with easy wartime credit no longer available, were hard pressed to borrow additional capital. Those factories owned by workers’ cooperatives were somewhat better off, because most of their debt was owed to the African Labor Bank [3] and thus subject to deferral, but the bank itself barely stayed solvent and survived only through severe self-taxation by the member unions.

The result was an economic restructuring much like what had occurred in the 1870s. About 15 percent of the industries in Ilorin went bankrupt, and a third of those in Adamawa or Sokoto; some were bought at bargain prices by those British companies still interested in West African investments, and others were bought and shuttered by their local competitors. A few were bought out by their workers, but the cash-strapped Labor Bank was unable to finance many such purchases. Unemployment rose and wages declined, feeding the competition between industrialists and workers for government funds and national priorities. In Ilorin, public investment was able to cushion the blow somewhat, but the other successor states were in deep recession and the labor brotherhoods’ mutual aid systems were strained to the limit.

But even as the dislocation worked itself out, the first signs of a turnaround were appearing. The problems of debt and foreign ownership meant that the postwar boom came slower to Africa than to Europe, but by 1899 the factories that had saved their wartime profits for a rainy day were again turning out consumer products. The automotive industry led the way, fueled by the sale of army surplus motor wagons. Ironically, the industrialists had opposed these sales out of fear that they would depress prices; instead, they stimulated demand for more. The workhorse wagon known as the Efon, or water buffalo, was already attaining iconic status, and demand for it was inducing smallholders to form cooperatives similar to those that existed in the urban industries…

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… During the war, democratization had begun to spread from Ilorin to the rest of the Oyo Confederation with the support of the imamate and the growing urban working class. Once the spiritual center of Ile-Ife instituted an elected legislature and a constitution, the other Yoruba city-states followed quickly; Yoruba monarchy had never been absolute and had always had indirect forms of popular participation, so formal elections weren’t that great a leap. These legislatures had limited powers and many were elected indirectly or via restricted suffrage, but they were a foundation as similar bodies had been in Europe.

The Dahomey and Asante protectorates were less hospitable to participatory government. Their kings were absolute, having become so with British encouragement, and they lacked the industrial development or the religious-ideological base that the Yoruba had. Both kings, with the aid of sympathetic British residents, cracked down harshly on the returning veterans who demanded reforms similar to those that their Yoruba and Malê comrades enjoyed. But as the twentieth century would prove, the new ideas could not be suppressed so easily…

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Grand Duchess, Nigist and Kandake Anastasia Romanova, My Four Kingdoms (New Moscow: Icon Press, 1961)

… My sisters hated Eritrea. They called it hot and squalid, complained that it was socially dead and that the people were common. From the time we landed, they talked of little other than which German or Italian prince they would marry to take them away from Africa.

My father hated Eritrea too; for him, it was a prison and a place of exile, a reminder of how far he had fallen. He hated it all the more when a delegation of officers and members of the governor’s staff made clear to him that it was beneath the dignity of the Tsar of All the Russias to act as governor of Eritrea. Their words were deferential, but he knew exactly what they meant: that he would reign in Asmara, but he would not be allowed to rule. Not only was he now a vassal of the Ethiopian emperor, but he would have no power in what remained of his kingdom.

I was, at first, inclined to agree with them. New Moscow, where we landed, was a port, and like all ports, it was dirty and disreputable. The air hung heavy over the docklands and dreary concrete buildings stretched away to the horizon, and I wondered to what circle of hell I had been banished. But at the end of the road was Asmara, set among mountains, with houses in the Russian style and streets lined by jacarandas. At that moment I knew that I had come home.

In Asmara there were two courts: my father’s, in which he and the other exiled nobles brooded over their downfall, and the governor’s, where the business of the province was done and where the talk was of ideas and the affairs of the day. I was not allowed to go to the governor’s house, but of course I took every chance to do so, and there was never any lack of young officers – Russians posted before the war and Eritreans who had fought with Colonel Mikoyan – who competed to escort me.

It was at the governor’s parties that I began to hear of Ethiopia, an old friend to us but a mystery all the same. It was a land of railroads and modern armies, but also one of feudal lords and castles. Colonel Mikoyan, now a general in Emperor Menelik’s service and the commander of the Gondar military academy, visited Asmara and told me stories of the island monasteries on Lake Tana and pilgrimages to Lalibela, and the Eritrean officers spoke of ancient wars and betrayals. The stories recalled the Russia of another time – or, I realized, the Russia of my father’s mind: a place modern but still stubbornly ancient.

In the spring of 1899, I would meet the Ethiopian emperor for myself. That year Menelik visited Asmara, bringing with him a host of bureaucrats and engineers to plan the extension of the railroad to the sea. And he also brought his son, the prince Tewodros, who was studying with the engineers and who was two years older than me…

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Aishwarya Trivedi, East Africa Under the Omani Raj (Zanzibar Univ. Press, 2007)

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… The Omani Empire came out of the war with a vast new “trusteeship” in the eastern Congo, a single army, and a sultan who had been acclaimed by, or at least with the acquiescence of, most of the realm’s elites. On paper, it was stronger and more united than ever before. But on the ground, weaknesses remained: it was heavily in debt to Great Britain; the interior was controlled by a patchwork of settlers, feudalists and chieftains; and the areas ruled by absentee landlords, including nearly all of the Congo trusteeship, had fallen into de facto British administration.

With two Indian regiments still on his soil and several millions of pounds owing to Whitehall, Tippu Tip could not challenge Britain directly, nor did he want such a confrontation. He chose a more subtle approach instead, devoting his first years in office to putting the empire’s administration on a sound footing and strengthening its control of the provinces. His approach to this problem was threefold: promulgating a constitution, restructuring the nobility and creating a modern civil service.

The constitution, announced in September 1897, was entirely the work of Tippu Tip and his close advisors. It would make Oman unique among constitutional monarchies in that there was no mechanism for popular participation in government; although Tippu Tip believed strongly in justice between ruler and ruled, he was not a democrat. The assembly of nobles that elected him would serve as a permanent parliament, but there was no elected lower house, and it would be up to each provincial feudalist whether to allow elections in his territory. The people were protected instead by a bill of rights which included freedom of speech and assembly as well as protection from arbitrary arrest or punishment, and by the right to petition the sultan directly. In this, Tippu Tip took a leaf from the British colonial handbook, setting himself up as mediator and court of last resort to which the people could take their grievances against local governors or even British district officers.

The charter also regularized the jumble of nobility that had grown up under the previous sultans, dividing it into three classes: princes, landed nobles and landless nobles. Princes, who were named to that rank by the sultan and who could be stricken from it by him, were eligible for the succession, and the parliament would choose the new sultan from among them when the title became vacant. Sons of the sultan were not guaranteed the title of prince; Tippu Tip granted that title to the members of the old royal family who accepted his rule, but denied it to the others. He also filled the ranks of the princes with his prominent supporters, including the Yao king, the leader of the Carlsenist settlers in the Rift Valley and several Swahili nobles who were allied with his family.

The lesser nobles who held land were confirmed in their titles, but with a catch: they were required to administer their estates and live on them at least nine months a year. Those who failed to do so would remain noble but would be stripped of their lands, and the sultan would name others to succeed to their titles. They would also lose their seats in parliament; unlike landed nobles, landless ones did not hold permanent seats but instead selected a hundred of their number to represent them. The constitution did, however, allow absentee nobles to sell their titles, and the years 1898 and 1899 saw a flurry of such sales as they found replacements who were willing to be hands-on rulers, sometimes with terms of sale that allowed them to retain their parliamentary seats as the new title-holder’s proxy. In a few cases, the people of a feudal province were able to buy out their landlord and hold his title collectively; these “free provinces” would assume disproportionate political importance in the twentieth century.

Tippu Tip also moved to create a nobility for the Congolese trusteeship territory. He recognized the inevitable by granting noble rank to British district officers, and also raised money for the treasury by selling estates to Swahili and foreign buyers, but also doled out titles liberally to African headmen. This would tie the eastern Congolese into the political system, give them some political leverage against the British, Arab and Indian nobles, and allow them in many cases to manage the collection of in-kind taxes. It was an exploitative system, but compared with the nearly two decades of hell on earth that had just passed, it was mild enough that most Congolese acquiesced for the time being.

The third and final part of Tippu Tip’s reforms would also take a leaf from the British book. In 1899, he pushed a law through parliament establishing a civil service chosen by competitive examination. Along with this, he founded four regional academies – one in Zanzibar, two in the African interior and one in Muscat – to train candidates for the examinations, and instituted a system of scholarships to send promising children to these schools. In the manner of prewar Russia, those who achieved high rank in the civil service would be recognized as non-landed nobles. And the service would include, among other things, a regular system of imperial courts with jurisdiction over the interior…

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Maria Kalonji, Tippu’s Peace, Blanco’s War: The Great Lakes and Congo After the War (Bakwanga: Makelela, 2009)

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… With the peace of Washington, twenty years of warfare in the Great Lakes and eastern Congo yielded to a pax Omanica. The non-state peoples were under Anglo-Omani trusteeship, and the emerging peasant-herder commonwealths west of the lakes had become internally self-governing Omani protectorates in order to avoid return to international rule. Ankole, with its spiritual ties to the Carlsenists, and Burundi, which increasingly depended on the Omani port of Kigoma as its commercial lifeline, were also under strong Omani influence. Even Rwanda and Bunyoro, which maintained more independence, were constrained by the overwhelming strength of the Omani army and by Tippu Tip’s promise to punish any nation that broke the peace, and after two decades of war most of their people were happy enough to be constrained.

But Tippu’s peace didn’t protect the Great Lakes republics from internal conflict, and he could not abolish religious and political strife. Buganda after the Eight Kings’ War had largely resolved this problem through broad religious tolerance, and in Ankole, Bunyoro and Burundi, the new order was based on the majority faith and enjoyed widespread popular acceptance. In Samuel the Lamanite’s kingdom, on the other hand, the ruling faith was still a minority, and the violence and expulsions of the commonwealth’s early days still cast a shadow. And in Rwanda, under an inexperienced prophetic leader from a minority religion, the old elites constantly threatened to reassert themselves.

Samuel had sought to strengthen his position during the war by gathering in persecuted Mormons from the western Congo, and now he reached out further by sending an embassy to Salt Lake City. The Mormon church had heard refugees’ tales of Samuel’s kingdom but had discounted them; now, with the stories confirmed, it dispatched a mission to Africa to investigate. This was all Samuel had hoped for, but what he hadn’t realized was that the church leadership would view his doctrines as heretical and his prophetic claims as unauthorized. The resulting exchange between Samuel and Salt Lake City would indeed strengthen his nation, but not in quite the way he had anticipated…

… In Rwanda, the prophet Mélisande had assumed a role that was as much itinerant preacher and judge as ruler, spending much of the year wandering the kingdom and hearing appeals directly from the people. This method had its strengths – it ensured that local abuses could not remain hidden, and that the common people would look directly to her for guidance – but it also reduced her ability to concentrate her power and meant that her writ extended only as far as her moral authority.

She was not unaware of these weaknesses, and realized that she was unlikely to rule forever – a prospect that she greeted with equanimity given her deep ambivalence about wielding power. Like Samuel, she worked to strengthen the new order, but she did so by creating an ideology that would outlast her rather than trying to perpetuate her own authority. All the peasant-herder commonwealths were knit together by religion, but Rwanda would be the only one to develop an explicitly political theology rather than trusting its leaders to rule according to their personal faith and conscience.

Mélisande’s theology, announced in a series of prophetic messages during meetings of the general council, reflected the distrust of power brought on by her childhood as a rubber-company serf and wartime refugee, and was as close as it is possible to come to Islamic anarchism. It held that there should be no ruler but God, and that while divine law could not be questioned, everyone was responsible for its administration. Its guiding principle was that “the rightly guided need no king:” that if everyone kept and enforced the law, the result would be a society of mutual aid and harmony. It also took Abacarist conceptions of freedom, of which Mélisande was aware, and interpreted them even more radically than Abacar had, to hold that the exercise of arbitrary power over others – whether by noble over commoner, master over serf, or, most controversially, man over woman – was the greatest sin.

In practice, such a commonwealth would never be more than an ideal, and Rwanda would function through peasant-herder-military collectives and religious judges much like the other Great Lakes states. But this prophetic doctrine would fulfill another purpose: it would instill a deep distrust of claims to political power, and would ensure that any move by old elites – or new ones – to seize control would meet with overwhelming opposition…

… In the west, where Tippu Tip’s writ did not run, peace was longer in coming. The region north of the Congo River came under efficiently exploitative German trusteeship, while parts of the south came under inefficiently exploitative Portuguese control; both were far milder than the violently-enforced serfdom that had prevailed under the concessionaires, but both were resisted by the warlords and rebels that had entrenched themselves during the war. And in the rump international zone, Ramón Blanco ruled as governor-general in the name of a court that had not yet been constituted, and faced a daunting task in bringing to heel African rebels and renegade rubber barons alike.

But Blanco proved equal to this task; he had been a competent and judicious governor in Bas-Congo, and brought both qualities to bear in pacifying his new realm. He was an autocratic ruler and was not squeamish about using force, but never did so as a first resort, preferring to use diplomacy and a program of economic sticks and carrots. Also, uncharacteristically for Congolese governors, he thought of the Congolese as human beings first rather than sources of wealth, and offered genuine protection against European warlords and concessionaire mercenaries.

In this campaign, Blanco was quick to recognize and make use of the Luba trade network, which extended through much of the central Congo and connected to that of the Coaster peoples, and recruited the Luba as his diplomatic and commercial agents. The slow re-establishment of order in the international zone would formalize the Luba’s role as the Congo’s pre-eminent mercantile people, and would be the gateway for the Coasters to establish themselves as frontier merchants in the interior…

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Anita van der Merwe, The Trekkers’ Land (Cape Town: New Holland, 2003)

… Unlike Australasia, the southern African customs union [4] made no dramatic moves toward unity during the Great War. The gulf between dominions and colonies, small states and large, white and nonwhite, Englishmen and Boers, and the members that were part of the British Empire and those outside it, was still too great to bridge. But the war had forged strong ties between the union’s leaders, and the soldiers who had gone to fight in West Africa and Europe returned with broader horizons and a changed view of their place in the world. Political unity was still out of the question, but there was support on all sides for deepening the connections between the member nations.

In 1898, Cape Colony premier John Merriman proposed a reform package that included a raft of new institutions: uniform commercial law, a court of arbitration to resolve disputes between merchants from different colonies, a common registry of land ownership and mining claims, and most controversially of all, merger of the members’ armed forces under a single command. That year’s meeting of the union board was a particularly contentious one, with both Namaland and the Orange Free State threatening to withdraw if the military reforms were put through. In the end, Merriman was forced to remove that provision in order to obtain a consensus on the rest, and the treaty voted out of committee was considerably weaker than he had wanted.

The treaty still had to be ratified by the individual members, and the debate over it would occupy regional politics for the next two years. In the colonies and protectorates, ratification was a simple matter: the governors signed the treaty on their wards’ behalf, sometimes after consultation with local leaders and other times not. Elsewhere, however, the process was a more complicated one. Both the Cape and the Orange Free State had elections due in early 1900, and in both, the treaty question would lay bare the fault lines between the ultra-conservative, isolationist wing of the Afrikaner Bond on the one hand, and its more outward-looking wing and their allies among the Coloureds and Cape Malays on the other. This would also be the election that launched the political career of Jan Pieter Smuts…

… As the Orange Free State drifted into Britain’s orbit, the South African Republic became closer to Portugal. It had remained neutral in the war and its mining industry had prospered, but it still faced demographic pressure from immigrants to its diamond and gold fields, and its burghers were more afraid than ever that they would be overwhelmed. The government of Paul Kruger was aware of the deal that Marius Fourie’s trekkers had made with the Portuguese in Mutapa, and hoped that an alliance with Portugal would enable it to resist British demands to give political rights to the uitlander miners.

Neither Merriman nor the Bond, however, had given up on bringing the South African Republic into the customs union. For Merriman, the Transvaal was necessary to complete the regional grouping and make it truly viable. For the Bond – or at least for that part of it that favored the union in the first place – the South African Republic would add to the Boers’ weight within the union and dilute English influence. Their overtures to Kruger as the century ended were conciliatory and aggressive at the same time…

_______

[1] See post 553.

[2] See post 139.

[3] See post 1856.

[4] See post 1206.
 
Really love the return to Africa, though it's too bad the abacarists have gone through the process every longstanding major party in a democracy does.
 
Great post, as usual.

Bornu: Belloism is rediscovering its (relatively) revolutionary roots. I find it kind of weird that a kingdom with a Tuareg majority is still called Kingdom of the Arabs, though. The differences between the Algerians living on the coast under French rule and the Tuaregs living in the interior as a semi-independent state are already noticeable and will only get more noticeable...

Ilorin: Unlike Belloism, Abacarism seems doomed. One of Paulo's descendants is an infamous industrialist, the other members of the Abacar family don't care about politics, and except for the True Abacarists, the Abacarist Party is now a centre-left party. However, it seems that Ilorin, along with the other states of the Confederation, could become a first world country by ATL 2013 - unless this timeline's AIDS fucks things up and the region becomes a less arid Botswana or Namibia instead.

Eritrea: Holy shit. Anastasia as Empress of Ethiopia? If this means what I think it means, Eritrea will become little more than an Ethiopian province by 1961. But... Anastasia's book is titled "My Four Kingdoms": The first one's Russia, the second's Eritrea, the third's Ethiopia, and... the fourth?

Oman: I like what Tippu Tip has done, especially giving princely titles to loyal nobles without giving a fuck about the nobles' race, and establishing a mandarin caste based on merit - at least in theory. The Omani domains in Africa could become as Omani as Senegal is French. The "free provinces" remind me of something someone said somewhere on this site: making the people equal not by abolishing nobility, but by making everyone a nobleman. :D

Rwanda: "...to hold that the exercise of arbitrary power over others – whether by noble over commoner, master over serf, or, most controversially, man over woman – was the greatest sin." If Mèlisande actually existed, she would be one of my favourite historical leaders. She will surely die an untimely death though.
 
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