Malê Rising

If I might intervene on this point, if you're thinking of marrying Isabel with one of the Bonaparte princes, Louis-Napoléon's son Prince Napoléon is far too young for such a match, and all the other Bonaparte males are either a generation ahead or behind Isabel, and beyond that most of them would already be married by the time she was of marriageable age. So if Isabel were to still marry a French noble ITTL, it would have to be from the either the Bourbons or Orléans, and would likely be Gaston d'Orléans as IOTL. So from the view of family-noble affairs, there would be little reason for Louis-Napoléon to support Brazil.

I wasn't planning for her to aim quite so high as a Bonaparte prince - Napoleon III would want better (read: European) marriages for them. I had some vague idea of marrying her into a minor French noble house with Bonapartist leanings, but on second thought, there weren't any of those, were there? Not to mention that marrying into a minor house would be beneath an imperial princess' station.

Hmmm - maybe she can marry a Catholic Austrian count from a collateral branch of the Habsburgs, or even a Spanish nobleman with family ties to Eugénie. Do you know any suitable candidates offhand? If not, I'll have to do some matchmaking when I get to that point in the story.

BTW, as a post-POD child, Dona Isabel won't be exactly the same person in this timeline that she is in OTL. She'll have the same name, and some of her personality features such as religiosity and abolitionism will be the same, but she'll be a year and a half older and considerably less retiring.

Besides which, Brazil was, or at least was perceived as, still nothing more than a break-away colony of a minor European state at this point.

Brazil in 1860 OTL was a country of eight million - equivalent to Mexico during the same period - was rich in natural resources, and was starting to draw significant European immigration. In this timeline, its population would be about a million less due to the loss of Pará and Piratini, but the other factors would still exist, and immigration may actually accelerate over OTL due to the slave-labor crisis. The European powers certainly wouldn't consider this Brazil an equal, but it might be valuable enough (as Mexico was) for one or another of them to meddle in local politics.

Also, as you noted, France and Britain had strategic interests in the Platine region which were aligned with Brazilian interests, so they'd probably want to prevent a Brazilian collapse and might intervene if there were a threat of one.

But that's rather missing my point. Its unlikely for there to be a "British-allied Argentina," as both France and Britain had a vested interest in the area. Its rather like saying Turkey was a British ally in the same time period, when it was France who provided the majority of the grunt-work in the Crimean War.

Granted, especially since both French and British interests tended to be opposed to Argentina. Upon further thought (and further research), I assume that this common interest will prevail through the 1860s and 70s, meaning that neither Brazil nor Argentina will become a pawn in a Franco-British imperial rivalry, although as noted above, France and Britain may want to prop up Brazil to prevent the Argentines from having unrivaled regional hegemony. By the 1880s and 90s, though, when the Argentine state has coalesced and when France and Britain are starting to develop an overarching imperial rivalry, their attitude toward Latin American regional politics may change.
 
Brazil in 1860 OTL was a country of eight million - equivalent to Mexico during the same period - was rich in natural resources, and was starting to draw significant European immigration. In this timeline, its population would be about a million less due to the loss of Pará and Piratini, but the other factors would still exist, and immigration may actually accelerate over OTL due to the slave-labor crisis. The European powers certainly wouldn't consider this Brazil an equal, but it might be valuable enough (as Mexico was) for one or another of them to meddle in local politics.

Brazil was indeed an important country. Especially as it had become the metropole of the Portuguese Empire, and had a monarchical government, Brazil was treated with a lot more respect by many Western European nations than other South American nations like Venezuela and Colombia. We might see a higher amount of Irish and German immigration to Brazil ITTL.

By the way, Jonathan, the last two updates were marvelous. I was banned when you posted them (I went fishing), but have read them now. You have an excellent and engaging writing style. Usually, I'm a bit off-put when timelines constantly change styles and sources, but you integrate it beautifully.

Cheers,
Ganesha
 
So having finished reading all the updates thus far (though next to none of the posts/discussions in between) I must say this is now only one of the best and most unique TL's I've read, but is definately now tied for my favourite.


Oh, and I hope you don't mind if I borrow your writing style of a mix of at the time story and modern snippets for my own future TLs.
 
Brazil was indeed an important country. Especially as it had become the metropole of the Portuguese Empire, and had a monarchical government, Brazil was treated with a lot more respect by many Western European nations than other South American nations like Venezuela and Colombia. We might see a higher amount of Irish and German immigration to Brazil ITTL.

At this point in the story, most of the Germans are in Piratini (the OTL states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina) and the established communities there will draw many German immigrants to Piratini rather than Brazil. However, Brazil is much bigger and richer than Piratini, and the industrialization of São Paulo state will draw German as well as Irish, Jewish, Slavic and Balkan immigration. We may also see immigrants settling in Bahia, Minas Gerais and the northeast coastal states after... well, that would be telling.

By the way, Jonathan, the last two updates were marvelous. I was banned when you posted them (I went fishing), but have read them now. You have an excellent and engaging writing style. Usually, I'm a bit off-put when timelines constantly change styles and sources, but you integrate it beautifully.

Thanks! Does that include the poem, or should I stick to prose in the future? (You'll notice that the poem was written when Koité was 17. I'm not fool enough to think I can pass for a renowned ATL poet, but I think I can pull off a renowned poet when she was in high school. :))

Oh, and I hope you don't mind if I borrow your writing style of a mix of at the time story and modern snippets for my own future TLs.

I certainly don't mind, especially since that style isn't my invention - others have included modern snippets/interludes, and I'm also not the first to include literary excerpts (Gonzaga's late and lamented Madness and Greatness, for instance, includes lines from an ATL play). My innovation, such as it is, is to use the author bios to provide spoilers about the timeline's future, and I'm certainly planning to include more ATL literary selections than is common in alternate history, but I don't have a copyright on the style.

I'm eagerly waiting to see how French Senegal evolves with a charismatic spokesman like Diouf.

"Spokesman" is definitely the right word. Diouf has made a tactical decision to represent Senegal in Paris, where the levers of imperial power are located and where he can act as ambassador and lobbyist. But this means that, most of the time, he won't be in Senegal, and the actual governance of the colony will be done by others. He'll still be able to put his stamp on colonial policy and development, because his political party will be strongly represented in the communal councils, but other interest groups will also have power, and in time, other leaders of his party may grow independent of him. The Paris-appointed governors will also have a say, and depending on the issue and the governor's ideology, may either work with Diouf or oppose him. There will be many factors that contribute to the development of French West Africa, and some of them will (hopefully) be surprising.

Anyway, the next update will be this weekend as the butterfly event horizon spreads to East Africa and a labor movement begins to materialize in the Sahelian cities (not sure which one I'll get to first).
 
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Abdullahi Mukhtar, Before Our Sweat Dries: The Labor Movement in the Sokoto Successor States (Zaria: Alliance, 1988)


… By the end of the 1840s, the Sahel’s fledgling industrialization had begun to spread beyond the Sokoto Republic. In Adamawa, the establishment of a state-run military foundry at Yola had sparked the construction of other ironworks and bronze foundries by private entrepreneurs. The neutral cities of Zaria and Kaduna - the latter, especially, favored by its position on a river that was navigable most of the year - invested the riches gleaned from acting as middlemen into foundries and mills of their own, and continued to do so after becoming vassals of the weak Sultanate of Zamfara in 1852. Moreover, as glass, ceramics and furniture were added to the initial textile and ironworking industries, small factories began sprouting up in other towns. The Sokoto successors never experienced the sort of explosive industrial growth that Britain or the United States did during the early 19th century - that would have been impractical given the available infrastructure and capital - but the industries employed a significant fraction of the population, and by the 1850s, an urban working class existed alongside the traditional farmers, herders and artisanal craftsmen.

New ways of work and production inevitably brought disputes over wages and working conditions. In the metal works, which were owned by a small number of industrial barons, these clashes were particularly acute, but even the mills which began as craftsmen’s cooperatives quickly grew beyond their origin and were dominated by wage-earning employees. In the Republic, with neither the government nor the stakeholders themselves experienced in resolving this sort of dispute, their adjudication fell to the qadis, who attempted to adapt traditional Islamic labor law to new circumstances.

The qadis’ rulings were, in many ways, surprisingly progressive for their time. Islamic law took a paternalistic, quasi-feudal view of employment as a relationship of mutual obligation. According to hadith, a worker must be paid “before his sweat dries,” meaning that wages must be paid regularly and not withheld, and those who stole wages from workers were regarded as enemies of God. Just as importantly, workers must be paid enough to provide for the basic needs of themselves and their families. The qadis differed somewhat as to which needs were “basic” - some held that adequate food, water and clothing were sufficient, others added medicine and education, and there were differences of opinion as to how much of each must be provided beyond the minimum for survival - but they could and did order factory owners to raise their workers’ wages. Ultimately, the consensus was that workers must be paid enough to be liable for zakat - in other words, that they should not be poor by the standards of their community, and that the nisab (the “poverty line” below which zakat need not be paid) was effectively a minimum wage. [1]

Employers are also enjoined by Islamic law not to make employees work beyond their capacity, which the qadis interpreted as forbidding working hours that were dangerous to health. Again, there were varying opinions as to where this threshold lay, but the majority held that work should not begin until half an hour after fajr and must cease half an hour before maghrib, which in an equatorial country meant a twelve-hour day. Finally, an employer’s paternal obligation to his workers was held to require provision of medical care to those who fell sick or were injured on the job, although this obligation did not extend to sickness unrelated to work or illness in the employee’s family.

Employees did, to be sure, have their own duties and restrictions. The qadis ruled that they must work loyally for their employers and that they could be fired if they failed to measure up to the employer’s standards and rules. Also, because the employer was the head of the factory “family,” employees were not permitted to combine against him any more than children were allowed to organize against their parents. Thus, while the qadis set a legal minimum wage and maximum working day, employees were not permitted to organize collectively for still higher pay or shorter hours, and their recourse in labor disputes was to the courts rather than to self-help.

Little of this changed with the Republic’s law code of 1846. Paulo Abacar, who empaneled the law revision commission, was broadly sympathetic to workers and shared the qadis’ paternalistic world-view, and the panel’s final product didn’t stray far from his vision. The qadis retained jurisdiction to fix wages and regulate working conditions, and the new code explicitly set the nisab as the minimum annual wage. In towns which had populist governments after the 1847 election, including Sokoto city and Ilorin, the qadis provided an effective check against employers’ power.

With the fall of the Republic, the successor states began to go their separate ways. In Ilorin and Jebba, which had a liberal Abacarist government, the 1846 code continued unchanged, the qadis were generous in adjusting the minimum wage to rising prices, and the cooperative ethic of the local industries, which viewed employees as part of the business, allowed most disputes to be settled through mediation. Conditions were far from a paradise by modern standards, but discontent was muted enough that, ironically, the labor movement got started much later than in the less progressive states to the north.

In Sokoto proper, Amilcar Said sought to reform the labor code to favor the large merchants and industrialists who had backed him, but with Abacarism still a strong political and religious force, there were limits to how far he could go within the bounds of acceptability. His legal reforms of 1854 retained the qadis’ wage and hour jurisdiction, and even permitted employers to discharge part of their zakat obligation by hiring displaced workers or paying more than the minimum wage. But the reformed code also placed the minimum wage in the discretion of the qadis rather than tying it to the nisab, and under Said’s regime, qadis were appointed centrally rather than being chosen by local councils. His judges were chosen for sympathy toward the industrialists, and they allowed wages to stagnate or even fall, and workers won fewer and fewer of their lawsuits against management.

Adamawa, which had never been part of the Republic and where the 1846 code had never held sway, developed along yet a third pattern. Although Abacarism was never a state ideology, the itinerant jaji teachers had spread it widely among the populace, and the ideals of Belloist communal living had also filtered down from Bornu. This meant, on the one hand, that industries tended to develop out of artisans’ cooperatives as in Ilorin rather than being owned by a few large shareholders, but on the other hand, that employees saw themselves as communal brotherhoods entitled to a say in setting wages and managing the enterprise. The government, which owned several foundries itself and considered the metalworking industries to be a key military resource, naturally sided with management, and the qadis’ rulings placed much more emphasis on the duties of employees than the reciprocal obligations of employers. While the Islamic judges did restrain the worst excesses and the cooperative ethic prevented others from occurring, labor relations in many shops became increasingly contentious by the mid-1850s.

Most contentious of all were Zaria and Kaduna. The industries of those cities were founded by small groups of wealthy merchants rather than cooperatives and, knowing they would have to compete with the already-established foundries of Sokoto and Ilorin, they sought to carve a place for themselves by using low-wage labor to produce cheaper goods. They were also in firm enough control of the city governments to shape the labor codes to their liking, and admitted neither a minimum wage nor any meaningful regulation of hours or working conditions. The late 19th-century class struggle would be at its grittiest here, especially after the 1856 collapse of the Gusau radical regime brought in many refugees with explicitly socialist interpretations of Islam.

The workers in the successor states faced daunting obstacles in organizing. Even in liberal Ilorin and Jebba, unions were illegal, and in the more conservative countries, labor leaders faced arrest or violence. Workers organized instead around daily prayers - no employer would dare deny his employees the opportunity to pray - and around the irmandades, or religious brotherhoods, that the Malê had brought with them from Bahia. Since religious activity was at least partially sheltered from official harassment, the brotherhoods and mosques doubled as unions and political meetinghouses, and labor activism took on a religious cast. “Before our sweat dries” became the rallying cry of the Sahelian workers, and strikers or labor protesters would often dress as if for prayer.

The first recorded strikes in the northern successors occurred in Kaduna in 1855, with the employees of several textile and furniture mills downing tools and occupying their shops. The city government called out the militia against them, but the militiamen were themselves workers or from working-class families, and many refused to fight. After several days of pitched battles, the employers agreed to a modest wage increase, but they were already recruiting their own security force in anticipation of the next strike. For decades to come, labor relations in Kaduna and Zaria would be a tearing battle between the workers’ brotherhoods and the industrialists’ private guards, with the city governments blatantly favoring the employers. In Adamawa and Sokoto, the struggle was somewhat more restrained, but only because the regular army was reliable enough in suppressing labor protests that private militias never formed.

By the 1860s, the industrial workers were beginning to see themselves as a class and to think in terms of ultimate goals rather than merely the conditions in their particular shop. For many, better wages and shorter hours were all they wanted, but others favored wider political reforms, such as the institution (or, in Sokoto, return) of universal suffrage, the legalization of unions and the formation of labor courts with worker representation. Some sought inspiration in Abacar’s Thawra, arguing that however flawed his radical conception of ijma (consensus) might be in running a state, it pointed to an ideal way to manage an industry, through councils in which a consensus of workers and employers might be reached. A few argued that employees’ labor should be treated as an investment in the company, and that in addition to their wages, workers should receive progressive amounts of equity ownership. The artisans’ cooperatives should, in effect, expand to workers’ cooperatives.

In the meantime, of course, a way had to be found for the proponents of all these views to work together. Thus it was that in 1864, delegates from workers’ brotherhoods throughout the Abacarist world made the difficult journey to Ilorin, meeting clandestinely in the first of many Labor Shuras

_____________

[1] For the basic principles of Islamic labor law, see Adnan A. Zulfiqar, “Religious Sanctification of Labor Law: Islamic Labor Principles and Model Provisions,” U. Pa. Journal of Employment Law 9(2): 421-44 (2007).
 
I have to say, I'm surprised by the lack of conflict between traditional artisans and the newer industrial workers. In essentially every other industrializing 19th century state the former were quite skilled, but could only produce so much, even when working in groups, though their work was of the highest quality; where as the latter were unskilled, often migratory, workers, who could out-produce cheaper, if less quality, goods and often swamp out the artisans. Indeed half of the conflict the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe were artisans versus proletarians, and there is an argument to be made for the continuation of slavery and serfdom depressing the labor market such in both America and Russia that neither truly industrialized until after those restraints had been removed.
 
Wonderful update, Jonathan. In response to your question, the poem was great as well. I like that it's not required that every update provide an "advance" in the story. It allows the timeline to flow much more freely and makes it far more interesting.

I have to say, I'm surprised by the lack of conflict between traditional artisans and the newer industrial workers. In essentially every other industrializing 19th century state the former were quite skilled, but could only produce so much, even when working in groups, though their work was of the highest quality; where as the latter were unskilled, often migratory, workers, who could out-produce cheaper, if less quality, goods and often swamp out the artisans. Indeed half of the conflict the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe were artisans versus proletarians, and there is an argument to be made for the continuation of slavery and serfdom depressing the labor market such in both America and Russia that neither truly industrialized until after those restraints had been removed.

I'm somewhat surprised at this as well. On the other hand, I don't think the small-scale industrialization that is happening is threatening too many pre-existing artisans. After all, West Africa imported many of their goods from Europe during this time period, and the finest artists (sculptors, painters) were employed by royals and other powerful figures, who cannot replace them with these industrial workers. In other words, this is an industrial revolution without many workers to displace, except for agricultural workers.

By the way, where is the extra food to support all these non-agricultural workers coming from? As I recall, the West African states and principalities, while wealthy, didn't really have a food surplus. Is their an agricultural revolution to mirror the industrial one and provide the needed sustenance? Or is grain and meat being shipped in from Europe or trans-Sahara?

Keep up the great work, Jonathan. It's obvious from every update how much work and devotion you pour into it. And the effort makes your writing and story shine!

Cheers,
Ganesha
 
I have to say, I'm surprised by the lack of conflict between traditional artisans and the newer industrial workers. In essentially every other industrializing 19th century state the former were quite skilled, but could only produce so much, even when working in groups, though their work was of the highest quality; where as the latter were unskilled, often migratory, workers, who could out-produce cheaper, if less quality, goods and often swamp out the artisans. Indeed half of the conflict the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe were artisans versus proletarians, and there is an argument to be made for the continuation of slavery and serfdom depressing the labor market such in both America and Russia that neither truly industrialized until after those restraints had been removed.

There has been some artisan-proletarian conflict - it's been mentioned that some blacksmiths were displaced by the military industries, and at one point the army had to be called out to protect the foundries from them.

You're right, though, that there has been much less of it than one might expect. The reason is that industrialization is proceeding more slowly and on a smaller scale than in Europe - as discussed here (post 123) and in succeeding comments, there were several financial and infrastructure factors that put severe limits on the speed of industrial growth. The foundries and mills in the Sahel are nowhere near as big as what you'd see in Manchester or Liverpool, and in many cases, the artisans themselves have been the source of local capital for their construction, so there's been more time for the artisans to catch up with social change.

Also, the government policy toward displaced artisans, at least under Abacar, was to employ them in the military industries where quality is important, or to help them set up as merchants, which was far from a perfect solution but reduced the conflict incrementally.

(How can these smaller-scale industries be competitive with European factories, you might ask? The answer is that they aren't. Their production costs are higher, and they're locally competitive only because the Sahel is geographically isolated and shipping costs add enough to the price of European products to make them more expensive than locally made ones. Things are starting to snowball by the late 1850s, so the economies of scale will get better, but they won't be fully caught up by the time the colonial era hits, and some local industries will have a much harder time dealing with colonialism than others. Also, faster growth will bring its own problems, including greater displacement of artisans, especially in the cities that are slow to industrialize.)

I'm somewhat surprised at this as well. On the other hand, I don't think the small-scale industrialization that is happening is threatening too many pre-existing artisans. After all, West Africa imported many of their goods from Europe during this time period, and the finest artists (sculptors, painters) were employed by royals and other powerful figures, who cannot replace them with these industrial workers. In other words, this is an industrial revolution without many workers to displace, except for agricultural workers.

There will definitely still be a market for artisanal goods among royals and notables, and there will also be (and already have been) periodic fads for African sculpture and art in Europe. Also, some of the industrial goods will make things that the Sahelians never had before, such as everyday cast-iron utensils, rather than things that were traditionally made by artisans. But as stated above, there will be some displacement, especially in industries like textiles and ceramics, and while the weavers in Ilorin and Jebba were able to get in on the ground floor as industrialists, those in villages and smaller towns who missed that opportunity will have a hard time.

By the way, where is the extra food to support all these non-agricultural workers coming from? As I recall, the West African states and principalities, while wealthy, didn't really have a food surplus. Is their an agricultural revolution to mirror the industrial one and provide the needed sustenance? Or is grain and meat being shipped in from Europe or trans-Sahara?

Part of it is that several hundred thousand people who were kidnapped into slavery in OTL are producing food in Africa in this timeline. Thus far, the number of farmers and herdsmen who have sought industrial work in the cities is less than those who would have been lost to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, so there are actually more food producers in the Sahelian states than at a comparable time in OTL. This will change as industrial growth accelerates, but that's years down the road, and in the meantime, there are people studying European and American farming methods and trying to adapt them to tropical conditions. Many of them, of course, won't be adaptable (as they weren't in OTL) but there will be some incremental improvements in irrigation, mulching and similar techniques - there will be earlier drip irrigation, and people will be paying attention to the acid-soil problem in an organized way.

Thanks again for the appreciation.
 
Just binged through this timeline, and it's great to see a TL where Africa isn't ignored or a sideshow (it's certainly been educational for me).

Anyway, as far as things I can comment on with any degree of authority go, it will be interesting to see if an earlier Liberal Empire leads to Bonaparteism being more firmly identified as a liberal brand, and the consequences of that in post-Franco-Prussian War France. Will butterflies have reached South Africa by the time of the Zulu War and the Prince Imperials OTL death?
 
Anyway, as far as things I can comment on with any degree of authority go, it will be interesting to see if an earlier Liberal Empire leads to Bonaparteism being more firmly identified as a liberal brand, and the consequences of that in post-Franco-Prussian War France.

Depends on how far the Second Empire's liberalism goes in this timeline - there's still a powerful clerical-conservative faction. It may also depend on how much the Prince Imperial is influenced by his mother - if he succeeds to the throne and rules as a liberal, then many of the republicans may throw in the towel and join the team, but if he's right-wing, the identification of Bonapartism and liberalism may erode.

Will butterflies have reached South Africa by the time of the Zulu War and the Prince Imperials OTL death?

I'm expecting the first major changes in southern Africa to come in the 1870s, after the diamonds are found and Britain starts to take a real interest in the interior. The conflicts with the Zulus and the Boers will play out differently - there may or may not be a Zulu War as we know it, and while there will be at least one war between Britain and the Boer republics, it won't follow the same path.
 
Depends on how far the Second Empire's liberalism goes in this timeline - there's still a powerful clerical-conservative faction. It may also depend on how much the Prince Imperial is influenced by his mother - if he succeeds to the throne and rules as a liberal, then many of the republicans may throw in the towel and join the team, but if he's right-wing, the identification of Bonapartism and liberalism may erode.

It would be fun to see the trend OTL amongst French monarchists (where the royal being backed is essentially a figurehead for a fringe political party more then an actual dynastic pretender) ends up being part of the general discourse.

I'm expecting the first major changes in southern Africa to come in the 1870s, after the diamonds are found and Britain starts to take a real interest in the interior. The conflicts with the Zulus and the Boers will play out differently - there may or may not be a Zulu War as we know it, and while there will be at least one war between Britain and the Boer republics, it won't follow the same path.

Ah, okay then. I was mainly wondering if the Prince Imperial might survive (his death pretty much reduced Bonapartism to the fringe), but no Zulu war would change the politics (and quite possibly the demographics) of the region substantially.
 
Also, I like the stuff about the labor movement. It looks like the Abacarist stuff is going to make the area more liberal regarding labor over time. It's nice to see somewhere industrializing without some of the excesses of most other early industrialized states.

I'm looking forward to the reaction of Britain to these greater workers' rights. Might we see labor unions in Britain and the Americas use the rights in West Africa as an inspiration, something along the lines of 'well, if some Africans can have 12-hour days why can't we?' If this becomes a problem, we might see British authorities trying to stamp out any pro-labor tendencies among the courts in West Africa, which may prove a catalyst for an independence movement.
 
...
Part of it is that several hundred thousand people who were kidnapped into slavery in OTL are producing food in Africa in this timeline. Thus far, the number of farmers and herdsmen who have sought industrial work in the cities is less than those who would have been lost to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, so there are actually more food producers in the Sahelian states than at a comparable time in OTL.
This is brilliant!
...
This will change as industrial growth accelerates, but that's years down the road, and in the meantime, there are people studying European and American farming methods and trying to adapt them to tropical conditions. Many of them, of course, won't be adaptable (as they weren't in OTL) but there will be some incremental improvements in irrigation, mulching and similar techniques - there will be earlier drip irrigation, and people will be paying attention to the acid-soil problem in an organized way.

Thanks again for the appreciation.
It's appreciated because you're doing it right.

I suspect that if it's locals doing the research and experimentation, rather than Europeans with motives ranging from "bringing improvement to the benighted heathen" to making a lot of money on some plantation cash crop, their successes are more likely to fit into the local customs and economy and thus spread wider and faster. And they are starting sooner.

So if they are starting to accumulate some experience of success with adapting European scientific thought on agriculture about when the uptake of the industrial labor market raises demand while biting into supply, there will be market pressures to reward the more successful at improving local crops OTL Europeans wouldn't be thinking of adapting at all. One dynamic I see at work is the industrial workers, finding the supply of traditional crops tightening, will start buying more imported goods from the Atlantic market, meaning generally more European-favored stuff, but of course also helping create an export market for Brazil and its split-off pieces. But the workers will also want to buy more local stuff if they can get it because it's more like the food they grew up with.

In turn some of these goods may find larger export markets they didn't OTL.

Another possible development is that the industrial workers eventually displaced by European imports will be hired up by foreign-owned factories paying them little but using their relatively developed industrial skills to produce competitive industrial goods for the world market; the capital is now coming from Europe (presumably mainly Britain) and the revenues mostly going there in the form of profits, but the workers, while ill-paid and proletarian, will be working in factories using a mix of cheap-labor alternatives to Euro-American methods and the latest technologies.

This is what Trotsky, I believe following Lenin, called "combined development" in Russia--the most advanced capitalist techniques are adapted to cheap labor to create a large industrial proletariat out of rather unpromising human capital--eg Russian serfs straight off the farm.

Actually the Malê region will, I expect, be less rawly exploited than Russians were and somewhat less likely to go completely Bolshevik, but I do think a flavor of quasi-Russian conditions will be in the mix, with both Abacarist-Islamic and hard atheistic Social Democracy tending toward Communism versions, and with quite sophisticated factories, mostly European-owned, but also tending to support a network of local specialized artisan/technician subcontractors vaguely analogous to the networks of suppliers who supply the major Japanese firms.

Of course compared to either Russia or Japan, the West Africans will suffer somewhat from not having local political control, but it's being established that both British and French colonialism in the region is going to be more participatory, and also by the same token of the political last word being a foreign one, the local elites will not be calling all the local shots. You've already alluded to unionism, we've already seen radical Abacarists, and heard of laborite local political figures. The interests of local big shots are mixed up with more plebeian types in the cross-currents of anti-colonial nationalism--some of the African "gentry" will be against it, some of the proletarian and middle-class movements will be cemented together by the nationalist struggle.

Vice versa figures who in a Russian or Japanese analog position would be firmly against the mob will here be drawn into laborite populism of various kinds.

I can't think of any really analogous situations in OTL colonial history; India comes closest, and perhaps the Chinese diaspora under European colonialism in places like Singapore and Hong Kong.
 
True, did I miss something about the Franco-Prussian war or its result being butterflied? If so..opps, my bad :eek:

We kinda hashed out in discussion over the last several pages that in an Second Empire where Louis-Napoléon isn't forced to rely solely on the monarchist right for support then then the French state & her military won't be so drastically weakened, and the Franco-Prussian War would likely play out very differently. iirc Jonathan Edelstein has stated that Louis-Napoléon won't be captured ITTL during the FPW, and the French won't suffer a defeat such as Sedan.
 
It would be fun to see the trend OTL amongst French monarchists (where the royal being backed is essentially a figurehead for a fringe political party more then an actual dynastic pretender) ends up being part of the general discourse.

What may happen is that various members of the Bonaparte family end up being stand-ins for political factions - the clerical conservatives will be identified with Prince X, the classical liberals with Empress Y, the socialists with Duke Z, etc. Assuming that the Empire survives and that the emperor becomes steadily more of a figurehead (both of which may or may not happen), then the royals' support of different parties may become more symbolic than anything else.

Of course, the dynamics would be different with an extant imperial house than in a republic where the princes/princesses are pretenders. In the latter case, it would only make sense for parties to have imperial patrons if there's a large amount of residual monarchist sentiment; if Prince X doesn't draw votes, he'll be relegated to the fringe, but if he does, then he might be a party-list candidate or even titular leader.

We'll see what happens when we get there.

Ah, okay then. I was mainly wondering if the Prince Imperial might survive (his death pretty much reduced Bonapartism to the fringe), but no Zulu war would change the politics (and quite possibly the demographics) of the region substantially.

There may be a Zulu war; it just won't be the Zulu War. You can take it to the bank, though, that the Prince Imperial won't be involved.

I'm looking forward to the reaction of Britain to these greater workers' rights. Might we see labor unions in Britain and the Americas use the rights in West Africa as an inspiration, something along the lines of 'well, if some Africans can have 12-hour days why can't we?' If this becomes a problem, we might see British authorities trying to stamp out any pro-labor tendencies among the courts in West Africa, which may prove a catalyst for an independence movement.

By the time the British and American unions hear about the African ones, they'll probably be fighting for 10-hour days together, but the American and European labor movement will take notice, and there will definitely be that unconsciously racist touch of "shouldn't we have the same rights as a passel of Africans?" There will also be some more genuine solidarity, especially once the British unionists realize that cheap imperial labor is threatening their own wages and that higher pay in Africa will mean less downward pressure in Britain.

The colonial government's relationship with the unions will often be difficult, and there will be some attempts to shut down the labor movement in the areas under direct British rule. On the other hand, not all the colonial authorities will be bought and paid for by the industrialists, and the "princely states" will retain considerable say over how their workers are treated.

There will definitely be a tie-in between the unions, the mosques and the independence movement - remember Hónorio Yaji from the prior literary interlude - but that struggle will pit the workers against their own elites as well as the colonial government.

I suspect that if it's locals doing the research and experimentation, rather than Europeans with motives ranging from "bringing improvement to the benighted heathen" to making a lot of money on some plantation cash crop, their successes are more likely to fit into the local customs and economy and thus spread wider and faster. And they are starting sooner.

Some of the Malê have knowledge of tropical agriculture from their experience in Brazil, and it doesn't all relate to cash-crop agriculture - slaves were used in all types of farming in Brazil, including cultivation of food for local consumption. Much of this knowledge will be of limited use in the Sahel where the rainfall is less, but some of it will translate. In addition, the Malê have brought with them an openness to foreign ways of doing things, and they'll be actively studying how other people have improved crop yields.

I'd expect the major improvements to be in irrigation (drip irrigation was invented in the 1860s OTL, although many of the refinements occurred in the 20th century) and in improved crop rotation and fertilization techniques. And they will, as you point out, be concentrating on local food crops rather than cash crops, and the indigenous people will be partners rather than research subjects, so there should be less cultural resistance to the reforms.

One dynamic I see at work is the industrial workers, finding the supply of traditional crops tightening, will start buying more imported goods from the Atlantic market, meaning generally more European-favored stuff, but of course also helping create an export market for Brazil and its split-off pieces. But the workers will also want to buy more local stuff if they can get it because it's more like the food they grew up with.

In turn some of these goods may find larger export markets they didn't OTL.

You've given me a great deal to think about here. I expect the workers would want to buy more local produce; on the other hand, imported foods might be associated with wealth and sophistication. And, for that matter, some of the Malê who retain the Afro-Brazilian culture might consider Brazilian imports to be a taste of home.

(Which raises the question of what Brazil will think of the Malê when, inevitably, it learns what they've been up to? Will they react with proprietary pride at the idea of Brazilian culture taking root in Africa, or will they consider it a threat? I suppose a good deal will depend on the status of slavery in Brazil at that time, and how far it has gone toward recognizing Afro-Brazilian culture as part of itself.)

Another possible development is that the industrial workers eventually displaced by European imports will be hired up by foreign-owned factories paying them little but using their relatively developed industrial skills to produce competitive industrial goods for the world market; the capital is now coming from Europe (presumably mainly Britain) and the revenues mostly going there in the form of profits, but the workers, while ill-paid and proletarian, will be working in factories using a mix of cheap-labor alternatives to Euro-American methods and the latest technologies.

This is what Trotsky, I believe following Lenin, called "combined development" in Russia--the most advanced capitalist techniques are adapted to cheap labor to create a large industrial proletariat out of rather unpromising human capital--eg Russian serfs straight off the farm.

Actually the Malê region will, I expect, be less rawly exploited than Russians were and somewhat less likely to go completely Bolshevik, but I do think a flavor of quasi-Russian conditions will be in the mix, with both Abacarist-Islamic and hard atheistic Social Democracy tending toward Communism versions, and with quite sophisticated factories, mostly European-owned, but also tending to support a network of local specialized artisan/technician subcontractors vaguely analogous to the networks of suppliers who supply the major Japanese firms.

This also bears more thought, but I think you've got it about right. One caveat is that the local industries won't all be absorbed - there will still be some African-owned factories, and some colonial administrators (along with many princely-state governments) will encourage British industrialists to take local partners. This means that there will be more of a native industrial elite in addition to the artisan/technician subcontractors, and that there will be greater transfer of technical and managerial knowledge to that elite, than you'd expect in a Russian-type situation or in traditional OTL colonialism. The Malê will also be seen as better material than raw peasants - Muslim Africans will get a good deal more respect in this timeline than in OTL, and will be considered "civilized" by the colonialists where other Africans are not. But yes, a lot of British factory owners and colonial authorities will see West Africa as a source of cheap industrial labor, and Marxism (along with quasi-Marxist versions of Islam) will have substantial appeal. Some of British West Africa will have a very "modern" twentieth century.

Of course compared to either Russia or Japan, the West Africans will suffer somewhat from not having local political control, but it's being established that both British and French colonialism in the region is going to be more participatory, and also by the same token of the political last word being a foreign one, the local elites will not be calling all the local shots. You've already alluded to unionism, we've already seen radical Abacarists, and heard of laborite local political figures. The interests of local big shots are mixed up with more plebeian types in the cross-currents of anti-colonial nationalism--some of the African "gentry" will be against it, some of the proletarian and middle-class movements will be cemented together by the nationalist struggle. Vice versa figures who in a Russian or Japanese analog position would be firmly against the mob will here be drawn into laborite populism of various kinds.

There are going to be a lot of shifting alliances between the colonial authorities, the local elites and the workers, not to mention between factions within each group. You'll have the local bourgeoisie allied with the workers on questions of participatory democracy and local control of resources, while they might be more in line with the colonial authorities on economic matters -- but then again, some of the colonial administrators will consider themselves "protectors of the natives" and side with the workers against both local and European exploiters. I think it's safe to say that there won't be any uniformity of opinion within classes and that there will be many points in history during which class interests are split and cross-class alliances are built.

I can't think of any really analogous situations in OTL colonial history; India comes closest, and perhaps the Chinese diaspora under European colonialism in places like Singapore and Hong Kong.

I've been using India as a rough template, although Abacarist ideology and the somewhat later onset of colonialism raise obvious differences. The colonial merchant diasporas are also an interesting comparison, and may be a guide for how the Malê (by that time less a national identifier than a marker for West Africans influenced by Abacarism and Brazilian culture) will fare elsewhere in the empire. Another analogy I've been looking at is neocolonialism avant la lettre (as to both the political and economic relationship between Britain and the "princely states"), which might mean in turn that the nationalist movement is a pre-emptive attack on post-independence neocolonialism as well as a challenge to colonialism as such.
 
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