Malê Rising

But that was Romanov Tsarist Russia. All of a sudden Russia is a Narodnik Christian Socialist federation. Meanwhile the Ottoman Sultanate is less a military government claiming to rule over all Islam and more of a federal union of stronger local more or less democratic governments united by a more democratically accountable central Sultan's state, that does a lot more for the realm than fight on its borders or to put down unrest within it. If we can depend on Tolstoy to guide his Narodnik followers (and the more or less opportunistic other brands of leftist reformist revolutionaries, and keeping the conservative remnant who haven't followed Nicholas into exile attached on patriotic grounds) to tolerance and mutual understandings based on common ground of some Muslim communities within Russia, then they can negotiate amicably enough with Muslims outside Russia--especially since the Sultanate has been as noticed modernized in a ramshackle way. Narodnik Russia and the Belloist Sultanate are going to see eye to eye and find many common interests, since both are regimes ruling underdeveloped but rapidly developing diverse peoples that add up to quite a lot of potential power.

It might not work out so neatly as I once offhand suggested as a possibility, a Moscow-Constantinople alliance, but anyway the old causes of the perennial clashes are removed or much diluted.

But also new ones added. For example Russia has just gone from a strong Christian majority which is mostly Orthodox, to an overwhelming Christian majority that is equally dominated by the Orthodox Church. Tolstoy can leave a positive legacy, Mandela-ish perhaps, but in the long run more familiar tensions will return to visibility.

If Russian-Ottoman amity develops fast enough it might scare both sets of their former European allies quite a lot. Well, I hope both Britain and France take it calmly. And that the Germans are satiated by suddenly acquiring hegemony over most of eastern Europe. But if it goes that way, suddenly Europe (if we see Russia as being on the border of Europe, mostly in Asia--and the Ottoman state too has an important foothold in Europe but is centered elsewhere, with the capital literally on the border of Europe and Asia) is in a much less commanding position worldwide. Especially if the Chinese do line up with Russia.

Definitely. Not least because an Ottoman alliance would secure Russian interests in Central Asia as well, if not helping where the border lies. If Turkish rapprochement lasts, technically Russia may have lost the war, but geopolitically it triumphed. Give up pretensions in Persia and the hold on Finland for what? Poland and the Caucasus were arguably more a drain to rule than a benefit, and Russia can still trade with them. Central Asia is a hit, but at least Russia is more cohesive now. Plus if Great Turkestan is friendly (due to a relationship with Stamboul), they'll be economically in the Russian orbit with the other players in the region being Russian allies anyway. And a friendship with the Ottomans means open Straits. Add in the Chinese, Koreans, and the probable friendship with Ethiopia pending the death of Menelik's vassal....

Russia has been pushed back onto its core, but that core's mostly unharmed. If they can restrain themselves from political annexations of the old style and project their potentially enormous soft power they'll be the hegemon of the core of Eurasia with substantial influence in the eastern Med, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and northern Pacific.

If Turkish rapprochement lasts.
 
I'd dispute the mention about the Curzon Line being near the ethnic frontier. There were millions of Poles beyond that line, and for that matter many Poles in the Baltic countries. And I think I'm imagining Russia ITTL going much more to pieces than you are. Above and beyond the devastation experienced in OTL, Russia has also experienced a Stalin-like crash industrialization program, much more political repression, has had to fight a whole new front in Central Asia, and has fought four years of trench warfare instead of three.

But draw a line that includes those millions of Poles and you include more millions of eastern Slavs and Balts in your Poland. It's a decent line for a state without large minorities - more important for young nations. Of course you're right that the Poles'd never feel that way.
 
But most of Russia's problems you list here are in the past now. The key is Tolstoy negotiating an equitable peace with the Ottomans, and with Muslims who might either remain Russian citizens or secede, but possibly amicably. The trouble with just letting Central Asia go is that a lot of Russians have settled there, and also Jonathan told us some time ago, the Muslim Central Asians are not nearly as hostile to the Russians as I was assuming. Tolstoy and other Russian radicals have taken some inspiration from Islamic reformism as it has filtered into Russia, and can offer in good faith fair terms for Muslim Russian citizens to live under--hopefully this applies to Jews too. Or, if the Central Asian rebellion has gotten to the point that the people there will not return to Russia, then Tolstoy can let them go with a blessing, and have some grounds to think Russians settled there who chose to remain will be all right.

The trauma of industrialization is largely in the past and I gather has raised the level achieved, despite war-related disruptions, to a higher level than OTL by the same time. Of course I presume industrialization under the Tsar involved unacceptably bad living and working conditions for the workers and therefore the outputs will drop as these workers quit (or just don't return from their army service, going back to the land instead). To revive the industry will involve luring them back, presumably by better conditions that will take time to achieve and weaken the position of Russian products on the world markets.

We might well wonder just how long Tolstoy will remain "vozhd" and what kind of leadership will succeed him. He may be discredited and fail. But I don't think he's facing a worse situation that the Bolsheviks were when Lenin inaugurated NEP; it looks a lot better. It depends on how likely old-style Russian chauvinists are to regain power and how aggressive Russia wants to be. I think for quite some time Russia will be happy to be peaceful, Narodnik style, and prosperous on a peasant basis. And for some time they should be confident they will be left in peace, on those terms. So Tolstoy has a chance to build up a legacy of success.

A lot of abandoned factories, with the remaining workers organizing to force exorbitant wages out of those that remain in business? Feels like there might be a decade of it to look forward to. And there'll be a lot of pressure to resume semi-coercive methods of maintaining the labor supply in that time. Tolstoy'd resist, certainly, but he won't be there forever....
 
A lot of abandoned factories, with the remaining workers organizing to force exorbitant wages out of those that remain in business? Feels like there might be a decade of it to look forward to. And there'll be a lot of pressure to resume semi-coercive methods of maintaining the labor supply in that time. Tolstoy'd resist, certainly, but he won't be there forever....

Honestly given the influence syndicalists had on the revolution the workers probably aren't going to be extorting wages, they are going to be running the factories themselves through some organ like the unions. The moneyed classes of Russia are going to be massively displaced here, noble and capitalist alike.
 

Hnau

Banned
Honestly given the influence syndicalists had on the revolution the workers probably aren't going to be extorting wages, they are going to be running the factories themselves through some organ like the unions. The moneyed classes of Russia are going to be massively displaced here, noble and capitalist alike.

^ This. If the villages are now owning their land and deciding democratically who gets what, then we can expect the same norm expanding into the factories. Workers cooperatives have their own challenges, but inefficiency isn't one of them.

Admiral Matt said:
But draw a line that includes those millions of Poles and you include more millions of eastern Slavs and Balts in your Poland. It's a decent line for a state without large minorities - more important for young nations. Of course you're right that the Poles'd never feel that way.

I mean, I guess it depends who comes to power in Poland and how much Germany is influencing policy in the country. From what I've read, the idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was still a monolithic idea in Polish culture. We know Pilsudski wanted to recreate it and he was going to push eastward regardless of who was in power in Moscow. To be fair, Pilsudski went even beyond the aspirations of the average Pole in advocating independence for any non-Russian ethnic group under Russian hegemony. The Germans put a lot of support behind Pilsudski to push Russia to its breaking point, believing that the more states there were to their east, the less chance they'd have trouble coming from that direction.

There are a few question worth asking and answering when it comes to Russia and their future borders.

1) Would anyone in the German government want to strengthen even a Tolstoyan Russia, rather than weaken it?
2) Would anyone in the German government hold back the Poles if they want more territory from Russia?
3) By 1898, when there will probably be the peace conference to the war, who is going to be on Russia's side for them holding the territory they want?
4) How much strength will statesmen put behind de jure support?
5) Is Russia going to be in a position to threaten Germany enough in order to retain the territory it wants?
6) Do Tolstoy and the majority narodnik government even care about retaining non-Russian territory?

Shevek23 said:
But most of Russia's problems you list here are in the past now.

There is still a lot to fix, and how fast Tolstoy and others can fix things will determine how much territory they can keep. The peace conference will probably be organized for 1898. If there is still chaos in the country side and if there isn't a functional military force, that's going to affect how the lines are drawn.

Shevek23 said:
Or, if the Central Asian rebellion has gotten to the point that the people there will not return to Russia, then Tolstoy can let them go with a blessing, and have some grounds to think Russians settled there who chose to remain will be all right.

If Turkestan is letting everyone live according to their own laws, I wonder if the Russians will still live under Russian law?

Shevek23 said:
The trauma of industrialization is largely in the past and I gather has raised the level achieved, despite war-related disruptions, to a higher level than OTL by the same time. Of course I presume industrialization under the Tsar involved unacceptably bad living and working conditions for the workers and therefore the outputs will drop as these workers quit (or just don't return from their army service, going back to the land instead). To revive the industry will involve luring them back, presumably by better conditions that will take time to achieve and weaken the position of Russian products on the world markets.

In our timeline the cities emptied in 1917, with the lower classes returning en masse to the countryside to find food. The soldiers and workers just wanted to go back to their home village to participate in the land grab. I presume this will happen in 1897 to an even greater degree. But you're right, I'm assuming that Russia has climbed to a higher level of industrialization than it was at this point.

Shevek23 said:
We might well wonder just how long Tolstoy will remain "vozhd" and what kind of leadership will succeed him. He may be discredited and fail. But I don't think he's facing a worse situation that the Bolsheviks were when Lenin inaugurated NEP; it looks a lot better.

Sure, there won't be war communism or a civil war, but what I'm getting at is that for the moment things are worse than they were in 1917. And the moment is an extremely important one because the post-war settlement is coming. I think Tolstoy seems like the kind of leader to guide the Russian government until they get to calmer political waters, and then retire Washington-style.
 
Honestly given the influence syndicalists had on the revolution the workers probably aren't going to be extorting wages, they are going to be running the factories themselves through some organ like the unions. The moneyed classes of Russia are going to be massively displaced here, noble and capitalist alike.

Same difference. With an ongoing famine and a regime stepping back from things like forcing peasants to hand over food, the cities will empty. So to afford food (and because they won), those cooperatives will set prices really really high for whatever they're producing, which will collapse the amount of people who'll actually buy any manufactured products, which means there'll be a lot of pressure to resist that by semi-coercive methods....
 
I have a question: Is the new Russian government able to feed their population?

If it is not able to do so, either because there simply isn't food available, or because the farmers want to leave the prices as high as possible it will get into trouble quickly.
No matter how democratic or progressive a government is, people want first of all food and security. The peace will do wonders for the security aspect, but I would say, that without enough food the relief won't last long. Workers from the cities could soon want to see actions against the rural population horting grain and other foodstuff. If the Narodniks are not able or willing to get enough food into the cities and lower the food prices I cannot see the workers staying loyal to the government.

Edit: Uups semi-ninjad
 
^ This. If the villages are now owning their land and deciding democratically who gets what, then we can expect the same norm expanding into the factories. Workers cooperatives have their own challenges, but inefficiency isn't one of them.

*blinks*

I mean, I guess it depends who comes to power in Poland and how much Germany is influencing policy in the country. From what I've read, the idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was still a monolithic idea in Polish culture. We know Pilsudski wanted to recreate it and he was going to push eastward regardless of who was in power in Moscow. To be fair, Pilsudski went even beyond the aspirations of the average Pole in advocating independence for any non-Russian ethnic group under Russian hegemony. The Germans put a lot of support behind Pilsudski to push Russia to its breaking point, believing that the more states there were to their east, the less chance they'd have trouble coming from that direction.

Of course, that depended on the Germans first reaching the Lake Pskov and the Don. Do you expect that.

At the end of the day, Versailles and the associated treaties had no influence on the location of the border. It was the Polish-Soviet War did that. I'd expect the peace treaties here to have more effect - making slight changes to the de facto line - but only if there is no Polish invasion. But in that case, again, I suspect it'd fall near the Curzon Line, because that is what looks reasonable to an objective third party.

There are a few question worth asking and answering when it comes to Russia and their future borders.

1) Would anyone in the German government want to strengthen even a Tolstoyan Russia, rather than weaken it?
2) Would anyone in the German government hold back the Poles if they want more territory from Russia?

Unless the Germans support a Polish attack into the ethnic frontier, they'll have little influence on the border. Well, really they'll have a lot of say - just not in the sense of pushing it far past Curzon's.

3) By 1898, when there will probably be the peace conference to the war, who is going to be on Russia's side for them holding the territory they want?

Britain, wot wot.

4) How much strength will statesmen put behind de jure support?
5) Is Russia going to be in a position to threaten Germany enough in order to retain the territory it wants?

None of this carries a great deal of weight, as the boots on the ground are going to define things more.

6) Do Tolstoy and the majority narodnik government even care about retaining non-Russian territory?

That's just it: it is Russian territory. The Poles there are all jumbled up with Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians. And the Belarusians at least will in this period still think of themselves as Russians-with-western-accents.
 
At the end of the day, Versailles and the associated treaties had no influence on the location of the border. It was the Polish-Soviet War did that. I'd expect the peace treaties here to have more effect - making slight changes to the de facto line - but only if there is no Polish invasion. But in that case, again, I suspect it'd fall near the Curzon Line, because that is what looks reasonable to an objective third party.

Unless the Germans support a Polish attack into the ethnic frontier, they'll have little influence on the border. Well, really they'll have a lot of say - just not in the sense of pushing it far past Curzon's.

I'm afraid that talking about Curzon Line is slightly anachronical in this context. There is no collapse of states here which leaves total chaos. No new principium established that any nation can have it's natural borders and the right to have it's own state. Simply the FAR Alliance was defeated and the new countries (or - in this case old but quite long defunct) can be (re)established at their expense. In case of Poland: it could be easily made of marginal regions of Austrian and Russian Empires which are too troublesome to keep. Plus the Germans would like to have a buffer which would protect them from the east.
Russians if I'm not mistaken didn't really considered regions east of Bug as part of their territory. So this is what the Poles really can get: former Polish Congress Kingdom + Galicia. No access to the sea. And it's questionable if the reborn Polish Kingdom would regain Posen Grand Duchy. Maybe, if the North Germans would decide that there is too much danger of irredentism in this province. But they didn't want to let it go in 1848, so why would want to do it now, when they just won the war?
I would see the russian diplomacy pushing for reestablishment Polish kingdom together with PGD - ostensibly agreeing with claims of Casimir the Great (which would explain why they wouldn't claim eastern Galicia) but the hidden catch would be that the reviving Piast tradition and old Corona Regni Poloniae would in longer terms make problems for Germans because some Nationalists like Dmowski would dream of glory of Bolesław the Brave.

I'm curious what about restauration of Czech Kingdom. It would be a natural ally of Poland until Silesian question resurfaces.


That's just it: it is Russian territory. The Poles there are all jumbled up with Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians. And the Belarusians at least will in this period still think of themselves as Russians-with-western-accents.
The Belarussians at that times considered themselves "Locals". Whole old Great Duchy of Lithuania would be a big problem for Russians and they would probably like to play Poles against Lithuanians there like earlier Austrians Rusyns/Ukrainians against Poles in Galicia. Don't forget about the Jews too.
 

Hnau

Banned
Admiral Matt said:
Same difference. With an ongoing famine and a regime stepping back from things like forcing peasants to hand over food, the cities will empty. So to afford food (and because they won), those cooperatives will set prices really really high for whatever they're producing, which will collapse the amount of people who'll actually buy any manufactured products, which means there'll be a lot of pressure to resist that by semi-coercive methods....

Admiral Matt said:

Are you challenging my claim that workers cooperatives can achieve high productive efficiency? ;)

The peasants now have much more land after the requisition of noble estates are completed. The village council will also be appointing plots of land according to a family's capability to farm it, which means the crop management system is more efficient. Food production is going to ramp up quickly. And while there will be many hungry people to feed initially, demand for food is going to fall as loyalists emigrate, as people die (unfortunately), and as military operations cease. The price of food is going to drop as it did in OTL (unless they find a foreign buyer?)[Scissors Crisis]

Meanwhile, labor is more valuable in the factories because the cities emptied. Supply of manufactured goods will shrink. That means prices will rise. The peasants were reportedly very inelastic with their buying habits, and would switch to home-made goods if prices of manufactured goods were too high (like making candles instead of buying a lantern). But workers co-ops probably won't be getting food directly from the government, which means if they want to keep eating they'll have to lower prices so that peasants will buy from them. Co-ops will compete with each other for customers, so it should put prices at an efficient level.

There are two problems from this scenario. First, is this model doesn't encourage much expansion of the industrial sector. Workers co-ops will want to keep workers out to keep their incomes high. Few private entities are going to have the capital to fund new co-ops and put people to work in the cities. The government will have to be responsible for that, and they'll only succeed if they have succeeded in restructuring following the end of the war and have started pulling in sufficient tax revenue. Second, IOTL the New Economic Policy created a class of entrepreneurs known as NEPmen many of which profited by buying food for cheap, selling it high in the cities, then buying cheap manufactured goods and selling it low in the villages. As they find the right prices to buy and sell at, it'll make profit very difficult for the factories and for the villages. IOTL the Bolsheviks hated these guys and even at the inception of the NEP they kept their eye on them to regulate their activities. ITTL the NEPmen will have even more freedom to do their price gouging. The one benefit to this is that the NEPmen might attain enough capital to start private enterprises.

There will be a shift in the cities to produce artisanal products which will be able to match the low buying power of the villages. This will definitely be a step back as far as industrialization goes, but it will give Russia a more diverse economic portfolio than the war allowed for, which means a more sustainable and healthy economy. But does this mean Russia can get out of its economic trap naturally without government intervention? I don't see any way that would take less than a decade or more.

Confronted with these problems, the new Russian government have a couple of options they could pursue. They could open up the country to foreign investment which would also involve selling Russian products internationally, but the whos and whats matter a lot here. Moscow could crack down on the NEPmen so that the workers and peasants retain more profit. They could also help organize consumer cooperatives among the peasants that would lower prices across the board. A federation of workers cooperatives could also achieve the same effect. But maybe Moscow would want to be more brutal about it, not to the degree the Soviets did IOTL by targeting NEPmen for violence, but they could do price fixing of their own though that would open a pandora's box that would be problematic later. And, of course, its a little too early to be talking about electrification but a national program for electrifying the cities and villages would ramp up both industrial production and demand from the peasants for manufactured goods.

The best immediate policy cocktail IMO for Moscow to adopt would be to focus on forming consumer co-ops and find a couple good places overseas to sell agricultural products. If only Austria-Hungary fell into a multi-year civil war that'd help them out a great deal.

And that ends a long musing on this subject. :)

Admiral Matt said:
None of this carries a great deal of weight, as the boots on the ground are going to define things more.

Well, that's kind of what I meant by 4 and 5.

Just take a look at an ethnic map and tell me whether or not you think the Poles would be pleased with the Curzon Line. I think if it extended to include Lwow and Wilno we'd be talking about something more plausible.
 
Update possibly tonight, more likely tomorrow. A couple of points in the meantime, with apologies for not responding to comments individually:

Russian industrialization and food self-sufficiency are, at this point, two sides of the same coin. The Russian industrial work force consists of two groups: the prewar urban workers, and peasants conscripted during the war under military discipline. Most of the peasants will head straight for home now that leaving their jobs is no longer considered desertion. A sizable percentage, however, have married into urban families or simply discovered that they like city life better. The returning soldiers will likewise go both ways, depending on where their families are or (for those without families) where they feel they have the best chance of making a living.

The government's first priority is the food supply - industrial production is needed in the long term, but right now everyone needs to eat - so it won't do much to stop the conscripted peasants from going back to the land. The winter crops need to be harvested now, and spring grains need to be sown as soon as possible. This means that Russia will be very short on industrial workers, even if women stay in the work force, and that some short-term deindustrialization will happen. I'd guess they can live with this, given that war production will no longer be necessary and there may not be enough capital to retool all the factories for consumer production. And, ideologically, the narodniks will see near-term deindustrialization as an opportunity to redesign the cities.

During the war, you see, the conscripted peasants did what peasants do - they turned every open space in their shantytowns into a garden, and taught the urban workers to do the same thing. There wasn't nearly enough open space to make the cities self-sufficient, but it did prevent the famine from being worse than it was. By war's end, the industrial cities of Russia came to look something like many modern African cities, in which the shantytowns of the urban periphery are an important food source.

If the factories get thinned out a bit, then this state of affairs can be systematized - replace the shanties with low-rise housing set along the streetcar lines, build in space for individual plots and communal gardens, and turn the remaining factories into the hubs of self-managed and communally owned urban villages. The urban narodniks will see themselves as peasant-workers rather than as workers tout court, and may actually consider industrial production to be simply another of the "crops" raised on their land - "we harvest the vegetables here and the tractors there." (That might also make it seem more natural for women to stay in the labor force - women have always helped get the harvest in when they were needed).

Actually making this work is, of course, easier said than done. There will be pressure to get the factories back online in order to earn foreign exchange, which will run up against labor shortages, capital shortages and inefficient economies of scale (all of which will tend to reduce production and increase prices). A hitherto-untried decentralized urban design will have shakeout problems and in some instances will fail. As Hnau says, there may be at least a temporary shift toward artisanal production in the cities - another niche that semi-skilled peasant-workers might fill - and a need for government investment and infrastructure-building that may not be available for a while. The government may have to take over the NEPman role if the price-gouging gets too bad, which would introduce more potential inefficiencies. But I think that in the short to medium term, a rollback of industrialization may actually suit the new regime's desire for social experimentation.

Russian Jews: Most of them are in the Ottoman Empire, Western Europe or the Americas at this point due to the greater-than-OTL persecutions of the 1880s and early 1890s. The ones who are still there will be fine; in fact, Tolstoy may try to get some of the emigres to come back.

BTW, Zemsky Sobor or Duma? I'm leaning toward the former.

Poland: I think nearly everyone who matters will be pulled two ways at the peace conference. On the one hand, the Germans aren't sure if Tolstoy will last or if an aggressive regime might take power in Russia down the line, which will incline them to push for a big Polish buffer state. On the other hand, they don't want Poland to be too big, because then it might forget who its patron is. Britain will want Poland to be big enough to have some independence from Germany, but not so big that Russia becomes weak. And Tolstoy won't care about Congress Poland, but the further the border extends into areas where Ukrainians and White Russians live, the more he'll object, and by 1898 nobody will be interested in restarting the war to conquer marginal territory. So I'm guessing that Poland will be fairly big, and that it will get Lviv and maybe Wilno/Vilnius/Vilna as well, but that it won't have anything near Brest-Litovsk borders.

Ottoman peace aims: Basically, they want to be recognized as a world power, and cement their role as the leading Muslim nation and the patron/protector of the neighboring Muslim states. They aren't out to annex a great deal of territory outright, but they want to carve out spheres of influence in the Caucasus, Bornu, Persia and Central Asia (they know they'll have to share the latter two) and to bring Egypt back into the fold. Beyond that, the Ottomans, and Midhat Pasha in particular, want to bring the conflict with Christian Europe to a definite end, and to settle relations with the Bulgarians and the neighboring European states to mutual satisfaction. They'll need Russian help with that, so they will indeed want to forge an alliance with Tolstoy, although there may be no end of complications.

I'll be returning to all these topics after the war, so if I left anything out, don't take it as a slight; I appreciate all your comments and I'm enjoying the conversation a great deal.
 
a) Crimea is likely to become somewhat of an issue.
b) The Ukrainians in East Galicia are pretty likely to object to either Russian or Polish rule as well as being unable to enforce anything else. It's hard to see what the lesser evil would be in their eyes. Lemberg is likely to end up Polish.
c) Any Polish claim on Vilnius and thereabouts will bring to the fore whatever the Lithuanians are thinking about. Poland is likely to be happy to swallow Lithuania wholesale as a reenactment of PLC, but it's not like the Lithuanians are going to agree easily, not to mention the Russians.
d) The Caucasus seems to be destined to become a clusterfuck of a tangle of intertwined messes.
e) Sorting out the western and southwestern borders of Russia is likely to become sorta complicated in many places.
 
Are you challenging my claim that workers cooperatives can achieve high productive efficiency? ;)

Not at all. :) The claim that inefficiency is not one of the problems they have to deal with, though, that I would question.

The peasants now have much more land after the requisition of noble estates are completed. The village council will also be appointing plots of land according to a family's capability to farm it, which means the crop management system is more efficient. Food production is going to ramp up quickly. And while there will be many hungry people to feed initially, demand for food is going to fall as loyalists emigrate, as people die (unfortunately), and as military operations cease. The price of food is going to drop as it did in OTL (unless they find a foreign buyer?)[Scissors Crisis]

Yeah, the Scissor's Crisis was precisely my worry. A very difficult thing to solve without strong arming people who are just following their interests. For a state that really doesn't want to be brutal, the course of least resistance would be to let the new industries largely collapse and the peasants mostly return home to farm. You could still get a lot of them back for seasonal work, at least, this being Russia.

It's not good, but the plant, the experienced workers, and even many of the managers will still be around for a gradual resumption. That's a lot more than the Soviets had after the civil war.

If the peasants export their grain (and other products) to a large degree, they'll pretty much force Tolstoy's hand. No government can afford to allow years of famine. Hrm.... They'll feel the need for capital investment to industrialize much less than did the Soviets. [One of my favorite Russian historical ironies.] Perhaps Tolstoy's government will ban food exports?

Meanwhile, labor is more valuable in the factories because the cities emptied. Supply of manufactured goods will shrink. That means prices will rise. The peasants were reportedly very inelastic with their buying habits, and would switch to home-made goods if prices of manufactured goods were too high (like making candles instead of buying a lantern). But workers co-ops probably won't be getting food directly from the government, which means if they want to keep eating they'll have to lower prices so that peasants will buy from them. Co-ops will compete with each other for customers, so it should put prices at an efficient level.

At seems really optimistic. And microeconomical. That kind of competition might work somewhat in the densely industrialized areas around St Petersburg or Moscow, or along Ukrainian rivers. But what if their nearest competitor is hundreds or thousands of miles away?

One coop won't be driving up food prices - the national economy (driven, yes, by these shops) is doing it. For anyone worker's coop without a local competitor, their best interests are in putting their prices as high as the market can bear. This strikes me as being, at least initially, a tragedy of the commons situation.

In the long run they'll naturally find a balance that works a little for all parties. But initially, well, none of these people have MBAs.

There are two problems from this scenario. First, is this model doesn't encourage much expansion of the industrial sector. Workers co-ops will want to keep workers out to keep their incomes high. Few private entities are going to have the capital to fund new co-ops and put people to work in the cities. The government will have to be responsible for that, and they'll only succeed if they have succeeded in restructuring following the end of the war and have started pulling in sufficient tax revenue. Second, IOTL the New Economic Policy created a class of entrepreneurs known as NEPmen many of which profited by buying food for cheap, selling it high in the cities, then buying cheap manufactured goods and selling it low in the villages. As they find the right prices to buy and sell at, it'll make profit very difficult for the factories and for the villages. IOTL the Bolsheviks hated these guys and even at the inception of the NEP they kept their eye on them to regulate their activities. ITTL the NEPmen will have even more freedom to do their price gouging. The one benefit to this is that the NEPmen might attain enough capital to start private enterprises.

There will be a shift in the cities to produce artisanal products which will be able to match the low buying power of the villages. This will definitely be a step back as far as industrialization goes, but it will give Russia a more diverse economic portfolio than the war allowed for, which means a more sustainable and healthy economy. But does this mean Russia can get out of its economic trap naturally without government intervention? I don't see any way that would take less than a decade or more.

Possibilities. Any alt-NEP-men would likely be much more constructive sort, investing more concretely in society and making developments for the future. That was the OTL problem - the Soviets made it very clear to these people they needed that they were considered parasitic trash by their own government, but weren't going to be shot in the street just yet. It didn't exactly encourage planning for the future, much less ethical business! So a lot of these guys actually lived rather hand-to-mouth despite their wealth - always blowing and wasting what they had. Which was constructive in a way, for Soviet ideology.

Confronted with these problems, the new Russian government have a couple of options they could pursue. They could open up the country to foreign investment which would also involve selling Russian products internationally, but the whos and whats matter a lot here. Moscow could crack down on the NEPmen so that the workers and peasants retain more profit. They could also help organize consumer cooperatives among the peasants that would lower prices across the board. A federation of workers cooperatives could also achieve the same effect. But maybe Moscow would want to be more brutal about it, not to the degree the Soviets did IOTL by targeting NEPmen for violence, but they could do price fixing of their own though that would open a pandora's box that would be problematic later. And, of course, its a little too early to be talking about electrification but a national program for electrifying the cities and villages would ramp up both industrial production and demand from the peasants for manufactured goods.

The best immediate policy cocktail IMO for Moscow to adopt would be to focus on forming consumer co-ops and find a couple good places overseas to sell agricultural products. If only Austria-Hungary fell into a multi-year civil war that'd help them out a great deal.

And that ends a long musing on this subject. :)



Well, that's kind of what I meant by 4 and 5.

Just take a look at an ethnic map and tell me whether or not you think the Poles would be pleased with the Curzon Line. I think if it extended to include Lwow and Wilno we'd be talking about something more plausible.

Never let it be said that I thought the Poles would be happy! I just don't think we are going to get treaties determined by their feelings. That said, what you meant about the ethnic frontier is quite clear around Wilnow.

For one, there's no Wilson running around. For another the Germans haven't cleared the road for them. Even in 1917, the Germans were in Riga.

I do think the Poles have a strong chance at Lvov, depending of course on whether or not Austria-Hungary collapses. And the Vilnius panhandle would be a possibility to get past that line as well. The trick is how the Poles would get it. A treaty negotiation would give them some, at least, but likely not all. If they invade that is one thing, but would they only invade right there, or also into the pink-speckled zones? I suspect the latter. Alternately, some of that region could perhaps have organized itself from the ground up and declared itself a part of Poland, given the decline in St Petersburg's authority.
 
West Africa, March 1897

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The part of Freetown where Sanie Carter lived was called Little Charleston these days. It was close enough to the port to be walking distance from the warehouses, but far enough up the hill that the air was fresh. The first South Carolina trader had built a house there not long after the last war, the others had put theirs in the same place, and with all the buying and selling that was happening in this war, the neighborhood had grown to a small town.

Not much like Charleston, though, Carter thought as he made his way up Tubman Street. For one thing, you could stroll down a Charleston street without having to climb it. But it was a lot more than that. The people here weren’t Charleston people – most of them were from the Sea Islands and the lowland Gullah country, and while they might have warehouses and offices in Charleston, it wasn’t where they called home.

Which made it less of an enclave than a real Little Charleston might have been. Most of the rest of the town was Krio, and their language and Gullah were almost the same, and what they did was pretty much what the Gullah did. Sanie’d heard about it, and he’d once met a Krio girl that a distant cousin had brought home, but he hadn’t been prepared for what he’d seen when he finally got here.

The very day he’d arrived, even exhausted from shepherding his consignment of guns and clothing through Liberia [1], he’d known he wanted to stay. That was two years ago. He’d stayed in a dockside hotel for a while, and after he sold his second shipment, he’d bought some land and hired carpenters to build him a house on the hill. It was small next to some of the others – the richest of the South Carolina merchants seemed to have a contest going – but it was big enough for one. And maybe now for two.

Light spilled out of the house at the top of Tubman Street, and Sanie could hear the music playing even before he set foot in the yard. There were lights and music in the yard as well; this was a high-society dance, but it was Gullah high society, and nobody wanted to waste a starlit night with a fresh breeze blowing. There was a scent of sweetgrass and potpourri, and pitchers of ginger-beer for the Muslims and the real thing for the Christians, and if Sanie closed his eyes, the voices sounded like they might have come from home.

There was someone he was looking for, but she found him first, dressed in royal blue and smelling of lavender. He couldn’t take her in his arms like he wanted to do, not here, but he took her right hand in both of his and bowed from the waist.

“You came,” she said, favoring him with a smile.

“I knew you’d be here.”

“Then you know more than my parents do.” She said the words lightly, but he knew they were true; Mary Jaiah was from an old, upright Krio family, and her preacher father didn’t care for dancing. He didn’t care much for Sanie either. But Mary knew her own mind, and ever since the two of them had met in church, she’d found ways.

He offered her an arm and led her to the dancing – pure Sea Islands, not one of the stately waltzes that were the fare at Krio parties or over in the British colony. They’d call it folk dancing in Charleston, much less London, but neither of them cared. “All the society dances were folk dances once,” she’d said three parties ago, or maybe it was four. “Wait twenty years – they’ll be doing this in Paris, and they won’t remember where it came from.”

That wasn’t what she wanted to talk about now, though. “What are your plans, now the war’s almost over?”

He considered as they whirled past the fireflies. “Can’t sell to the soldiers any more, but I’ve got to know some of the Coasters in Monrovia and Lagos. Fernando Po too, even Libreville.” Smuggling and trading information, he didn’t say – there’d been a lot of both during the war. “With peace coming, this’ll be the perfect meeting place between them and South Carolina. I figure I could do well as a broker and outfitter, maybe sell some palm oil as well.”

Mary nodded gravely. “You’re staying, then.”

“I’ve told you that.”

“During the war. Plans change.”

“I’m not making any plans,” he said firmly, “that take me three thousand miles from you.”

The smile that rewarded him made the first one seem pallid. Yes, maybe that house will be for two.

*******

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I guess it’s only fair that I’m fighting in this war, Paul Koffi thought. After all, I helped start the damn thing.

He hadn’t meant to, of course – when he and the Sakassou council had refused to cooperate with arbitrary colonial regulations [2], starting a global war had been the last thing on his mind. But it had been their arrest and trial that had caused the socialists to leave the government, and everyone knew what Leclair and his caretaker cabinet had done after that.

Maybe that was why he’d volunteered for the tirailleurs at the age of forty-five – no one could rationally blame him for the war, but he’d still felt an absurd need to atone for it. That wasn’t the whole reason, though. He was also a French citizen, and even if France had treated him shabbily, the Rights of Man had found their way into his bones. Liberté, égalité et fraternité were worth fighting for, even if he might have to turn around and fight his own government for them when the war ended.

So he’d gone to the tirailleurs – and now, when Sakassou and all of Côte d'Ivoire were under British occupation, he was still fighting.

A sound interrupted his thoughts, and he saw that his quarry was coming. There were thirty troopers marching up the track – Asante, most of them, from the British garrison. They were joking, making plans for the war’s end, not paying much attention; after all, this area was peaceful. The nearest French troops were hundreds of miles from here, in the trench line defending Senegal and the Bambara provinces; what could a routine British patrol have to fear?

Koffi fingered his rifle and looked down the line at the others – half of them tirailleurs like him, the rest Sakassou burghers or recruits from the surrounding villages. Some of them still had French weapons; the others were armed with surplus rifles that he’d bought from the Liberians. They were happy enough to sell guns to Sierra Leone when the British were under siege; now they’re happy to sell them to us, as long as it’s under the table and we pay in cash.

The Asante patrol had almost reached him now. He felt a pang of guilt for what he was about to do; he had nothing against these soldiers, and if he’d still been mayor of Sakassou and they’d come as traders, he’d have welcomed them to his city. But they had come as invaders to his city and his country, and they had to leave.

He put his rifle to his eye and sighted with practiced ease. “Fire,” he said, and the world exploded with noise.

*******

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“Be welcome here,” said Aguibou Tall, and ushered the desert chieftains into the chamber. They were in an upper room of the Sankoré mosque, filled with dusty volumes, and a table was laid with flatbread, goat cheese and cups of thick eghajira.

The men gave Aguibou the barest of nods – something of which he approved, emperor though he was – and seated themselves at the table. They were veiled, which Aguibou also approved; he knew they didn’t do it for modesty’s sake, but it was still fitting that men would cover their faces before God. He regarded them as he sipped a ladle of the eghajira, the tang of the goat cheese contrasting with the sweetness of the dates and milk.

“You have come for judgment?”

“We have, sidi.” The men at the table launched into a story of an ancient dispute over an oasis; generations ago, their two tribes had come to an agreement over its use, but one held that the land had been sold while the other argued that there had only been an ijarah – an easement or lease – and that the right to use the oasis had now reverted to them.

“Were there documents, when the contract was made?”

“No, sidi, there were not.” Aguibou had expected that; few of the desert Tuaregs were literate, and even fewer had been when the tribes had made their pact.

“Were the words of the agreement passed down, then?”

Both men answered at once, spelling out the contract as told to them by their ancestors. The words weren’t the same, and Aguibou had no way of telling which of them remembered the pact correctly – if, indeed, either of them did.

“I will have to consult the ulema on this,” he said; the dispute had passed beyond pure contract law, which he could judge himself, into the law of evidence or even the weighing of competing traditions. There should be more than one judge for this dispute, and the judges should be greater scholars than he was.

And besides, he reflected, my triumph is that they’ve come to me in the first place.

Once, in the early days of the war, Aguibou’s troops had turned away Tuaregs and Bedouins at the border, lest the French chase them onto his territory. But then the front lines in the desert had moved north, and those to the south were now static by unspoken mutual consent, with the French unable to attack and the British unwilling to pay the price of pushing into Senegal or the French Sudan. There was no more danger in accepting embassies from the desert – and with France pushed out of its farcical Kingdom of the Arabs, and no one else to rule in its place, the tribesmen had grown used to taking their disputes to him.

And now, refreshed, he took the chieftains up to the minaret, where they looked out over the city while the ulema was summoned. He could see the dark waters of the Niger, and the ancient houses, and the smokestacks of the factories in the new city to the east, selling their wares to the Malê. Somewhere in there was another embassy, not from the clean desert but from the hucksters in Ilorin. It was a part of the city that Aguibou didn’t care to think about, but he suddenly realized that it seemed less threatening.

Usman Abacar was clever when he came here and set up his embassy [3], but he didn’t see everything. The Malê leader had thought that if he took his case to the townsmen and the industrialists, they would force Aguibou to do his bidding. But the townsmen weren’t all the people, and Aguibou too had been able to find new horizons; the men of the desert were well suited to the scholars’ and herders’ commonwealth that his father had envisioned, and they added to his strength as Usman had added to the industrialists’.

I need the factories, he thought, watching the smoke rise to the pale sky, but I won’t surrender to them. We’ll build the future together.

*******

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The place where Sergeant Salifou Mindaoudou stood had once been a village – he could tell by the burnt remains of huts, the jumble of stones that had once surrounded a well, the thorn-fence growing out from the few places where the fire hadn’t touched it. He didn’t know whether the village had been destroyed by the advancing French or by the Sultan’s own army in retreat, and it hardly mattered now. It had been that kind of war.

There were rules, and both the French army and that of Bornu had largely kept to them, but that hardly mattered either. Three years of scorched-earth warfare, back and forth across the country, took their toll with the best of intentions. The battle deaths had been the least of it; far worse had been the privation, hunger and disease that had followed in the armies’ wake. Bornu had survived, and was even victorious, but the price didn’t bear thinking on. The wise men said that a sixth of all the people who’d lived in Bornu before the war were dead now, and the books and records confirmed that a third of the soldiers were.

And so there were villages like this one, all over the Sultan’s realm. No one knew where the villagers had gone; some were surely dead, others taken refuge with friends or strangers, still more with the armies or the labor battalions in the cities. They, and the citizens of a thousand other villages, were scattered like the dust, far beyond anyone’s ability to gather them together again. Which was why Sergeant Mindaoudou and his company were here.

They were soldiers no longer. Peace had come to Bornu; the fighting was in Algeria now, and it looked like there wouldn’t be much more to it. The army was being reduced to peacetime strength, and those who remained were being sent, troop by troop and company by company, to resettle the land. This would be home now; Mindaoudou and his men, and the camp-followers and children who trailed after them, would rebuild it together as Belloists ought to do.

At least the war taught us what Belloism was really about. In the Peace Before, as people were calling it now, it had become enmeshed in rituals and trappings; the wise men speaking at the assemblies, the ritual teachings in village squares, the sultan ostentatiously paying his labor-tax. It had taken the war for the sergeant to remember what Belloism truly was: communities working and praying together, learning from each other and teaching their neighbors. His company had become that; he wasn’t afraid to ask help from his soldiers, and at prayer, camp-followers and cooks were equal to the commander.

Mindaoudou looked around the ruined village, and he could see the others doing likewise: assessing, planning, deciding which of the myriad tasks of reconstruction would have to be done first. It seemed overwhelming, especially to those already exhausted from the last four years’ trials, but they’d survived the war, and they would survive this too.

Belloism started in places like this – villages on the frontier, communities built from barren ground. We will restart it here. Together.

_______

[1] See post 1924.

[2] See post 1133.

[3] See post 1644.
 
Wonderful update, again, really gonna miss these when the war is over. Although I have to say you've really succeeded in turning this world into a living breathing place, the Great War was amazing from a world holding point of view.
 
Great update.

A big difference between OTL and TTL is that in OTL many of the newly independent African states were effectively used as testing grounds for fashionable political and economic theories from the 'North'.

Whereas in TTL we've seen and are still seeing more 'organic' political and economic ideas grow from the local areas themselves.

But what will happen when these different systems come into competition with each other?

We're already seeing it between Abcarism and Tallism (if that's the right description of the herder/scholar ideology) and we could well see competition between Belloism and Tallism in the newly 'liberated' Kingdom of the Arabs and French Mauretania.
 
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Wow, France is having its arse kicked accross Africa now.

What's happened viz Madagascar, the French islands in the Indian Ocean, and North America by now?

I do wish we'd get to the end of this war soon, so we could have some more maps. :p:eek::D
 
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