(If your regional accent has its own sheep-counting words, does this cross the line into dialect?)
That's because the strategy changed to bypassing strong Japanese positions whenever possible. Most of the Japanese army in the South Seas was left to "Rot on the vine". The Australian effort was fully tied in with the Americans. Most of the aircraft, landing craft, warships, and logistical support was American, and MacArthur directed strategy. The Australians weren't off on their own having "Fun" with the Japanese.Do not mistake the Australian effort for the US's. After the battle of the bridgeheads, this weren't as hard as you are assuming. New Guinea was a bit of a backwater as far as the Japanese were concerned.
Australia was increasingly sidelined by Washington. Washington did not want to share the victory table with anyone. After the ANZAC declaration, Washington was aware that the two Pacific Dominions were not going to fall into line and do as they were told. Hence the Australians were sent to the islands, out of the way places which they the US had already bypassed. Canberra was forced to accept a secondary role as a consequence. Macarthur wasn't interested in using the Australians, any more than Washington was. New Guinea was to him a route to the Philippines, nothing more. It wasn't important to the USN. To the Japanese, it was a place from which they could threaten Australia. It was a savage, remote place. As to who was or wasn't committed to the theatre is ultimately immaterial. They died there. Simple as that. The Japanese lied to themselves that they could make a go of conquering the place. America told itself lies as well. Australia was under no illusions. It was a tough, hard place to live, let alone fight in.That's because the strategy changed to bypassing strong Japanese positions whenever possible. Most of the Japanese army in the South Seas was left to "Rot on the vine". The Australian effort was fully tied in with the Americans. Most of the aircraft, landing craft, warships, and logistical support was American, and MacArthur directed strategy. The Australians weren't off on their own having "Fun" with the Japanese.
New Guinea was a backwater for the Americans, the front door for the Australians, and a major theater for the Japanese Army. In late 1942-1944 it was the major focus of IJA strategy, with far more being put into it than Burma, only China had more troops devoted to active military operations there. Most of the IJAAF was committed to the theater, and thousands of aircraft were lost there.
Just what were the ANZAC's being told to do that they didn't want to do? Basically, it was agreed they wouldn't fight north of the equator. The liberation of the Philippines, and the final drives against Japan were American concerns. Australia was a country with a small population that had already made outsized contributions to the war effort. Some of the operations they engaged in during the last few months of the war were really unnecessary.Australia was increasingly sidelined by Washington. Washington did not want to share the victory table with anyone. After the ANZAC declaration, Washington was aware that the two Pacific Dominions were not going to fall into line and do as they were told. Hence the Australians were sent to the islands, out of the way places which they the US had already bypassed. Canberra was forced to accept a secondary role as a consequence. Macarthur wasn't interested in using the Australians, any more than Washington was. New Guinea was to him a route to the Philippines, nothing more. It wasn't important to the USN. To the Japanese, it was a place from which they could threaten Australia. It was a savage, remote place. As to who was or wasn't committed to the theatre is ultimately immaterial. They died there. Simple as that. The Japanese lied to themselves that they could make a go of conquering the place. America told itself lies as well. Australia was under no illusions. It was a tough, hard place to live, let alone fight in.
It was committed to see the war through. Personally, I think they should have just packed up their gear and stayed at home, once they had freed their own territory and told the Poms and the Yanks where they could put their colonies where the sun did not shine. However, we don't and cannot shirk our duties as easily as other countries can. Once we partake in an alliance, we stick with it and make it work, more fool us.Just what were the ANZAC's being told to do that they didn't want to do? Basically, it was agreed they wouldn't fight north of the equator. The liberation of the Philippines, and the final drives against Japan were American concerns. Australia was a country with a small population that had already made outsized contributions to the war effort. Some of the operations they engaged in during the last few months of the war were really unnecessary.
What you are misunderstanding is how each combatant viewed New Guinea. To Australia it was important because it was the doorway to northern Australia and a part of the Australian nation. To the Japanese it was important because it offered them a doorway to Australia and it was a doorway for the allies to strike at the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. To the Americans it was a route back to the Philippines that American imperial possession which wasn't. America didn't want New Guinea at all apart from as a stepping stone to the Philippines. The Japanese didn't make a tremendous effort to hold it, once they had it, they were unwilling though, to let it go but they didn't commit the huge forces you assume they had to it.I don't understand your point about what everyone committed to New Guinea is immaterial. Each sides level of commitment is what gave the battles there its strategic significance. As with any island it was very difficult to defend without sea, and air control. The Japanese made such a major effort to hold it because it commanded the southern approaches to the Southern Resources Area. That made it vital to Japan's defensive strategy, and a critical factor in the war in the pacific.
Thank you Nevarinemex, a link to a lovely set of photos of the old workshops
and^^^^ More than two sides in this Cold War.
Eyes weren't only on Japanese activities, the British authorities had major concerns about the growth of communism among the Chinese in Malaya, especially in the emerging trade unions, Malay nationalism, the state of Terengganu being a hot bed, and Indian links with Nationalists back in India.Can this mean that the Indian Nationalist movement is already penetrated by Japanese Intelligence? I would surmise that Sentul group is passing along the information to the Fujiwara unit? However, this could all be exposed to rodent interrogation counterintelligence methods developed by an Eric Blair in Burma...
I do not think that is the word you meant to usereached out and shocked hands,
The problem of defending South-East Asia in a nutshell - every port, airfield, oil well or settlement you garrison is a further strain on very limited resources, while every one you don't garrison is a freebie for the Japanese.Beforehand he’d been driven out to see Kuching airfield, a major dilemma in their strategic thinking. From here maritime recon could cover a large part of the South China Sea, being much better placed than the Dutch based at Pontianak, 125 miles southwest. But first Percival was saying he didn’t have enough troops spare to defend it, while Park was saying he didn’t have any aircraft to base there. Both unhelpfully said possibly in time to come, provided further reinforcement happened.
Percival did visit Borneo, which was part of his command. Brooke Popham (Lord Gort) travelled more, to Hong Kong, Manila, Australia, Burma and the Dutch East Indies, visiting some places several times.OTL, did Percival or other top staff general make such a similar inspection tour?
To my mind, this trip becomes more fuel for the fire to act sooner. Time may run out before preparatory action can occur though.
Another deliberate mistake spotted!, thank you, and duly editedI do not think that is the word you meant to use
Lord Gort was a notorious practical joker and was almost certainly using one of these (possibly/maybe!)I do not think that is the word you meant to use
The problem of defending South-East Asia in a nutshell - every port, airfield, oil well or settlement you garrison is a further strain on very limited resources, while every one you don't garrison is a freebie for the Japanese