I understand your logic, but if you don't challenge the Luftwaffe in France their aircraft can go elsewhere, like Malta & North Africa. As far as logistics are concerned it's easier to support an air offensive based in England than from bases where everything has to be shipped into first. Besides France had many strategic targets that needed to be hit, including naval forces involved in the Battle of the Atlantic.I clearly don't get it at all. To my mind this was the RAF needing to do something to justify their very resource hungry expanding air force. The flights over France started well before any German invasion of Russia, with little strategic value to me, they were just going, looking for trouble. I know shipping was a major problem, but some of these wasted resources could have been better used in Malta and North Africa.
The British knew of the plans for Barbarossa about a week after Hitler and his 'Gang' had given the go ahead (August 1940) and had a very good idea what the movement of German forces meant so simply saying that the RAF acted for seemingly obscure reasons ignores what they saw coming.I clearly don't get it at all. To my mind this was the RAF needing to do something to justify their very resource hungry expanding air force. The flights over France started well before any German invasion of Russia, with little strategic value to me, they were just going, looking for trouble. I know shipping was a major problem, but some of these wasted resources could have been better used in Malta and North Africa.
I doubt that; daylight attacks by German bombers would only happen if the Germans removed a large part of their airforce from the Eastern front.In hindsight a wing of Spitfires or 3 could (and almost certainly should) have been released to Malta/North Africa - but without hindsight, it would have been a foolish decision.
That's what happened at the end of 1941. A whole Luftwaffe air Corps went to Sicily to bomb Malta.I doubt that; daylight attacks by German bombers would only happen if the Germans removed a large part of their airforce from the Eastern front.
I think that had as much to do with the Russian winter as the need to support Romel.That's what happened at the end of 1941. A whole Luftwaffe air Corps went to Sicily to bomb Malta.
The Luftwaffe fought on during the winter fighting around Moscow. They made the decision to send the Fliegerkorps II to Sicily because attacks on Axis supply convoys to North Africa were becoming critical.I think that had as much to do with the Russian winter as the need to support Romel.
The RAF Rhubarb's where a complete waste of time and resources not because the concept was bad but because the Bomber Barons where focused on area bombing German cities (and the countryside is several other countries) at night. This meant the the RAF fighter sweeps didn't have many bombers with them meaning the Germans could choose not to come up and play. Had the British conducted an escorted bomber offensive against French airports, transport infrastructure and ports, the Lufftwaffe would have had to at least try to contest these attacks. It also has the potential bonuse of actually having a chance to hit the targets with bombs! Also causing the transfer of fighters and AA away from the East and possibly convincing the Germans that the British were contemplating a Sealion in reverse 3 years early causing strategic reserves to be held back, just inncase! [I'M NOT, I REPEAT NOT SUGGESTING A BRITISH INVASION OF FRANCE IN 1941!]
I've seen an anecdote somewhere many years ago about an RAF fighter commander complaining the German radar was so good that they could distinguish fighters from bombers, as they didn't try to intercept fighter only sweeps. The scientist asked what speed the fighter only sweeps operated at...The RAF Rhubarb's where a complete waste of time and resources not because the concept was bad but because the Bomber Barons where focused on area bombing German cities (and the countryside is several other countries) at night. This meant the the RAF fighter sweeps didn't have many bombers with them
R.V. Jones "Most Secret War" which also includes the rationale for the sweeps.I've seen an anecdote somewhere many years ago about an RAF fighter commander complaining the German radar was so good that they could distinguish fighters from bombers, as they didn't try to intercept fighter only sweeps. The scientist asked what speed the fighter only sweeps operated at...
I had agreed to go to the Headquarters of No. Eleven Group at Uxbridge, to advise them what they could do about the German radar, which was detecting the ‘Rhubarb’ fighter sweeps the Group was carrying out in the Pas de Calais. When I arrived I met a party headed by Air Commodore Harcourt Smith in the chair and including Wing Commander ‘Sunshine’ Wells, in peacetime a grammar school headmaster from Gravesend way, but now Chief Intelligence Officer of the Group. My hosts were adamant that the Germans must have developed a new form of radar that could detect bombs in aircraft. When I asked them for their evidence they said that they carried out two kinds of sweep. One included a few Blenheim bombers, which represented the ‘teeth’ while the other was exactly similar, except that it consisted purely of fighters. The main aim of these sweeps was to get the German fighters to come up and fight, in the hope of gradually wearing them down and establishing air superiority. This had at first been fairly successful but now the fighters would only come up if the bombers were present and the problem therefore was how the Germans could detect six or so bombers in the presence of fifty or a hundred fighters. The theory was that somehow the German radar could see the bombs in the aircraft.
When I assured my hosts that as far as I knew about German radar, or indeed any other radar for that matter, it did not have the ability to achieve such a feat of detection, I was then challenged to say how the Germans could possibly know the difference between the one kind of sweep and the other. There was a silence while I thought, and then such an obvious solution occurred to me that I hardly dared to make it. Finally I said ‘Bombers have not got the speed of fighters. When the fighters are escorting the Blenheims, do they slow down?’
I think I read it 40 years ago; it's nice to know that my memory is not too bad.R.V. Jones "Most Secret War" which also includes the rationale for the sweeps.
Same here this was from memory but I also bought the ebook version so I can quote.I think I read it 40 years ago; it's nice to know that my memory is not too bad.
What really should've tipped them off was that they did the same thing during the Battle of Britain. The Germans sent out fighter sweeps which Fighter Command ignored.Same here this was from memory but I also bought the ebook version so I can quote.
andI think I read it 40 years ago; it's nice to know that my memory is not too bad.
Ah no doubt when you both were a couple of young whipper snappers!Same here this was from memory but I also bought the ebook version so I can quote.
You have to keep in mind that the Japanese had a good spy network in Malaya, and they had good air recon. If the beaches are heavily fortified most of the invasion force would come in via Thailand. They'd also know about new units going into Malaya and adjust their plans accordingly.1941, Tuesday 05 August;
Convoy WS 9AX eased slowly by under the big guns at Changi, passing the islands of Pulau Tekong and then Pulau Ubin to starboard, winding their way down the 20 miles of the Johore Straits to the Naval base, carrying over 3,500 men to boost the Malaya garrison. Two of the ships had been part of WS 9A, having left the UK in early June, stopping at Durban, before sailing on along the eastern side of Africa, until near the Horn of East Africa, where they had detached, and crossed over to Bombay. Joining them in Bombay were the two Indian troopers, SS Erinpura and SS Ellenga
HMS Durban led them in, having escorted them on the last leg of the voyage from Colombo, providing safety from the German raiders prowling the Indian Ocean. For the Empress of Japan, (later to be renamed Empress of Scotland for obvious reasons), once her Singapore passengers had disembarked, she would sail on to Hong Kong and Shanghai, while for Capetown Castle, once unloaded, it was to be a quick week’s worth of dry docking in Keppel Harbour for a bottom scrap, and then onwards with civilian passengers to Sydney. For the two Indian troopers, it would be back to Bombay, before resuming their shuffle, to and fro with the Suez.
On board Erinpura and Ellenga was a large draft for the Indian Army, many destined for the expanding Indian Artillery Regts in Malaya, the 57th Madras Sappers & Miners Field Company, to join the 41st Indian Bde in Kelantan, and another two battalions of Indian Aux Pioneers, the 24th and 29th, both of whom were going to Batu Caves for an additional month of training. The UK ships carried Royal Navy and Army drafts, as well as a large contingent of RAF, mostly groundcrew for the Article XV squadrons. Also, the empty bunks of personnel who had left the ships in India had been partly filled with men returning from the Middle East, mostly wounded, heading back to Australia and New Zealand, their war now over, due to their injuries, or a very long convalesce required.
But also with the returning wounded was a small number of transfers from the Middle East, Australian, British, Indian, men that would be taking a promotion, and at the same time adding some experience into the formations they were joining. They weren’t many, and some were still recovering from wounds, but it helped redress the milking of experienced men that had happened previously. Examples were Lt Stanley Dunstan, of the Leicestershire Regt, who was leaving the 1st Bn, to join the 2nd in Malaya, promoted to Captain, Sgt Victor Babbs, 2/4 Australian Infantry was taking an officer’s course in Singapore, while Corporal Edward James, promoted to Sgt, was leaving the 7th Medium Regt RA, for the 6th Medium RA in Malaya.
Sailing independently, over a dozen cargo ships had arrived over the last couple of months, more than one a week, most from the UK or Canada, but some from Australia, India and South Africa. Carried in them was an assortment of war material, including crated Hurricanes and other aircraft, aero engines, ASDIC sets, guns, specialist equipment, spare parts, and vehicles of various sizes and shapes including 40 South African constructed Marmon Herrington MK III armoured cars, the first of an agreed substantial number to be provided for Malaya. These cars were to equip a yet to arrive Australian cavalry regt.
But the arrival of one man would have gone unnoticed, had I not pointed him out to you. Too junior to be flown out, Brigadier Ivan Simson, recently appointed as the new CRE for Malaya Command, had arrived with the convoy, fresh from the Scottish Command in the UK. What he would discover, once having been briefed by his predecessor Brigadier JAC Pennycuick, was that what resources not used on the airfields and radar stations, or the upgrading of port and railway facilities, was used on beach defences at Mersing, Kuantan and Kelentan or on the rudimentary defences laughingly called the Jitra line. However, Simson’s skills as a up to date fortifications expert were going to shortly be put to work, as efforts to build a real defensive line for Malaya were to be doubled, in response to the growing threat.
You have to keep in mind that the Japanese had a good spy network in Malaya, and they had good air recon. If the beaches are heavily fortified most of the invasion force would come in via Thailand. They'd also know about new units going into Malaya and adjust their plans accordingly.
Yes, the Japanese will know the broad strokes of the changes, they probably however will miss just how much the the Imperial units have become better organised/trained ( both sides will tend to underestimate the other ). However logistics is the Achilles Heel of any invasion plan, the infrastructure is just not there to supply more units than OTL.You have to keep in mind that the Japanese had a good spy network in Malaya, and they had good air recon. If the beaches are heavily fortified most of the invasion force would come in via Thailand. They'd also know about new units going into Malaya and adjust their plans accordingly.
Isn't that perhaps part of the intention?
The more they fortify the South, the further North they incentize the Japanese to land. Just talking out loud but in FC's TTL, that means a greater distance between the landing areas to allied air fields (which means they can stay in action longer prior to being overrun) as well as with TTL's additional aircraft those longer supply lines become much more vulnerable to air interdiction (the value of which having already been learned in North Africa).
The only "critical infrastructure" present in most ports consisted of a pier...I wonder if the new CRE will ensure that there is a "demolitions plan" for all at-risk ports to ensure all cranes and other critical infrastructure are destroyed upon sighting any invasion force?
The Japanese had good landing craft similar to American Higgens boats, with drop ramps that can bring in supplies over a beach. They were very good at improvising and making do with less than Western forces would normally require.The only "critical infrastructure" present in most ports consisted of a pier...