Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Perhaps Singapore is used as a "Rest area for Subs and crews from the Med.. Send them to Singapore for longer refits and crew rest, or instead move older boats from the UK itself.
and
Depends on the logistics and equipment needed. Resources to maintain a small subron are one thing. Having a setup where there could be multiple boats coming and going, and taking up space in Singapore yards or drydocks might stretch things. Easier for subs to rest at a safe port in Egypt, or for a lot of stuff faster, cheaper, and more logistically practical to return to various bases in the UK proper as in OTL.

That's one thing overlooked at times, it's not necessarily the boats themselves, it's the ability to supply and maintain those boats so that they're actually usable. It's not just that 4 subs where moved to Singapore, though glossed over ITTL, likely a few dozen or so extra personnel would have needed to be assigned to shore installations in Singapore to help maintain and supply those 4 boats.

Hi Butchpfd, I agree with Viper91 on this, but its worth noting that a lot of the Royal Navy ships operating in the Med were given repairs and refits at Singapore
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Singapore was lost in 1936 when Italy joined the Axis. The British had a home fleet, and a Med fleet, but they didn't have a third fleet to send to Singapore. The Washington treaty in 1922 made that impossible.
Hi Belisarius, I think that's a bit premature to suggest. If France had been able to hold the German Blitzkrieg, the French Navy would have been able to cancel the Regia Marina, Germany would be restricted to sorties out into the North Sea, and Britain could have put a sizeable fleet out in the Far East. And France falling was way beyond most peoples dreams (or nightmares).
 
MWI 41072407 Further Transfers From Hong Kong

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 24 July;

The small convoy SK.3 split in two, one part headed into the Johore Straits, bound for the naval base. The boom defence ship, HMS Barlane opening the gate, allowing them to pass in single file. They were led in by HMCS Prince David, who was becoming a regular visitor to Singapore these days. The Canadian AMC was carrying air and ground crew for another forming Article VX squadron, RCAF 406, who would become a fighter squadron. In the ten days leading up to this, three more Canadian chartered steamers had arrived, their cargo holds loaded with Canadian built Hurricane aircraft, Ford and Chevrolet trucks, cement, steel products and a significant number of small arms and ammunition.

A small troopship followed her in, on board was the rest of the 2/14 Punjab Regt, two machine gun companies of the Middlesex Regt, and some more HKSRA artillerymen transferring to the Indian Army. Again, there were a few cadets for the Singapore OCTU, and a score of Royal Navy dockyard personnel, along with their families, transferring to the Singapore Naval base from the one in Hong Kong. The 2/14 Punjab would soon be moving onto Mersing, eastern Johore, while the Middlesex would move on up to Kuala Lumpur. Lastly came the river gunboat HMS Scarab, which would become the defence ship for Singapore.

The other three ships of the convoy anchored in Singapore Roads, awaiting supplies and fuel, before they continuing their journey onto Penang tomorrow. HMS Scout, who had shepherded the convoy on the entire journey from Hong Kong, and was now changing station to Singapore, would continue to escort the small tanker and a Chinese tramp steamer.

The small tanker, had aboard the last two MTBs, where they would complete the reforming of the 2nd Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla, with HMS Siang Wo as base depot ship. Siang Wo’s conversion had been similar to Whang Pu, although less extensive, as she would be depot ship to light forces, not submarines. The eight MTBs comprising of the 2nd MTB flotilla, were made up of six built by Scott-Paine, and two older Thorneycroft type, and the flotilla was commanded by Lt Cmdr G H Gandy RN (Rtd).

The last ship, the Chinese tramp steamer, had maintained a little distance from the rest of the convoy, as not only was she carrying three 6-inch coastal guns from the Stonecutters Island battery, and their associated equipment, as well as two 9.2-inch taken from other batteries, but she had a considerable amount of munitions as well. The steamer would be discharging some of her munitions, along with all the guns, at Penang, before returning to Singapore, to discharge the rest of the munitions.
 
1941, Thursday 24 July;

The small convoy SK.3 split in two, one part headed into the Johore Straits, bound for the naval base. The boom defence ship, HMS Barlane opening the gate, allowing them to pass in single file. They were led in by HMCS Prince David, who was becoming a regular visitor to Singapore these days. The Canadian AMC was carrying air and ground crew for another forming Article VX squadron, RCAF 406, who would become a fighter squadron. In the ten days leading up to this, three more Canadian chartered steamers had arrived, their cargo holds loaded with Canadian built Hurricane aircraft, Ford and Chevrolet trucks, cement, steel products and a significant number of small arms and ammunition.

A small troopship followed her in, on board was the rest of the 2/14 Punjab Regt, two machine gun companies of the Middlesex Regt, and some more HKSRA artillerymen transferring to the Indian Army. Again, there were a few cadets for the Singapore OCTU, and a score of Royal Navy dockyard personnel, along with their families, transferring to the Singapore Naval base from the one in Hong Kong. The 2/14 Punjab would soon be moving onto Mersing, eastern Johore, while the Middlesex would move on up to Kuala Lumpur. Lastly came the river gunboat HMS Scarab, which would become the defence ship for Singapore.

The other three ships of the convoy anchored in Singapore Roads, awaiting supplies and fuel, before they continuing their journey onto Penang tomorrow. HMS Scout, who had shepherded the convoy on the entire journey from Hong Kong, and was now changing station to Singapore, would continue to escort the small tanker and a Chinese tramp steamer.

The small tanker, had aboard the last two MTBs, where they would complete the reforming of the 2nd Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla, with HMS Siang Wo as base depot ship. Siang Wo’s conversion had been similar to Whang Pu, although less extensive, as she would be depot ship to light forces, not submarines. The eight MTBs comprising of the 2nd MTB flotilla, were made up of six built by Scott-Paine, and two older Thorneycroft type, and the flotilla was commanded by Lt Cmdr G H Gandy RN (Rtd).

The last ship, the Chinese tramp steamer, had maintained a little distance from the rest of the convoy, as not only was she carrying three 6-inch coastal guns from the Stonecutters Island battery, and their associated equipment, as well as two 9.2-inch taken from other batteries, but she had a considerable amount of munitions as well. The steamer would be discharging some of her munitions, along with all the guns, at Penang, before returning to Singapore, to discharge the rest of the munitions.
So, I take it that your striping Hong Kong because it's a lost cause, and moving stuff to Singapore? Ok. The British had troops in Hong Kong as a political statement that it was part of the British Empire, and the British would fight for it. At this time the British are still thinking in terms of deterring Japan, not making the hard decisions about what could ultimately be saved. In July 1941 that wasn't a message the British wanted to send to Japan, or the citizens, and residents of Hong Kong that they'd been written off. Now you can do that, but there will be a political cost.
 
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So, I take it that your striping Hong Kong because it's a lost cause, and moving stuff to Singapore? Ok. The British had troops in Hong Kong as a political statement that it was part of the British Empire, and the British would fight for it. At this time the British are still thinking in terms of deterring Japan, not making the hard decisions about what could ultimately be saved. In July 1941 that wasn't a message the British wanted to send to Japan, or the citizens, and residents of Hong Kong that they'd been written it off. Now you can do that, but there will be a political cost.
tell the public that these are old guns being removed to second line positions and that newer bigger and better guns will be arriving soon, plus with there being a hot war in europe/north africa you can say that it is just a part of shuffling units around?
 
The hard decision on Hong Kong had been made years earlier, the various War Memorandum (East) reports had all written off Hong Kong even in the early 1930s prior to Japan invading China.

Churchill didn't believe it could ever hold and wanted a 'symbolic' garrison at Hong Kong in January 1941 and probably earlier, that was just the first date I could find. So stripping Hong Kong is entirely in line with his OTL position, the argument is just how small you can go and still be 'symbolic'. His note suggested a couple of battalions would be fine and they could be from the local regiments.
 
tell the public that these are old guns being removed to second line positions and that newer bigger and better guns will be arriving soon, plus with there being a hot war in europe/north africa you can say that it is just a part of shuffling units around?
You could say that, but I don't think too many people would believe it. As war clouds gather a lot of Europeans would leave Hong Kong, which is probable for the best anyway.
 
Hi JIM, logistics are the key for everyone, but you're right to point out how the Japanese can manage with less.
Yes they can, and for a shockingly long time by Western standards of the time. But once their logistics snap the Japanese fighting strength declines fast due to them having so little on them to begin with. That can be utilized by the British commanders.
 

Driftless

Donor
The hard decision on Hong Kong had been made years earlier, the various War Memorandum (East) reports had all written off Hong Kong even in the early 1930s prior to Japan invading China.

Churchill didn't believe it could ever hold and wanted a 'symbolic' garrison at Hong Kong in January 1941 and probably earlier, that was just the first date I could find. So stripping Hong Kong is entirely in line with his OTL position, the argument is just how small you can go and still be 'symbolic'. His note suggested a couple of battalions would be fine and they could be from the local regiments.
The Commonwealth forces that remain in HK also go on frequent public displays of troop numbers and equipment, even if its all smoke an mirrors. It wouldn't fool the Japanese, but maybe mollifies some of the locals.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Hi Belisarius II, TheNewIKB, El Pip and Driftless, re the strategy of Hong Kong's defence, see posts 2 and 86. For the stripping of Hong Kong's defences, see posts 432, 873 and the recent 1475. For the remaining defences of Hong Kong, including the raising of a Chinese Regt, see posts 424, 484, 687 and 1279 for where we are now.
 
Shifting the forces ment for Hong Kong to Malaya is, to me, one of the more plausible things that can be done. A lot of those forces where ment to be in the western Pacific regardless, picking Malaya over Hong Kong isn't that big a stretch. Likewise, finding a couple thousand second hand rifles to arm a couple ad hoc battalions of Hong Kong locals is much easier then finding a few dozen extra tanks for Malaya.

I think if you're going to have even a small force of submarines, the key will be how and where to use them. Kota Bharu in northern Malaya is to me the obvious location where a good sub skipper could have the biggest impact right out of the gate. Take out even one of the three invasion transports early on, even if most of the troops aboard are still ultimately rescued and put ashore later, you'd still kill a number above OTL Japanese losses, and there's a good chance that a lot of supplies and heavier equipment will be lost.

Even if the Japanese successfully land and force a British retreat, it could easily create a situation where the British can conduct a more orderly retreat, possibly move some supplies and equipment that couldn't be taken OTL, and if need be, have time to either set up a few booby traps on the way out, or otherwise conduct some last minute sabotage.

Or even if British forces withdraw no better then OTL, it might create a situation where unbeknownst to them, the Japanese landing force, even in victory, could be so weakened that they have no ability to successfully conduct further operations for several days until reinforcements can be brought in.
 
Shifting the forces ment for Hong Kong to Malaya is, to me, one of the more plausible things that can be done. A lot of those forces where ment to be in the western Pacific regardless, picking Malaya over Hong Kong isn't that big a stretch. Likewise, finding a couple thousand second hand rifles to arm a couple ad hoc battalions of Hong Kong locals is much easier then finding a few dozen extra tanks for Malaya.

I think if you're going to have even a small force of submarines, the key will be how and where to use them. Kota Bharu in northern Malaya is to me the obvious location where a good sub skipper could have the biggest impact right out of the gate. Take out even one of the three invasion transports early on, even if most of the troops aboard are still ultimately rescued and put ashore later, you'd still kill a number above OTL Japanese losses, and there's a good chance that a lot of supplies and heavier equipment will be lost.

Even if the Japanese successfully land and force a British retreat, it could easily create a situation where the British can conduct a more orderly retreat, possibly move some supplies and equipment that couldn't be taken OTL, and if need be, have time to either set up a few booby traps on the way out, or otherwise conduct some last minute sabotage.

Or even if British forces withdraw no better then OTL, it might create a situation where unbeknownst to them, the Japanese landing force, even in victory, could be so weakened that they have no ability to successfully conduct further operations for several days until reinforcements can be brought in.
My darling for Kota Bharu is the 2nd MTB Squadron that was ITTL withdrawn from Hong Kong being based there

For me its an obvious position for it (its a relatively small port)

And the 2 Insect class gun boats Cicala and Moth also withdrawn based on the West coast of Malaya doing 'river gun boat' stuff and also able to act as supply and even troop transports with their shallow draft
 
My darling for Kota Bharu is the 2nd MTB Squadron that was ITTL withdrawn from Hong Kong being based there

For me its an obvious position for it (its a relatively small port)


And the 2 Insect class gun boats Cicala and Moth also withdrawn based on the West coast of Malaya doing 'river gun boat' stuff and also able to act as supply and even troop transports with their shallow draft

Putting the MTB's in Khota Baru is definitely going to create a significant tripwire as it's unlikely the Japanese would leave such vessels alone when they make their first moves..... thinking that installing at least a significant number of light-medium AAA around where they are docked would be wise as it would guarantee any attacking aircraft would take meaningful losses.
 

Driftless

Donor
And the 2 Insect class gun boats Cicala and Moth also withdrawn based on the West coast of Malaya doing 'river gun boat' stuff and also able to act as supply and even troop transports with their shallow draft

A different avenue for a Special Boat Section/Commando/Chindit/Raider insertion and pickup?
 
Putting the MTB's in Khota Baru is definitely going to create a significant tripwire as it's unlikely the Japanese would leave such vessels alone when they make their first moves..... thinking that installing at least a significant number of light-medium AAA around where they are docked would be wise as it would guarantee any attacking aircraft would take meaningful losses.
A different avenue for a Special Boat Section/Commando/Chindit/Raider insertion and pickup?
Its about 60 NMs from Pattini as well easy for them to race off and 'have a butchers hook' and be back inside of 4 hours

And yes plenty of opportunity for 'ungentlemanly warfare'
 
Hi Belisarius, I think that's a bit premature to suggest. If France had been able to hold the German Blitzkrieg, the French Navy would have been able to cancel the Regia Marina, Germany would be restricted to sorties out into the North Sea, and Britain could have put a sizeable fleet out in the Far East. And France falling was way beyond most peoples dreams (or nightmares).

Another option is the France fights on senario, where French North Africa, the overseas colonies, and the Fleet fight on.
 
Yes they can, and for a shockingly long time by Western standards of the time. But once their logistics snap the Japanese fighting strength declines fast due to them having so little on them to begin with. That can be utilized by the British commanders.
Only if the British know how few the Japanese are, and how short they are of supplies. Once the fighting started the Commonwealth forces were throw so off balance, they couldn't tell what they were dealing with. With the enemy seemingly all around them they thought they had to be outnumbered. Being conservative, and conventional thinkers, they couldn't imagine the Japanese would go into a major operation unless they had adequate supplies. After all they'd never run such risks, so, how could the Japanese.

In the ACW the cavalry forces of Nathan Bedford Forrest consistently ran circles around superior Union forces and had them convinced he outnumbered them. On several occasions he had them so demoralized they surrendered after only putting up token resistance. The object of strategy is to overcome the enemies will to resist. If you defeat the enemy in his mind you don't need to defeat his body.
 
Putting the MTB's in Khota Baru is definitely going to create a significant tripwire as it's unlikely the Japanese would leave such vessels alone when they make their first moves..... thinking that installing at least a significant number of light-medium AAA around where they are docked would be wise as it would guarantee any attacking aircraft would take meaningful losses.
AAA units are in global short supply. Don't count on shooting down many planes. If 10 planes attack the MTB base you might shootdown 1.
 
AAA units are in global short supply. Don't count on shooting down many planes. If 10 planes attack the MTB base you might shootdown 1.

Shooting down a few planes wouldn't hurt, but the biggest issue at Kota Bharu is that the Japanese have a light cruiser and 4 destroyers along with a few smaller auxiliary escorts. The MTBs would likely do ok against the transports and light escorts, but the cruiser and destroyers would rip them to pieces.

Depending on if a sub or two could damage the landing force enough, even if the Japanese still land and drive the British off, albeit with likely much heavier then OTL casualties, the MTB flotilla could launch a night raid and shoot up the beach. Might not kill many of the invasion troops, but that would be a good way to take out supplies and small boats and landing craft along the beach.
 
Shooting down a few planes wouldn't hurt, but the biggest issue at Kota Bharu is that the Japanese have a light cruiser and 4 destroyers along with a few smaller auxiliary escorts. The MTBs would likely do ok against the transports and light escorts, but the cruiser and destroyers would rip them to pieces.

Depending on if a sub or two could damage the landing force enough, even if the Japanese still land and drive the British off, albeit with likely much heavier then OTL casualties, the MTB flotilla could launch a night raid and shoot up the beach. Might not kill many of the invasion troops, but that would be a good way to take out supplies and small boats and landing craft along the beach.
This is a case of names not being representative, on paper its a cruiser and 4 destroyers but in reality they are very small, old and modified. Its more a destroyer and 4 gunboats when you take into consideration the effects of the modifications to carry troops. Their guns are not that fast firing or fast traversing so highly vulnerable to torpedo boats.
 
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