MWI 41070412 Operation Etonian
1941, Friday 04 July;
It had first reared its ugly head when they looked at the defence of Malaya back in late December. There was no getting away from it, militarily, the most attractive option by far was an occupation of the Kra Isthmus. Sitting back and just defending Malaya left them exposed to so many dangers. In the West, the Jitra line, while politically acceptable to most, still surrendered away the state of Perlis, while physically, lying across padi fields made its occupation wet, with shallow trenches, and exposed to air attack, a less than attractive proposition. And in the East, defending the airfields at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedak, the only line of supply for the state of Kelantan was the single-track railway running down through the mountain range, assuming they didn’t have complete control of the seas, and, given they would be facing an invasion, was a certainty, which left a large part of the Army very much out on a limb.
Increasingly Gort’s mind had turned to an advance into the Kra Isthmus as answer to all his problems. But he also drew from his experiences in France. He wanted his forces to have clear objectives, a plan they could follow with no hesitantly. And secondly, he wanted a clear understanding of when he could order such an advance. Well, the political decision to give him the executive power to order such an advance was something he’d have to work on elsewhere. So, for now he just wanted a feasibility study, undertaken in secret, with just a few officers involved.
In the initial meeting today there was just Percival, Malaya Command, who would mastermind the plan, Wann, RAF 223 Group, with Park’s blessing, in charge of air operations, Godwin-Austen and Murray-Lyon of III Indian Corps, along with Gort, who would set out the main objectives for the advance. They would then have the weekend to consider what officers they assign to the task, the group first meeting on Monday to start planning in earnest. Intelligence, RAOC and RASC would be involved as well as HQ officers. Gort was giving them just a month to plan it, although the units to be used would in the main not be identified as yet. He’d considered bringing in Bennett, but he didn’t trust the Australian not to create some problem or another, along with the fact he was very friendly with the Sultan of Johore, a fact that caused some concerns over security.
The basic idea was to call for a quick, 48-hour, advance into Thailand, occupying the port of Songkhla, and the lesser port of Pattani, both their airfields, the Hat Yai rail junction, and as far up the peninsula as was possible. The plan was to be called Operation Etonian. Gort himself, meanwhile, was being given an office at the Naval Headquarters on Monday, within the Singapore Naval Base, allowing him to spend some time there, co-locating with Layton, commander of the naval forces, improving their understanding of each other’s ways of working.
It had first reared its ugly head when they looked at the defence of Malaya back in late December. There was no getting away from it, militarily, the most attractive option by far was an occupation of the Kra Isthmus. Sitting back and just defending Malaya left them exposed to so many dangers. In the West, the Jitra line, while politically acceptable to most, still surrendered away the state of Perlis, while physically, lying across padi fields made its occupation wet, with shallow trenches, and exposed to air attack, a less than attractive proposition. And in the East, defending the airfields at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedak, the only line of supply for the state of Kelantan was the single-track railway running down through the mountain range, assuming they didn’t have complete control of the seas, and, given they would be facing an invasion, was a certainty, which left a large part of the Army very much out on a limb.
Increasingly Gort’s mind had turned to an advance into the Kra Isthmus as answer to all his problems. But he also drew from his experiences in France. He wanted his forces to have clear objectives, a plan they could follow with no hesitantly. And secondly, he wanted a clear understanding of when he could order such an advance. Well, the political decision to give him the executive power to order such an advance was something he’d have to work on elsewhere. So, for now he just wanted a feasibility study, undertaken in secret, with just a few officers involved.
In the initial meeting today there was just Percival, Malaya Command, who would mastermind the plan, Wann, RAF 223 Group, with Park’s blessing, in charge of air operations, Godwin-Austen and Murray-Lyon of III Indian Corps, along with Gort, who would set out the main objectives for the advance. They would then have the weekend to consider what officers they assign to the task, the group first meeting on Monday to start planning in earnest. Intelligence, RAOC and RASC would be involved as well as HQ officers. Gort was giving them just a month to plan it, although the units to be used would in the main not be identified as yet. He’d considered bringing in Bennett, but he didn’t trust the Australian not to create some problem or another, along with the fact he was very friendly with the Sultan of Johore, a fact that caused some concerns over security.
The basic idea was to call for a quick, 48-hour, advance into Thailand, occupying the port of Songkhla, and the lesser port of Pattani, both their airfields, the Hat Yai rail junction, and as far up the peninsula as was possible. The plan was to be called Operation Etonian. Gort himself, meanwhile, was being given an office at the Naval Headquarters on Monday, within the Singapore Naval Base, allowing him to spend some time there, co-locating with Layton, commander of the naval forces, improving their understanding of each other’s ways of working.
