Malaya What If

[Parma]

Besides the shipyard, and ship repair facilities in Singapore there were well equiped ship repiar facilities in the Dutch East Indies. The Droogdok Maatschappij Tandjong Priok (Tanjung Priok dry dock company) had a floating dock of 4000 tons and a floating dock of 8000 tons and since the thirties a slipway for new build ships.
Next to this private company the Royal Netherlands Navy facilities had several bases in the East Indies in Soerabaja and Tandjong Priok and several smaller, some of them with very well equiped facilities for maintenance of surface ships, submarines and torpedo's and later floatplanes

 

[Parma]

The British and Dutch are similarly afflicted. They have some wonderful facilities without anyone to use/man them. Well, anyone but the Japanese. When did ABDA use Tandlong Priok? I know that Soerbaya and Tjilitjap were used. Thanks

According to my understanding both the private owned drydock company and the Royal Netherlands Navy facilities were in full use, there for I can only conclude they were well staffed and manned with skilled labor. No difference I think for the Malaya facilities.

 

[Butchpfd]

I am curious as to whether Tanjung Priok could have hosted the surface elements of US Asiatic Fleet. Or does this congest the port facilities too badly? Further reading/research indicates that Soerbaja facilities though still in development, would be better suited for submarines. In the OTL the Asiatic Fleet are deployed southward in September 1941. The Navy Department was displeased when ADM Hart returned to Cavite in November 1941. Perhaps if they were not refugees things go better?

Hart moved the Asiatic fleet south in September for training and see what worked in the DEI,as well as working up Cebu as a secondary base.. he had to return to Manila in November to do maintenance on his ships. Hart only had 2 Destroyer Tenders, 2 Sub Tenders, 1 General Stores ship and 2 Oilers for his fleet train. Hart had no Repair Ship, no Ammunition ship. The only dry dock that could take his cruisers and train was the Dewy Dock in Manila Bay, or the British docks at Singapore. Hart had the Dewy moved for it's safety to Mirivales on Baatan. The Navy was concerned, but not willing to give Hart any more auxiliaries or Destroyers to protect them. Hart had 13 WW I 4 pipers for destroyers, Barely enough for fleet operations, without trying to protect the auxiliaries.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Hart moved the Asiatic fleet south in September for training and see what worked in the DEI,as well as working up Cebu as a secondary base.. he had to return to Manila in November to do maintenance on his ships. Hart only had 2 Destroyer Tenders, 2 Sub Tenders, 1 General Stores ship and 2 Oilers for his fleet train. Hart had no Repair Ship, no Ammunition ship. The only dry dock that could take his cruisers and train was the Dewy Dock in Manila Bay, or the British docks at Singapore. Hart had the Dewy moved for it's safety to Mirivales on Baatan. The Navy was concerned, but not willing to give Hart any more auxiliaries or Destroyers to protect them. Hart had 13 WW I 4 pipers for destroyers, Barely enough for fleet operations, without trying to protect the auxiliaries.

Are you sure that Hart moved back to Manila because the DEI bases were insufficient? At that point the DEI was still in neutral-mode so would'nt service British or American ships anyway. The Combined Strike Force operated from Soeroebaja en Batavia.

 

[Driftless]

A bit of a side bar to the Malaya discussion, but was there any real contingency plans for moving the Dewey dry dock south to a safer location? I know you need a genuine repair yard to get full utility from that drydock, so there's that, but a floating drydock is no resource to waste.

 

[gallen95]

Freemantle or Brisbane?

Also, moving her was not a fast endeavor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Dewey_(YFD-1) . And, work on other ships could not be done at the same time, although you possible move the ex-Brooklyn at sametime.

 

[Logan2879]

@Fatboy Coxy

When you got time read this:

What if Singapore Had not fallen?

I found this topic in the internet and was thinking that this a good topic disccusion what do you think? What If Singapore Had Not Fallen? BY MARK GRIMSLEY 12/1/2010 • BATTLE FILMS, BATTLE OF SINGAPORE, FALL OF FRANCE At the start of World War II, Singapore had symbolized the British Empire’s...

www.alternatehistory.com

Maybe some information could help. Also it talks about the drydock USS Dewey

 

[Butchpfd]

Here are a couple of questions. Would the metric-Imperial measurements be an impediment? Likewise, is there an electrical issue between 50 and 60 cycle AC to consider? I would be curious to know whether these questions were being bandied about in the preliminary conferences between the British and Dutch. If these can't be addressed, it may make matters more moot.

Yes, the measurements difference would be an issue. Screws, nuts, bolts, tools would all be problems, let alone mechanical systems , electrical wiring , pumps, generators. British and American 8" are not cross-compatable. Dutch 150mm shells will not fit USN or RN 6" guns USN and RN 6" are likewise not cross-compatable. Dutch Bofors 40mm shells will not fit RN 40 mm 2lbr, nobody else uses USN 1.1" /28mm . USN 5"/25 and 4"/40, I'm not sure onDutch and British 4' and 4.7"/

 

[Butchpfd]

Then there were these modest considerations...

1941 Pacific Typhoon Season – Cyclone History

www.cyclonehistory.com

http://navsource.org/archives/14/0701.htm

I'm not sure if there are ocean-going tugs or tankers capable/available for towing during the transit. At five knots, I'm guessing five weeks
minimum to Freemantle. maybe six weeks to Brisbane? It's going to take plenty of planning and coordination of resources. Apparently
it took YFD-1 Dewey about six months to transit from (?) Newport News, VA to Subic.

A similar time requirement for WS convoys from the UK to Singapore? The enormity of the task is mind boggling. And what if the planners
are wrong in their assumption? Dominican and not Aden cigars?!?

Yes, 6 month Norfolk via Canaries to Gib., to Suez to Ceylon, to Singapore, to Manila; towed by a large collier and a Supply ship , with 2 tugs steering, relieved by a cruiser so other vessels could do maintainance. The only USN ships West of Hawaii to tow Dewy Dock would be CA Houston, CL Marblehead, AS Canopus or Otus, AD Black Hawk or AV Langley. Dewy dock was 14,600 tons, with a lift capacity of 13, 000 tons and 550 foot . There were no USN Fleet tugs West of the US West Coast.

 

[Butchpfd]

Thank you. I've been wondering where the Asiatic Fleet actually deployed in September 1941. Did ADM Hart acquire knowledge as to what might work in the NEI? It sounds like the upkeep on the DD's was preferred at a US yard; the metric vs. Imperial issue? There was a book about the USS Houston, where it is mentioned that there was a scheduled installation for radar sets.

From the photo sources that I've found for Tanjung Priok, it had some resemblance to the Embarcadero piers in San Francisco. Or maybe Pier 7 in Manila. Proper for cargo and passenger purposes, but not so much a wartime hub. Still it's much better than Subic, Mariveles, Cebu City, Davao,

Tawi-Tawi or Tutu Bay I would think.

Re: USN Asiatic Fleet; Cavite was maxed out in size that is why the USN was moving basing to Olopongo (future post war Subic Bay Naval Base) and Marivales on Baatan. Larger space, deep water, and at Marivales conditions to build protected muntions and fuel stores. All the Asiatic Fleet could get at Java was food, and Fuel. Ammunition and repair stores were in the P.I. Black Hawk and 4 DD were at Borneo preparing, as of 6 December 1941 Far East Time to transit to Singapore to provide additional escort to Adm Phillips.
As to the question about Houston, yes there was a radar set and an additional pair of Quad 1.1's at Cavite, but the war warnings and then outbreak of war prevented their installation. Nothing was heard of the radar or guns after the bombing of Cavite.
Hart knew that he had no ammunition on Java and no way to move any quantity there in a workable timeframe, spare parts were at Olopongo, or Cavite, or on the Asiatic Fleets tenders Ammunition was at Cavite onboard warships or tenders, with the exception of 3" which IIRC had been moved to Marivales. The only

 

[vetinari]

There was also Darwin, a port that all too often gets forgotten in your musings. Houston was ported there several times to replenish ammunition and fuel in late '41/early '42. While it wasn't capable of repairs it was sufficiently important to warrant the Japanese attacking it on 19 February 1942.

 

[general]

There was also Darwin, a port that all too often gets forgotten in your musings. Houston was ported there several times to replenish ammunition and fuel in late '41/ear;y '42. While it wasn't capable of repairs it was sufficiently important to warrant the Japanese attacking it on 19 February 1942.

And with a larger force than used at Pearl Harbour.

 

[Butchpfd]

Some comments on Adm. Hart and the Asiatic Fleet. A. it was small, especially it's surface force, it was a show the Flag /trip wire force, the striking power was the submarine force, which was failed by faulty MK XIV torpedoes which Hart by direct orders was not allowed to do live firings of so it's multitude of faults did not show up until war broke out and combat shots were taken. B. An inadequate supply basing ( nothing outside the Manila area) and inadequate Fleet train something the entire USN suffered from until early to mid 1943. C. No decent commander or budget for the 16th Naval District covering the entirety of the P.I. until early 1941. ( At that time Naval Districts were parallel commands, not always under the local Fleet Command.) D. not enough Naval aviation Hart wanted more PBY's as well as his own combat air and AAA, to protect his bases, however that was the duty of the U.S. Army, under MacArthur, as was mine laying , something the army was reluctant to do outside the Manila area. E. Last but not least Hart was until the outbreak of the war subordinate to the Supreme Commander U.S. Forces Far East; Douglas MacArthur who forbid close in submarine and PBY patrols of Formosa or the Japanese Mandates.

 

[Driftless]

(snip)No decent commander or budget for the 16th Naval District covering the entirety of the P.I. until early 1941. ( At that time Naval Districts were parallel commands, not always under the local Fleet Command.) D. not enough Naval aviation Hart wanted more PBY's as well as his own combat air and AAA, to protect his bases, however that was the duty of the U.S. Army, under MacArthur, as was mine laying , something the army was reluctant to do outside the Manila area. E. Last but not least Hart was until the outbreak of the war subordinate to the Supreme Commander U.S. Forces Far East; Douglas MacArthur who forbid close in submarine and PBY patrols of Formosa or the Japanese Mandates.

*Highlighted phrase above* One of many ironies about the defense of the PI in 1941-42, is that the US Army's own long -standing tactical assessment was that the most likely landing area for a Japanese invasion was at Lingayen Gulf. That's where the Japanese landed in 1941, just as Gen Liggett predicted 25 years earlier.

.....If only some minefields had been laid..... Not enough to defeat the landings in force, but perhaps more time is gained for a better organized defense. A longer fought campaign in the PI also may lead to less resources flowing to the Malayan campaign.

 

[CB13]

Some comments on Adm. Hart and the Asiatic Fleet. A. it was small, especially it's surface force, it was a show the Flag /trip wire force, the striking power was the submarine force, which was failed by faulty MK XIV torpedoes which Hart by direct orders was not allowed to do live firings of so it's multitude of faults did not show up until war broke out and combat shots were taken. B. An inadequate supply basing ( nothing outside the Manila area) and inadequate Fleet train something the entire USN suffered from until early to mid 1943. C. No decent commander or budget for the 16th Naval District covering the entirety of the P.I. until early 1941. ( At that time Naval Districts were parallel commands, not always under the local Fleet Command.) D. not enough Naval aviation Hart wanted more PBY's as well as his own combat air and AAA, to protect his bases, however that was the duty of the U.S. Army, under MacArthur, as was mine laying , something the army was reluctant to do outside the Manila area. E. Last but not least Hart was until the outbreak of the war subordinate to the Supreme Commander U.S. Forces Far East; Douglas MacArthur who forbid close in submarine and PBY patrols of Formosa or the Japanese Mandates.

What was the justification provided for the order to not do live firings?

 

[Ltlconf]

Again, loving the attention all are paying here to the ugly reality of transit distances, times, the fuel eaten up by such, the lack of interchangeable spare parts and ammunition types (and calibers), torpedo faults amongst the US submarine command, and the piss poor command set up on the US side. Fine in peace time, as it kept interservice rivalry to a manageable level, but in wartime it was a utter clusterfuck. But to be fair that was something that could be fixed only in the aftermath.
Also, mining and patrolling the airspace and waters of a power you are still ostensibly at peace with? Not something your government would appreciate. Yeah, in HINDSIGHT MacArthur would've been smart to do so, but it would've pissed off Washington DC, he was under pressure from his employers in Manila to placate the Japanese as well, and the guy tended to play the safe game politics wise. As for mining home waters? Agreed, probably should've done it, but first local fishing boat that gets blown up as collateral damage BEFORE December 7th is going to be a VERY nasty story...which is likely why it wasn't done.
We tend to ALWAYS judge these things with 20/20 hindsight, but I remember what it was like for me before and after 9/11. Before, I didn't see the warning signs. After? I slammed my head into the proverbial desk for not seeing them clearly, because they were so OBVIOUS! Thus I tend to give these guys more slack.
Even that egotistical asshole MacArthur.

Also, I may point out sometimes their radios sometimes couldn't even talk to each other! One of the funniest traits of comms gear of the day, I've read. How common it was, I don't know, but it happened.

 

[Rescribor]

What was the justification provided for the order to not do live firings?

Costs , limited scale of production (up to 250 per year) of replacement torpedoes and bureaucratic infighting. Essentially, Bureau of Ordnance insisted that only their tests can be correct, and if the Navy wants to waste some torpedoes, let them say to Congress which budgetary items they will go without, to pay for manufacturing those extra torpedoes.

 

[Ltlconf]

Costs , limited scale of production (up to 250 per year) of replacement torpedoes and bureaucratic infighting. Essentially, Bureau of Ordnance insisted that only their tests can be correct, and if the Navy wants to waste some torpedoes, let them say to Congress which budgetary items they will go without, to pay for manufacturing those extra torpedoes.

And while that sounds small minded and petty, Congress at the time, due to the Depression and the sheer scale of money spent elsewhere on social programs believed vital to keep the nation afloat, the military was just not a priority. When the military finally was, well, there was just a sheer FUCK TON of priorities and torpedoes were again low on the totem pole budget wise. Just not sexy enough. Money was it seems poured into surface and air assets. All fleets tended to ignore the sub arm initially. Even the Germans tried to it seems!

Mind you, of all the naval powers, it looks to me that only the Japanese entered the war with a high quality submarine torpedo (not the Long Lance, that was a destroyer torpedo), and maybe the Italians right behind them. The RN torpedo, well, worked, which considering the US and German issues is definitely a vast improvement, but it wasn't a world beater. So this doesn't seem to be a unique issue and that torpedoes, unless given a vast amount of money and time investment in R&D, tend to be problematic. The Japanese and Italians did during the interest years, while the other navies of the world either showed various degrees of neglect or lacked the resources.
On the other hand Japanese sub doctrine sucked serious donkey nuts so it was a wash while the Wallies had time to perfect their doctrine and fix their flaws. Thus, their badly undersized and overworked fleet trains sailed about (often, though not always) ignored by well armed Japanese subs who were instead aimed at Allied warships who had built up two years doctrinal experience fighting U-boats (if often green on practical experience). By late '44, the IJN sub fleet barely existed...same with their merchant marine.

 

[Butchpfd]

What was the justification provided for the order to not do live firings?

Bureau of Ordinance had issued fleetwide orders, all commands, including Hart's were
not to spend the money and waste expensive torpedoes on tests we ( The Newport torpedo factory Mafia) have conducted. Tests and live firing was allowed with the MK X torpedoes carried by the S Boats. the USN would have been far better off if all subs were set up for the excellent MK X (It really worked). When the Sub tenders Holland and Otus evacuated they carried primarily MK XIV torpedoes. After over 200 torpedoes and sub launched mines were destroyed in the bombing of Cavite all the available torpedoes were on the Canopus at Miravales a mix of MK Xs and MK XIVs.

As a side note, twice previously in his career Hart had tangled with the Newport torpedo Mafia, who had FDR's political ear, and it had hurt his career.

 

[Butchpfd]

Was it noted at the ABDA pre-conferences that there was such disparity in support capabilities?

Yes it was, the problem again was getting the supplies to where it was needed. Again the lack of an Ammunition ship and Repair Ship and a second general cargo in the Asiatic Fleet was telling.
As it was Hart had to charter and modify the Liners Presidents Harrison and Madison to evacuate the 4th Marines something done on the 27th and 28th Of November. Hart had wanted these forces as well as those in North China and as many American civilians as possible, evacuated, starting in July, however Washington dithered around until the November war warning came out.