Malaya What If

[Amir]

And here we are, back at the beginning.

I really want to know, what armored force/British tanks/British armour are we talking about exactly? Please tell me. I wish I was sarcastic, but I really want to know is there an availlable unit to be dispatched to Malaya?

Sure-

3rd Indian Cavalry Regiment arrived in late JAN 42 with a reinforcing squadron of Vickers Mk II and Mk VI Indian pattern light tanks. Probably not soon enough to salvage the situation on the mainland, and they were held as a counterattack force in any case. getting those (very) light tanks any earlier with the rest of 11th Indian could have opened up some possibilities. They‘re not tank killing tanks, per se, but it meets the qualifications of tracks, armor, radio, turreted main armament to give enemy infantry something to worry about and able to move under direct fire to provide support for friendly infantry and sappers .This was around the same time that the Kings Own Hussars we’re sending a Vickers equipped squadron from North Africa to Singapore (diverted to Java after Singapore fell). it’s seems like the organizations are there, it’s a question of time, priorities for shipping, and force allocation. All of which are driven by intelligence estimates, training outcomes (wargaming), and support for requirements. Again, there’s no single item of materiel or trick of training that’s a stand-alone war winner. Given enough time and prioritization of effort a better approach COULD have been crafted that gives Percival the edge he needs to defeat Yamashita.

 

[Errolwi]

Here is one cure for those boring milk runs. View attachment 790304

Kittyhawk Topside by Errol Cavit, on Flickr

 

[Triune Kingdom]

Sure-

3rd Indian Cavalry Regiment-snip.

What additional armoured forces could have been sent is my question, not what went in OTL.

And there is Gort, to whom Percival is subordinate to.

 

[Aber]

What additional armoured forces could have been sent is my question, not what went in OTL.

Tank shipments to the Middle East second half of 1941
https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/02/...eliveries-to-egypt-july-1941-to-january-1942/

Obvious unit from the UK would be 22nd Armoured Brigade (or more likely one of its tank battalions)
https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/sale-collection-voyaging-war

Or one of the battalions in the Middle East reforming after Greece - say 3 RTR. You might even bring Reginald Keller and Bob Crisp.

 

[Triune Kingdom]

Tank shipments to the Middle East second half of 1941
https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/02/...eliveries-to-egypt-july-1941-to-january-1942/

Obvious unit from the UK would be 22nd Armoured Brigade (or more likely one of its tank battalions)
https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/sale-collection-voyaging-war

Or one of the battalions in the Middle East reforming after Greece - say 3 RTR. You might even bring Reginald Keller and Bob Crisp.

Thanks!

 

[Belisarius II]

Yes, I have gone this way to some extent, along with playing more on Britain's need to defend the Far East herself, and not rely so much on the USA.

In Churchill's mind keeping Russia in the war was far higher on his list of priorities than a buildup in Malaya. Churchill, and the general staff thought Malaya was reasonable safe from a Japanese attack. The speed of the Japanese offensive shocked them all. To have them know in advance they were so vulnerable is unrealistic. At the time sending aid to Russia was critical. The situation in the Middle East also had a higher priority with Rommel in Egypt, besides they thought Malaya was poor tank country. In mid 1941 the British were also concerned about the Burma Road, and the war in China.

In 1941 there are so many fires burning they just don't have enough firemen to go around. The crisis developed so quickly it was hard to keep up with it. The invasion of Russia, the Japanese move into Indochina, and the American oil embargo accelerated everything. Underlining all of this is a consistent underestimation of Japanese intentions, and capabilities. Much of this was based on racism, and over a hundred years of superiority over Asian peoples. It was almost unthinkable that Japan could challenge the premiere imperial power in the world in a modern war.

 

[Belisarius II]

Have to disagree on tanks, based on OTL Burma, the presence of even a small number of tanks would greatly reduce the ability of the Japanese to trap troops in encirclements. The entrapping roadblocks were easily broken by even a single tank (Stuarts in Burma) during the retreat as the infiltrating troops had no AT capability.

In Malaya it wasn't that CW Troops were encircled, and trapped, it was they were forced to fall back. One line after another was flanked and abandoned till, they reached the Straits of Johor. Having tanks to help run the roadblocks won't change much, they already had armored cars for that. The Japanese don't need a lot of AT guns, just cut down trees, and lay mines on the roads. That'll take a toll on the tanks over a period of weeks. Keeping up on the maintenance of tanks during one, one-hundred-mile road march after another won't be easy.

Japanese bicycles were more effective than a couple dozen more British light tanks would've been. Japanese air & sea power would also make up the difference. You can't keep the Japanese from landing behind you over, and over again. Defending a long peninsula in the face of an enemy with sea & air control is next to impossible without significant mobile reserves, which the CW Forces didn't really have. The CW Forces simply weren't prepared for the mobility, and tempo of the Japanese offensive any more than they were able to deal with the Germans in 1940, or in the desert at the time. They had to start climbing a steep learning curve before they could really get into the game. Sometimes there just isn't a shortcut.

 

[HJ Tulp]

In Churchill's mind keeping Russia in the war was far higher on his list of priorities than a buildup in Malaya. Churchill, and the general staff thought Malaya was reasonable safe from a Japanese attack. The speed of the Japanese offensive shocked them all. To have them know in advance they were so vulnerable is unrealistic. At the time sending aid to Russia was critical. The situation in the Middle East also had a higher priority with Rommel in Egypt, besides they thought Malaya was poor tank country. In mid 1941 the British were also concerned about the Burma Road, and the war in China.

In 1941 there are so many fires burning they just don't have enough firemen to go around. The crisis developed so quickly it was hard to keep up with it. The invasion of Russia, the Japanese move into Indochina, and the American oil embargo accelerated everything. Underlining all of this is a consistent underestimation of Japanese intentions, and capabilities. Much of this was based on racism, and over a hundred years of superiority over Asian peoples. It was almost unthinkable that Japan could challenge the premiere imperial power in the world in a modern war.

This is a very important post.

 

[Aber]

It was almost unthinkable that Japan could challenge the premiere imperial power in the world in a modern war.

Up to a point...

In January 1921, war plans drawn up against Japan suggested that long-range operations against Australia were unlikely, but that they might take Hong Kong either to keep or to bargain with and that seizing Singapore was possible but unlikely.

 

[Derwent Water]

Of Tanks, Tactics and Roadblocks.

I've been massively enjoying this timeline. I have read with interest the posts over the past coue of pages.

The Japanese preferred tactic when coming across an (always road based OTL) CW defensive position was to pin the defenders while infiltrateing lightly armed infantry around the defensive position to create a road block. The Japanese always impressive in defence made breaking through these blocking positions very difficult and bloody. This caused the CW forces to retreat leaving their heavy equipment and supplies behind. The CW forces got in the habit of being beaten by the Japanese and arrived after a long retreat defeated. The Japanese being always light on supply arrangements arrived at Singapore with very little left and only because they had been living off the land and captured loot.

There are IMO two options to counter the road block. The first is to have some tanks available. Due to the light equipment of the Japanese flanking forces a few tanks could usually break through the road block allowing the trapped forces to escape with most their equipment and supplies. This is the reason Bill Slim was able to get his forces out of Burma as he had an Armoured Brigade (originally being sent to Malaya but diverted once it became apparent that fight was effectively over). A few tanks also make up for the weaknesses of the poorly trained and equiped CW forces allowing them the time to gain the experience they need to fight the Japanese more effectively.

Of course there is a big shortage both of Tanks and the trained men to use them. This is a matter of priorities and expected need. There were some tanks and crews in the UK who could have been sent out to Malaya if it was deemed necessary, especially once Barborossa kicks off making a German invasion of Britain in 1941 even more unlikely. ITTL the command personalities in Malaya are of a higher quality and have more influence in London. Further priorities for Malaya are a little higher. Remembering that in the pre war plans for the defence of Malaya called for 2 tank battalions indicates to me that the some British commanders thought they might be useful and the likes of Gott would. I suspect be pushing for them (especially considering his experiences in France 1940).

The other option is to prepare for anall round defence with flanking infantry patrols to engage and frustrate the Japanese infiltrators. This combined either with the ability to resupply by air (later in the war alas) or to have a powerful counter attacking force to allow the road blocks to be attacked from both sides. IMO I think that the small changes ITTL including (I think) a greater emphasis on training and jungle warfare indicate that ITTL this will be the preferred early tactic.

Of course both of the above tactics are made effective by combining them together. If as I suspect, the Japanese offensive will be slower and bloodier for the Japanese there is every reason to believe that the British will hold out longer allowing the OTL substantial reinforcements to attive including tanks.

 

[CB13]

What exactly did the Japanese light infantry use as road blocks? Did they cut standing trewles to fall across the road?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What exactly did the Japanese light infantry use as road blocks? Did they cut standing trewles to fall across the road?

My understanding is that they used felled trees to create an abatis covered by LMG and 'Knee' Mortars as well as snipers and other small arms from dug in positions

These roadblocks prevented movement of all motor transport and could not even be crossed by Universal Carriers

Had M3s or British cruisers/infantry tanks been present then they would have made short work of the defenders

What the 14th Army discovered in Burma was that such roadblocks were manned by soldiers who had moved cross country and as such lacked much in the way of heavy weapons, ammunition or indeed food and water and were just as cut off as the enemy they sought to disrupt and so any serious combined arms attack on the roadblock would defeat it.

The main problem in 1942 was that the CW soldiers and officers in theatre were generally of poorer quality and experience than the Japanese soldiers and as such the Japanese 'got away with it' with the CW forces fearing that they were cut off and overestimating the size of the blocking force abandoning their positions and much of their heavy kit/motor transport (not to mention wounded) and moving around said roadblocks on foot with only what they could carry drastically degrading the fighting ability of said unit.

 

[CB13]

My understanding is that they used felled trees to create an abatis covered by LMG and 'Knee' Mortars as well as snipers and other small arms from dug in positions

These roadblocks prevented movement of all motor transport and could not even be crossed by Universal Carriers

Had M3s or British cruisers/infantry tanks been present then they would have made short work of the defenders

What the 14th Army discovered in Burma was that such roadblocks were manned by soldiers who had moved cross country and as such lacked much in the way of heavy weapons, ammunition or indeed food and water and were just as cut off as the enemy they sought to disrupt and so any serious combined arms attack on the roadblock would defeat it.

The main problem in 1942 was that the CW soldiers and officers in theatre were generally of poorer quality and experience than the Japanese soldiers and as such the Japanese 'got away with it' with the CW forces fearing that they were cut off and overestimating the size of the blocking force abandoning their positions and much of their heavy kit/motor transport (not to mention wounded) and moving around said roadblocks on foot with only what they could carry drastically degrading the fighting ability of said unit.

Just to fully understand the tactic involved, was the main issue the large distances between the Commonwealth defensive points? So that once the Japanese had cut through jungle and into their flanks, they literally had a 20+ km section of uninhabited road with which to pick a spot for their roadblock? And critically they had time to set up those roadblocks unmolested?

Thank you again, Matthew. 🍻

 

[Ramontxo]

My understanding is that they used felled trees to create an abatis covered by LMG and 'Knee' Mortars as well as snipers and other small arms from dug in positions

These roadblocks prevented movement of all motor transport and could not even be crossed by Universal Carriers

Had M3s or British cruisers/infantry tanks been present then they would have made short work of the defenders

What the 14th Army discovered in Burma was that such roadblocks were manned by soldiers who had moved cross country and as such lacked much in the way of heavy weapons, ammunition or indeed food and water and were just as cut off as the enemy they sought to disrupt and so any serious combined arms attack on the roadblock would defeat it.

The main problem in 1942 was that the CW soldiers and officers in theatre were generally of poorer quality and experience than the Japanese soldiers and as such the Japanese 'got away with it' with the CW forces fearing that they were cut off and overestimating the size of the blocking force abandoning their positions and much of their heavy kit/motor transport (not to mention wounded) and moving around said roadblocks on foot with only what they could carry drastically degrading the fighting ability of said unit.

In fact, I may be wrong, but it was not that different from the infiltration tactics China used against Mac Arthur in Korea

 

[Cryhavoc101]

In fact, I may be wrong, but it was not that different from the infiltration tactics China used against Mac Arthur in Korea

Yes and the better troops were able to fight their way clear

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Just to fully understand the tactic involved, was the main issue the large distances between the Commonwealth defensive points? So that once the Japanese had cut through jungle and into their flanks, they literally had a 20+ km section of uninhabited road with which to pick a spot for their roadblock? And critically they had time to set up those roadblocks unmolested?

Thank you again, Matthew. 🍻

As I understand it yes

I have always seen the criticism levelled against the CW forces that they were 'road bound'

But that was true of the Japanese as well for the majority of their logistics and troop movement

Any force that has moved cross country is only carrying what they have they have on their backs and can only move at walking pace

The problem with light infantry is that it is "To light to fight and too heavy to move" and cannot be expected to prevail against heavy troops - that is troops with heavy weapons (especially if that includes AFVs and Arty) and transport and better logistics.

(Edit: A good example is paratroopers dropping behind the enemy)

Unless those troops are green and poorly led such as the CW forces in Malaya and Burma in which case the tactic works.

Once there position is know they are pretty much stuck there and in this case dependent on the enemy breaking and abandoning their positions allowing the rest of the Japanese 'heavy' forces to reach them and also the enemy not having forces capable of defeating them

Its the same with the Banzai charge - works really well against lesser opponents, not so good verses trained and experienced opposition with decent weapons such as the USMC on Guadalcanal or some of the better trained Chinese units.

 

[Triune Kingdom]

ITTL the command personalities in Malaya are of a higher quality and have more influence in London. Further priorities for Malaya are a little higher. Remembering that in the pre war plans for the defence of Malaya called for 2 tank battalions indicates to me that the some British commanders thought they might be useful and the likes of Gott would. I suspect be pushing for them (especially considering his experiences in France 1940).

That is something that I did think about, especially when considering what was actually unengaged and in some sort of a "reserve". With greater level of interest from London, especially now that "substantial" reinforcements have made their way in the theatre, there should be some notion of situation there. Due to not only Lord Gorts and other commanders military ranks/titles/importance, but also due to their political and social rank, which really does matter in that time and age.

So hopefully, a tank battalion finds its way to Malaya, all tank models merits and flaws aside, just as long as they arrive in time to be actually useful in their role.


In regards to armoured cars that were present, 6 Lanchesters and unknown number of Marmont Herrington armoured cars;
In July 1942 Lieut. R L Rendle of the FMSFV Intelligence branch wrote a ‘secret’ report on the action of the F.M.S.V.F armoured cars units in Malaya from the 6 – 15th February 1942. He states that the armoured cars were prone to ambush, a skill quickly developed by the Japanese. He does note however that early in the campaign the armoured cars were effective against what he considered ‘irregular’ Japanese troops who were untrained and unequipped to attack armoured vehicles and suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. Notably he reports that second-hand accounts were telling of Japanese troops attacking with magnetised mines and bottle bombs of Nitric Acid in almost suicidal assaults on the armoured cars.

So, for all the faults that AC will have when not used in their intended role, but instead as ersatz tanks, they still could be useful, if there is a good enough reason (and vehicles&etc.) to actually send them there. Rough draft would be something about mechanising the Indian Army, particulary one of its Cavalry rgts., for fighting in the Middle East, by the way of Far East, with training being done in Malaya, by the power of politics?
And the will of the OP.

 

[Derwent Water]

With the greater emphasis on the state of Malaya's defenses perhaps some additional Armoured Cariers Wheeled-Indian Pattern could be made available. An armoured car, addmittedly lightly armed but built in India, shouldn't affect the higher priority areas like the defence of the UK or the Middle East.

Perhaps even the promise of some more armoured cars might lead to some interesting "Tempory" lash ups built in Country for training while they wait for the real thing!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Sure-

3rd Indian Cavalry Regiment arrived in late JAN 42 with a reinforcing squadron of Vickers Mk II and Mk VI Indian pattern light tanks. Probably not soon enough to salvage the situation on the mainland, and they were held as a counterattack force in any case. getting those (very) light tanks any earlier with the rest of 11th Indian could have opened up some possibilities. They‘re not tank killing tanks, per se, but it meets the qualifications of tracks, armor, radio, turreted main armament to give enemy infantry something to worry about and able to move under direct fire to provide support for friendly infantry and sappers .This was around the same time that the Kings Own Hussars we’re sending a Vickers equipped squadron from North Africa to Singapore (diverted to Java after Singapore fell). it’s seems like the organizations are there, it’s a question of time, priorities for shipping, and force allocation. All of which are driven by intelligence estimates, training outcomes (wargaming), and support for requirements. Again, there’s no single item of materiel or trick of training that’s a stand-alone war winner. Given enough time and prioritization of effort a better approach COULD have been crafted that gives Percival the edge he needs to defeat Yamashita.

The 3rd Indian Cavalry Regt arrived in Malaya in November 1941, having recently been mechanized. This was merely exchanging their horses for light lorries, and on arrival were issued with the Marmon Herrington armoured car. Of the initial 16 issued to them, they had damaged 13 with a couple of weeks, such was their poor training.

Your right, a squadron of light tanks, all previously heavily used, arrived in January 1941

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Just to tell you that there is a long discussion in this threads about when, and how, did the Australians (dont know enough to differenciate between Militia, Regular Army etc) got an HE shell for the Two Pounder

Yes, I did follow that, but its not something I can use pre war with Japan, I'm unable to justify a change for that to happen