I don't think you'd need a fire in Singapore. It rarely falls below 25 degrees C there, particularly during Monsoon season.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Sources for that not linked to British leadership that was 3rd rate and still in "time for a gin" mood? War is ongoing in Africa and the Indian regiments there had no issue with fighting spirit (the reverse in fact) plus the recruitment was mainly among the more martial castes/tribes anyway.
In OTL one of the key factors in Malaya was that the Indian Army facing the Japanese was not the Indians who faced the Italians or Germans in North Africa. It was under-trained and poorly led, compared to what had been employed in Africa. The Indians in Malaya were rife with defeatism and were susceptible to the lies that Bose and other Indian revolutionaries told them. With proper training and leadership they were just as good as the older formations but they didn't have time to receive either.
Exactly what I was saying, better leadership/training as ITTL and the OTL issues disappear.
You are mispresenting the strategy even of OTL. It was, if Perceval had not dithered, to be in three phases. First launch Operation Matador into Thailand. This would have slowed down the Japanese if successful, the next step was a bit like the Soviets wanted to do (and the Russians had done in 1812), bleed the invaders whilst trading ground to keep forces as intact as possible. All done in the expectation of reinforcements arriving as well as the Monsoon. Last phase would have been to counterattack once sufficient force had arrived, after the Monsoon, driving the invaders back. In no case was it supposed to be, fall back to Singapore and fort up.
Now OTL the Japanese shortcut this by a combination of being able to advance at high-speed, disregarding logistics and a lot of luck in capturing supplies/boats/key locations quickly. Troops that are better trained, know jungle is not impenetrable and have tactics to counter infiltration, will slow the Japanese up. This makes the wheels fall off, if the Japanese don't get to Singapore at OTL speed (as they were all but out of supply by then), they have no option but to pull back to a position they can get decent supply to and pause. This would almost certainly mean the Monsoon stops play and the momentum shifts. (It also means the Burma Campaign almost certainly does not happen as its supplies will have been used to try and force the way to Singapore. So, no Bengal famine and the Japanese having to guard against an attack from the West)
As for the amphibious landings, these need two things the Japanese are likely to be short of, boats (most OTL were captured ones rather than part of the Japanese force so slowly advance means less are likely to be found) and a panicking, lethargic unprepared opponent (a competent commander could easily block the assaults as they would not have much supply or heavy equipment, let alone use proper landing craft). Remember also the longer Singapore holds, the more submarines are going to cripple the Japanese logistics which are marginal to start.
The Japanese cannot just attack Sumatra, they lack everything. OTL the attack was launched after Singapore fell, mainly using forces that had taken Singapore. This because as long as Singapore holds, its near impossible to attack from anywhere but Java. However, the only way to take Java whilst Singapore holds, is by marching across it from the East. Which then brings up the big flaw in the Japanese concentric attacks plan. If they are still fighting heavily in Malaya and so using up all the supplies they can get hold of, they will have very little supply left over for the Central attack which is needed to reach a position to even attack Java from the East.
As you can see, once the Japanese start getting behind schedule or take heavier than expected losses, it quickly becomes a total train wreck. Their plan only works if everything goes right, which it did in OTL. Once things go wrong, it collapses as forces from earlier operations are supposed to be used for later ones. This also is the case for the logistics which assume the fighting has stopped in the earlier operation and so most of its supply operations can be transferred.
The invasion at Palembang was launched the day before the surrender of Singapore. It only needed to neutralise Singapore as a base of operations. This had been done much earlier than mid-February.
This is simply not true. The Japanese were thundering through the center (taking Balikpapan on the 24th of January) and through the east (Ambon 30 January, Timor 19th of February). What you are saying is the same thing Wavell and his incompetent staff was saying: throw everything at Singapore! It was foolish then, it's not much better now.
I have serious doubts about that. The Japanese weren't going to starve as they could requisition food in Malaya. Of course that's not the case with bullets and the like but the Commonwealth forces will have to improve a lot if it wants to be capable of an effective counterattack.
Now that is an interesting question. How quickly will the British decide that even the small amount of resources and supplies being sent to the Malaya and Burma should instead be redirected to help the Soviets? After June 1941 what can and will be sent to Singapore and Rangoon?
The amphibious moves were on the west coast of Malaya. So the only watercraft the Japanese had there must have been captured, unless they brought some down from the west coast of Thailand (seized there from local Thais).
I think an argument can be made ITTL for slightly less British Lend Lease being sent to the Russians in the second half of 1941 due to the greater understanding of the weakness of the British position in the Far East in London. This small increase in surplus supplies and transport allows a bit more than OTL to trickle into Malaya. As this excellent TL is demonstrating little changes can have big impacts.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Mister Nevarinemex, you are out of order sir! I'll have you know that not only is Major General David Murray-Lyon a fine and outstanding officer of his majesty's British Indian Army, but he is also an exponent of bagpipe playing, along with being a connoisseur of cigarettes from Aden. Consider yourself dressed down , and you are not to suggest any such outrageous allegations of any sort of impropriety towards this officer again!
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Historically, the captured Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore didn't respond as well as you might think to the overtures made by Bose and other Indian Nationalists, and I would suggest that most of those who did, did so for such basic things as better food and treatment, and not for any Nationalistic fervour. And I agree, given time they would have been as good as any Indian soldier fighting in North Africa or later in Italy.
One only has to look at the 17th "Black Cats" Division to see how an Indian Division improves over the years
Few units fought the Japanese as often as them starting with them getting a thrashing at Bilin River and Sittang Bridge in 1942 and then took part in the retreat from Rangoon
By the end of the war they were an Elite formation and had fought at Imphal and inflicted blitzkrieg in the Jungle on the Japanese in 1945.
The original version of MATADOR was a higher-level decision, but he was briefed on various smaller versions (basically take the Ledge and blow it up plus various levels of extra delaying actions) and did dither on those. So, when it came to it, the forces were not prepared, sent too late, and the Japanese got there first.
A well flown Hurricane could hit the A6M pretty hard, to say nothing of the Ki-27 and Ki-43. During the Ceylon raid in '42, the few Zeroes that went down to Hurricanes (Hurricanes piloted by tried and true veterans such as Teddy Peacock-Edwards and Dave Fulford) 'disintegrated' under the impact of concentrated .303-calibre fire. I daresay even the Inano Detachment might have had a tough time, had it been, say, the Poles of 303 Squadron flying from Kallang.
IIRC there was a unit of Hurricanes or Spitfires in Malaya flown by seasoned pilots that got crushed by the Japanese because they fought the Japanese like they fought the Germans: by getting in a turn-fight instead of 'zoom and boom'.
Not in Malaya during 1941 or early 42 and not versus IJA KI-27 and the like
but during a daylight raid on Port Darwin vs IJN Zeros and IJA Oscars in May 1943!
Note: the Allied losses were all Australian and almost all inexperienced pilots with no previous combat in the ETO (or even MTO)
Also, even with 5 aircraft running out of fuel during the fight the Australians actually shot down more planes than they lost
but still their ignorance of "boom and zoom" at this late date was inexcusable
(and quietly hushed up by the PM Curtin's government)
Tactics and training were rapidly addressed however
and by late June 43 two small nuisance raids and two similar escorted attacks had been roughly handled with few losses in the air
giving a combat ratio of 12+Japanese fighters and 11+ bombers for 3 Spits (including a landing loss)
The Japanese then abandoned daylight attacks , switching to night bombing
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belated apologies for the multiple edits to complete this post
My Hands, and eyes once again not cooperating very well
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I might be mistaken, but I do believe that Australians lost some aircraft in non-combat related accidents as well.
Eitherway, ITTL Japanese are going to run into an actual, existing air defense system and get wrecked, we have not even got into June, and CW build up is gathering steam. That is not accounting OTL course of events, with USA getting so pissed off that it lays down more tonnage in '41-'45 period, then Japan did from 19th century until 1945.
Doesn't sound right. Only 5 A6Ms and 1 Ki-43 were lost over Darwin in 1943; the win-loss ratio for the Spits was 1 to 1, but only if you include Japanese bombers downed. In terms of pure fighter versus combat, the Japanese had the Spits beat.
Spit losses over Darwin in 1943 were 38 aircraft overall, of which about 15 were lost to mechanical failure/fuel starvation/other operational causes and the rest to enemy action.