MWI 41032700 The ABC Talks
1941, 27 March
The talks were held with total secrecy in Washington, daily, between the 29th January to the 27th March, either in plenary session or broken down into relevant committees. Leading the British delegation was Rear Admiral Bellairs, while the American delegation was led by Rear Admiral Ghormly and Major General Embick
The war, from a British perspective, was looking quite bleak, and seemed to be growing so. What the British most wanted to secure from the United States was commitments to military cooperation, and a joint military strategy, with Germany First, at the top of its agenda. This, Churchill was most adamant about, and the CoS were in line with that.
On the American side, Roosevelt’s military commanders had already expressed their concerns to him about Germany becoming too powerful, and its defeat should be their primary goal, Britain’s efforts to have this point agreed was pushing at an opened door. However, with promises made during a presidential election late last year, commitments were hard to give, as Roosevelt walked the high wire between peaceful cooperation and embroiling the USA into another European war.
However, the talks were much more than just that, with an impressive detail over a whole range of subjects, all planned to either become the de facto arrangement, or an agreement on how things would be conducted, upon the United States entering the war. Much of the detail was worked out quite harmoniously, although at times things had become quite intense, indeed, bruising, an example being the Americans making it crystal clear they would not be moving ships to Singapore, to protect the British Empire.
The differences over the Far East and Singapore were never going to allow the talks to break down, both sides had too much political capital invested, the Americans had to keep Britain in the war, a German dominated Europe was unthinkable, and that meant securing the Atlantic lifeline, while the British were desperate to get the United States on board, and the Far East was, after all, just a risk of war, and one that Churchill was prepared to take.
The quandary the British were in; was that they desperately needed help in the North Atlantic, but at the same time, were looking for the US Navy to be the deterrent against Japan. The grievous merchant ship losses in the Atlantic were something Britain couldn’t sustain, and from the American view, this had to be addressed quite urgently, if Britain was to remain in the war. And not only were the losses due to submarines, mines and aircraft attack, climbing, with the French Atlantic ports in German hands, so German surface warships were now posing a problem. The expectation was things would get worse, the Germans had nearly made repairs to all the ships damaged in the Norwegian campaign, and would soon be commissioning two new Bismarck battleships along with another heavy cruiser.
On reflection, the British, if anything, overplayed their hand with regard to help in the North Atlantic and they had been given more US help than they might have anticipated. However, this left the Pacific fleet weaker, and with their refusal to move to Singapore, created a need for a substantial British force in the Far East. Indeed, the Americans were saying, by providing more capital ships of their own in the Atlantic, surely the British could now release battleships for the Far East. When the British planners explored this idea, the idea that emerged, was of a battlefleet based around Nelson and Rodney, supported by three of the R’s, and Force H, the battle cruiser Renown, and aircraft carrier Ark Royal. Assembling this force would take time however, firstly on when the US major naval units could be deployed, and on the repair and refit of the British ones.
Overall, the ABC talks had been a watershed for the British, a great success, with many far-reaching agreements, endorsing the principle of blockade, a maximum air offensive against Germany, the early elimination of Italy, and above all the principal of Germany First, but with regard to defence of the Far East it was a strategic failure. They lost the opportunity for greater co-operation with the United States in the Far East theatre, which would now devolve into almost a ‘look after your own patch’ philosophy, they had caused the US to weakened the Pacific fleet, and hence its deterrence effect on the Japanese, while on the other hand they had the promises of more than they could want, in the Atlantic, most of which they couldn’t use unless the United States entered the war. It was a mistake that would come back and bite them!
The talks were held with total secrecy in Washington, daily, between the 29th January to the 27th March, either in plenary session or broken down into relevant committees. Leading the British delegation was Rear Admiral Bellairs, while the American delegation was led by Rear Admiral Ghormly and Major General Embick
The war, from a British perspective, was looking quite bleak, and seemed to be growing so. What the British most wanted to secure from the United States was commitments to military cooperation, and a joint military strategy, with Germany First, at the top of its agenda. This, Churchill was most adamant about, and the CoS were in line with that.
On the American side, Roosevelt’s military commanders had already expressed their concerns to him about Germany becoming too powerful, and its defeat should be their primary goal, Britain’s efforts to have this point agreed was pushing at an opened door. However, with promises made during a presidential election late last year, commitments were hard to give, as Roosevelt walked the high wire between peaceful cooperation and embroiling the USA into another European war.
However, the talks were much more than just that, with an impressive detail over a whole range of subjects, all planned to either become the de facto arrangement, or an agreement on how things would be conducted, upon the United States entering the war. Much of the detail was worked out quite harmoniously, although at times things had become quite intense, indeed, bruising, an example being the Americans making it crystal clear they would not be moving ships to Singapore, to protect the British Empire.
The differences over the Far East and Singapore were never going to allow the talks to break down, both sides had too much political capital invested, the Americans had to keep Britain in the war, a German dominated Europe was unthinkable, and that meant securing the Atlantic lifeline, while the British were desperate to get the United States on board, and the Far East was, after all, just a risk of war, and one that Churchill was prepared to take.
The quandary the British were in; was that they desperately needed help in the North Atlantic, but at the same time, were looking for the US Navy to be the deterrent against Japan. The grievous merchant ship losses in the Atlantic were something Britain couldn’t sustain, and from the American view, this had to be addressed quite urgently, if Britain was to remain in the war. And not only were the losses due to submarines, mines and aircraft attack, climbing, with the French Atlantic ports in German hands, so German surface warships were now posing a problem. The expectation was things would get worse, the Germans had nearly made repairs to all the ships damaged in the Norwegian campaign, and would soon be commissioning two new Bismarck battleships along with another heavy cruiser.
On reflection, the British, if anything, overplayed their hand with regard to help in the North Atlantic and they had been given more US help than they might have anticipated. However, this left the Pacific fleet weaker, and with their refusal to move to Singapore, created a need for a substantial British force in the Far East. Indeed, the Americans were saying, by providing more capital ships of their own in the Atlantic, surely the British could now release battleships for the Far East. When the British planners explored this idea, the idea that emerged, was of a battlefleet based around Nelson and Rodney, supported by three of the R’s, and Force H, the battle cruiser Renown, and aircraft carrier Ark Royal. Assembling this force would take time however, firstly on when the US major naval units could be deployed, and on the repair and refit of the British ones.
Overall, the ABC talks had been a watershed for the British, a great success, with many far-reaching agreements, endorsing the principle of blockade, a maximum air offensive against Germany, the early elimination of Italy, and above all the principal of Germany First, but with regard to defence of the Far East it was a strategic failure. They lost the opportunity for greater co-operation with the United States in the Far East theatre, which would now devolve into almost a ‘look after your own patch’ philosophy, they had caused the US to weakened the Pacific fleet, and hence its deterrence effect on the Japanese, while on the other hand they had the promises of more than they could want, in the Atlantic, most of which they couldn’t use unless the United States entered the war. It was a mistake that would come back and bite them!
