Driftless

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How earlier warning in Malaya might have affected US preparations may be moot. Our author has repeatedly implied/stated that he's not appreciably altering US ops - that's outside of the scope of his Malaya TL.

Maybe Admiral Hart gets a bit of a jump, as he had better relations with his British counterparts, and had taken some precautionary actions, but that might be it?
 
How earlier warning in Malaya might have affected US preparations may be moot. Our author has repeatedly implied/stated that he's not appreciably altering US ops - that's outside of the scope of his Malaya TL.

Maybe Admiral Hart gets a bit of a jump, as he had better relations with his British counterparts, and had taken some precautionary actions, but that might be it?
The most we'll probably see is heavier Japanese losses at Pearl, and perhaps at least one battleship being saved. Possibly California.
 
How earlier warning in Malaya might have affected US preparations may be moot. Our author has repeatedly implied/stated that he's not appreciably altering US ops - that's outside of the scope of his Malaya TL.

Maybe Admiral Hart gets a bit of a jump, as he had better relations with his British counterparts, and had taken some precautionary actions, but that might be it?
True, but in case of Hawaii, we are talking about getting a few hours warning of a war overseas. But only 1 hour warning of a submarine attack.

Odds are the only changes at Pearl are ships buttoned up and crews on alert looking for subs. Possibly recalling crews from liberty. The only ships really moving might be additional destroyers to reenforce WARD.

But in the end it is one hour warning, looking down, not up
 
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True, but in case of Hawaii, we are talking about getting a few hours warning of a war overseas. But only 1 hour warning of a submarine attack.

Odds are the only changes at Pearl are ships buttoned up and crews on alert looking for subs. Possibly recalling crews from liberty. The only ships really moving might be additional destroyers to reenforce WARD.

But in the end it is one hour warning, looking down, not up
Hi ,Just how many alerts would have Hawaii had leading up to december ? It would have had an effect
 
The most we'll probably see is heavier Japanese losses at Pearl, and perhaps at least one battleship being saved. Possibly California.
The only thing that might save some of the battleships would be anti-torpedo nets, but no one wanted to put them out. Most of the fighter planes should've been dispersed to outer airfields, with some on alert and others on standing patrols. The PBYs should've been out on patrols at first light, but no one thought an air attack was a realistic possibility despite the fact they had no idea where the Japanese carriers were.
 
The only thing that might save some of the battleships would be anti-torpedo nets, but no one wanted to put them out. Most of the fighter planes should've been dispersed to outer airfields, with some on alert and others on standing patrols. The PBYs should've been out on patrols at first light, but no one thought an air attack was a realistic possibility despite the fact they had no idea where the Japanese carriers were.
I agree, the battleships will still be hit hard. But if the guns are going earlier there may be fewer hits. Considering the very dangerous approach, the Japanese torpedo. Bombers had to make that makes them easy targets.
 
The biggest thing, is that if Kimmel is awakened to news about a possible war in the Far East, then he may have have some alert going. He is probably at his headquarters instead of getting ready for a golf game. This means the WARD’s report should be taken more seriously.

A sub sighting on a peace time Sunday, is an overeager rookie skipper. A sub sighting with shooting near the Philippines is Gunther Prien…
The sub was in a Shoot to kill zone. The skipper of the Ward was sure of the sighting of the sighting , as was the CO of the Antares. The Ward, at 0645, shot and hit and depth charged, and with one 4" hit sank the Japanese mini-sub. The CO of the Ward, notified 14th Naval District HQ ) 0653 hours( his higher Command) who asked for confirmation, when they got confirmation the duty officer @0730 Notified Adm Bloch ,( CO 14th Naval District) ,and alerted the stand by destroyer ( 10 min alert) to get under way, and put the other DDs of the stand by division on 10 minute alert. 0755 attack begins. Communication through channels takes time.
 
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I agree, the battleships will still be hit hard. But if the guns are going earlier there may be fewer hits. Considering the very dangerous approach, the Japanese torpedo. Bombers had to make that makes them easy targets.
PBYs were out on patrol there were only 3 x 14 plane squadrons available, normal was 1/3rd down for Maint. 1/3rd prepping for next day, and 1/3rd on patrol. That means each plane has at it's furthest arc ,has an area of 26 degrees to cover. That means that each plane has 800 mile operational range that means each plane has an in and out range of @300 miles with an arc of @126 miles, leaving a margin for emergencies . Normally the PBYs flew ,depending on the model ,85-100 mph on patrol. That is a lot of area to cover, @ 12,000 square miles of ocean
 
How earlier warning in Malaya might have affected US preparations may be moot. Our author has repeatedly implied/stated that he's not appreciably altering US ops - that's outside of the scope of his Malaya TL.

Maybe Admiral Hart gets a bit of a jump, as he had better relations with his British counterparts, and had taken some precautionary actions, but that might be it?
Hart will get official notification when the RN Singapore gives it to his staffer. CAST and Radio Sangley, will let Hart know when they hear clear traffic and relay intercepted coded traffic to RN staffer at CinCAF HQ, who depending on his standing orders ,may or may not decode transmissions. IMO if Radio Sangley is picking up clear language combat, he probably will decode. We are looking at a 30-60 minute communications lag here. When Hart gets word shooting has started he will IMO do what he did OTL 8 Dec notify dispersed Asiatic Fleet get Pat Wing 10 in the air asap, ships in Manila Area ( Olapango, Miraveles, Cavite, and Manila Bay) on alert and at GQ at 1 hour before 1st light or ASAP depending on time of day. He will begin sorte orders for his subs, who have to be escorted through the mine fields. Then he will contact Mac Arthur's HQ who will tell Hart as they did OTL, they can do nothing until the Japanese make an overt move on the Philippines.
 
Hi ,Just how many alerts would have Hawaii had leading up to december ? It would have had an effect
Hawaii had been on constant alert since November 27th with the War Warning. Army and Navy decided to take a down weekend for R&R and Maint. California was going to undergo a material inspection on the 8th Hawaii time, the Pennsylvania and Arizona were undergoing maint. to get ready for a mid December trip to Bremerton for overhauls and upgrades to radar, AAA, and AA Fire Control. BB Colorado was almost done at Bremerton, and would replace one of the BBs at Pearl.
 
Ignoring Hart for this because his setup is different than the rest of the US Pacific holdings, no one is going to wake Kimmel or Short like IOTL when shooting starts in Malaya. It will be in the morning briefing but not a wake up call unless Adm Hart sends some priority message to Pearl Harbor and Kimmel specifically. Short was out of his loop and he would realize that would cause problems for him from Mac and Washington.
 
The Malaya scenario is far more interesting than the Pearl scenario to me.

The Malaya scenario is about whether Imperialism/Colonialism holds back the oncoming forces of time.
I don't believe that the Dutch and UK can stave off time. However, they may cause mortal damage to the
Japanese Colonial ambitions and receive a brief reprieve.

There may be unctuous behavior by the Colonial Powers if the DEI and Malaya are secured. Especially
when the PI are lost. However, if they do they'll still be financially bankrupt and dependent on The States.

The Pearl scenario is less complex. Once the movie of the USS Arizona igniting, exploding and in flames
is showed in the US movie houses, it becomes elementary. Would you like one nuke or two with your
surrender?
 
MWI 41120703 Phuket Island

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Sunday 07 December, 03.00 Hrs (Singapore Time)

Warren Parsons stood facing Captain Luang Teanprasitsarn, Governor of Phuket Island, his hands open in apology, while he spoke softly in Thai. "It is with great regret," he said, "that Your Excellency must now be detained. This is a temporary measure to avoid bloodshed. All British forces will depart as soon as all foreign civilian residents have been evacuated.

"We are friends," Parsons went on, "and I hope Your Excellency will come to understand the necessity of it all." The Governor did understand: the three men with Parsons in his residence, equipped with Thompson machine guns, grenades, pistols and daggers helped. The presence of his wife, and his young children, who clung to him wide eyed for protection, made sure of it.

For Parsons, the Australian superintendent of a local tin mine, this was the execution of a plan long in the making, which he’d hoped would never be used. During the previous summer he had been approached by SOE. They'd asked him to coordinate a secret party of local residents, organised to evacuate all the tin miners and their families, should war come. In the last four months, a number of engineers and administrators of the foreign tin mining companies had gone on 10-day vacations in Singapore. What wasn’t said was they’d been at "Secret training school 101", learning useful military skills. And as they returned, weapons, a radio, and other equipment had been smuggled in, hidden in oil drums and mining stores, and held in company compounds.

A small committee had taken turns to monitor the radio at pre-set nightly times, awaiting a codeword. Earlier tonight they had received it, and quickly the plan unfolded. Men were mobilised, arms were distributed, and vehicles left compounds. At 1 AM, a mile off Rawai beach, HMCS Prince Henry (recently modified) heaved to, and three of the six US-built Eureka boats she carried were lowered from their davits. The boats then powered their way up the beach and landed 45 Australian Commandos from the 2/2 Australian Independent Company.

Parsons was waiting in a small dusty maroon Peugeot 201 car, with four Bedford WS trucks and their Australian drivers from a local Chinese tin mining company. The Commandos climbed in and they were off. Parsons in the Peugeot with three Commandos drove to the Governor’s residence. Two trucks headed back to Phuket town, while the other two trucks began the 11-mile journey to the only airfield on Phuket Island, at Ban Manik, which the Commandos would quickly secure from the small police guard.

Now the Governor picked up the telephone and began making calls to the harbour office, police station, radio station, and other strategic points, giving orders not to resist. Some of his calls were answered by Commandos already in place. Twenty minutes later, the Governor had finished his calls. Everyone understood their orders; there would be no bloodshed. Parsons, now an acting Lieutenant of Engineers in the Indian Army, felt the relief that the plan had gone like clockwork. It was like a heavy weight lifted off him. Now they just had to await the arrival of the Navy.
 
PBYs were out on patrol there were only 3 x 14 plane squadrons available, normal was 1/3rd down for Maint. 1/3rd prepping for next day, and 1/3rd on patrol. That means each plane has at it's furthest arc ,has an area of 26 degrees to cover. That means that each plane has 800 mile operational range that means each plane has an in and out range of @300 miles with an arc of @126 miles, leaving a margin for emergencies . Normally the PBYs flew ,depending on the model ,85-100 mph on patrol. That is a lot of area to cover, @ 12,000 square miles of ocean
Sure, that's a lot of ocean to cover but you won't need to do a full long-range search. If a PBY took off at 0700 and headed north at 100mph by 0730 they'd see over 100 aircraft headed straight for Pearl Harbor and start screaming on the radio. They may have ignored a radar warning they won't ignore a patrol aircraft warning of over 100 Japanese aircraft approaching. That would give them 25 minutes to take action.

That morning there were 64 P-40B/C Warhawks and 20 P-36 Hawk available. If 40 Warhawks and 12 Hawks took off and reached 15,000 ft over Pearl, the Japanese would've gotten a warm welcome. In 25 minutes, every AA gun in the fleet would've been manned, along with the army AA. OTL the IJNAF lost 29 aircraft in the attack on Pearl Harbor, maybe now they lose 50. Maybe the Arizona doesn't get a perfect hit from a dropped 14" shell because their aim might be disturbed by flak or fighters.

The USS Enterprise could recall her SBDs to refuel & rearm on board the carrier while maybe 12 F4F-3 could be dispatched to join the fight, probably during the 2nd wave. Things could be a lot better for the defenders with a 25-minute warning.
 
Nicely done. Hannibal Smith would approve. Now all they have to do is keep things under control while they do what they came to do, and then get out before the Thai Air Force or Navy decides to intervene.

Incidentally, I made a mistake in my last post - I was thinking of an advance up the East coast through Pattani to Songkhla/Singora. Although Songkhla is ~60 miles NW of Pattani, and Pattani is about 100 miles from the border (either from Kota Bharu of via the Ledge), Songkhla is only about 50 miles from the western part of the border at Padang Besar, which is a much more achievable distance.
 
North was not the direction that they were oriented toward for an attack from Japan. The Mandates were to the Southwest and that is where their fleet and aircraft were known to be and they had preset the surface, sub, and aircraft searches that direction where they would be coming from. Remember no one knew where the Kido Butai was at this time and were not expecting the to attack Pearl. The intelligence pointed to them either attacking the Far East, Malaya or Philippines, or to attack from the mandates to the southwest of Pearl.
 
Sure, that's a lot of ocean to cover but you won't need to do a full long-range search. If a PBY took off at 0700 and headed north at 100mph by 0730 they'd see over 100 aircraft headed straight for Pearl Harbor and start screaming on the radio. They may have ignored a radar warning they won't ignore a patrol aircraft warning of over 100 Japanese aircraft approaching. That would give them 25 minutes to take action.

That morning there were 64 P-40B/C Warhawks and 20 P-36 Hawk available. If 40 Warhawks and 12 Hawks took off and reached 15,000 ft over Pearl, the Japanese would've gotten a warm welcome. In 25 minutes, every AA gun in the fleet would've been manned, along with the army AA. OTL the IJNAF lost 29 aircraft in the attack on Pearl Harbor, maybe now they lose 50. Maybe the Arizona doesn't get a perfect hit from a dropped 14" shell because their aim might be disturbed by flak or fighters.

The USS Enterprise could recall her SBDs to refuel & rearm on board the carrier while maybe 12 F4F-3 could be dispatched to join the fight, probably during the 2nd wave. Things could be a lot better for the defenders with a 25-minute warning.
The big if is what exact bearing the 2 Northern bearing PBYs are at at that specific time, what altitude, rarely above 10,000 feet, How far are they from the actual Japanese flight path, do they spot the Japanese first or do the leading A6M spot the PBY first. Do they miss the Japanese in the clouds. The Japanese approach was @ 15,000 feet. It is quite possible the PBY and Japanese could miss each other with clouds and altitude difference.

Hawaii fighter command was not set up on an intercept alert, It will take time to get the flight crews alerted, and to the flight line, armorers get the ammunition from magazines, to load the planes, some will need fuel, IMO they will be lucky to get 1/3rd of the fighters airborne. Most additional Japanese losses will come from the improved AAA. Also the P-40 C had a rate of climb of 1,900 foot per minute, meaning at best 8 minutes to head on altitude and 11 minutes to 20,000 foot.
 
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