Malaya What If

[Butchpfd]

I had fun with it!

right on the edge of trolling!

 

[Nevarinemex]

right on the edge of trolling!

Seriously though.

What explanation was given for the USS Wakefield, USS West Point and USS Mt. Vernon in carrying the 18th Division?
The USN Chain of Command was seriously concerned about the ramifications of transporting belligerents. Not the
escort so much.

Likewise with the HMS Indomitable being in a Norfolk Navy Yard drydock for upwards of ten (10) days in NOV 1941.
The Graf Spee was only afforded 72 hours under the Hague Convention (1907 or 1899).

 

[Butchpfd]

Seriously though.

What explanation was given for the USS Wakefield, USS West Point and USS Mt. Vernon in carrying the 18th Division?
The USN Chain of Command was seriously concerned about the ramifications of transporting belligerents. Not the
escort so much.

Likewise with the HMS Indomitable being in a Norfolk Navy Yard drydock for upwards of ten (10) days in NOV 1941.
The Graf Spee was only afforded 72 hours under the Hague Convention (1907 or 1899).

As I said until Lend Lease all RN repair work in USN Yards was cash and carry, after that it went on the Lend Lease books. As to the transports, that was a Charter paid for under Lend Lease. IIRC the 72 hour limit was at the option of the ports nation. Also by 1941 the Rules of War and Hauge treaties had except in the case of POWs in Europe and the Med had been dumped. Starting withy Germany's actions against Poland, Denmark ,and Norway.

 

[Nevarinemex]

As I said until Lend Lease all RN repair work in USN Yards was cash and carry, after that it went on the Lend Lease books. As to the transports, that was a Charter paid for under Lend Lease. IIRC the 72 hour limit was at the option of the ports nation. Also by 1941 the Rules of War and Hauge treaties had except in the case of POWs in Europe and the Med had been dumped. Starting withy Germany's actions against Poland, Denmark ,and Norway.

The British have chartered commissioned US Warships for WS-12X . That it's legit and legal under Lend Lease is now proven. It would certainly simplify things, if the British just charter the entire US military. In for penny, in for a pound.

 

[Ramontxo]

I don't understand your position. To support the UK was certainly an FDR policy. It was publicly stated and carried. When the UK couldn't keep on with Cash and Carry the US Congress approved the Lend Lease law. The US Navy followed its Commander in Chief orders and helped him fulfil his policy.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

That is laughable!,
You have fallen into the often disproven conspiracy theory that FDR wanted to provoke a war with Japan. He was failed by his State Department on understanding how far Japan could be pushed. He never violated his oath of office. The work on foreign vessels in American ship yards was until Lend Lease (passed into Law by both Houses of Congress) was on a cash basis. That was no different then building warships for foreign countries. IMO, FDR never waxed poetically on Neutrality, He played a political game with it. Escorting vessels at sea is no different then today's " Freedom of the Seas" operations.

Yeah, I think the conspiracy theory is crap. But the US administration did objectively push Japan too far in the summer of 1941, almost certainly for the reason you stated. Misunderstanding how the Japanese regime would react to pressure. And possibly not realising how quickly the embargo would cripple their military operations?

 

[GarethC]

Likewise with the HMS Indomitable being in a Norfolk Navy Yard drydock for upwards of ten (10) days in NOV 1941.
The Graf Spee was only afforded 72 hours under the Hague Convention (1907 or 1899).

Reuben James was sunk on Oct 31, 1941, taking a torpedo intended for a merchant ship while escorting a convoy - and when I say escorting, I mean attacking a submerged U-boat with depth charges.

I don't mean to say that the US decided to repair Indomitable because of James's sinking; rather, both are clear indicators of where the US was at the time, which was in an undeclared state of war with the Kriegsmarine.

At the start of the war, Norway tried neutrality - even going so far as interning a German prize crew of the captured American merchant City of Flint and returning the ship to its USN reservist skipper, when the Germans decided to flout the limits of the Hague Conventions. Look where that got Norway.

By late 1941, Britain is buying American for cash, and selling American assets on the cheap. Germany is all the way over there and can't buy American - and after June '41 the concept of doing business with Hitler ever seems just laughable.

 

[Parma]

the input from the vastly experienced British pilots who unlike their Dutch counterparts have actually flown in combat, will mean that the Dutch fighters will be now flying in finger four formations, not vic threes

OTL there were a handfull of Dutch fighter pilots transfered from the UK to the NEI. They had experience in the war over Holland and participated in the BoB. The KNIL pilots were , just as the Dutch pilots during the war over Holland, quite daring, close to reckless, but lacked the tactical training/education. In OTL the handfull of Dutch pilots tried to change this, maybe under tighter RAF instructors improve.

British input will ensure that the Dutch airfields will have some basic infrastructure to enable them to withstand enemy attack. Just dispersing the fuel and ammunition dumps and providing basic blast protection and camouflage

Just before the War over Holland in May 1940 the Dutch Army leaders recognised , as one of the few European armies the danger and potential of airborn attacks and assault by paratropers and planned the defense according, this with mixed results. Despite the near destruction of the German paratroopers this airborn asaults where a major factor in the early defeat in 1940. The delivery of a few more M3 scoutcars with .50 guns or the infamous Marmon Herrington CTLS's might help to defend the airfields a bit better.
The British experience from the BoB how to make an airfield more resiellient to bomber and straffing attacks is very welcome.

The Dutch ground forces, will have begun to switch from being a colonial police force, to an effective army, capable of operating in the jungle and away from their home bases

The KNIL was in trasition from a light armed army on foot and horse, capable to do offroad action to a motorised road bound army with heavier arms. Not sure if this was a correct path. On the other hand most battles took place in area's with well established infrastructure, airfields, oil installations, cities and ports. They might chose TL to extend the Korps Marechaussee te voet (literally "marshal corps on foot") which were almost the inventors of jungle contra guerrilla in the Atjeh war. The latter ended formaly 40 years ago, however the situation remained tense in Atjeh and Sumatra. To such an extend that the KNIL was sometimes literly stabbed in the back during the Japanese Invasion of Sumatra.
An other , very genaralising, attitude of the Indo and Dutch born and bred NEI officers , is their very swift and no-nonsens reaction on unexpected events like a war. During the German attack on the Netherlands, it were KNIL and Navy officers, Indo and Dutch who were the first to react and in a propper manner, swifly organised the defense on their location, with the avialable men and resources they had. This is at least my perception. Charles Louis Jean François "Siki" Douw van der Krap as best example

Charles Douw van der Krap - Wikipedia

nl.wikipedia.org

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

The Sape Straight, where the Boise struck a reef, was a navigation pathway frequently taken by shipping,, for hundreds of years. For whatever reason either the Dutch missed marking the reef, or the chart the Boise was given was faulty. In the DEI, Straits were just as important as harbor entrances. Just look at a map of Indonesia.

Hi Butchpfd, I've not been able to find out much about this event, and the subsequent damages to Boise, so thank you for this. Wiki has an excellent map, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sape_Strait and expand the map, and what looks like plenty of room on google maps, is in fact quite a treacherous passage.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Tuesday 02 December;

Lord Gort’s orders to move to second degree readiness sparked it off, the chain reaction causing Lt Gen Godwin-Austen to prepare III Indian Corps for action. Up to now a number of British artillery regiments had an establishment of two batteries, not three, but gradually all these units had absorbed more men and equipment with the aim of expanding to three. Moving to a war footing pushed that development along, helped by the arrival of a big draft of Royal Artillery in the convoy five days ago.

Parts of the 12th Indian Bde were being entrained to journey to Kelantan, ready for the possible enactment of Operation Matador, with them was 278 battery, 122nd West Riding Field Regt, the second battery 280 being left back in Kuala Lumpur. A reasonable number of officers and men, along with some equipment and vehicles was now selected to form the cadre of the new battery, number yet to be decided so given the title A Battery, 122 Field Regt RA, and began the journey to Port Swettenham, where they would continue their development.

Already based in the big Royal Artillery camp at Port Swettenham was 81 Battery, 5 Field Regt RA, having left the rest of the regiment in Kelantan back in mid-November. She had almost a full complement of officers and men, eight 4.5-inch How’s, equipment and munitions, but was waiting on more gun tractors and signalling equipment, which had just arrived in Malaya. Once they had received this, along with some field training, they could be declared operational mid to late December, and re-join the regiment.

Both the 155 and 160 Field Regts RA were also based at Port Swettenham, had been since their arrival at the beginning of September. A month earlier 160 had been created by taking A Battery from 155, and creating a new D battery as her second. Both were being declared operational, although they could have benefited from more time training, the 155 going to the 11th Division, the 160 going to the 9th Division. Both were leaving a third battery in creation, F Battery for 155, and E Battery for 160, neither of which would be ready before the new year.

Meanwhile down in Malacca, in the big Australian army camps there, the raising of the 2/3 Medium Regt RAA was going well, both 68 and 69 batteries had been equipped with eight 6-inch howitzers each and were expected to complete training at the beginning of the new year. The other artillery regiments weren’t looking so healthy, equipped with either 4.5-inch howitzers or 18-pounders, and 2/15 had all three batteries issued with 12 3-inch mortars. Both 60 Btty, 2/10 and 64 Btty, 2/14 were left in Malacca, awaiting new guns to be issued. The 8th Australian Division’s 2/4 Anti-tank Regt also was in great need of new guns, currently making do, mostly with 75mm mountain guns, and their 16th Btty was also in Malacca awaiting new guns.

 

[vpsoccer]

The latest post from our author raises some interesting points, one why are the British allowing the Japanese to run spy flights over Singapore, and
<<SNIP SNIP>>
However the British might be in a transition phase, where the old idea of establishing a deterrent and thus letting the Japanese know about the improvements to the defence capabilities of the colony is desirable. As apposed to the present situation where the deployment of naval units is a secret, and thus information to be withheld from the Japanese.

Indeed the very reason that the two capital ships were there was to be seen. They were to be seen and disappear, repeatedly, so as to make clear to the Japanese that they would face opposition if they got frisky. Hence they were to be seen at various places: Darwin, Borneo, major ports in Indonesia, etc. The idea was to make them seem like a powerful force that could appear and exert itself at any point in the region.

Now whether this was reasonable or not is "another question," but their presence was to be a vestige of good old RN gunboat diplomacy - with everyone around intended to know that the Big Dog was hanging about and paying attention. Of course they didn't reckon that there was a new Big Dog about to make itself known.

How effective this might actually be in an era of 700-1000-mile air search capability is another example of "yet another question" but they were there to be seen.

 

[jlckansas]

Against the Japanese, the 18lbr could still be an effective weapon given the fact that is lighter than a 25lbr and could be manhandled easier. You also had a more institutional memory with it with long service members having started on the weapon and having lots of time using it, even going back to the 1st World War.

 

[Butchpfd]

Hi Butchpfd, I've not been able to find out much about this event, and the subsequent damages to Boise, so thank you for this. Wiki has an excellent map, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sape_Strait and expand the map, and what looks like plenty of room on google maps, is in fact quite a treacherous passage.

I had to look up damage reports to USS Boise to find it. Even there it, was barely a footnote to later battle damage,

 

[Butchpfd]

Hi Butchpfd, I've not been able to find out much about this event, and the subsequent damages to Boise, so thank you for this. Wiki has an excellent map, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sape_Strait and expand the map, and what looks like plenty of room on google maps, is in fact quite a treacherous passage.

I found the list of official USN damage reports, and there is none for the Boise's grounding. Apparently it was not classed as combat damage. The only reference I can find is in Adm Hart's war diary, that the Boise had struck a reef, and suffered an @ 20 foot gash on her lower hull, forward. It does not mention how wide or deep the damage was.
IMO, that would put the damage well forward of the superstructure. Since several sources state that Boise offloaded most off it's 6" ammunition for Marblehead, and 5" for Houston, it imo appears the flooding did not reach her magazines.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Seriously though.

What explanation was given for the USS Wakefield, USS West Point and USS Mt. Vernon in carrying the 18th Division?
The USN Chain of Command was seriously concerned about the ramifications of transporting belligerents. Not the
escort so much.

Likewise with the HMS Indomitable being in a Norfolk Navy Yard drydock for upwards of ten (10) days in NOV 1941.
The Graf Spee was only afforded 72 hours under the Hague Convention (1907 or 1899).

I mean by the time the events you are talking about took place - Germany was not exactly in a position to complain about it and also had pretty much pissed all over every every treaty It had signed and not a single fuck had been given with regards to the neutrality of Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands and Luxemburg and arguably Belgium.

So it could hardly expect the USA to obey the letter of the laws that Germany had stomped all over and supporting Britain was in its interests.

 

[FriendlyGhost]

I found the list of official USN damage reports, and there is none for the Boise's grounding. Apparently it was not classed as combat damage. The only reference I can find is in Adm Hart's war diary, that the Boise had struck a reef, and suffered an @ 20 foot gash on her lower hull, forward. It does not mention how wide or deep the damage was.
IMO, that would put the damage well forward of the superstructure. Since several sources state that Boise offloaded most off it's 6" ammunition for Marblehead, and 5" for Houston, it imo appears the flooding did not reach her magazines.

From The One Ship Fleet: USS Boise 1938-45 by Phillip Parkerson:

on 21 January 1942, she struck an unchartered reef off the island of Timor, ripping a huge gash in the hull. Thus, the cruiser had to put into Colombo, British Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) for repairs. [...] where it remained for 11 days (9–18 February) awaiting a berth for repairs. When no room for her was found in Colombo, Boise departed on 18 February for Bombay (Mumbai), British India, where she went into dry dock.​

When temporary repairs were completed, Boise got underway from Bombay on 4 April 1942 and made for Mare Island Navy Yard at San Francisco, California, where she underwent an overhaul and refitting for war.​

So it seems that the damage, although enough to stop her proceeding with the mission she was on at the time, was not bad enough to stop her sailing long distances. There might be more in the Boise's own war diaries, but I don't have access to those.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

From The One Ship Fleet: USS Boise 1938-45 by Phillip Parkerson:

on 21 January 1942, she struck an unchartered reef off the island of Timor, ripping a huge gash in the hull. Thus, the cruiser had to put into Colombo, British Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) for repairs. [...] where it remained for 11 days (9–18 February) awaiting a berth for repairs. When no room for her was found in Colombo, Boise departed on 18 February for Bombay (Mumbai), British India, where she went into dry dock.​

When temporary repairs were completed, Boise got underway from Bombay on 4 April 1942 and made for Mare Island Navy Yard at San Francisco, California, where she underwent an overhaul and refitting for war.​

So it seems that the damage, although enough to stop her proceeding with the mission she was on at the time, was not bad enough to stop her sailing long distances. There might be more in the Boise's own war diaries, but I don't have access to those.

Hi Friendly Ghost, yes that's pretty much what I concluded as to what happened. The interesting thing here is the suggestion, that if the USN said she needed to remain in theatre, I think she could have been capable of doing that after a patch up! Just how long she was actually under repair in Bombay would be interesting to know, and whether a quicker turnaround might have happened in a safe Singapore Naval Base is something I wonder about.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Tuesday 02 December;

The battleship Nagato swung on its anchor chain peacefully in the Hashirajima Anchorage area, the Navy’s staging post for major fleet departures. Yamamoto had just left his cabin, and was on his way to the Flag Bridge, wanting to spend some time idly gazing out over the anchorage, watching the daily activities of his assemble fleet. As he stood in the elevator, its shaft central in the large pagoda like mast, carrying him up, so a coded message ‘NIITAKA-YAMA NOBORE 12 08’ was being taped out in the radio room. The message would be relayed out to all ships in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The date was 8th December, but for some ships, namely the Kido Butai, which was maintaining Tokyo time, because they would be over the international dateline, this would mean the 7th of December.

Deep in the wintery North Pacific Ocean, 940 miles north of Midway, the fast battleship Kirishima, flagship of Vice Admiral Mikawa’s support force, picked up the signal, and relayed it to Vice Admiral Nagumo in the carrier Kaga, flagship of the First Air Fleet Striking Force, and within the hour, everyone in the Kido Butai had received the signal, passed up the lines by flashing signal lamps.

At anchor off Haha Jima, Bonin Islands, lay the four heavy cruisers, Furutaka, Kako, Kinugasa and Aoba, who was flagship of Rear Admiral Goto’s Guam Invasion Force, with the big minelayer Tsugaru and four attached destroyers, the signal for them meant they would sail on the 4th December.

240 Nmi’s west of Kwajalein, in the Marshal Islands was the light cruiser Yubari, flagship of Rear Admiral Kajioka, commander of the Wake Island invasion force, with the light cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta, six destroyers, and five transports with the No 2 ‘Maizuru’ Special Naval Landing Force, three days out of Truk. The signal ended their wait, Kwajalein tomorrow, two days at anchor then onto Wake Island and glory.

In Kossol Roads, Palau, at the western end of the Caroline’s Island chain, Rear Admiral Takagi was pleased to finally get the nod, knowing the timetable now meant he would be leaving in his Flagship Haguro, along with her sister heavy cruisers Myoko and Nachi, the light aircraft carrier Ryujo, light cruiser Jintsu and nine destroyers in four days’ time to provide cover for the planned landings at Davao and Legaspi, in the southern Philippines. Along with them was Rear Admiral Kubo’s invasion forces, his flagship, the light cruiser Nagara, seaplane tenders Chitose, and Mizuho, light cruiser Naka, five destroyers and seven transports

At Mako, Pescadore Islands, off Formosa, the heavy cruiser Ashigara, flagship of Vice Adm Takahashi, swung at anchor, her restfulness belying the excitement as the signal was taken. In five days’, time she would be leaving to support the Northern Philippines invasion force along with another heavy cruiser, Maya, the light cruiser Kuma and two destroyers

Also, at Mako, lay the Main Body of the Southern (Malaya) Force at anchor. Admiral Kondo, in his flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, is made aware of the signal. Together with her sister ship Takao, the two fast battleships Haruna and Kongo, along with eight destroyers, they now knew in two days’ time they would be sailing for the South China Sea to provide distant cover for the invasion forces of Malaya and the Philippines.

In Samah Bay, Hainan Island, off the southern coast of China, the heavy cruiser Chokai, Flagship of Vice Admiral Ozawa’s close support group, Southern (Malaya) Force takes the signal, flashing it on to the rest of his command including Rear Admiral Kurita’s CruDiv 7, Kumano, Mogami, Mikuma and Suzuya, the light cruisers, destroyers and the transports carrying the first wave of Lt Gen Yamashita’s 25th Army. For them sailing time would be in a couple of days.

While out in the South China Sea, sailing down the coast of French Indo-China, the ten submarines that had left Samah yesterday, on receiving the signal, were able to open their sealed orders and know of their true destination, along the eastern coasts of Malaya.

Standing in the wings of the Flag Bridge, a breeze in his face, Yamamoto looked out over his fleet, resigned to the fact that the peace was ending, baring a miracle they would soon be at war with the United States and Great Britain. He was confident his ships would, in the main, do well, but there was always fate waiting to play a hand. The main worry was the Kido Butai, if they could pull off the Pearl Harbor attack, it would be a major achievement, but there was little he could do now, except take his own ships here in anchorage, out to meet the carriers on their return, and wait to hear of the results. And after that he thought they had maybe a year to win, before American might became too much, and they would be ground down by the numbers.

 

[Admiral Jellicoe]

Nagata

Nagato?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Two things that occur to me, one the damage suffered by the USS Boise and the second the increased readiness that the British forces are going through ITTL at this time. As there seems to be very little information on the regarding the USS Boise striking a reef, we don’t know what the reason was, it could have been a navigation error, or a mistake in the chart which like a lot of charts of the area was old, and hadn’t been updated recently. There is also the possibility that due to the lack of understanding at the time about the possible effects of tectonic movement on both the land and seabed, that the reef had moved in recently and this hadn’t been observed. The DEI/Indonesia is part of the ring of fire, and it’s only recently that we have begun to fully understand just how fluid the world can be. The range of instruments that are available now to monitor both the land and seas around the islands, wasn’t available to the people of the nineteen forties, nor were there the electronic computers available to crunch data, at the time computers were humans and remained so until the nineteen sixties. It is only recently that we have be able to understand and monitor the numerous effects that can and do occur regularly not just in this region but throughout the world.

The move of the British forces to second degree readiness, is progressing well, and by the time of the Japanese assault, the overwhelming majority of British forces will be in place and as prepared as they can be. Has enough been done by the British to bring their forces, that were at the beginning of the year, totally disorganised and sleeping their way to an inevitable and embarrassing defeat, to the point that they can easily defeat the invading Japanese, no. Without diverting substantial resources from what are at present far more vital areas to the British, there is no way that a force particularly naval can be assembled, that guaranties the British will be strong enough to defeat any Japanese assault. However given just how stretched the Japanese are, they face the problem that to succeed they must win every encounter, and can not afford any major delay. Provided the British can prevent the Japanese from getting inside their command loop, and forcing the British to make a series of uncoordinated retreats on land, and additionally suffering a catastrophic defeat at sea. The efforts made to date large and small, should see the British able to hold onto the majority of Malaya, and force the Japanese to substantially change their plans. Provided the British make no substantial mistakes, they should by the time that the monsoon shuts down the campaign, have been able to resist the Japanese, along with preventing them from carrying out a campaign in Burma, and along with the Dutch retained Sumatra and a substantial portion of Java. Plus ensuring that the Japanese do not gain any access to a functioning oilfield, which will cripple their ability to conduct future operations.

RR.