Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
I do wonder if some of the changes here might change the date?

I mean what set the 7th Dec as the day anyway?

IIRC it was a Sunday morning in Hawaii and the Japanese liked this time as it was 'the morning after Saturday' - thinking folk will be hung over or some such, and 'People will be at Church' and therefore the enemies at their least effectiveness.

It was the same for the Indian Ocean raid on Columbo

So perhaps it is fixed!

Given the scale and complexity of the Japanese plan there were only two factors that dictated the date and time of the commencement of the war. Unlike a smaller operation like D-Day were storms in the channel delayed the start from the 5th of June to the 6th. With multiple operations in various time zones across different locations, the timing was primarily military, the Japanese military essentially wanted to launch as near simultaneous attacks close to or before dawn as they could. They were to an extent lucky that the British and the Americans didn’t have a unified command structure or any agreement that an attack on one was to be regarded as an attack on both. In the modern world not only do nations constantly monitor the airwaves for information about the outbreak of a conflict anywhere in the world. But some, such as the members of NATO, constantly ask each other is everything ok with you, and this takes place every second. Now while such a system wouldn’t be possible in 1941, the communications technology didn’t exist to do so, hence the problems that the Americans encountered in trying to update the war warning to Pearl Harbour. Instead of using a dedicated wireless/radio link, the message was sent by commercial cable as Pearl Harbour didn’t have even a dedicated cable connection to Washington. Now the British ITTL are a little bit more switched on than they were IOTL, and their command site/bunker in Hong Kong and Singapore will be maned 24/7, and sending regular signals equivalent to are you ok, at least every half hour. So once the Japanese attack HK, the British in Singapore will move to being at war and fully alert. Will they subsequently send a signal to Manila, Pearl and Washington, and if they do who will it be addressed to, is another question. They will off course immediately send signals to all the various commands under their control, along with London and Delhi, plus a broadcast to all the ships at sea. So to get back to the original question, might the date ITTL of the commencement of hostilities change, I for one seriously doubt that, even if there was a major Typhoon in the Pacific, and there were serious storms, just the message that the Japanese fleet had had to deal its attack on Pearl Harbour would give a warning to the Americans that something unusual was going on, and cause them to put their forces on a war footing.

RR.
 
Having the 25th army stop because of their logistics does everything for Sumatra and the DEI. Even IOTL they had to pull units out from Hong Kong and China because of the time it took to take Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines put everything behind on the timetable. The other part to that is the IJN was not providing support beyond the original planned landing, so saying they just have to hop down the coast doesn't work. Just providing the basic logistics that were planned is all that is going to happen with the IJN and Imperial Army working together. Remember these services were so bad the Army built their own ships so they would not have to ask the Navy for basic supply service going so far as building their own aircraft ferry/CV because they didn't want to ask the navy to carry their aircraft from Japan to other bases. This is not the RN and British Army working together. You the US had more working together with the Army and Navy in the Philippines by the Mac and Hart than the Navy and Army of Japan. Like I posted earlier, they didn't just not talk they lied and would not even tell each other when attacks were coming or even if they were being attacked.
 
Almost half of the almost 3000 jeep vehicles produced by Bantam were delivered to the US Army in 1940...the rest in 1941.

And, over half of the total production was provided by the US Government to Britain--OTL, some in 1940, the rest in 1941. Some of the OTL remainder went to the Soviet Union.

So it's entirely conceivable that a few Bantam jeeps might have found their way onto one of the Malaya bound convoys, specifically for military evaluation in mountainous-jungle conditions.

It's also conceivable ITTL that some or all of the OTL-Soviet-Union jeeps might have been diverted to SE Asia. There'd have been no discernable effect on the Eastern front's war progression, and arguably at the time such a decision could have made sense at the US Government end as a way of gathering better information sooner on the suitability of the design for military use--the British Army being better organized to formally report back sooner what their user-experiences had been, particularly in regard to maintenance.
 
Given the scale and complexity of the Japanese plan there were only two factors that dictated the date and time of the commencement of the war. Unlike a smaller operation like D-Day were storms in the channel delayed the start from the 5th of June to the 6th. With multiple operations in various time zones across different locations, the timing was primarily military, the Japanese military essentially wanted to launch as near simultaneous attacks close to or before dawn as they could. They were to an extent lucky that the British and the Americans didn’t have a unified command structure or any agreement that an attack on one was to be regarded as an attack on both. In the modern world not only do nations constantly monitor the airwaves for information about the outbreak of a conflict anywhere in the world. But some, such as the members of NATO, constantly ask each other is everything ok with you, and this takes place every second. Now while such a system wouldn’t be possible in 1941, the communications technology didn’t exist to do so, hence the problems that the Americans encountered in trying to update the war warning to Pearl Harbour. Instead of using a dedicated wireless/radio link, the message was sent by commercial cable as Pearl Harbour didn’t have even a dedicated cable connection to Washington. Now the British ITTL are a little bit more switched on than they were IOTL, and their command site/bunker in Hong Kong and Singapore will be maned 24/7, and sending regular signals equivalent to are you ok, at least every half hour. So once the Japanese attack HK, the British in Singapore will move to being at war and fully alert. Will they subsequently send a signal to Manila, Pearl and Washington, and if they do who will it be addressed to, is another question. They will off course immediately send signals to all the various commands under their control, along with London and Delhi, plus a broadcast to all the ships at sea. So to get back to the original question, might the date ITTL of the commencement of hostilities change, I for one seriously doubt that, even if there was a major Typhoon in the Pacific, and there were serious storms, just the message that the Japanese fleet had had to deal its attack on Pearl Harbour would give a warning to the Americans that something unusual was going on, and cause them to put their forces on a war footing.

RR.
USN Station CAST on Corrigidor, picked up the Pearl Harbor prior to 0330 on the 8th. Hart states in his war diary, that he was notified at 0330. That means CAST receives and confirms message even earlier. I imagine they also picked up the massive uptick in Japanese traffic and where it was from. CAST had the large setup on Topside Corrigidor as well as the larger set at Sangley Point, both could under decent conditions directly contact navy commo at Pearl, San Diego and San Francisco. The could nearly pinpoint the locations of transmissions to the West and SW of Manila. East was iffier..
 
Having the 25th army stop because of their logistics does everything for Sumatra and the DEI. Even IOTL they had to pull units out from Hong Kong and China because of the time it took to take Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines put everything behind on the timetable. The other part to that is the IJN was not providing support beyond the original planned landing, so saying they just have to hop down the coast doesn't work. Just providing the basic logistics that were planned is all that is going to happen with the IJN and Imperial Army working together. Remember these services were so bad the Army built their own ships so they would not have to ask the Navy for basic supply service going so far as building their own aircraft ferry/CV because they didn't want to ask the navy to carry their aircraft from Japan to other bases. This is not the RN and British Army working together. You the US had more working together with the Army and Navy in the Philippines by the Mac and Hart than the Navy and Army of Japan. Like I posted earlier, they didn't just not talk they lied and would not even tell each other when attacks were coming or even if they were being attacked.
In OTL the Singapore campaign was ahead of schedule as was Hong Kong. Only reason Philippines was behind is they did not understand the retreat to Bataan so did not aggressively pursue.
As for coast hopping they accomplished that using seized local small craft for the most part. Many were seized at Penang.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I do wonder if some of the changes here might change the date?

I mean what set the 7th Dec as the day anyway?

IIRC it was a Sunday morning in Hawaii and the Japanese liked this time as it was 'the morning after Saturday' - thinking folk will be hung over or some such, and 'People will be at Church' and therefore the enemies at their least effectiveness.

It was the same for the Indian Ocean raid on Columbo

So perhaps it is fixed!
Hi Cryhavoc101, so there you go again, someone starts the war earlier, thanks, that's another sleepless night for me!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
That may well be but none of the Australian TOEs show jeeps on establishment at this time and I suspect neither do the UK ones.. Later, yes, plenty of them. Since large scale production only took off in early 1941, I am doubtful that a), many actually reached Malaya as opposed to North Africa and b), that a senior officer would be thinking in jeep terms when most of his life had been Austins and Bedfords.
Still. it does give us an idea of what was meant.
Hi Igkmas, yes please, we'll settle on the idea, 👍
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Where there’s a will there’s a way. Tracks (dozers), animals, people. Whatever it takes.

Going back to at least 1778 at Ticonderoga the British military has excelled at placing heavy equipment into operation at odd locations. Once the equipment is moved, sustainment is usually a relatively easier process.

The process can be accelerated with command emphasis…
Hi Amir, I think Patrick O'Brien wrote in one of his excellent Aubrey–Maturin series, about raising a cannon, a 12 pounder I think, by block and tackle up the crest of a large rock. It is a good illustration of what could be done in the early 1800's.
 
MWI 41111310 The Dockyard

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 13 November;

The door closed behind the captain of HMAS Vendetta, Lt Cmdr Stephenson, who had just completed the formal handing over of the old V class ship to the Singapore Naval Dockyard. Stephenson and most of the crew would over the coming weeks be sent back to Australia for well-deserved rests, with a small volunteer crew of 21 led by Lt Whitting, left to assist the dockyard during her refit. Vendetta, along with the other four RAN destroyers of the affectionately known “Scrap Iron Flotilla” had served in the Mediterranean for nearly two hard years, and was worn out, badly in need of attention.

Well, she would be getting it, the office Stephenson had just left belonged to Chief Constructor William Jackman, the senior Constructor of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors at Singapore. He would soon have her dry docked in AFD 10, the small 5,000-ton lift, floating dry dock, and begin stripping her. The boilers and propulsion system would be completely dismantled, shafts and propellers removed along with all her armament, for a complete overhaul and clean. It was planned that in about six months she would return to the fleet as a dedicated escort vessel, losing two of her 4-inch guns, allowing the fitting of the anti-submarine Hedgehog in place of A mounting, and an increase in light AA armament, another 40mm pom-pom and four 20mm Oerlikons, along with a Type 271 surface radar.

For Jackson, this was the bread and butter of his profession, well within the capabilities of the Singapore Naval base. The base, completed in 1938 at an enormous cost of £60 million pounds, housed an extensive array of repair facilities, beginning with the enormous King George VI graveling dock, which at 1,000 ft long, was the largest in the world, along with the Admiralty Floating Dock No 9, which had been towed all the way from the UK in two parts, before being assembled, who’s length of 850 feet and lifting capacity of 50,000 tons meant she also, could take a battleship. The big workshops ashore, connected by a network of light railway lines, assisted by dockside cranes, meant a substantial fleet could be maintained here.

The workforce, a mixture of British professionals and Asian labour, was well skilled and manning levels were good. Most of the British and all the Asians lived on the base, their barracks or ‘Coolie Lines’ meant the base was like a small town, with all the facilities required, present. Defence was provided by the extensive batteries of coastal guns, positioned around the coast of the island, everything from a Lewis light machinegun, up to five 15-inch guns were installed, while her antiaircraft defences were incorporated into the main Singapore air defence system.

This was because the Singapore Naval Base was the key element to the entire Far East defence strategy, the ‘Singapore Strategy’ as it was called. In any event of war with Japan, a Royal Navy fleet would sail from home waters, and base itself on Singapore. From here she would be able to intercept any Japanese force heading west to India, or south to Australia, thus defending the Empire. Almost right from its inception, questions had been raised, but in want of an alternative strategy, for various reasons, it had persisted, and so the great Naval Base had been built. Only now, with the ‘worst case scenario’ the ‘fall of France’ happening, was the strategy being laid bare.

Nevertheless, the asset was being put to good use, numerous ships had and were planned to be sent here for refit and repair. It was quicker to send a ship from the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet though the Suez Canal, across the Indian Ocean to here than back to the UK, or as was now increasingly likely, the USA. The only drawback was propulsion systems, armament and technical equipment all had to be shipped out here from the UK, there wasn’t the industries here to manufacture them.

Vendetta was replacing Vampire, another Australian destroyer who had just finished her refit, and was now in the process of ‘working up’, while the Royal Naval destroyer Isis, had arrived the middle of last month for a four-month period of repair, having previously suffered structural damage in action in the ‘Med’ by two near misses, which had lifted the vessel, causing the hull to buckle and fracture, and flooding some compartments. Another ship which had arrived last week, and was now tied up in the basin was HMS Mauritius, a Fiji class light cruiser, who’s water main had suffered serious corrosion, with much pipework requiring replacement, a task that would take the dockyard about ten weeks to complete. And this was in addition to the almost daily affairs of the numerous smaller repairs and modifications that were being undertaken, as ships were fitted for minelaying, or ASDIC was installed, maybe additional light AA guns were to be added, and so forth.

Yes, the dockyard was a busy place, with no lack of work, but they all toiled under almost peacetime conditions, with no ‘black outs’ and plenty of sports or social activities to keep everyone happy. They knew they were at war, but the war was a very long way off, and at times it could be forgiven that they sometimes forgot the war, living in the paradise that was Singapore.
 
In OTL the Singapore campaign was ahead of schedule as was Hong Kong. Only reason Philippines was behind is they did not understand the retreat to Bataan so did not aggressively pursue.
As for coast hopping they accomplished that using seized local small craft for the most part. Many were seized at Penang.
They had problems and were not actually ahead as much as people think. They were pushing it to get there because they were running out of their supplies. If the British were not handing over parts of the Malay peninsula to them wholesale they would not have made it before they would have been stopped by their own plans. All those forces on Malaya were going on to Sumatra and the DEI afterwords. Having Singapore control the straits they don't have a way to get to Penang except by trying to make it the long way around and that would need them going to the Navy for help.
 
Fien Hi Amir, I think Patrick O'Brien wrote in one of his excellent Aubrey–Maturin series, about raising a cannon, a 12 pounder I think, by block and tackle up the crest of a large rock. It is a good illustration of what could be done in the early 1800's.
Another example is the VC moving artillery to the mountain tops surrounding the French in Điện Biên Phủ
 
Hi Cryhavoc101, so there you go again, someone starts the war earlier, thanks, that's another sleepless night for me!
Well to help you sleep one of the primary reasons the date could not be moved up was the modified torpedoes for the shallow water of pearl harbor were not ready till literally just before they sailed in the OTL
 
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They had problems and were not actually ahead as much as people think. They were pushing it to get there because they were running out of their supplies. If the British were not handing over parts of the Malay peninsula to them wholesale they would not have made it before they would have been stopped by their own plans. All those forces on Malaya were going on to Sumatra and the DEI afterwords. Having Singapore control the straits they don't have a way to get to Penang except by trying to make it the long way around and that would need them going to the Navy for help.
I don't disagree if we are talking about this timeline. In OTL Penang was evacuated by the Commonwealth forces and the Japanese were actually invited in by those who were left to stop the aerial bombing. The boats left there then were used for 3 flanking attacks down the coast the first forcing the Commonwealth Army force at Kampar to fall back where they had originally stopped the Japanese in hard fighting.
They had problems and were not actually ahead as much as people think. They were pushing it to get there because they were running out of their supplies. If the British were not handing over parts of the Malay peninsula to them wholesale they would not have made it before they would have been stopped by their own plans. All those forces on Malaya were going on to Sumatra and the DEI afterwords. Having Singapore control the straits they don't have a way to get to Penang except by trying to make it the long way around and that would need them going to the Navy for help.
 
MUI is that despite the stories, the naval guns could fire inland. It was more that the HE had been affected by the climate. Having written that, i have no idea where I read it. I think it was "Purnells' History of World War II" in the '70's.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Any HE for the 15", and can they be turned to fire inland?
Hi Marquis, I've spoken to Commander William Burrows, RAN, head of the British Armed Services Public Relations, and he said you chappies need to let the military do its job, they're terribly good at it, but he's happy to discuss your concerns over a Singapore Sling in Raffles bar, at your expense of course.
 
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