Malaya What If

[Merrick]

This is a big change from OTL. The Valentines, as previous posters have stated have the potential to be absolute monsters in Malaya, particularly against the thinly-armoured and under-gunned Japanese tanks. Against infantry maybe not so much, but mobile MG pillboxes are still a nasty challenge for infantry not to mention reversing the OTL psychological effect on a light infantry force without effective AT weapons forced to face tanks. The only things the Japanese have that will kill a Valentine are mines, tank/AT/artillery at scary-short range or heroes of the Empire with petrol bombs and demolition charges. At Slim River OTL, Shimada effectively destroyed two Indian Army brigades with little more than an improvised mechanised battalion. There's the potential to reverse that if the Valentine are able to surprise a Japanese infantry column as it advances down a Malayan road.

If they're used effectively. If they're not held back in reserve at Singapore or Johore until it's far too late. If they can cooperate properly with the infantry. If they don't get isolated and ambushed at close range in the jungle. If the supply lines and support services can be organised so that they're not abandoned one by one as they break down, bog down or run out of fuel.

And the timelines are terrifyingly tight. There's exactly one month left before the hammer falls. Realistically, this means the Valentine crews will have about three weeks to get familiar with their vehicles , to learn how to manoeuver them in Malayan conditions and for the support engineers to learn how to keep them running in the tropics. Any infantry assigned to work with them will have at most a fortnight to practise their combined arms tactics, something the British OTL were infamously bad at.

 

[Driftless]

For the tankers, wasn't there also the issue of basic ventilation in equatorial climate? The interior could become oven hot if they were buttoned up and crew performance suffered accordingly. Or, is that an overstated historical myth?

 

[Merrick]

I do not want to spoil the tank discussion😄 but what about the strategic geographic flanking threat of Singapore/Malaya? 🤔
It is not the main topic but Tarakan and Balikpapan were not only major oil fields and installations but had as well airfields of various qualities, militairy and civilian. Balikpapan can be used to threathen Java and Singapore/Malaya by air.
While on Celebes, Menodo and the more important Kendari had airbases and aircraft infrastructure for floatplanes which can be a thread to Australia. Kendari airfields were used to bomb Darwin as aircraft from Kendari can threat Java and maybe Singapore.

I don't think Singapore is going to worry much about Japanese aircraft in Tarakan or Kendari. They're not much closer than existing airbases in Indochina, and a lot less worry than the IJAAF bases in Thailand. Whoever gets the job of defending the East Indies, OTOH will worry very much about the Japanese seizing control of the northern airfields. Once the Japanese are there, it becomes very hard for Allied naval forces (let alone transport convoys) to operate in the Makassar Straight or Molucca Sea and the Japanese have air cover for their next push south. OTL, the Japanese operation was a superbly played game of amphibious hopscotch, with relatively small forces making multiple short-range amphibious landings, seizing bases and bringing in the aircraft to cover the next hop south.

The KNIL was defending the mentioned sites on Borneo and Celebes with mixed efforts and results but at the end the KNIL forces were defeated at all locations. Defeat was mainly due to resource shortages.
This was probably partly due to the limited resources of the KNIL and their strategy to focus only on the defense of Java, again forced due to the limited resources. And probably the idea that the KNIL air branch and Allied Naval forces would defend in depth?

The KNIL defence of Borneo/Celebes is pretty much Mission Impossible. Compared to what's coming for them, the KNIL forces are outnumbered, individually inferior and drastically less mobile, both strategically and tactically. The enemy has air superiority. The Japanese also have the initiative and the KNIL has way too many targets to defend. Every port, airbase or oilfield that is not garrisoned is a freebie for the Japanese, but scattering the defenders in penny packets across the whole region is a guaranteed failure as well. And the first hammer isn't even going to fall on Borneo or the Celebes, but on Mindanao, which OTL fell in three weeks, giving the Japanese airbases in the region and the key port of Davao.

Realistically the best the KNIL can do is fight delaying actions, while trying not to lose too much or leave any working oil installations behind for the Japanese.

Could it have proceeded better if the KNIL was more forward deployed? It looks like the garrisons
were to deal with insurrections, rather than invasions. That might be the key. Slow the IJA/IJN
advance and instead allow reinforcements to arrive at Java and Sumatra?

The trouble with forward deployment is that if the enemy breaks through your perimeter at one point and exploits towards the objective, you're left trying to get your troops out of their forward deployments and back to where the fighting is. And the KNIL perimeter, being largely composed of sea, is very permeable to an amphibious enemy. Suppose you send a brigade (battalion-level forces won't cut it against Japanese regimental-scale landings) to Tarakan, another to Menado and a third to Ambon. How much do you have left, and what will you do if the Japanese bypass your strongpoints and land in Balikpapan or Kendari?
It's very easy to end up with the bulk of your troops cut off, unable to move (particularly as the Borneo road network isn't) and simply waiting to die while the Japanese drive on to Java.

I've wondered if Menado and Bitung were not the key to the NEI defense.
It's at a juncture of the Celebes and Molucca Seas. The head of the Makassar Strait is to the SW.

It looks as good as anything on the map. The problem is conducting naval operations once the enemy has air superiority. And preventing the enemy gaining air superiority requires you to hold on to airfields well north of whatever choke point you're trying to defend.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Could it have proceeded better if the KNIL was more forward deployed? It looks like the garrisons
were to deal with insurrections, rather than invasions. That might be the key. Slow the IJA/IJN
advance and instead allow reinforcements to arrive at Java and Sumatra?

The trouble with forward deployment is that if the enemy breaks through your perimeter at one point and exploits towards the objective, you're left trying to get your troops out of their forward deployments and back to where the fighting is. And the KNIL perimeter, being largely composed of sea, is very permeable to an amphibious enemy. Suppose you send a brigade (battalion-level forces won't cut it against Japanese regimental-scale landings) to Tarakan, another to Menado and a third to Ambon. How much do you have left, and what will you do if the Japanese bypass your strongpoints and land in Balikpapan or Kendari?
It's very easy to end up with the bulk of your troops cut off, unable to move (particularly as the Borneo road network isn't) and simply waiting to die while the Japanese drive on to Java.

The KNIL forces in the East East Indies were mainly there for three reasons: (a) keeping the neutrality (if you don't have forces there for a fight the enemy might just occupy them without a DOW), (b) as a show of force towards the natives (can't have the Moluccas, the homeland of a large part of the KNIL, be occupied without a fight) and (b) to delay an occupation so that important installations can be destroyed, As Merrick says, if you want to actually defeat the Japanese invasion forces, you need much stronger defensive forces (and leave other places undefended) or you need to have the Japanese invasion force be weakened before it lands.

 

[Parma]

The KNIL defence of Borneo/Celebes is pretty much Mission Impossible. Compared to what's coming for them, the KNIL forces are outnumbered, individually inferior and drastically less mobile, both strategically and tactically. The enemy has air superiority. The Japanese also have the initiative and the KNIL has way too many targets to defend. Every port, airbase or oilfield that is not garrisoned is a freebie for the Japanese, but scattering the defenders in penny packets across the whole region is a guaranteed failure as well

I agree it is very, very difficult. On the otherhand it must be quite obvious where the Japanese will strike first. Tarakan is too tempting to leave at first, next tot he oil fields and installations it has an airstrip.
At the same time Manado is a good port, has an airbase and an floatplane air base, which make sense to defend this
Next is Kendari, with an airbase whihc was used by the Americans, who as well saw the strategic importance of this base as must the Australians. I do not expect Australia or Commonwealth troops on Borneo, but it would be in the interest of Australia to help the defence of some point in Celebes?
Mindanao and Davo did give the Japanese a good airbase on the otherhand is it not a bit too far to achieve clear air supiority over Clebes in the opening stages?

The defense of the airbases, where the opening battles were focused on, would be helped if there were some of the infamous Marmon Herrington CTLS-4TAC or CTMS-1TB1 if it was only to prevent the outflanking of the defenders by the Japanese paratroopers.

On the other hand the Dutch were in Indonesia defeated twenty years before, between 1920 and 1923 by there own politicians and a large portion of the population.

​

 

[HJ Tulp]

I don't think that there needs to be any worry with ADM Helfrich and GEN Ter Pooten in charge.
Nothing will change in the NEI.

I'm glad you shared your comments. I've wondered if a Naval Battle of the Surigao Straits could be
achieved with a heavier ABDA presence.

Well Helfrich - and I don't like defending the guy - was very much in favour of engaging the IJN as far away from Java as possible. It had been the great selling point of the light cruiser doctrine that it would be able to defend the Outer Regions in the first place. However, the British insistence that the Singapore convoys had to be heavily escorted - needlessly as it turned out - and Harts insistence that the fight was already lost and it was better to preserve seapower, made those offensive plans a no-go.

 

[Parma]

Well Helfrich - and I don't like defending the guy - was very much in favour of engaging the IJN as far away from Java as possible. It had been the great selling point of the light cruiser doctrine that it would be able to defend the Outer Regions in the first place. However, the British insistence that the Singapore convoys had to be heavily escorted - needlessly as it turned out - and Harts insistence that the fight was already lost and it was better to preserve seapower, made those offensive plans a no-go.

Or Helfrich must return to the submarine rudel-division strategy, with proper submarine divisons of three boats with a MLD air recconaisance, after realising that the navalist/cruiser doctrine is not possible due to the limited number of heavy surface units, even with British and American ships, and the British force Z as exception.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Or Helfrich must return to the submarine rudel-division strategy, with proper submarine divisons of three boats with a MLD air recconaisance, after realising that the navalist/cruiser doctrine is not possible due to the limited number of heavy surface units, even with British and American ships, and the British force Z as exception.

Well sure, but we both know that he is never going to do that.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

So the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry was a TA Regiment (battalion for those who are hard of Commonwealth) formed on 1st Sept 1939

So it had been in existence for 2 years - enough time to be fully trained with a NCO core and trained officers

OTL it did not fight in any actions until D-Day when it was the Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment for the 11th Armoured Division.

Before that it had been a part of the 20th Light Armour Brigade until 20th April 1943 when it was rerolled as a Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment equipped with Cromwell and challenger tanks

A challenger tank of the OTL 2nd NY advance through France in mid Aug 1944 shortly before the unit was disbanded and its surviving personnel used to reinforce other Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments

Hi Cryhavoc101, yes the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry was about as unglamorous a fighting unit as you can get in the British Army. I chose them to limit ripples as much as possible, and I needed a trained tank regiment with Valentines, which was the tank I thought most likely to be sent to a backwater like Malaya. That's if you can get you head around the idea they would have ever sent any there at this stage of the war, hence my plausibility stretch.

Do we have any accounts from anyone serving in the regiment in Normandy, I might use them in Malaya, it's good to write from an individual's perspective. And do the Northampton's have any battle cry?

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Could it have proceeded better if the KNIL was more forward deployed? It looks like the garrisons
were to deal with insurrections, rather than invasions. That might be the key. Slow the IJA/IJN
advance and instead allow reinforcements to arrive at Java and Sumatra?

I've wondered if Menado and Bitung were not the key to the NEI defense.
It's at a juncture of the Celebes and Molucca Seas. The head of the Makassar Strait is to the SW.

Hi Nevarinemex, The only real defence of these island is strong naval and air forces, which the Dutch lacked, although they were investing heavily in new American aircraft. There was an alternative defensive plan which has been discussed, using a division of submarines attacking the Japanese invasion fleet as it closed on its target, the submarines guided by communicating seaplanes. It promised potentially heavy losses on the Japanese, but I'd fear for the submarines too. I'd welcome input from our Dutch residents Parma and HJ Tulp on this.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

On 7 Decembeir Oahu date, 13 of 18 American heavy cruisers were in the Pacific Fleet, 2 escorting a British troop convoy to South Africa, 2 in Iceland covering the Iceland UK gap , and only one in Port .
5 out of 9 Brooklyn/Helena class in the Pacific Fleet, 2 at anchor Bermuda, 1 harbor, 1 under service at Philadelphia Navy Yard, 1 at anchor New York harbour,
6 out of 10 Omaha class were with the Pacific or Asiatic fleets, 3 at Trinidad patrolingSouth Atlantic, or watching the French Fleet at Martinique, an one escorting a GermanBlockade runner to Puerto Rico.
Last but not ,least the CLAA Atlanta undergoing trials on U.S. East Coast.
By May, 3 more New Orleans, class had joined the Pacific fleet.

Hi Butchpfd, thank you for this. We have to be careful here, given the losses in battleships, a lot of these cruisers are liable to be held back, and I guess two or three with each carrier?, this limits what might go west.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

For the tankers, wasn't there also the issue of basic ventilation in equatorial climate? The interior could become oven hot if they were buttoned up and crew performance suffered accordingly. Or, is that an overstated historical myth?

Hi Driftless, sat in a hot metal box, engine running, standing in 30 degrees of sun is going to get very uncomfortable. They'll be parking tanks under trees not just to avoid observation.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Or Helfrich must return to the submarine rudel-division strategy, with proper submarine divisons of three boats with a MLD air recconaisance, after realising that the navalist/cruiser doctrine is not possible due to the limited number of heavy surface units, even with British and American ships, and the British force Z as exception.

and

Well sure, but we both know that he is never going to do that.

Hi guys, with the forming of ABDA, with the Navy under nominal Royal Navy control, could he have re-invented this plan to block some routes, allowing the joint surface fleet to defend other routes, or use the submarines as a first line defence of the obvious route, Makassar Straits?

 

[vetinari]

Hi Driftless, sat in a hot metal box, engine running, standing in 30 degrees of sun is going to get very uncomfortable. They'll be parking tanks under trees not just to avoid observation.

Personally, I have exercised with Leopard AS1 tanks in Australia. While a modern tank, the West Germans had designed them to reduce their IR signature by exhausting all their electronics inwards, into the turret. The result was that the tanks would often reach over 39 degrees Celsius and totally lacked air-comditioning systems in summer. I could imagine Valentines while lacking all the electronics gear were similar, particularly in the tropics, where it often reached humidities of up to 100%.

 

[Parma]

and

Hi guys, with the forming of ABDA, with the Navy under nominal Royal Navy control, could he have re-invented this plan to block some routes, allowing the joint surface fleet to defend other routes, or use the submarines as a first line defence of the obvious route, Makassar Straits?

I would think yes. It was a bit an internal Royal Netherlands Navy doctrine debate, theoretical since there was no real harware, and Helfrich and his superior Furstener were very convinced in their cruiser strategy.
On the other hand Furstener was far away in London and Helfrich confronted with the reality might change his mind a bit earlier than in OTL.
The cooperation between the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy started in this world much earlier than in our time, maybe the British could convince Helfrich to have a bit more faith in their own submarine tacktic and not only put all his faith in the big British ships of force Z.

I do not know the vison of rear Admiral Doorman, Helfrich second, his background was Navy air branch which cooperated close with the submarines.. Luitenant ter Zee, LTZ, Bussemaker, the flotilla comander of the Dutch submarines was convinced that the rudel tactic in the Makassar Straits would work, although with potential heavy losses. The potential heavy losses was since the conception of the strategy a known and accepted risk.

As far as I understand from documents the submarine divisions formations were intact and under Dutch command and only came under British command at the start of December and thus using the rudel-divison tactic was still in place until change of command.

Approximate patrol locations end November 1941:

1st Submarine division O16, K XVII and K XVIII Sambas North West coast of Borneo, later December 1st division cam under British command and relocated to Singapore for individual patrols in the South China Sea as scouts. LTZ Bussemaker commanding the O16.

2nd Submarine division K X, K XI, K XII and K XIII came in December under British command, after Pearl Harbor. Under British command boats made individual patrols, not in division, East of Malaya

3rd Submarine division K XIV, K XV and K XVI Sea around Tarakan and later Makassar Straight.

4th Submarine division O19 and O20 (minelaying capacity) Sea of Flores

Apparently, K XVIII (18) was as well part of the 1st division as 3rd, but could be copy paste type error and it should be K XVII (17)? But the boats could be allocated to different divisions. The K XVII boat patrolled the South China Sea between Borneo and Malaya start of December and there some vague accounts concerning the disappearance of this boat on 7 December. There is a wild story that this boat detected the Hawaii ? attack fleet but was detected and destroyed before contact could made. The real story is that the boat was destroyed by a mine which was laid by the Japanese shortly before.

All above submarines were modern and some very modern, the old ones; K VIII, K IX and K X kept in reserve.

 

[Aber]

Hi Cryhavoc101, yes the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry was about as unglamorous a fighting unit as you can get in the British Army.

Up to a point...

Yeomanry regiments were full of aristocrats eg Army list from 1940
https://deriv.nls.uk/dcn17/8983/89838306.17.jpg
Viscount Suirdale is:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Hely-Hutchinson,_7th_Earl_of_Donoughmore

And yes the unemployed list for the 1st, Major Profumo J is exactly who you think

https://www.tracesofwar.com/docs/wardiary.asp?docid=39&menu=1
I believe youngest son of
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Montagu_Douglas_Scott,_7th_Duke_of_Buccleuch
who is related to the Duke of Gloucester by marriage

 

[HJ Tulp]

and

Hi guys, with the forming of ABDA, with the Navy under nominal Royal Navy control, could he have re-invented this plan to block some routes, allowing the joint surface fleet to defend other routes, or use the submarines as a first line defence of the obvious route, Makassar Straits?

I would think yes. It was a bit an internal Royal Netherlands Navy doctrine debate, theoretical since there was no real harware, and Helfrich and his superior Furstener were very convinced in their cruiser strategy.
On the other hand Furstener was far away in London and Helfrich confronted with the realitymight change his mind a bit earlier than in OTL.
I do not know the vison of rear Admiral Doorman, Helfrich second since his background was Navy air branch whihc cooperated close with the submarines.. Luitenant ter Zee Bussemaker, the commander of the Dutch submarines was confinced the rudel tactic in the Makassar Straits would work, although with potential heavy losses. The potential heavy losses was since the conception of the strategy a known risk.

I personally very much doubt it. On one hand you have Helfrich and the cruisermafia who think that the submarine is way to vulnerable (especially when the KM got their hands on British ASW devices and started training with them) and also not powerful enough. Helfrich obviously employed submarines against the Japanese, but was not going to concentrate them in roedels because he didn't see them as the main battleforce. On the other hand you have the Royal Navy who thinks of submarines as smart minefields and puts the naval air reconnaissance under ABDAIR instead of ABDAFLOAT, so information reached the fleet way to late. Doorman had a long history in the Naval Air Arm, and I suspect that he was - and not without basis - convinced the jig was up when the Japanese gained airsuperiority.

 

[Parma]

I personally very much doubt it. On one hand you have Helfrich and the cruisermafia who think that the submarine is way to vulnerable (especially when the KM got their hands on British ASW devices and started training with them) and also not powerful enough. Helfrich obviously employed submarines against the Japanese, but was not going to concentrate them in roedels because he didn't see them as the main battleforce. On the other hand you have the Royal Navy who thinks of submarines as smart minefields and puts the naval air reconnaissance under ABDAIR instead of ABDAFLOAT, so information reached the fleet way to late. Doorman had a long history in the Naval Air Arm, and I suspect that he was - and not without basis - convinced the jig was up when the Japanese gained airsuperiority.

Cruisermafia 😄 😄 briliant.
I made an update to post #3395
It seems the Dutch submarines who were in the Far East were under Dutch command up to the start of December 1941, and I would say the Dutch MLD float planes, Do24's and PBY's as well. Due to this I assume the whole rudel-divison tactic still excisted up to the end of November.

Maybe Helfrich will have an epiffany or a bad dream due to a wrong prepared sate ajam and realise he should not put all his cards on the nearly mithical might of force Z. Or more down to earth, had a sobering look at the American four stackers in Soerabaja or Balik Papan, who, according to an account of an Indo RNN sailor, looked as floating lumps of rust compared to the spick and span painted Dutch ships.

​

 

[kelgar04]

Personally, I have exercised with Leopard AS1 tanks in Australia. While a modern tank, the West Germans had designed them to reduce their IR signature by exhausting all their electronics inwards, into the turret. The result was that the tanks would often reach over 39 degrees Celsius and totally lacked air-comditioning systems in summer. I could imagine Valentines while lacking all the electronics gear were similar, particularly in the tropics, where it often reached humidities of up to 100%.

I imagine they cracked the hatches every chance they could get just to get some air movement.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

While there is no question that operating tanks in 1941 in Malaya will be tremendously uncomfortable, especially if sealed down with the engine running and in action. That along with a road march, is probably the worst conditions, that the crews will face. Sat in a hidden position with shade and all the hatches open, engine turned off, and plenty of water/tea available, things will while difficult will be bearable. These are not green crews, but very experienced pre war yeomanry, who have at least two years together, and much;more used to hard conditions than modern youth are. While I do not doubt that Gort and Percival will contrary to established wisdom, insist on dividing the tanks up into penny packets, to the fury of all within the regiment. Given the conditions on the ground, trying to deploy a full regiment is a total waste, /and even today what works best in open country, is not what works best in closed and tight conditions.