You know, the future of the Empire is going to be rather interesting; I just noticed that Sandler was writing in 1942, and says that Africa is just emerging from colonialism. So, decolonization at least 20 years early? I look forward to it.
Malê Rising
- Thread starter Jonathan Edelstein
- Start date
I don't think so. Oman proper will may become marginally bigger absorbing some of the immediate territories and towns but that should be about it, and even I'm doubtful about that. Their attention will be almost entirely drawn to east africa.
I don't see why not. Of course they couldn't take over and try to run everything as demigods they way they did OTL, but they certainly could immigrate and buy land (or whatever equivalent negotiations they need to perform) and set up operations. They will probably not have legal extraterritoriality but as British subjects (or citizens of other European nations; OTL British East Africa had colonists from a variety of European countries for instance) the government will probably go out of its way to please them and avoid offending them.
I'm not sure whether Abacarism will have become influential in the Sudan at that time. The most prominent Sahelian influence in Egypt and Sudan will be Belloism, and as a quietist doctrine, Belloism wouldn't be a good rallying point for a revolt. On the other hand, a Belloist-influenced Egypt might be less oppressive toward the Sudanese, resulting in the Mahdist revolt not happening or not getting as much traction. We'll see when we get there, I guess.
I'm guessing that the French would still try to take Djibouti, which is a good strategic position as well as an inlet for trade with Ethiopia. The rest of Somalia, as in OTL, might go to Italy or some other minor power.
Tippu Tib (or Tip) was born in 1837, so he'll exist in this timeline (the POD was 1835, but nobody outside Brazil noticed it before 1840, and the butterfly event horizon won't reach East Africa until the 1850s). He'll appear in future updates, but his career will be very different in an environment less congenial to the slave trade.
The emergence of the Zulu nation, the Mfecane and the Great Trek were also pre-POD, so the Mfecane kingdoms and the Boer states will also exist in substantially the same form as OTL. I'm not sure, at this point, how much effect Malê doctrines will have on their history - a Muslim West African philosophy would be alien to them - but you never know what ideas might pass, in distorted form, through the vector of British imperialism.
Don't fear for Abacar's family. Keep in mind that they're also part of the Fodio/Bello family and that they have their own power base among the Fulani as well as (thanks to the jajis) in the Hausa villages. They can take care of themselves, and they will. Without giving too much away, there will be several successor states to the Sokoto Republic, and the bulk of the family will end up well-placed in one of them. And Major (soon to be Lieutenant Colonel) Alexander will remain close to the family - we'll be seeing more of both.
It's too early, though, for Sokoto or any of the successors to become British protectorates - they're a long way inland, with a number of independent kingdoms between them and the nearest British colony, and adding them to the empire at this point will be logistically improbable. It will be a while before colonialism gets that far, which will give the successor states that much more time to develop, and will make them that much more valuable as administrators and service-providers to the RN.
This is what I meant by being colonized and liking it; industrial development, even of a rather light kind, means creating ties within the larger British system, means fostering ambitions on too great a scale to be contained in the one republic or even a larger republic built around it. West Africans are going to include people who want to stay in the Empire for its global-scaled opportunities--provided those opportunities are not closed to them by their race or other background considerations (like being Muslims, for instance.) That was the sense in which I meant less British racism--not "of course my daughter can marry one!" (though certainly while that kind of caste-racism was common in the OTL colonists, during WWI as well as WWII, African-American soldiers had relatively little trouble acquiring English girlfriends--the trouble they had was when their white US officers found out about it--so that sort of acceptance might not be quite as ASB after a few generations as Americans might assume) but simply accepting that West African businessmen with dark skins who happen to worship Allah can nevertheless be among the top commercial men of London and the Empire broadly speaking, and this is good for the Empire rather than any kind of scandal.
This might happen to a substantial degree - the Sokoto successor states (or at least some of them) will be unique among client states in their industrial base, and they may take their place alongside rich Indians as businessmen to the empire. There might be Malê merchants along with the Indians in places like Zanzibar and Aden, for instance, and the British-educated children of the more successful ones (or of the ones who become army officers) could become substantial financiers in London.
Some - the ATL's counterparts of Blaise Diagne - may well want to stay in the empire. They'll lose out as you say, but as you also say, we don't yet know what Commonwealth-type arrangement may take their place.
I tend to agree with Shevek23 that white settlers might still come to territories nominally under the control of an African king; I believe (although I could be wrong) that some of the settlement in Natal took place before it was annexed to colonial South Africa. Once in place, of course, they would form a privileged class under British protection, and might try to pull a Rhodesia.
Also, the Omanis may not have time to take over all the highlands before European settlers start to come - they'd probably go after Tanganyika first, and might not absorb all of Kenya.
The way I'm planning to avoid the Ethiopian campaign and to keep Egypt solvent is to have the khedive fall under the influence of a Belloist minister and/or court favorite, resulting in an Egypt that is less expansionist in general. This could prevent the Ethiopian debacle and (as mentioned above) forestall or defang the Mahdist revolt, but it would also mean that Egypt will confine its Sudanese territorial ambitions to the northern Nile Valley, the Red Sea ports and possibly Darfur.
Some sort of Egyptian clientage over southern Sudan and Bunyoro, on the other hand, may be very possible.
Good point. I'm not sure they'd want Portugal to be that minor power, though - if the Congo basin became Portuguese, then Portugal would have a huge contiguous territory with Angola, and would be within shouting distance of establishing a corridor to Mozambique. I doubt any of the great powers would want Portugal to be able to cut Africa in half, not to mention that the Portuguese might not have the capital to exploit such a big region. Italy wouldn't have the money either, and would want territories closer to home. So maybe Belgium as in OTL, or the Netherlands, or Germany/Prussia (depending on the progress of German unification)?
The tricky part is that, as you say, there would be a subsidiary Omani/Zanzibari empire within the British empire, with many of its territories only recently added. This could go one of two ways - consolidation into a multiethnic nation-state, or development of regional nationalisms opposed to both Britain and Zanzibar. (For an example of the latter in OTL, see Sudan.) Probably there will be a combination of both.
For the record, I'm somewhere between you and Ridwan as to how much of Yemen the sultanate would pick up - I think they'd be dragooned into taking over some of the petty Yemeni kingdoms (or at least acting as the sheriff/peacemaker), but they wouldn't get all of Yemen, and certainly not the north.
And the development of democratic forces will be a matter of when, not if - the Zanzibari sultanate will be Muslim, and liberation theology will get there sooner or later.
He said Africa is starting to emerge from colonialism in the early 1940s - decolonization has started, but it still has a way to go, especially since there will be much greater divergence in ideologies and patterns of governance between colonial powers.
On the other hand, one guess which country will be one of the first to get its independence back.
Very nice updates, Jonathan. Particularly nicely written was the battle scene; well-paced, and interesting.
How internationalized is West Africa at this time, and Sokoto in particular? By that, I mean things like this: How often might Sokoto traders go abroad to ply their wares and pick up business? How many diplomats do West African states send to European and Asian courts? How much trade was there across the Sahara, and how did that compare to Atlantic trade? Finally, how does all of this compare to OTL?
Cheers,
Ganesha
How internationalized is West Africa at this time, and Sokoto in particular? By that, I mean things like this: How often might Sokoto traders go abroad to ply their wares and pick up business? How many diplomats do West African states send to European and Asian courts? How much trade was there across the Sahara, and how did that compare to Atlantic trade? Finally, how does all of this compare to OTL?
Cheers,
Ganesha
1) The coming of white settlers in Kenyan highlands was virtually unprecedental and was certainly artificially imposed IOTL, and that was due to British direct control over the place in the first place. It's no comparison to South Africa, which had had been hosting white settlers for more then a century by then for being geoclimatically relevant for such to begin with. So I can't imagine how can there be whites to arrive in the area before Zanzibari authority even does, considering that expanding their interest conveniently through the Sultanate being British' policy in the region to begin with.
Some interesting fact from OTL to note, just after the partition, British actually considered putting their share under direct control of Zanzibar, up to Uganda, before eventually deciding to put them under their own direct rule instead. I thought I have PM'd you several lengthy links, haven't I ? At least one of those contained this information, though since they're all fairly long threads it's understandable if you haven't read any. Apologize for the trouble
We'll may see some white gentlemen conglomerate or two to somehow earns the right from the Sultan in Zanzibar to build an estate of plantation in the highlands, and then bringing some employees and professionals from home with them maybe up to hundreds, but I don't see thousands of white immigrants incoming. No matter what, it's not a crown colony of Britain, but part of a technically sovereign state, a fact which will may even be rendering actual settling of whites there unprofitable.
2) I don't think they will necessarily mind. At least, the British won't. Actually, I think because they likely won't have enough money to run such a big territory, that the other powers, at least the British, won't mind. Portugal was only a little better then the likes of Zanzibar and other British major clients. They were British client, and largely helpless before London. Portuguese expansion in Africa will mostly serve similar purpose Zanzibari expansion will do, and they will only be able to do that with British blessing. Besides, it's to be noted that IOTL, while their intention for transatlantic corridor between Mozambique and Angola had been there for centuries, they had been more concerned for Congo Basin for as long. Pink Map was only a reaction towards their failure in wrestling The Congo from Leopold. Prior, they pretty much neglected the area but they cared for Zambezia even less. Should the British decide to support their claim over Congo, I think the Portuguese will happily relinquish their ambition for the corridor. Actually, I think the British will even be generous enough to grant a worthless strip of corridor to them if they would support the British efforts later against the Boer States, by say granting Delagoa Bay to British control.
Maybe that Portuguese Congo, in absence of Leopold, isn't inevitable. Certainly still the most likely scenario, however. They were pretty much the only one who had the precedent to claim it. Leopold's intrusion pretty much came out of nowhere. However, doesn't mean it couldn't have had been done by someone else. But, again, who else would ?
It depends on how things would've developed by the time we get there. Will we still see Germany as naval competitor to Britain as IOTL ? Will US be harboring more colonial ambition vis a vis OTL by then ? etc.
3) I've mentioned about this in my previous post. If the British won't get any foothold in the region then the French certainly won't. There were European colonies across Yemen IOTL due to vacuum left by declining Ottoman-Egyptian power there in the first place.
The rest of Somalia may go to Italy, if they will still end up wanting it ITTL. But I'm personally interested in seeing it going to Oman-Zanzibari instead
Or maybe the French get that rest of Somalia instead ? I guess not, seeing its geographical location, but its ecological quality seems crappy enough for the Brits to not mind giving it to the French... Madagascar is a much better place then that !
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Oh, I didn't see this post before, sorry
My thinking is closer to this, but less optimistic. I don't think there will be thousands of them coming. At least, not nearly as much as OTL. 5000-ish at most. And they won't get there before Zanzibari rule gets established.Oh, I didn't see this post before, sorry
Ah, you didn't mean to say "absolutely no colonization at all," then, just "less of it," which seems reasonable. But how much less? I'm not having an easy, quick time of coming up with cumulative figures for the migration of Europeans (mostly from Britain but as I mentioned, this colony OTL did include non-British European settlers too). The only numbers I see mentioned in several Internet articles I've found as yet are figures for European populations of major cities, of which Nairobi leads the way with something like 3000 circa 1920 or so (per the "classic" 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica, obviously updated past WWI anyway)
That article mentions that the colonists were employing something like 100,000 native Africans.
So I kept looking--the most informative thing I've found so far is this article at Wikipedia on the "1952 Emergency" aka "Mau Mau Uprising;" it mentions something like 30,000 Europeans by the 1930s. In the context, of course, of their having expropriated a huge amount of land, and their continual demand for yet more African labor, finding those hundreds of thousands inadequate!
So yes, a few thousand at most would be an order of magnitude reduction and a completely different character of presence; if those few thousands did not have the tremendous amount of legal compulsion at their disposal the OTL Kenya colony employed (not entirely clear they would have none of it, depending on how obsequious the nominally African regime was in the service of profit-seeking Europeans who might be the chief props of their government) then the sorts of profits that attracted "settlers" OTL would not prevail and the magnitude of settlement might be lower still.
Your point substantially stands then; mine is tantamount to saying "none at all" compared to OTL scale.
I knew of course that generally speaking the sort of colonization Europeans were aiming at in the late 19th century and after (most of those 30,000 and more came in in the 20th century) was not for African benefit and was disruptive; it is a salutary reminder how disruptive it was. If this sort of colonization is constrained by native Africans with a reasonable say in what happens to them it clearly would be very very different. It is well to remind ourselves how different it would have to have been to be a reasonably acceptable situation for the people who already lived there and it underscores how and why the colonial enterprise would have been limited and yet be brought to an end!
Thanks!
Hmmm. Diplomacy between Africa and Europe at this time in OTL was largely an ad hoc affair - the interior African states didn't have enough interaction with Europe to make it worth the expense of having full-time embassies, and the Europeans didn't consider African countries to be "real" states with recognized diplomatic relations. There were exceptions - Britain maintained a consul in Zanzibar, and I believe there was also one in Ethiopia - but for the most part, diplomacy consisted of one-off missions by envoys or military officers who were sent for a specific purpose.
The ATL still follows this pattern in the 1840s. However, with the increasing volume of trade and the formation of de facto military alliances, there will be more need for diplomacy in the future. One or more of the Sokoto successor states may begin by appointing some prominent Englishman as honorary consul to act on their behalf in London (a certain soon-to-be-retired lieutenant colonel might fit the bill) and eventually upgrade to a small full-time mission, while Britain might appoint a permanent military liaison who also acts as consul.
Trade: there was definitely trans-Sahara trade to Morocco through Timbuktu and to Egypt along the Darb al-Arba'in, as well as the via the salt oases in OTL Niger and Mali. Figures are very hard to come by, but the volume will be greater in the ATL because of Sokoto's manufacturing base. The Republic also built roads and dug canals to improve navigation on the Niger (although these were only partially finished at the time of Abacar's death) so there will be significant trade with the Yoruba city-states, the British in Lagos, and the Niger delta. There wouldn't be a great deal of trade with Europe yet - locally produced industrial goods wouldn't be competitive, although specialty crafts might find their way abroad as luxury items.
There will also be a greater trade in ideas - the items going north from Lagos to Ilorin and Sokoto (and vice versa) will include books and newspapers, and there will be exchanges with the rest of the Islamic world via pilgrimages to Mecca.
I checked some figures, and I think you're right. British settlement in Kenya and Tanganyika was subsidized - the colonial authorities would give land grants to retired officers - and the white settlers had a legal monopoly on coffee planting. Neither of these would be the case in an Omani/Zanzibari Tanganyika. What might happen instead is that the Sultan, with British "encouragement," would invite white settlers in to develop some of the land that doesn't go to his own generals and noblemen. Or maybe the feudal estate-holders themselves would lease land to white developers who would provide capital, and who would then bring in the retired officers as managers.
Either way, the whites wouldn't have a monopoly and would have to compete with the Omani/Zanzibari estate-owners and with those Africans who manage to keep their land, so the profits would be lower. Your figure of 5000 sounds about right - enough to form an economically privileged class, but far too few to pull a Rhodesia. (Speaking of which, some of the settlers who went to Kenya and Tanganyika in OTL might be redirected to Rhodesia in the ATL, assuming that the British pick it up, which is probable since they'll want to outflank the Boer republics.)
On the other hand, the number of Indians and Arabs in mainland East Africa might be more than in OTL, as they would fill the middleman-merchant niche. As I mentioned yesterday, we might also see some Malê there.
Some interesting fact from OTL to note, just after the partition, British actually considered putting their share under direct control of Zanzibar, up to Uganda, before eventually deciding to put them under their own direct rule instead. I thought I have PM'd you several lengthy links, haven't I ? At least one of those contained this information, though since they're all fairly long threads it's understandable if you haven't read any. Apologize for the trouble
No trouble - I appreciate the information! I've read some of them, but haven't had time to go through them all.
Which is precisely why the other European powers won't want Portugal to take over. Britain is already going to have a larger African empire in the ATL, and the other great powers won't want the British to take it all. They want those resources too! Maybe what would happen is that the great and minor powers would club together and demand that, in exchange for allowing Portugal to take over the Congo basin, each of them be granted concessions. Thus, while the Congo would be nominally Portuguese (and parts of it, especially the areas contiguous to Angola, would actually be Portuguese-administered), most of it would be a concessionaire colony which would be leased to various European countries and subleased to private contractors. This would mean that, in addition to the usual viciousness associated with rubber colonialism, there would be claim-jumping and turf wars. Yeesh, this might actually make the Congo worse.
I'd also thought of an American Congo. I have a feeling that the United States would make a singularly bad colonial overlord in Africa, given the racial attitudes of the time. I'm not sure if the US would have that kind of colonial ambitions in the ATL, though - I guess we'll see how things develop.
The rest of Somalia may go to Italy, if they will still end up wanting it ITTL. But I'm personally interested in seeing it going to Oman-Zanzibari instead
The Omanis will get some of it, I think. France and Italy might take the rest in order to block the British from controlling the entire Horn - with the British in Aden, I think France will want someone else (not necessarily themselves, but someone other than Britain or a British proxy) to hold the other side of the Bab el Mandab.
I've also hinted at another French blocking action - instead of settling one shipload of freedmen in Libreville (Gabon) as in OTL, they're sponsoring the settlement of a genuine freedmen's colony along the lines of Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Definitely - and also a reminder of how disruptive settler colonialism (on the one hand) and labor-intensive resource extraction colonialism (on the other) were in comparison to the paternalistic colonialism practiced in most of West Africa. Even paternalistic colonialism is bad from the indigenous standpoint; the others are far worse, and no indigenous entity with even a nominal amount of say over their development would allow uncontrolled settlement or resource extraction. Which again brings me around to the point of view that you and Ridwan express, where white settlement in an Omani/Zanzibari mainland - although it would exist - would be much less widespread and more tightly regulated than OTL.
I must say this is really rather good so far, very compelling!
I would think that South Africa could develop in quite a different way than IOTL, based on what has happened so far and it could be that the formalisation of the Afrikaner republics and their subsequent disputes with all and sundry, the outflanking that was Rhodesia all change markedly. Here are some thoughts:
Britain, India, Oman and Zanzibar – Potentially with your thoughts as outlined, there could be a bigger presence on the East Coast for Indian migrants, more so than OTL. This could have a presence in Natal and possibly the Cape, or even in land, if things go a little differently. So by 1900 or so there might be a far larger Indian population resident IOTL SA, which could have all sorts of butterflies for a second South African War.
At the very least, the trading dynamic with East Africa/India/the Empire may be quite different with a longer lasting Sultanate just up the coast. It will be much harder for disaffected Afrikaner migrants to percolate northwards without the IOTL colonial set up
I get the impression, perhaps wrongly, that a lot of the British experience in West Africa in the late 19th century, in the hinterlands anyway, was of the District Officer kind. Now, if we have the Princely State model of long lasting persistent entities well into colonial rule, the Colonial Office and British government generally are going to have to spend more time and resources managing their interests there.
Less hands off perhaps? This could be both a distraction from SA as well as a benefit, as the British may maintain a more significant Imperial regular forces presence in West Africa, which is easier or faster at least to deploy to SA.
The TL is currently at 1850, so far as I can tell. This is only a couple of years before the British met with the two Afrikaner republics and recognised their independence, although I am sure they were de facto independent already. So do the Sand River and Bloemfontein agreements go as per OTL? I really do not remember much about this era in SA history, but up to that point the British had just annexed the various Afrikaner republics that arose (or at least, Natalia). I guess OFS and Transvaal were more awkward to reach than Natalia, but what if Britain had kept at it?
It could end up that the Afrikaners, Cape, Natal or inland stayed under British direct rule for some time. If this happened, I would expect revolts, but I would also expect that Britain would look to make an early federation, just like they tried in the 1870s IOTL
I would think that South Africa could develop in quite a different way than IOTL, based on what has happened so far and it could be that the formalisation of the Afrikaner republics and their subsequent disputes with all and sundry, the outflanking that was Rhodesia all change markedly. Here are some thoughts:
Britain, India, Oman and Zanzibar – Potentially with your thoughts as outlined, there could be a bigger presence on the East Coast for Indian migrants, more so than OTL. This could have a presence in Natal and possibly the Cape, or even in land, if things go a little differently. So by 1900 or so there might be a far larger Indian population resident IOTL SA, which could have all sorts of butterflies for a second South African War.
At the very least, the trading dynamic with East Africa/India/the Empire may be quite different with a longer lasting Sultanate just up the coast. It will be much harder for disaffected Afrikaner migrants to percolate northwards without the IOTL colonial set up
I get the impression, perhaps wrongly, that a lot of the British experience in West Africa in the late 19th century, in the hinterlands anyway, was of the District Officer kind. Now, if we have the Princely State model of long lasting persistent entities well into colonial rule, the Colonial Office and British government generally are going to have to spend more time and resources managing their interests there.
Less hands off perhaps? This could be both a distraction from SA as well as a benefit, as the British may maintain a more significant Imperial regular forces presence in West Africa, which is easier or faster at least to deploy to SA.
The TL is currently at 1850, so far as I can tell. This is only a couple of years before the British met with the two Afrikaner republics and recognised their independence, although I am sure they were de facto independent already. So do the Sand River and Bloemfontein agreements go as per OTL? I really do not remember much about this era in SA history, but up to that point the British had just annexed the various Afrikaner republics that arose (or at least, Natalia). I guess OFS and Transvaal were more awkward to reach than Natalia, but what if Britain had kept at it?
It could end up that the Afrikaners, Cape, Natal or inland stayed under British direct rule for some time. If this happened, I would expect revolts, but I would also expect that Britain would look to make an early federation, just like they tried in the 1870s IOTL
1) They may won't want it, but they won't necessarily be able to prevent it. Judging from material power alone, Britain was definitely capable to dominate the continent and dictating most of the terms. IOTL however, they got entangled with Egypt, which proved to be immense diplomatic strain. That was why Germany could get to set up African colonies, and France was able to rush up to Fashoda. Had it not been the case, there is little the other colonial players can do outside of their own established spheres.
Portuguese Congo was the most likely possibility even IOTL. So unless someone else would preempt that by making a dynamic entry into the Congo like Leopold did IOTL, it will end up Portuguese. The moment another great power making their moves around the region, the British will immediately prop up the Portuguese to contain it.
Though, indeed, they won't be able to completely forbid foreign business from entering as well. But they will limit it, and British will still end up the biggest winner. And, I don't think Portuguese Congo will end up as chaotic as you think. I think such will have been preempted in the formative agreement of cake sharing. And I don't think Portuguese control will be that limited. British and other parties won't want to run the administration and order maintenance by themselves, and thus will subsidize Portugal to do the hard work.
2) The stretch of land from Massawa to Berbera will remain Egyptian without British occupation of Egypt, so all that would be left is that rest of Somalia, which is worthless enough, but Italy is a safer candidate then France. Oman-Zanzibar however, is an even better option.
About Egypt....
Since I know little about Egyptian history, so I asked about what caused Egyptian financial crisis back then in the other site. Here's what I got.
As I said, he is the man who showed me actual debt receipt of Ottoman Empire (now burried in the debt of facebook, hwv), and he certainly has one for Khedivate as well. I would naturally assume that he knows much about all concerning the causes of Egyptian financial crisis, specifically about how much their invasion of Ethiopia actually hurt themselves, in comparison to the debt imposed by foreign powers post-Suez Canal.
I think for now, I'm back to my previous "British or Ottoman" stance regarding Egypt.
Since I know little about Egyptian history, so I asked about what caused Egyptian financial crisis back then in the other site. Here's what I got.
As I said, he is the man who showed me actual debt receipt of Ottoman Empire (now burried in the debt of facebook, hwv
), and he certainly has one for Khedivate as well. I would naturally assume that he knows much about all concerning the causes of Egyptian financial crisis, specifically about how much their invasion of Ethiopia actually hurt themselves, in comparison to the debt imposed by foreign powers post-Suez Canal.I think for now, I'm back to my previous "British or Ottoman" stance regarding Egypt.
Why was Egypt such a strain on Britain's resources? They had huge incentive to hold on to it in order to control sea lanes to India, and they were able to hold on to India firmly for 150 years without collapsing the rest of the Empire. Was the addition of 40 million Egyptians really that much of a problem for the British?
Quite possibly. I've also mentioned the possibility of Malê businessmen playing a secondary role to the Indians as the British empire's colonial merchants, which means some of them might also end up in ZA - probably in the Cape, although there might be a few in the diamond fields.
British West Africa, in the early days, followed the princely-state model more than many people think - consider the career of Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company, for instance. In this timeline, the empire will take over from the company somewhat earlier (after one of Goldie's expeditions gets its head handed to it by one of the Malê successor states) and the princely-state model will continue, although the weaker areas will fall under direct rule. This probably will mean a less hands-off approach with more regional diplomacy, and also some turf wars between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office as to who has jurisdiction over various parts of the empire.
I'm not as familiar with southern African history as I really ought to be. It seems, though, that the Orange Free State wanted to stay British in the early 1850s, but Britain didn't want to be bothered. It was later, after the gold and diamonds were found, that Britain became interested in the OFS again - and as late as 1881, it didn't consider the Transvaal worth the expense of reconquering. I'm not sure that would change in this timeline, especially with bigger East and West African empires occupying British energy and resources. My guess is that foreign immigration to the gold and diamond fields will be the flashpoint as in OTL, but I'm willing to be persuaded otherwise.
All right, I'm pretty much convinced, although I still think the British wouldn't be able to have things all their own way - whatever Berlin Conference analogue takes place in this timeline will be as much about splitting up the concessions in Portuguese Congo as it will be about dividing Africa - maybe it will be more so, since the African empires will have defined themselves to a greater extent.
I'm going to do the world a favor and assume that Leopold II won't get a loan to set up a Congolese colony, although as noted, rubber colonialism will be brutal no matter who's nominally in charge. The French part of Congo in OTL wasn't much different than the Free State.
Or Ethiopia - if they aren't weakened by the Egyptian invasion, and if Menelik II still comes out on top of the pile (which I think he will), they might be able to compete with Italy for it.
Interesting. If AHP says that avoiding the Ethiopian war wouldn't have kept Egypt solvent, I'll take his word for it. On the other hand, his post suggests another possibility - a different outcome to the 1864 Suez Canal Company arbitration. In this timeline, with an earlier British interest in Africa, shares of the company might sell better in Britain, with French stockholders holding only a minority of shares. If so, then Napoleon III might be persuaded to rule in Egypt's favor in order to weaken British regional interests. Conversely, if French investors do hold a majority, Britain might insist on a more neutral arbitrator (possibly German or Dutch, or even American) in order to prevent Nappy from strengthening French regional interests and to incur a debt of gratitude from Egypt. This timeline may see an earlier and sharper British-French imperial rivalry, making them more likely to oppose each other in Egypt rather than acting jointly.
Still other alternatives might involve Ismail Pasha not repudiating his predecessor's concessions to the company, or (if he's still forced to sell his shares to Britain in 1875) France forcing a write-down of Egyptian debt at that point in order to keep the British from getting too much control. I'm working with an earlier POD than AHP was, so I have more leverage - give me an early enough POD and some halfway plausible consequences to flow from it, and I shall change the world!
BTW, I read through the non-ah.com links you sent me. Interesting stuff. I see AHP already thought of Anglo-Zanzibari East Africa, so I guess there's nothing new under the sun, although with my earlier POD, I get to keep the Omanis as part of that empire.
iddt3
Donor
I think Fight and be Right had an American Congo which had very interesting effects down stream, as it was being run, explicitly at least, as a humanitarian venture but in actuality had become a sort of banana republic Vietnam hybrid. On the other hand, if America takes it early, does brutal stuff, and gets caught, it might be embarrassing/horrifying enough to have America reassess it's relationships with third world countries, if it happens early on enough it might even be fixable. It already sounds like your timeline will result in both a more diverse and earlier integrating America, if you delivered a check to american exceptionalism, or at least a caution, it would be even more awesome.
Actually, on that note, I wonder if the Congo could get bad enough to give America a guilt complex on the order of post world war two Germany's, that would see it engaging with the world but in a more restrained and nuanced manner.
*edit* Oh, and your timeline is absolutely amazing, it's in an area of history I didn't know well, and extremely well written as well as actually emotionally engaging. Keep it up!
Actually, on that note, I wonder if the Congo could get bad enough to give America a guilt complex on the order of post world war two Germany's, that would see it engaging with the world but in a more restrained and nuanced manner.
*edit* Oh, and your timeline is absolutely amazing, it's in an area of history I didn't know well, and extremely well written as well as actually emotionally engaging. Keep it up!
That's not the problem. It was very profitable for British to hold onto Egypt, so much it's simply not fair for the other powers, and that's where the problem lies. First, they will want to guard it at all cost, restraining their movement to do much elsewhere. Second, the disparity resulted from Egypt vis a vis other powers will make anti-British bloc forming among the later more possible to happen. That put a significant handicap on Britain's bargaining position, and IOTL, Germany was well aware of it, and immediately exploited their vulnerability. Even Britain herself I think, was well aware of it before they ended up occupying it anyway and in fact tried to avoid doing so by beforehand inviting Ottomans instead to occupy the Khedivate.
Prior to Egypt, Britain preferred to expand in Africa through native client states. Occupation of Egypt was a massive boost to scramble for Africa since it provoked other powers to rush for grabbing their own share of the continent. It was a green light for other powers, both for being a plain starting signal for the African race, and for nailing Britain's priority in Egypt. Thus, Britain was forced to save what they could from their former spheres of influence and put them under direct colonial administration, which drained their colonial profit more then significantly. It wasn't insurmountable for their financial prowess of the time, but it was still a drain. An Egypt-less British Empire would've likely become richer and more globally dominant then OTL counterpart, with their colonies being better developed.
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1) Indeed, indeed. The Congo fiasco was a useful distraction bone for France and other parties who engaged in similar practice.
2) I need to learn more about this specific topic and Egyptian history in general, so either denouncing or recognizing the possibility of your plan is out of my league. Your earlier PoD should indeed at least gives you more leverage, but I think you should discuss this with someone your caliber in the field of African studies. I will immediately alert the old man about your message for him, and this great TL !
wolf_brother
Banned
Abacar seems to be a more successful Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte in just about every way.
EDIT: On the subject of the Congo, French Congo seems like a strong way to compensate for France's weaker position, and Britain's stronger one. Giving the region to a minor power will not redress the balance of power, and unlike Germany, or the US, or any other state, France at least has a vague claim to the region via Gabon.
As well in East Africa, what about one of the Somalian Sultanates surviving? Why does it have to go a European power? The Devrish kept the Europeans out for decades; a more conciliatory attitude and policy in the part of the Europeans vis-à-vis Africans means many of the native states that resisted European dominion for a long time might do even better ITTL.
EDIT: On the subject of the Congo, French Congo seems like a strong way to compensate for France's weaker position, and Britain's stronger one. Giving the region to a minor power will not redress the balance of power, and unlike Germany, or the US, or any other state, France at least has a vague claim to the region via Gabon.
As well in East Africa, what about one of the Somalian Sultanates surviving? Why does it have to go a European power? The Devrish kept the Europeans out for decades; a more conciliatory attitude and policy in the part of the Europeans vis-à-vis Africans means many of the native states that resisted European dominion for a long time might do even better ITTL.
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Now there's a comparison that never occurred to me. I assume that since you said "Louis-Napoleon" rather than "Napoleon III," you're referring to the 1848-51 period rather than the empire. What areas of greater success are you thinking of - economic modernization? Military intervention in the near abroad? Being a de facto monarch with democratic sensibilities? Balancing domestic political factions? I'm not as familiar with the man as I ought to be, so I'm sure there's some nuance I'm missing here.
Hmmm. On the one hand, the British would hate this idea. On the other hand, they might be sufficiently overextended in West Africa, South Africa and the Swahili coast that they wouldn't be able to do much about it. Probably the French would at least try to push east and south from Gabon at the same time that the Portuguese push north from Angola. I'm still inclined toward a brokered settlement under which a minor power will run the Congo basin as a concessionaire colony, but we'll see how things develop.
The areas that became Djibouti and British Somaliland in OTL are, I think, too strategically valuable - the British will want to lock them down in order to control access to the Red Sea, and the French and Germans will want to do so in order to prevent Britain from holding both sides of the Bab el-Mandab. On the other hand, assuming there's still a charismatic leader who unites the Dervishes, the Europeans might agree to leave him the interior as long as he lets them have the coast. I'd expect any such deal to be made and broken several times over, and I'd expect that Ethiopia might also try to expand into this area, but it at least seems possible.
The areas facing the Indian Ocean might survive - the land is marginal and the strategic value minimal, so they might be more valuable as buffers between the Omani-Zanzibaris and whoever controls the north than they would be as colonies. There would be a lot of great-power and minor-power intrigue among them, though, and some would become semi-vassals of one country or another.