Malê Rising

Hnau

Banned
Heh, yep.

Man, poor Germany. I don't know why, but I'm rooting for them.

They are the definite underdogs in the European theater, being attacked on every border except with Denmark and the Netherlands. I can't help but think there are a lot of Germans upset with Wilhelm's decision to intervene in the Bavarian civil war... they are paying the largest cost of the Great War because of it.

Oh, and, no way the Germans won't declare war on Belgium as soon as they get to their borders! What are the Belgians thinking?
 
Boy, if the French are really counting on 1890s tech trucks to replace trains for logistics, they are going to get a huge surprise.

Id except those trucks will break down regularly, and theyll do horribly on muddy roads. Even roads that USED to be allweather.

Besides, they'll cost the moon, to both buy and run.

Granted. The French aren't counting on trucks to replace trains, not by a long shot. They're treating the trucks as an alternative logistical system in places where trains are absent - for instance, where the rails have been blown up by retreating North Germans. What they hope is that motor transport will at least partially neutralize the German scorched-earth tactics.

And yeah, the trucks are temperamental as hell, and it usually helps to have some infantrymen handy to push them out of potholes. They're somewhat less expensive than one might think, given that a "truck" at this point was basically a wagon with an engine and drive train added (see), and the French government is requisitioning old farm wagons to use as bases. Of course, this won't do anything for their reliability, and given that the engine and drive train are the only systems that use standard parts, repairs will tend to be makeshift.

The trucks will get better by the end of the war, though, especially once the British and Germans start making them.

Btw, how are the russians, for instance doing for nitrates? When are they going to run out of shells and cordite?

France can import through spain. But Russia will have really minimal access. AH is going to be in trouble, too. Even the ottomans might, if FAR has closed the Suez canal to BOG.

The Russians are importing them through Korea and Manchuria at the moment - they built a railroad through Harbin in the late 1880s when Korea first started to drift into their orbit - which is one of the reasons why the Japanese incursions into Manchuria are making them so nervous. Japan is leaving the Korea-Russia link alone, but a wrong move on either side could be disastrous.

A-H is in bad shape, and is mostly depending on what it can get through France. The Ottomans are hurting, but are able to get supplies through the Med and the Persian Gulf.

Well, the game seems up for the German attempt at secrecy, but not without some gains. I admit I wasn't expecting them to reach as far as Prague, even if it looks unlikely to fall. Interesting to see the Russians start to feel the strain of war; are we going to get a closer look at that? Might a 1905-style revolution or rebellion be in the cards?

The Austrians weren't able to regroup in the Erzgebirge, and weren't sure whether Sudetenland was friendly territory. They're dug in north and west of Prague; the front is about 50 kilometers from the city, and it's in no immediate danger of falling.

We'll get a closer look at the Russian home front very soon, and again during year three. And almost anything might be in the cards.

Man, poor Germany. I don't know why, but I'm rooting for them.

Because for all Wilhelm's fecklessness and warmongering, they're making a damned brave stand? And because the industrial workers are going to come out of this war with vastly increased power and respect?

They are the definite underdogs in the European theater, being attacked on every border except with Denmark and the Netherlands. I can't help but think there are a lot of Germans upset with Wilhelm's decision to intervene in the Bavarian civil war... they are paying the largest cost of the Great War because of it.

Oh, and, no way the Germans won't declare war on Belgium as soon as they get to their borders! What are the Belgians thinking?

As I've said before, much of the Anglo-German strength is latent. The North Germans are underdogs now, but if the Ruhr holds out through the winter and Silesia stays safe, they'll be considerably stronger come spring.

There are certainly many unhappy Germans, and they'll become more so this year, especially since Köln will prove to be a meat-grinder for both sides. Victory, if it happens, will atone for some of Wilhelm's sins, but given the scale of the losses, it won't atone for all of them by any means. The Social Democrats are waiting in the wings.

And the Belgians are thinking that the NDB is about to crack and that it's time to get their share of the spoils. Rumors of the North Germans' demise will, however, prove somewhat exaggerated.

I have finally caught up with this, and I must say that this timeline is absolutely amazing! Keep up the good work, Jonathan!

Thanks! The Belleville home front will be next, with a Senegalese veteran who we've seen before.
 
Right now I am seeing North Germany as sort of the "France" of this alt-WWI, with large chunks of its land under foreign occupation, and basically just holding on through a years-long meatgrinder: of course, unlike OTLs France, there are potentially big prizes waiting if it holds on till the enemy gives...

Bruce
 
Interesting.
I am waiting for further updates. It looks like the situation is getting messier before it gets clearer (cit.).

North Germany is really fighting for its life, as I expected. But Austria is not particularly in a good shape too. I suppose there will be a hell of a lot of upheaval if Prague is threatened, though as I wrote above, I really don't see the Czechs jumping on the Grossdeutsch bandwagon. The Sudetendeutsch, of course, are another matter, as suggested.
All this movement in Northern Europe might buy Italy some desperately needed time. I suppose that Italy is really in a difficult spot at thic point. But if the FAR are focusing on North Germany, we can just manage the crisis for long enough to survive as a state.
 
I forgot to mention earlier - just how close are Russia and Korea in this timeline? Because unless they are extremely close - as in Russian divisions sitting there to defend the place - it's very hard to understand why Japan is attacking China and not Korea.

Japan in this period wasn't looking for an India yet; it was looking for the fundamentals to sustain and defend itself. Trying to get Taiwan is one thing - it's defensible, demographically viable as a permanent conquest, and the returns on investment will definitely be there. Attempting Manchuria while Korea sits across your lines a mere 80 miles from the home islands....that verges on insanity.

And that is the case especially if Korea is allied with a European power. Never mind that the power in question has been actively expansionist in northeast Asia!
 

Hnau

Banned
I forgot to mention earlier - just how close are Russia and Korea in this timeline? Because unless they are extremely close - as in Russian divisions sitting there to defend the place - it's very hard to understand why Japan is attacking China and not Korea.

Japan in this period wasn't looking for an India yet; it was looking for the fundamentals to sustain and defend itself. Trying to get Taiwan is one thing - it's defensible, demographically viable as a permanent conquest, and the returns on investment will definitely be there. Attempting Manchuria while Korea sits across your lines a mere 80 miles from the home islands....that verges on insanity.

And that is the case especially if Korea is allied with a European power. Never mind that the power in question has been actively expansionist in northeast Asia!

I have to admit, I am a bit confused with that choice as well. Not attacking Korea is one thing... but attacking Manchuria before Korea? I'd also like a refresher on who's where in China, by who I mean the Europeans and Japanese and by where I mean their colonies.
 
Germany will definitely want the Sudetenland for itself, and the Czech nationalists will probably have to swallow it if the BOGs win, because they'll be negotiating from a position of weakness. They can't provide nearly as much military aid to the BOGs as the Poles can, so they'll have correspondingly less leverage in dictating the terms.

Bohemian and Moravian kingdoms, either incorporated into a postwar German Empire or as separate client states, would make sense in the context of a BOG victory that leads to an Austro-Hungarian collapse. Maybe a Slovak state as well, although that would depend to a great extent on how Hungary leaves the empire. But whether the Czech (and Slovak) nationalists would accept such an arrangement in the long term is open to question - as you say, central and eastern European nationalism tends to be a bloody mess, and although much of Europe will eventually become a world of layered sovereignty, getting there won't be easy.



They'd fit right into the international order of the 1960s. Getting there, though...



Hmmm. I didn't have any Australia/NZ updates planned, but now that you mention it, I think I'll visit them during either year three or year four. Homefront updates will become more frequent as the political element of the war (or at least the European theaters) starts to match the military element in importance; that transition will take place late in the third year, although there will be plenty of forerunners.

I'm guessing that Australian and New Zealand military preparedness will be less than in our World War I, but that they'll have made at least some reforms in response to Russian and Japanese expansion, and the Australians may also be concerned about colonial wars in the Dutch East Indies spilling over onto its territory. I agree that Australian and NZ troops will be closely associated during the war, with many of them under joint command in both the southeast Asian theater and Europe. I also agree that the Australian colonies becoming involved separately rather than in federation might make NZ first among equals, although there might be some proto-federal institutions in Australia similar to the 1885 federal council of OTL.

I'll have to think about how this might play out after the war. NZ might be more willing to join an Australian federation if it felt less likely to be overwhelmed. I've also seen it suggested that aboriginal policy played a role in NZ not joining Australia in OTL, because of fear that the Maori would be treated as Australian aborigines; maybe a New Zealand that had more regional clout would be able to negotiate guarantees of Maori rights (and possibly even a better deal for the aborigines).

And of course, Australia and NZ won't necessarily be the only players. Fiji was part of the 1885 arrangement in OTL, and Britain may end up with a few more Pacific possessions before all's said and done; you'll find out fairly soon what happens to Tahiti.



Definitely. There will be those, including Usman Abacar, who will try to develop the existing imperial war cabinet into a federal system. They'll fail, as I've already mentioned, but their ideas and proposals will go into the mix that shapes the international order later, and they may be more successful in some parts of the empire than in the whole.



Depends on which one, doesn't it? :p

Interesting. Well, as you of all people would expect, the decision as to whether to pursue federation or not on NZ's part and what part Maori relations played is a complicated story.

My view is that there were a collection of reasons that drove the decision, Maoridom being one (but not necessarily the key, if there is a single key reason), but another is the position of the Prime Minister, Seddon.

He is one of history's Big Man style Premiers, where his personality drove the agenda and spirit of the nation for his decade of rule. I get the impression that he was happy enough with NZ the way it was (after centralisation) and that he had very clear ideas as to where he wanted NZ to develop and that this was alongside but not with Australia.

Given your POD, Seddon may not even be PM. As often is the case, he could have easily been supplanted OTL at the last moment, as there were other candidates who were equally likely to get the nod from the Governor.

Then, with the Great War and long build up, Seddon, if he is PM will be distracted by that and the need to co-ordinate the country with the Empire's war effort. Federation in that situation is not a distraction to developing the country, it is instead a possible expedient solution to pressing problems of war (money, organisation, defence, etc).

On Maoridom, well, almost all governments or the general (settler, not Maori) public at the time seemed on board with the program of supplanting Maori, whether by the traditional method (Land Wars) or the current methods (land seizure, expansion of settler areas/government control/immigration etc). Seddon and co were Liberals but that I do not think helped Maori to any great extent.
 
Right now I am seeing North Germany as sort of the "France" of this alt-WWI, with large chunks of its land under foreign occupation, and basically just holding on through a years-long meatgrinder: of course, unlike OTLs France, there are potentially big prizes waiting if it holds on till the enemy gives...

Then I suppose that France is the "Germany" of this war - fully committed, but fighting almost entirely outside its borders. Although unlike Germany in OTL, France in TTL is threatened from only one side - both the North German and Italian fronts are on its eastern border, and the western border abuts a friendly neutral power.

All this movement in Northern Europe might buy Italy some desperately needed time. I suppose that Italy is really in a difficult spot at thic point. But if the FAR are focusing on North Germany, we can just manage the crisis for long enough to survive as a state.

Of course, a good deal also depends on how well Italy is able to resist the German and British calls for a full-on offensive to bail them out. The Ottomans are starting to go over to the attack in the Balkans, which will divert the Austrians and Russians somewhat, but unless the Netherlands give up their neutrality, Italy is the only power that can put pressure on France. The Italians have got away with half-hearted offensives thus far, and they'll try to do so this time as well (they know how vulnerable they are in the event of a French breakthrough) - the question is whether the British, who provide naval protection, will push them.

There's also the question of whether a second British expeditionary force might land in Italy to attack France from another direction - or, alternatively, whether one might land in the Balkans and attack the Austrians' rear as previously suggested. The British army doesn't feel ready for either move now, but they might next year.

I forgot to mention earlier - just how close are Russia and Korea in this timeline? Because unless they are extremely close - as in Russian divisions sitting there to defend the place - it's very hard to understand why Japan is attacking China and not Korea.

Japan in this period wasn't looking for an India yet; it was looking for the fundamentals to sustain and defend itself. Trying to get Taiwan is one thing - it's defensible, demographically viable as a permanent conquest, and the returns on investment will definitely be there. Attempting Manchuria while Korea sits across your lines a mere 80 miles from the home islands....that verges on insanity.

I have to admit, I am a bit confused with that choice as well. Not attacking Korea is one thing... but attacking Manchuria before Korea?

Hmmm. fair points. I'd figured that Japan might attack Manchuria first because (a) it's a softer target than Korea, (b) control of Manchuria would enable Japan to surround Korea and cut it off from easy Russian aid, and (c) it would give them access to lots of iron and coal. But I see what you mean about Japan not being ready yet - a Manchurian conquest would leave it overextended and very exposed to the Russian threat. And they could get the coal in Korea.

Fortunately, I haven't yet etched anything in stone. So let's say that, thus far, Japan has only conquered Taiwan, and that it's fighting a limited war in eastern China with the objective of obtaining extraterritorial trading rights similar to what the Europeans have. Manchuria is a Russian sphere of influence, with a Russian-built railroad and a large presence of Russian mining companies. Given Korea's tilt toward Russia, the Manchurian railroad has been built south as far as Seoul.

That leaves the question of Japanese intentions toward Korea. Japan wants to grab Korea before it falls too far into the Russian orbit, but it's wary of getting into a fight with all the FAR powers at once, especially while it's still embroiled in China. Britain is probably pushing for an immediate attack, because if Japan takes Korea, then Russia will be cut off from its Asian import corridor. Hard as it is for Russia to import nitrates through Korea and ship them across Siberia, it will be much harder (read nearly impossible) to try to get them via Persia or through chaotic China. I'm guessing that, given the stakes for both Britain and Russia, Japan has a bidding war going, and they'll tilt in favor of whoever offers the best price.

I'd also like a refresher on who's where in China, by who I mean the Europeans and Japanese and by where I mean their colonies.

Japan has Taiwan (although, as stated above, not Manchuria) and is making some incursions on the east coast but has no intention of making permanent mainland conquests just yet. The Europeans have a treaty-port arrangement similar to OTL - the treaty-port system began in 1842, and I don't see anything in the POD that would affect the Opium Wars or their aftermath - and have influence over some of the provincial governors. Beyond that, I'm handicapped by the fact that I don't know nearly as much about China during this period as I should, and I'm certainly open to suggestions.

My view is that there were a collection of reasons that drove the decision, Maoridom being one (but not necessarily the key, if there is a single key reason), but another is the position of the Prime Minister, Seddon.

He is one of history's Big Man style Premiers, where his personality drove the agenda and spirit of the nation for his decade of rule. I get the impression that he was happy enough with NZ the way it was (after centralisation) and that he had very clear ideas as to where he wanted NZ to develop and that this was alongside but not with Australia.

Given your POD, Seddon may not even be PM. As often is the case, he could have easily been supplanted OTL at the last moment, as there were other candidates who were equally likely to get the nod from the Governor.

Certainly, by the 1890s, there's been ample time for stochastic effects to reach even as far as New Zealand, so Seddon (who was born after the POD in any event and would thus be an ATL-sibling) might never rise to power. Who else could likely have been PM during this period, and what would their attitudes toward federation be like?

I agree that the war will help, especially with Australia and New Zealand already represented on the imperial war cabinet - a joint system of military command and logistics might seem attractive, and that could easily lead to civil integration via such things as a common policy toward war industries.

And while the Maori were certainly dispossessed of their lands during the late 19th-early 20th centuries, they were also citizens with voting rights, representation in parliament and ministers in government (James Carroll). That's not even in the same league as how the Australian Aborigines or Native Americans were treated at that time. If NZ joins an Australian-dominated federation, and if "native policy" becomes a federal matter, the Maori could end up much worse off; I'd expect the Maori leadership to push for land and citizenship policy to be decided by the member states.
 
That leaves the question of Japanese intentions toward Korea. Japan wants to grab Korea before it falls too far into the Russian orbit, but it's wary of getting into a fight with all the FAR powers at once, especially while it's still embroiled in China. Britain is probably pushing for an immediate attack, because if Japan takes Korea, then Russia will be cut off from its Asian import corridor. Hard as it is for Russia to import nitrates through Korea and ship them across Siberia, it will be much harder (read nearly impossible) to try to get them via Persia or through chaotic China. I'm guessing that, given the stakes for both Britain and Russia, Japan has a bidding war going, and they'll tilt in favor of whoever offers the best price.
It's worth it to FAR to have Japan simply neutral. I doubt they'd tilt pro-FAR.


Certainly, by the 1890s, there's been ample time for stochastic effects to reach even as far as New Zealand, so Seddon (who was born after the POD in any event and would thus be an ATL-sibling) might never rise to power. Who else could likely have been PM during this period, and what would their attitudes toward federation be like?

I agree that the war will help, especially with Australia and New Zealand already represented on the imperial war cabinet - a joint system of military command and logistics might seem attractive, and that could easily lead to civil integration via such things as a common policy toward war industries.

And while the Maori were certainly dispossessed of their lands during the late 19th-early 20th centuries, they were also citizens with voting rights, representation in parliament and ministers in government (James Carroll). That's not even in the same league as how the Australian Aborigines or Native Americans were treated at that time. If NZ joins an Australian-dominated federation, and if "native policy" becomes a federal matter, the Maori could end up much worse off; I'd expect the Maori leadership to push for land and citizenship policy to be decided by the member states.
There's your PoD, maybe. Let native policy be a State Matter, and NZ (and Fiji) can deal with things as they choose.

Of course, Maori businessmen visiting Australia might have problems....
 
I know it's unfair and a bunch of Kiwis are about to kill me, but my first thought Jonathan was "19th century New Zealand has war industries?"
 
I've lost track of the situation in Scandinavia.

1) Is Norway still part of Denmark? If so, Denmark shares a land border with Russia.

2) Assuming Denmark stays neutral and all parties abide by existing treaties as regards shipping in Danish waters, what does that mean in terms of naval actions?

OTL, by this date there was a treaty declaring certain Danish straits "international waters," whatever exactly that means. It meant the King of Denmark could no longer collect tolls from merchant traffic, certainly. I presume as long as Denmark is neutral, merchant ships under all flags are free to enter, transit, and leave Danish waters.

I'm less clear on how it applies to warships, in a time of war. I'd guess that neither the British nor the Russians (if their ships got that far) could send fleets through without at least a protest from Denmark; either side forcing their ships through would probably lead them to ally with the other side.

The situation is not symmetrical of course; if the RN decides to shove on through into the Baltic, the Danes may join FAR if they like, and then the British will just shell their cities and occupy strategic ports and let them fight as guerillas all they like. More likely, if the British and Germans decide they need RN fleets coming through they put pressure on the Danes to join BOG or else; that would settle the matter.

Whereas I don't think the Russian fleet based in the Baltic would make it that far west without the North German navy, which I presume exists to some considerable extent, shooting the tar out of them.

Denmark, I gather, has often made common cause with Russia, at least before the Bolshevik Revolution, but given the relative powers of the RN and any other navy in the world, I don't think they'd want to go that far now.

So--the OTL treaty might not exist in any form in this timeline, though I think it quite likely something that at least frees merchant ships from the tolls would by now. And regardless of what it says OTL about warships, it might say something different here.

Bottom line-how does the North German navy, based presumably in the Baltic, stack up against the Russian Baltic fleet? I'd think that ship for ship the Germans would be superior, but the Russians might have a lot of ships. That doesn't matter west of Denmark with the RN lying in wait; the Russian Baltic fleet isn't getting into the North Sea even if they sink everything the Germans have first, and neither then is any Russian flagged ship getting past Denmark.

But can the Russians move around in the Baltic or will the Germans sink them? If they can get past the Germans they can trade with Sweden and Denmark, and let the Scandinavians be their middlemen, if they are so inclined. And if they can do that, they can add yet another front to North Germany's woes, harrying the north coast as well.

So in that case, the RN is going to want into the Baltic, and if Denmark is the only way, they are going to want permission, or else demand it, whatever the consequences.

I don't suppose anything like the Kiel Canal can exist as yet, and if it did, would it have the capacity to let British capital ships into the Baltic without compromising Danish neutrality?

If the Germans have built up a fair sized fleet including sufficiently big ships, they can possibly take care of the Russian ships on their own.

Is that implicit in the statement that the Scandinavians are staying neutral? Or was that even said here--I might be cross-wired with Es Geloybte Aretz again.:eek: I think it was said, and I trust it only makes sense if the Germans can handle the Russian Navy without British help?

Or. considering that the Danish waters border on North German ones and British ships can transit directly from Danish international-by-treaty waters to North German waters, can the Danes just allow British fleets to pass through without being legally guilty of compromising their neutrality in Russian and French eyes?

That seems unlikely, that any ally of North Germany's can move freely but the Russian fleets can't, and that's legal--I don't know maritime law but it seems unlikely such a principle could stand.
 
I've lost track of the situation in Scandinavia.

1) Is Norway still part of Denmark? If so, Denmark shares a land border with Russia.
The point of divergence was after 1815, and I can't find any reference to Denmark regaining Norway, so I expect Norway is more-or-less like OTL (in an uneven union with Sweden).
 
I posted before thinking about the deeper question--where is the RN in all this? On land the British are looking pretty pathetic at the moment, in Europe anyway--they seem to be doing fairly OK in the colonies, though losing Yemen is damned embarrassing. But Britain is famed for its navy, not its army--an army that is going to grow and harden to be sure, but at this phase on land they are rather like the USA in WWII in say 1942--lots of talk, lots of potential, but not so much to throw down in the crucial battles on the crucial fronts--yet.

At sea though--the only really potent and serious challenge would be whatever France has come up with. And I'd think some big sea battle in which the British Home Fleet puts the latest French school of thought on their naval options to the test would have to have happened pretty early.

Meanwhile of course a whole lot of the RN is scattered across the world, patrolling dozens of crucial sea routes against whatever penny-packet mischief far-flung French and Russian raiders might try. They have to protect not just their shipping but the German and Ottoman too; a fair number of ships have to be tied up in the Mediterranean in particular.

Let's see, looking at the map of Africa 1892, the FARs have a lot of ports on the African northwest and in the Congo (all French) and for the moment control the mouth of the Red Sea, both sides (I presume that Italian Assab was made short work of, or anyway it's beleaguered) and apparently, though mostly lightly and indirectly, Madagascar. There's French Indochina also, and I don't know what scattered across the Pacific, as well as islands in the Caribbean and I presume Guiana, much enhanced by lots of allies in South America.

The Russians can't have put a lot of naval force in Ethiopia, and otherwise mainly threaten from their bases in Maritime Siberia. I don't think the French dared scatter too much of their naval power in these colonial ports either, they have to be preoccupied with guarding their metropolitan coast and perhaps forcing passage from southern France to Algeria. So the threat to BOG shipping isn't that tremendous from any one of these ports.

The problem for the British is, they might strike from any of them, so a whole lot of RN force is out there, much of it in the Med. Where I presume they hope to muster some force to come down the Red Sea from Egypt and regain the southern straits, at least well enough for free passage. They are also probably clotted pretty thick in Southeast Asia, supporting the push into Burma and on to Siam and French Indochina and trying to isolate these from all seaborne support--and from sallying out of Indochinese ports on raids.

The Dutch being neutral probably complicates maneuvering there too.

Still--I'd think that when all that is accounted for, the British still have quite a lot of sea power close at hand, based in Britain. Some are in reserve for far-flung skirmishes, but in addition to demanding British troops of whatever color to try to hold the line on North Germany's shrinking frontiers, shouldn't the King of Prussia and President of the Confederation be also demanding they do something with that vaunted fleet of theirs?

I trust that we will have a naval update sometime, I can wait until its good time comes. But I do wonder why some sort of early dramatic RN action against France, even if it turned out to be a fiasco, hasn't been mentioned yet.
 
The point of divergence was after 1815, and I can't find any reference to Denmark regaining Norway, so I expect Norway is more-or-less like OTL (in an uneven union with Sweden).

Oh, I guess crosstalk with yet another favored timeline (one that hasn't updated in a long time though!:eek:) confused me; I had forgotten it was Sweden and not Denmark the Norwegians broke from in 1905.:eek:
 
I know it's unfair and a bunch of Kiwis are about to kill me, but my first thought Jonathan was "19th century New Zealand has war industries?"

Mining, if nothing else.

OTL, by this date there was a treaty declaring certain Danish straits "international waters," whatever exactly that means. It meant the King of Denmark could no longer collect tolls from merchant traffic, certainly. I presume as long as Denmark is neutral, merchant ships under all flags are free to enter, transit, and leave Danish waters.

I'm less clear on how it applies to warships, in a time of war. I'd guess that neither the British nor the Russians (if their ships got that far) could send fleets through without at least a protest from Denmark; either side forcing their ships through would probably lead them to ally with the other side.

The treaty in question is the Copenhagen Convention of 1857, which is still in force. The text, which took some finding, can be found starting at page 1301 of Hertslet.

According to article 1, "no Vessel whatever shall henceforward be subjected, under any pretext, to any detention or impediment whatever, in the Passage of the Sound or of the Belts." That would seem to include warships as well as merchant ships, and Wikipedia says this is the case.

The treaty is post-POD, but I'd be very surprised if there weren't something similar in TTL. If you look at the list of signatories, it's basically everyone with any shipping interest in the Baltic, and it's pretty clear that they all ganged up on Denmark to open the straits in return for a cash payment. The same thing would happen in TTL as northern Europe becomes more industrialized and the volume of shipping increases - if Denmark insists on keeping the sound dues, it'll end up on the losing end of a trade war.

So I'll assume that the treaty exists in TTL, plus or minus a few details, which means that it would be legal for either side's warships to pass through the straits. As you say, Russia probably won't exercise this right because it would be suicide; they'd probably concentrate on achieving local superiority within the Baltic and keeping the Gulf of Bothnia open for trade with Sweden. The question is whether the British and North Germans can spare enough warships to close the gulf, or if they're spread too thin to do so in the face of the entire Russian Baltic fleet (especially since the German warships will be needed for home defense).

The Danes will let the ships pass and say as little about them as possible, lest they compromise their neutrality - Scandinavia is indeed neutral.

I trust that we will have a naval update sometime, I can wait until its good time comes. But I do wonder why some sort of early dramatic RN action against France, even if it turned out to be a fiasco, hasn't been mentioned yet.

You mean, aside from the fact that I know jack about late 19th-century naval tactics, and that I doubt I could write a convincing naval battle without considerably more research than I've thus far done? :p

I am planning to treat the war at sea eventually - there should be a naval update sometime in year three - but I need to do more homework first. In the meantime, you're basically correct. The RN is all over the place escorting BOG merchant ships, supporting the land campaigns, defending the Baltic and the Med, blockading as many FAR ports as they can, and conducting commerce raiding. Collectively, the RN outmatches all the FAR navies put together - in fact, it isn't even close - but if the French and Russians send out enough raiders to keep the RN spread thin, they have a chance to keep a few of their own shipping routes open.

Of course, French or Russian local superiority on any given sea lane will collapse if the RN moves in force to close that lane. The FARs are thus trying to keep the RN on the hop with commerce raiders and attacks on colonial ports. I'll assume that, thus far, the French fleet has suffered individual defeats but the RN hasn't been able to gather enough strength in one place to deliver a knockout blow, and that the North Germans - who aren't really threatened by sea, and who need the RN to help protect their merchant shipping - have higher priorities. I'm more than willing to be convinced otherwise, though.
 
I know it's unfair and a bunch of Kiwis are about to kill me, but my first thought Jonathan was "19th century New Zealand has war industries?"

No offence taken!

I was casually thinking about doing an ISOT from about 1899, around the start of the Second South African War, a while ago and did a bit of looking around to determine what kind of military industries were about and was not able to find much.

I think that there wouldn't really be anything specifically military, instead, lots of light dual use industries, like textiles & clothing, metal foundries that refine and produce light machinery, food processing and the like. There will also be some reasonably large railway works too.

So, industry (& the wider economy) will be able to support deployment by way of producing and processing food, clothing soldiers, supplying horses and tack, etc. At the same time producing minerals and large quantities of meats, leathers, wool, grain etc.

I would imagine after a year or so of war industry will be able to be contribute further specific military production but I would doubt that they would be able to produce anything super complex like artillery, rifles etc for a bit longer, if they wanted.
 
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The treaty in question is the Copenhagen Convention of 1857, which is still in force. The text, which took some finding, can be found starting at page 1301 of Hertslet.

According to article 1, "no Vessel whatever shall henceforward be subjected, under any pretext, to any detention or impediment whatever, in the Passage of the Sound or of the Belts." That would seem to include warships as well as merchant ships, and Wikipedia says this is the case.

The treaty is post-POD, but I'd be very surprised if there weren't something similar in TTL. If you look at the list of signatories, it's basically everyone with any shipping interest in the Baltic, and it's pretty clear that they all ganged up on Denmark to open the straits in return for a cash payment. The same thing would happen in TTL as northern Europe becomes more industrialized and the volume of shipping increases - if Denmark insists on keeping the sound dues, it'll end up on the losing end of a trade war.

So I'll assume that the treaty exists in TTL, plus or minus a few details, which means that it would be legal for either side's warships to pass through the straits.
Um, wow! I wouldn't have guessed that internationalization went quite that far!

Because of course it opens up, in theory, the horrible spectacle of two navies of comparable power meeting, and duking it out, right there in the Straits themselves--which is to say, right in the middle of Denmark itself:eek:--and the Danes legally speaking being restricted to spectators, wringing their hands and perhaps suing for damages for stray shots that happen to devastate their towns, cities and farms!

Not a very realistic prospect here, but say Russia and France had in some third timeline gotten strongly at odds with each other somehow and both built up large navies of comparable power.

Or, I'm not sure why this didn't happen OTL during WWI. The British not wanting to provoke the Danes into joining the Central Powers and perhaps persuading Sweden and Norway to join as well, treaty be damned?
As you say, Russia probably won't exercise this right because it would be suicide; they'd probably concentrate on achieving local superiority within the Baltic and keeping the Gulf of Bothnia open for trade with Sweden. The question is whether the British and North Germans can spare enough warships to close the gulf, or if they're spread too thin to do so in the face of the entire Russian Baltic fleet (especially since the German warships will be needed for home defense).

The Danes will let the ships pass and say as little about them as possible, lest they compromise their neutrality - Scandinavia is indeed neutral.
Well, all my speculations about the possibility of the Russians making the Baltic and Gulf of Bothina a Russian lake depended on my notion that the Danish straits were closed to warships and Kiel canal doesn't exist yet. (I assumed the Germans made Kiel canal OTL because they anticipated trouble going through Denmark, I didn't realize that the trouble would strictly be the RN preempting them by loitering there).

If the RN can move freely into the Baltic, I'd think they would bring in whatever force necessary to shut all Russian shipping, naval and merchant, into their ports near St. Petersburg. Russian trade with Sweden would practically be restricted to their logistically practically useless land border, because not only would the British want to free the North Germans of the distractions of being raided, they'd want to bottle up Russian trade and what naval power they had as tightly as possible.

In fact if the Danish straits are open, that helps answer my question, "why hasn't the RN pressed the French navy very hard off France itself yet?" If in addition to trying to police the world's shipping lanes they need to interdict French traffic across the Med and hold the Russian navy at bay in the Baltic--oh, and reinforce the Dardanelles too and try to hold as much of the Black Sea as they can, again penning the Russians into their ports there--well I guess then it would seem, the mass attack to break the core of French naval force defending the French Atlantic coast could wait.

After all such a battle only benefits BOG through attrition, unless the British are prepared to follow through with landings on the French Atlantic coast--and with what men? What the British can offer by way of Tommies and colonial troops they are currently sending to Germany; they can't dream of opening up another front by invasion until much later.

To be sure, I still think that neither British nor French admirals would be content to just glare at each other across the Channel; both will be itching to see how well they can do against the other. I presume the French have had all kinds of ingenious theories and nifty devices about how they can turn the tables on the mighty RN, at least in the matter of defending their own coasts and opening up wide breaks in the British blockade; the British would like to find out the worth of these newfangled notions almost as much as the French would. Hence my notion there would be a big clash quite early on--and perhaps it turns out the French ideas do have some merit after all, enough to keep the RN from just sinking every French hull in an orgy and then seeming to have no choice but to land what ragtag land forces they had on the defenseless coast.

I'm no more a naval scholar than you are and have no interest in a blow-by-blow bit of battle porn, but I do wonder what measures desperation combined with ingenuity might have been adopted by the French.

Torpedo boat squadrons, lacking range to be a threat on the high seas but capable of turning the tables, or holding their own, close to French ports, perhaps?

There would almost certainly be shore batteries bristling all along the French coasts. I don't know what degree of such guns the French economy could have supported, but whatever they could afford, they'd be there.

With spotters based in balloons, for long lines of sight. Especially if the French went in for some superguns, the way the Germans did OTL.

I pooh-poohed the idea anyone would be using submarines of any kind, but one possible place they might exist is in close defense of harbors; electric battery powered small subs might serve a useful function there, basically supplementing the shore guns and torpedo boats with stealth.

All of these ideas are suggestions of what the French might have done to keep a British landing off their shores and hold British gunships out of shelling range. I hope someone can critique them, and suggest what the French might have hoped to use to break out of the blockade and regain freedom of the seas.

In particular, they have to be worried about how they are going to keep communications open with North Africa; if they can keep ships going between Marseilles and Algeria, the rest can be overland, but can't the British put a stop to that in short order, unless the French have some clever trick up their sleeves?
You mean, aside from the fact that I know jack about late 19th-century naval tactics, and that I doubt I could write a convincing naval battle without considerably more research than I've thus far done? :p
I'm not looking for battle porn; I'm interested in the technologies and the outcomes.
...I'll assume that, thus far, the French fleet has suffered individual defeats but the RN hasn't been able to gather enough strength in one place to deliver a knockout blow, and that the North Germans - who aren't really threatened by sea, and who need the RN to help protect their merchant shipping - have higher priorities. I'm more than willing to be convinced otherwise, though.

Well, I guess I've come up with my own excuses why the RN might have held off. I'm not convinced entirely; I'd think there would have been a big battle early on, and if then French tricks turned out to be good, at least for purposes of making any close approach to French shores very costly, then they'd back off, because until the British accumulate an invasion port of decent size there' no point in coming in that close. Conversely if the French had some magic trick that let them break out of the blockade, they'd use it right away and you couldn't avoid talking about it, so they don't have that. So it's a stalemate for now, but I think they'd prove it to each other first before backing off and waiting for other factors to line up.

Given the constant drain of troops piecemeal into Germany, it may be a good long while before the Admiralty has to face the question of how to break through the French defenses, and whether that's a good thing to try or not.

I wonder if, if that is in the cards eventually, the invasion force the RN opens the way for will include lots of Ottoman troops?:p

It could also be, no extra front will ever be opened by a landing; that the strategy is to stay with the fronts they've got, to push the French out of Germany and to beef up the Italians so as to invade France from the south.
 
Hmmm. fair points. I'd figured that Japan might attack Manchuria first because (a) it's a softer target than Korea, (b) control of Manchuria would enable Japan to surround Korea and cut it off from easy Russian aid, and (c) it would give them access to lots of iron and coal. But I see what you mean about Japan not being ready yet - a Manchurian conquest would leave it overextended and very exposed to the Russian threat. And they could get the coal in Korea.

Fortunately, I haven't yet etched anything in stone. So let's say that, thus far, Japan has only conquered Taiwan, and that it's fighting a limited war in eastern China with the objective of obtaining extraterritorial trading rights similar to what the Europeans have. Manchuria is a Russian sphere of influence, with a Russian-built railroad and a large presence of Russian mining companies. Given Korea's tilt toward Russia, the Manchurian railroad has been built south as far as Seoul.

That leaves the question of Japanese intentions toward Korea. Japan wants to grab Korea before it falls too far into the Russian orbit, but it's wary of getting into a fight with all the FAR powers at once, especially while it's still embroiled in China. Britain is probably pushing for an immediate attack, because if Japan takes Korea, then Russia will be cut off from its Asian import corridor. Hard as it is for Russia to import nitrates through Korea and ship them across Siberia, it will be much harder (read nearly impossible) to try to get them via Persia or through chaotic China. I'm guessing that, given the stakes for both Britain and Russia, Japan has a bidding war going, and they'll tilt in favor of whoever offers the best price.

Japan has Taiwan (although, as stated above, not Manchuria) and is making some incursions on the east coast but has no intention of making permanent mainland conquests just yet. The Europeans have a treaty-port arrangement similar to OTL - the treaty-port system began in 1842, and I don't see anything in the POD that would affect the Opium Wars or their aftermath - and have influence over some of the provincial governors. Beyond that, I'm handicapped by the fact that I don't know nearly as much about China during this period as I should, and I'm certainly open to suggestions.

Hrm.... That sounds closer to the mark.

One thing that may yet be a question is how long the Sino-Japanese War will last. It wouldn't take long for the Japanese to sink most of the Chinese fleet, substantially longer to wipe out the entirety and secure Taiwan properly. But that done, there's very little left of practical consequence for Japan to do. Practically speaking you're right - it would perforce be a limited war. Japan doesn't have the capacity for occupation duties at a fraction of the scale of the OTL 1930s. More likely they are attempting to make the land war a series of punitive actions / hurried raids. Maybe they try to grab and hold Port Arthur / Dalian; that'd be within their capacity, thought a bit of a risky move.

It isn't like the OTL conflict - there the Chinese were of a mind to hasten to secure an immediate peace as soon as they knew they couldn't win. The risk of foreign powers intervening to impose "reasonable terms" was too great. As it was, that turned out to be a good short-term decision, as the terms inevitably imposed ended up instead splitting the Japans spoils with Russia or leaving them to China. Here though, China has little to fear from the European powers for the first time in generations. There would be a strong impulse to seize the day and make a show of strength to ward off the future attentions of a war-weakened Europe while also ensuring popular support for the Qing. And what better way to do that than to play out the Japanese war as long as possible? It's basically an extreme version of Chiang's 1937 situation - once the navy's sunk, the leadership only benefits from a long war. The Japanese can't muster a quarter the effort they did in the aforementioned war, and China is more unified as well.

What that says to me is that the Sino-Japanese War started short and sharp, and then just sort of stuttered along as a shouting match. Japan can bombard ports all it likes - it lacks the money, the men, the industry, and the finances for an all-out invasion. And while China is equally lacking in any ability to seriously hurt Japan, they can declare glorious victory every time they "beat back" a Japanese raid. A relatively cheap but drawn-out conflict.

The smart move for both would be to just leave things be. China partially resisting and swearing to avenge a foreign landgrab will secure the government. And Japan will have the most valuable thing it could practically speaking get. Letting the war nominally drag out isn't good, but it's better than really fighting it. But both will also have noticed that they don't necessarily have to settle for "pretty good." And - again for both - the area to escalate matters would be in Korea. Japan would have an easier job of targetting it, yes, but China's still Korea's nominal overlord and doesn't automatically have to go to war with Russia to make a play.
 
I don't really think the Settler's Maori policy was particularly coherent and from this far out, it does seem that the Maori voting and representation rights, while certainly better than most comparators were as much a sop to earlier loyalty (during the Land Wars) as a way to confine the still large and land owning Maori population into a narrow band of representation (4? MPs, elected by open acclamation out of 74, the balance elected by secret ballot). That doesn't meant to say there were not good men with good intentions involved in the decision to grant the representation (as there clearly were), but there was a very strong movement to not have these seats (and still is - the issue of the Maori seats comes up like a bad smell every year it seems, till this day).

Regarding the 1890 election, which was the one in question, Ballance was the leader of the winners/new Liberal Party and thus PM. He then died later in the term and was replaced. Then it seems Seddon snuck in and took the premiership instead of Stout (born post POD), who was apparently the favourite. Stout being a former premier (and later to be Supreme Court Chief Justice and a distant relative of mine - hooray for the Shetland Mafia!).

Stout may be more malleable?

The alternative, losing candidate at the 1890 election, Atkinson (born pre POD), well he is also a bit of a character. He has been on record for advocating extermination (cannot remember the wording exactly) of the Maori.

About a year ago there was a stoush in NZ about a Maori politician (iirc) calling the historic treatment of the Maori by the British settlers "genocide". This is always going to be a controversial thing to say for all sorts of reasons. One being that some members of the NZ Jewish community do not like that word being used lightly. That particular discussion point caused various people (including Radio NZ's Mediawatch program) to look at the use of such language in NZ and Atkinson's speech's came up.

I can find the URL to the podcast if anyone is interested
 
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