Malê Rising

[Falecius]

I just took a couple of days to read through this, though I may have missed some piece around.
It is absolutely wonderful reading.
Aside from general interest, plausibility and very good writing, I have sort-of-professional reasons to find this incredibly fascinating.

Both Abacars father and son are very interesting characters, sort of a pity they didn't live in our world. It seems that TTL will see the world generally better off and very likely more just than ours by 2013 and before, so double pity.

I have some considerations especially about Italy.

I think that keeping the Roman Question unresolved (from an Italian perspective) until 1893 in the context of this TL is a bit of a stretch.

Rome was bloody absolute top priority for Italy after unity. Italian governments would sell their souls and mothers for it, and it would be a serious sore point. Any Italian attempt to embark at even minor colonial activity without having fixed Rome first would be wildly unpopular (though the Assab thing had already started before; however the Italian public would have the vague notion of their country's activity in Eritrea only after Rome was taken IIRC), especially with the budget being what it was.
At the very latest, I assume that in the Eritrean deal you posit, Italian stance towards France would be "take that hellhole of Assab, take bloody Tunisia and whatever the hell you want, but please get out from Rome and let us negotiate with the obnoxious guy there with some serious firepower as a backing". Since you said that this particolar Emperor is not especially clerical, has liberal leanings, and his wife is the daughter of the Italian King, he might even be inclined to do so.

Italy will want to meddle somewhat with the Franco-Prussian war (as we did OTL) in order to get the French out of Rome, either dealing with the French or threatening them. If the war has a stalemate phase as you described, Napoleon may be relieved to pull out some troops with the assurance that Italy won't do stupid things; otherwise, he may be threatened by an Italian attack, which would not be funny when he's busy with the Germans.

Of course, there's plenty of butterflies even before the TL gets there with Garibaldi in Piratini, but my point is, unless the Italian diplomats are complete idiots, they'd sorted a way to finish business with the Pope without unwanted French bayonets in the way. Of course, many Italian diplomats of the time were indeed complete idiots.

 

[Falecius]

Sorry, I missed where you discussed the point at page 45.

And, speaking of butterflies, isn't American politics by 1867 affected enough to impact "Seward's folly"? Would Seward even be the one in charge by then (well, he could well be I think).

 

[Falecius]

Italy and Piratini

I've been thinking about Italian situation in your scenario again.
As I PMed you about, Garibaldi's different life in Piratini creates Italian butterflies even before 1848.
My reasoning here is that a) ITTL, prior 1893 Italy is not going to get any signficant colony, though her interest in Tunisia (which would include protection for a noticeable settler community, largely agricultural) will be recognized to a larger extent than IOTL, and b) IOTL, and very likely ITTL as well, what Italy was looking for overseas was to a very large extent a settler colony.

I'd argue that Piratini, while hardly going to be an Italian colony de jure, might end up as close to such a thing de facto. Italian emigration in the considered timeframe was considerable, though it will peak later IOTL; but it lacked any sort of focus. I think that after unification, and possibly to some degree even before, Piratini has the potential to offer such a focus. That woul mean that many Italians that would migrate to other parts of Brazil, Argentina, United States, France and Eritrea IOTL would end up in Piratini ITTL. The corresponding area would see significant Italian emigration IOTL too, but not to an overwhelming level.
Here, Piratini is going to have potential to attract a large number of Italian immigrants that would otherwise go in Argentina, other parts of OTL's Brazil, France and her Empire, and other places.
I don't have any figure at hand, but I suppose it's safe to assume that, if this is case, Piratini might be plurality, if not majority, Italian. I'd also assume that the Republic will readily accept a vague sort of Italian support/protection on the lines of what Liberia did with America, and even closer bonds through time.
If this is the case, Italy might be find herself tangled into the great War because of South American situation, that is indeed quite funny IMVHO.

 

[Hnau]

I'd argue that Piratini, while hardly going to be an Italian colony de jure, might end up as close to such a thing de facto. Italian emigration in the considered timeframe was considerable, though it will peak later IOTL; but it lacked any sort of focus. I think that after unification, and possibly to some degree even before, Piratini has the potential to offer such a focus. That woul mean that many Italians that would migrate to other parts of Brazil, Argentina, United States, France and Eritrea IOTL would end up in Piratini ITTL. The corresponding area would see significant Italian emigration IOTL too, but not to an overwhelming level.
Here, Piratini is going to have potential to attract a large number of Italian immigrants that would otherwise go in Argentina, other parts of OTL's Brazil, France and her Empire, and other places.
I don't have any figure at hand, but I suppose it's safe to assume that, if this is case, Piratini might be plurality, if not majority, Italian. I'd also assume that the Republic will readily accept a vague sort of Italian support/protection on the lines of what Liberia did with America, and even closer bonds through time.
If this is the case, Italy might be find herself tangled into the great War because of South American situation, that is indeed quite funny IMVHO.

I have to agree with this to a degree. If Garibaldi played a larger role in assuring the independence of Piratini, of course the country is going to have a better reputation in Italy as a good destination for emigrants. However, it is also important to remember that the immigration boom to Brazil in the late 19th century was fueled principally by the fact that slavery was abolished later on and capitalists had to find new way to make labor cheaper. In Piratini, this won't be the case, it wasn't an area that imported as many slaves as the rest of Brazil, so there'll be less of an incentive for capitalists to bring European workers to the country. Also, the revolution that led to the establishment of Piratini was in some ways a nationalist one. The gauchos saw themselves as a people different and separate from the brasileiros. And whereas the brasileiro identity was very easy for immigrants to adopt, I don't think it'll be much the same for the gaucho. To be gaucho means more than not about having family roots in the Pampas, while being brasileiro doesn't so often mean having family precede you in the country. Why I'm saying this is because I would think Piratini would experience a nativist movement similar to the Know Nothings in the US, based on the culture. Such political currents could make it difficult for Italians to overwhelm Piratini... it already has a rich culture that will not be so easily supplanted.

Piratini should experience more Italian immigration, but I think there is enough evidence to suggest that it will not become an Italian colony or protectorate.

 

[ArKhan]

Male rising. The title does not lie!

 

[Falecius]

I have to agree with this to a degree. If Garibaldi played a larger role in assuring the independence of Piratini, of course the country is going to have a better reputation in Italy as a good destination for emigrants. However, it is also important to remember that the immigration boom to Brazil in the late 19th century was fueled principally by the fact that slavery was abolished later on and capitalists had to find new way to make labor cheaper. In Piratini, this won't be the case, it wasn't an area that imported as many slaves as the rest of Brazil, so there'll be less of an incentive for capitalists to bring European workers to the country. Also, the revolution that led to the establishment of Piratini was in some ways a nationalist one. The gauchos saw themselves as a people different and separate from the brasileiros. And whereas the brasileiro identity was very easy for immigrants to adopt, I don't think it'll be much the same for the gaucho. To be gaucho means more than not about having family roots in the Pampas, while being brasileiro doesn't so often mean having family precede you in the country. Why I'm saying this is because I would think Piratini would experience a nativist movement similar to the Know Nothings in the US, based on the culture. Such political currents could make it difficult for Italians to overwhelm Piratini... it already has a rich culture that will not be so easily supplanted.

Piratini should experience more Italian immigration, but I think there is enough evidence to suggest that it will not become an Italian colony or protectorate.

Colony, most likely not. Protectorate in a formal sense, neither. Very close and de facto dependent relationship?
I think that Piratinian identity would change over time and become more inclusive. Italians won't, obviously, be the only immigrant group: the area attracted a fair number of Germans and Lebanese IIRC and it will still do so. Most people of Italian ancestry there would think of themselves as Piratinian, speak Portuguese (though I expect local Portuguese to become noticeably Italian-influenced), and merge with the general population.
I am taking OTL's Argentina as a rough guide for this.
There might be tension between the gaucho hinterland and heavily Italian cities and coasts, but if it goes too ugly, I suppose Italy could send a couple gunboats. Or maybe not.
I think that in the first phase, immigration will be essentially political: republicans, revolutionaries, utopian planners, nationalists would find safe haven from persecutions and censorship in Garibaldi's Piratini prior to 1848.
I guess that comes '48, Garibaldi won't come back to Italy alone, but with a small "legion" or both Italian returning volunteers and, possibly, some gauchos as well. Nothing major in terms of absolute numbers (we already know that TTLs European 1848 will go more or less the same, so Garibaldi can't be successful) but important in ideal terms in order to build a memory of shared history. It's basically the reverse of the Italian Legion that fought for Piratini both IOTL and ITTL.
After 1849 repression, Piratini might become the safe haven of choice for a larger number of nationalists and democrats. Probably there'll be more in France anyway, but Italians in Piratini might be in the low tens of thousands at most.
Another Piratinian Legion will be there with Garibaldi in the Italian independence wars again, and be remembered. That's the sort of things that help a lot in matters of shared identity (to a point; there was a Polish Legion in Italy IOTL at some point, but while this was conducive to some Polish immigration in Italy, it didn't bring the two countries to feel like one).
After Italian unity Piratini could think they need some level of European protection, especially with the French messing around and both Brazilians and Argentinians very clearly being dissatisfied with regional status quo.
Italy is, or may appear, a rather ideal choice, powerful enough to grant (some) protection, not enough to threaten independence. And we have the same national hero, fuck yeah.
Disgruntled democrats of the Mazzini sort might find Piratini attractive after unification as well, and Italian government likely will prefer them to stir trouble elsewhere. Piratini might even agree to lease some land for a penal colony (I doubt their finances would be in a wonderful shape, and OTLs Italy was making a fuss about having one at the time).

For this and other reasons, I expect TTL's Italy to be remarkably more liberal however, so maybe there wouldn't be all these exiles.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

I have some considerations especially about Italy.

I think that keeping the Roman Question unresolved (from an Italian perspective) until 1893 in the context of this TL is a bit of a stretch.

Rome was bloody absolute top priority for Italy after unity. Italian governments would sell their souls and mothers for it, and it would be a serious sore point. Any Italian attempt to embark at even minor colonial activity without having fixed Rome first would be wildly unpopular (though the Assab thing had already started before; however the Italian public would have the vague notion of their country's activity in Eritrea only after Rome was taken IIRC), especially with the budget being what it was.
At the very latest, I assume that in the Eritrean deal you posit, Italian stance towards France would be "take that hellhole of Assab, take bloody Tunisia and whatever the hell you want, but please get out from Rome and let us negotiate with the obnoxious guy there with some serious firepower as a backing". Since you said that this particolar Emperor is not especially clerical, has liberal leanings, and his wife is the daughter of the Italian King, he might even be inclined to do so.

Italy will want to meddle somewhat with the Franco-Prussian war (as we did OTL) in order to get the French out of Rome, either dealing with the French or threatening them. If the war has a stalemate phase as you described, Napoleon may be relieved to pull out some troops with the assurance that Italy won't do stupid things; otherwise, he may be threatened by an Italian attack, which would not be funny when he's busy with the Germans.

Of course, there's plenty of butterflies even before the TL gets there with Garibaldi in Piratini, but my point is, unless the Italian diplomats are complete idiots, they'd sorted a way to finish business with the Pope without unwanted French bayonets in the way. Of course, many Italian diplomats of the time were indeed complete idiots.

As I said to you off-list, I think that several factors might prolong the resolution of the Roman question.

Part of my thinking here was that a successful Piratini revolution might actually make Garibaldi more conservative, in that he would realize that the realities of building and governing a state require more compromise than leading a revolution. He would still be an Italian patriot, of course, and would still fight in the 1848-49 revolutions as well as against the Kingdom of Naples (and possibly a revolution in Venetia), and as you say, there would be volunteers from Piratini accompanying him on all these expeditions. But at the same time, he might become more of a gradualist and might come to emphasize diplomacy more than military action. And this might, in the end, make him more of an enduring and powerful presence in the Italian government, and contribute to the greater liberalism you suggest might happen.

In any event, even if the opposite effect occurred and Garibaldi became more of a firebrand, I doubt that he'd be more successful in recapturing Rome than he was in 1867 in OTL. Any Italian attempt to attack the French forces in Rome would have to be unofficial - the king couldn't risk giving official sanction to what the French government might see as an attack on France - and even a larger volunteer force probably wouldn't be able to overcome the French troops.

So my assumption is that the papal states would persist into the 1870s under French patronage. Although Napoleon IV might well want to reach a settlement - as you note, the Italian king is his father-in-law - the pressure of the Catholic parties in France would prevent him from doing so.

I suspect the real opportunity would come upon Pius IX's death in 1878. I don't know much about Church politics of the time - maybe you or wolf_brother has some thoughts in this regard - but I'm sure that the election would be a very different affair if the pope were still a temporal ruler. Very likely, both the French and Italian states would attempt to influence the election, with many bribes changing hands and many promises being made. This could result either in a pope more liberal than Leo XIII, or else Leo himself being elected (with French and Italian backing) in return for a promise to work toward political unification. That could set up a reunification of sorts in the 1880s, possibly under a federal plan with the Pope retaining autonomy within the former papal states, and would also mean that the papacy would remain engaged in Italian politics rather than throwing a tantrum as Pius IX did.

The other possibility, of course, is that the Roman question might not be resolved, and that it would continue to be a running sore in Italian politics throughout the 1880s. By this time, the French Emperor wouldn't have much power to effectuate a settlement, and the presence of the Catholic parties, as well as papal sympathizers even in the more secular right-wing parties, would thwart any attempt to change the status quo. France would make other gestures to Italy, such as recognizing Italian hegemony over Tunisia (as has already happened in TTL), but some of the Italian political factions would want to use the Great War as leverage to resolve Rome's status. This could potentially involve Italy coming into the war on either side, demanding Rome as a price for its neutrality, or simply attacking Rome on its own if it thinks this can be done without provoking a declaration of war from France.

We've kicked this question around a few times, to no certain conclusion. I'll have to make a decision soon, so any further thoughts are welcome.

I'd argue that Piratini, while hardly going to be an Italian colony de jure, might end up as close to such a thing de facto. Italian emigration in the considered timeframe was considerable, though it will peak later IOTL; but it lacked any sort of focus. I think that after unification, and possibly to some degree even before, Piratini has the potential to offer such a focus. That woul mean that many Italians that would migrate to other parts of Brazil, Argentina, United States, France and Eritrea IOTL would end up in Piratini ITTL. The corresponding area would see significant Italian emigration IOTL too, but not to an overwhelming level.

Here, Piratini is going to have potential to attract a large number of Italian immigrants that would otherwise go in Argentina, other parts of OTL's Brazil, France and her Empire, and other places.

I don't have any figure at hand, but I suppose it's safe to assume that, if this is case, Piratini might be plurality, if not majority, Italian. I'd also assume that the Republic will readily accept a vague sort of Italian support/protection on the lines of what Liberia did with America, and even closer bonds through time.

I have to agree with this to a degree. If Garibaldi played a larger role in assuring the independence of Piratini, of course the country is going to have a better reputation in Italy as a good destination for emigrants. However, it is also important to remember that the immigration boom to Brazil in the late 19th century was fueled principally by the fact that slavery was abolished later on and capitalists had to find new way to make labor cheaper. In Piratini, this won't be the case, it wasn't an area that imported as many slaves as the rest of Brazil, so there'll be less of an incentive for capitalists to bring European workers to the country. Also, the revolution that led to the establishment of Piratini was in some ways a nationalist one. The gauchos saw themselves as a people different and separate from the brasileiros. And whereas the brasileiro identity was very easy for immigrants to adopt, I don't think it'll be much the same for the gaucho. To be gaucho means more than not about having family roots in the Pampas, while being brasileiro doesn't so often mean having family precede you in the country. Why I'm saying this is because I would think Piratini would experience a nativist movement similar to the Know Nothings in the US, based on the culture. Such political currents could make it difficult for Italians to overwhelm Piratini... it already has a rich culture that will not be so easily supplanted.

I'm assuming that the demographics of Piratini would be roughly similar to Uruguay, which is at least as Italian as it is Spanish, and where a gaucho culture didn't prevent the society from becoming substantially Italianized. I'd expect that Piratini would retain at least the same connection to Italy that Uruguay does now, with many residents holding dual Italian citizenship (I believe a deputy from Uruguay actually held the balance of power in the Italian parliament after the OTL 2006 election) and a strong political sympathy with Italy. My guess is that Falecius' prediction of an Italian plurality with substantial immigration from other countries (some of which will also be political - many of the German immigrants, for instance, might also be 1848 revolutionaries), and the development of a shared identity and political alliance, is roughly correct - not a colony or a formal protectorate, but a "special relationship" of the sort the United States enjoys with Britain.

And, speaking of butterflies, isn't American politics by 1867 affected enough to impact "Seward's folly"? Would Seward even be the one in charge by then (well, he could well be I think).

Lincoln would still be president in 1867, but Seward would most likely continue as secretary of state (which he was during Lincoln's first term). My assumption is that the Alaska purchase still went through.

 

[Falecius]

I'm assuming that the demographics of Piratini would be roughly similar to Uruguay, which is at least as Italian as it is Spanish, and where a gaucho culture didn't prevent the society from becoming substantially Italianized. I'd expect that Piratini would retain at least the same connection to Italy that Uruguay does now, with many residents holding dual Italian citizenship (I believe a deputy from Uruguay actually held the balance of power in the Italian parliament after the OTL 2006 election) and a strong political sympathy with Italy. My guess is that Falecius' prediction of an Italian plurality with substantial immigration from other countries (some of which will also be political - many of the German immigrants, for instance, might also be 1848 revolutionaries), and the development of a shared identity and political alliance, is roughly correct - not a colony or a formal protectorate, but a "special relationship" of the sort the United States enjoys with Britain.

I was thinking more on the lines of US/Liberia than US/Britain, but anyway.
You are correct about that Uruguayan guy, though he was actually Senator.
However, the strong Italian influx on Uruguay (and Argentina as well; there's plenty of Italo-Argentinians on both sides, including some distant relatives of mine; and my hometown was not especially tied to the River Plate than any other place in Italy, so I suppose that's the standard situation) never translated into significant Italian political clout in Uruguay, and your average Italian would make a very interested face if offered the idea that we have a "special relationship" think with Uruguay.
Here, while the overall picture would be similar, the relationship would be perceived as special. Sharing a national hero of high symbolic value like Garibaldi, not to mention his personal political clout to help straighten things, will probably lead to some treaty sanctioning an overall closeness as desirable.

EDIT: it's likely that TTLs Uruguay and Argentina will be a bit less Italian than OTL. I still lack numbers, but I think that in both countries, Italians were the more numerous immigrant community, followed in Argentina by Levantines. In this TL, Germans and Eastern Europeans may end with a higher proportion there with more Italians going to Piratini instead and Brazil absorbing a generally larger quota of immigrants all over, and less Levantines have reason to migrate (possibly a little less Italians too but it has to be seen). OTOH, probably more Germans will migrate; though I don't see a Germanized Uruguay for example, German culture will likely have a larger place throughout the Platine region.
And there's also the politics of an independent Entre Rios. The sensible thing to do is a regional block of Piratini, Uruguay and Entre Rios (who'll share a similar gaucho culture, at least to a point) that tries to balance both Argentina and Brazil and sort of leans towards Paraguay as the obvious alternative; but border bickering and diverging interest may prevent that, as Entre Rios will see a threat in Paraguay almost as much as in Argentina, while Piratini would be largely concerned with Brazil.

 

[wolf_brother]

I suspect the real opportunity would come upon Pius IX's death in 1878. I don't know much about Church politics of the time - maybe you or wolf_brother has some thoughts in this regard - but I'm sure that the election would be a very different affair if the pope were still a temporal ruler. Very likely, both the French and Italian states would attempt to influence the election, with many bribes changing hands and many promises being made. This could result either in a pope more liberal than Leo XIII, or else Leo himself being elected (with French and Italian backing) in return for a promise to work toward political unification. That could set up a reunification of sorts in the 1880s, possibly under a federal plan with the Pope retaining autonomy within the former papal states, and would also mean that the papacy would remain engaged in Italian politics rather than throwing a tantrum as Pius IX did.

Given the circumstances it's much more likely that cardinals would elect someone who would continue Pius' reactionarism, or at least something quite conservative. I really doubt you'd see something as sweeping as what you're proposing; e.g. a liberal ruler that works with both the Bonapartists and Savoyards towards Italian political unification under the Papacy. Beyond the fact that I doubt you'd get the Church behind it, the Savoyards would never accept such a plan. By 1878 is too little, too late for such a proposal.

IOTL the 1878 conclave was between Pecci, a liberal, Bilio, a moderate, and Franchi, a conservative. ITTL you'd likely see Bilio elected, IMHO. Which means he tries to do as you propose, but flounders, losing the support of the conservatives in Rome & Paris and being too reactionary to court the liberals in Florence (& Paris). He's kept on his throne by French blood and French steel... and then the Great War comes along.

I could certainly see the Roman Question dragged out ITTL - the fact that it was resolved so quickly IOTL is something of a quirk of history considering all the players and powers involved. Changing the Franco-Prussian War radically changes the course of European history from 1870 onward.

EDIT: Let's also not forget this isn't long after Pius IX called the First Vatican Council and (re)declared papal infallibility and redefined it, where the Church formally adopted the ultramontane model. This Council isn't going to be interpreted by war, so we're going to see a Papal State and Catholic Church that is staunchly conservative, even reactionary, and highly centralized. It's still in power, it's dynamically opposed to Italian unification as a challenge to its temporal power, and it has a great power patron (for the moment) in France. I think Jonathan Edelstein has the right of it - Plon-Plon can't, or won't, sell Rome for fear of losing the conservative, Catholic, support in Paris (and Napoléon Victor is even less likely to try it either), and Victor Emmanuel won't risk trying to take it by force without France distracted.

Also, I forget if any of this is changed, but I'm assuming European history before 1870 is essentially the same as IOTL where not explicitly stated it's changed, what with the butterflies mostly in Western Africa for such a long time. So French has held Savoy & Nice only for a few decades by the time of the the Great War, and while Nice was at least culturally & linguistically French, Savoy was certainly EDIT: Italian; still the Italian nationalists considered them both to be a key part of Italian irredentismo IOTL. I bet that'll be an even stronger impulse ITTL. So that's going to be another screw that could be turned against France's favor for a possible alliance. As I've said before, the London-Berlin axis would have to make a good show about offering tangible aid to bring the Italians to their cause in the war, but they'll certainly have plenty of carrots to dangle in the Savoyard's eyes to try and lure them in - certainly more than a liberal, Imperial, France could, realistically, offer in return.

 

[Shevek23]

I'm really sad I don't know nearly enough about the politics of the Catholic Church in Italy at this time to contribute anything about which way things will go in the Vatican; just going by what murky stuff I do know, I'd have to second Wolf_Brother; the Church's high potentates will remain reactionary much on the lines of OTL and that will dictate how everyone else reacts to them.

Which is what I'm more interested in, actually. Will the perceived role of the RCC be any different, in any interesting way, far from Italy? In places like the USA, Latin America, or Northern Europe?

I'd guess not; as OTL in the Protestant-dominated nations, the Church will still be a bogeyman among Protestants, but in the USA immigration from Catholic nations will still make US Catholics a power bloc to be reckoned with. At the same time, OTL US Catholicism was polarized between ultramontanes and progressives; the reactionaries had the hierachy's pronouncements on their side but the progressives stubbornly went on thinking for themselves while still professing loyalty to their Church and the reactionaries were not generally in a position to shut them up, not unless they crossed certain lines--but Catholics inclined to openly challenge those lines would generally be on the point of abandoning and denouncing the Church anyway.

So, a wash. Same demographics, same dialectic within the Church, same outcomes in places like the USA--and same deal in Latin America where I gather the Church was more forthrightly reactionary and the outcome is either reactionary regimes allied with a reactionary Church, or repudiation of the Church completely.

That's my gut feeling but now I wish I'd read some of the books my Dad did about the "Battle For the American Church." I'm pretty sure that book (whose title I think I got right) was from a right-wing Catholic viewpoint, but I'd know more detailed facts about how things did go OTL, if only by reading rebuttals.

I've wondered before if there would be significant effects of the various Church thinkers contemplating the alt-forms of Islam. In particular, we have a stronger Ottoman state, and barring major changes in course we expect that Islamic empire to be allied to the North Germans and British in the coming war, pitting them against France and Russia, and if I haven't lost track of things, Austria.

So a monkey wrench would be if the Catholic Church is more vitrolically hostile to Islam across the board ITTL, which will have effects on how a still strongly Catholic France and Italy (no matter which side the Italians take in the war) deal with Islamic populations. Arguably it couldn't be much worse than the choices made OTL, and presumably in France at least there would be anti-clericists who might in reaction actually wind up more friendly with Muslims.

Alternatively, maybe the Catholics might get very Jesuitical, and start making distinctions between one kind of Muslim and another. The stronger Ottoman state seems the biggest barrier to that development though; the empire includes a wide range of Muslims from the more reactionary to the more progressive, so I suspect the geopolitics will incline the Curia to a blanket condemnation of all variants of Islam indiscriminately.

And that would have consequences in the USA obviously, with the African-American community including significant numbers of US Muslims and being broadly influenced by its culture even among the nominally Christian majority. Again, OTL there was in general a rift between Catholics and African-Americans (with exceptions, such as in Louisiana or I gather there was a major Catholic evangelical movement among African-Americans at one point) so aside from the exceptional cases that might be under more strain here, on the whole the practical result is a bit of a push. If we can assume that the Church is not broken by perhaps going out farther on a partisan geopolitical limb, allying more deeply with pro-Catholic and anti-Islamic nation-states at this juncture, and evolves roughly in parallel to OTL, then come the mid-20th century we can expect some ecumenicism and recantation of various forms of sectarian hate-mongering.

But in our current timeframe, the Baltimore Cathechism or its ATL equivalent will probably condemn all deviations from Catholic doctrine in harsh language and not only Muslims, but Jews and even Protestants would have grounds to feel pretty alienated by it.

I'm expecting the Franco-Russian-Austrian side to lose the war, pretty much. Insofar as the Curia hitches its wagon to those secular powers, it's going to be in for a rough ride.

Perhaps postwar, liberal and ecumenical movements will have traction within the Church somewhat earlier than OTL for that reason?

 

[Falecius]

Given the circumstances it's much more likely that cardinals would elect someone who would continue Pius' reactionarism, or at least something quite conservative. I really doubt you'd see something as sweeping as what you're proposing; e.g. a liberal ruler that works with both the Bonapartists and Savoyards towards Italian political unification under the Papacy. Beyond the fact that I doubt you'd get the Church behind it, the Savoyards would never accept such a plan. By 1878 is too little, too late for such a proposal.

IOTL the 1878 conclave was between Pecci, a liberal, Bilio, a moderate, and Franchi, a conservative. ITTL you'd likely see Bilio elected, IMHO. Which means he tries to do as you propose, but flounders, losing the support of the conservatives in Rome & Paris and being too reactionary to court the liberals in Florence (& Paris). He's kept on his throne by French blood and French steel... and then the Great War comes along.

I could certainly see the Roman Question dragged out ITTL - the fact that it was resolved so quickly IOTL is something of a quirk of history considering all the players and powers involved. Changing the Franco-Prussian War radically changes the course of European history from 1870 onward.

EDIT: Let's also not forget this isn't long after Pius IX called the First Vatican Council and (re)declared papal infallibility and redefined it, where the Church formally adopted the ultramontane model. This Council isn't going to be interpreted by war, so we're going to see a Papal State and Catholic Church that is staunchly conservative, even reactionary, and highly centralized. It's still in power, it's dynamically opposed to Italian unification as a challenge to its temporal power, and it has a great power patron (for the moment) in France. I think Jonathan Edelstein has the right of it - Plon-Plon can't, or won't, sell Rome for fear of losing the conservative, Catholic, support in Paris (and Napoléon Victor is even less likely to try it either), and Victor Emmanuel won't risk trying to take it by force without France distracted.

Also, I forget if any of this is changed, but I'm assuming European history before 1870 is essentially the same as IOTL where not explicitly stated it's changed, what with the butterflies mostly in Western Africa for such a long time. So French has held Savoy & Nice only for a few decades by the time of the the Great War, and while Nice was at least culturally & linguistically French, Savoy was certainly French; still the Italian nationalists considered them both to be a key part of Italian irredentismo IOTL. I bet that'll be an even stronger impulse ITTL. So that's going to be another screw that could be turned against France's favor for a possible alliance. As I've said before, the London-Berlin axis would have to make a good show about offering tangible aid to bring the Italians to their cause in the war, but they'll certainly have plenty of carrots to dangle in the Savoyard's eyes to try and lure them in - certainly more than a liberal, Imperial, France could, realistically, offer in return.

One of the areas of European history that IS slightly changed by butterflies prior 1870 is Italian Unification, because Garibaldi's early life in Brazil is different right from the start.
However, I don't see any immediate reason for this changes to affect the territorial swaps of 1860; Nice and Savoy will become French and, in due time, object of Italian irredentism (especially Nice). To my knowledge, Italian nationalism started caring about them only in the twentieth century, though Nice was widely considered as an Italian city anyway. This may be different ITTL, where Italian Unification happens with a slightly more participatory and democratic tone and with Italian patriots marginally more pissed off at France. I was reasoning with Jonathan in a PM that the September Convention may be butterflied away (this Garibaldi is less likely to do stuff like Aspromonte) and the Italian capital remain at Turin.
If France keeps propping up a Roman Papal state, anti-French irredentism is likely to emerge earlier and stronger, especially with France and Austria being allies.

OTOH, the effects of Garibaldi different experience in Piratini will impact on Italian 1866 as well. My general opinion is that 1866 is at least less of an unmitigated disaster for Italian arms, with *Custoza being maybe a draw and *Lissa butterflied.
This way, Italian military will be able to command a degree of respect, while still being inferior to either the Austrian or French one anyway.
I see Italy marginally stronger and better off than IOTL overall (not very high bar indeed) obviously focused on getting Rome, with a more liberal streak in her politics, that get messier as a consequence, and, if wolf_brother is right in that Rome won't be resolved easily or quickly, Italy might be the place where TTL's *Kulturkampf takes place.
We also don't know if the sphere of interest in Tunisia that the Powers have given Italy ITTL has evolved into some sort of protectorate; I think that any colonial move of substance might be highly divisive in Italy here, even more so than OTL.
I don't see any reason for Crispi not being the dominant figure of Italian politics in the ninenties, but there's a little chance that TTL's Crispi will a little less of dick at this point. He'd be interested in Rome, not in Africa.

The obvious consequence of all this will be Italy as a relatively junior partner of the Anglo-German alliance.
That has the obvious problem of Italy having to fight a very nasty two front land war with two stronger powers in a difficult terrain.
The other alliance option anyway is hardly much safer - Italy is very vulnerable from sea and fighting the two strongest navies in the Med isn't much of a bright idea too. An anti-prussian alliance of Italy, Austria and France was actually discussed IOTL around 1870 but had not very good prospects - less so ITTL.
Neutrality is safer, but Italy as well as North Germany here will have a serious feeling of unfinished business with both Austria and France and is likely to be going to pick a side, especially if Crispi is in charge.
This Great War seems hardly ideological, but from an Italian POV, the Franco-Austro-Russian side is likely to be seen as the most reactionary of the two. So my bet is that Italy will reluctantly chose the riskier path: land war in the Alps from more or less the beginning, in the context of a pre-existing alliance with Britain and North Germany, to get Rome (that's going to be easy) and other irredenta, including Nice and probably Corsica. Eritrea might be in the cards as a secondary war aim, though probably not an achieved one (and few will care anyway).
That's going to be ugly in the Alpine trenches, I suppose. Italy will need some noticeable British propping to pull this out, but I think that Britain WILL think that's worth it, to prevent all land armies in Western Europe ganging on North Germany ASAP.

Uhm. Serious mess ensues.
Also, note that North Germany and Britain are Protestant, the OE is Muslim; no power in this alliance will care about the Pope, as opposed to Austria, France, Bavaria and Brazil (all of them Catholic powers) on the other side. That could add a nasty streak of religious war to the mix, which might affect Ireland in generally ugly ways. (OTOH, liberation of Poland could well be a secondary war aim for the Anglo-Germans).
And isn't the situation in Southern Africa leading to a conflict where Britain and Germany are set against Portugal too? Catholic Leauge Redux?

 

[Falecius]

I'm really sad I don't know nearly enough about the politics of the Catholic Church in Italy at this time to contribute anything about which way things will go in the Vatican; just going by what murky stuff I do know, I'd have to second Wolf_Brother; the Church's high potentates will remain reactionary much on the lines of OTL and that will dictate how everyone else reacts to them.

Which is what I'm more interested in, actually. Will the perceived role of the RCC be any different, in any interesting way, far from Italy? In places like the USA, Latin America, or Northern Europe?

I'd guess not; as OTL in the Protestant-dominated nations, the Church will still be a bogeyman among Protestants, but in the USA immigration from Catholic nations will still make US Catholics a power bloc to be reckoned with. At the same time, OTL US Catholicism was polarized between ultramontanes and progressives; the reactionaries had the hierachy's pronouncements on their side but the progressives stubbornly went on thinking for themselves while still professing loyalty to their Church and the reactionaries were not generally in a position to shut them up, not unless they crossed certain lines--but Catholics inclined to openly challenge those lines would generally be on the point of abandoning and denouncing the Church anyway.

So, a wash. Same demographics, same dialectic within the Church, same outcomes in places like the USA--and same deal in Latin America where I gather the Church was more forthrightly reactionary and the outcome is either reactionary regimes allied with a reactionary Church, or repudiation of the Church completely.

That's my gut feeling but now I wish I'd read some of the books my Dad did about the "Battle For the American Church." I'm pretty sure that book (whose title I think I got right) was from a right-wing Catholic viewpoint, but I'd know more detailed facts about how things did go OTL, if only by reading rebuttals.

I've wondered before if there would be significant effects of the various Church thinkers contemplating the alt-forms of Islam. In particular, we have a stronger Ottoman state, and barring major changes in course we expect that Islamic empire to be allied to the North Germans and British in the coming war, pitting them against France and Russia, and if I haven't lost track of things, Austria.

So a monkey wrench would be if the Catholic Church is more vitrolically hostile to Islam across the board ITTL, which will have effects on how a still strongly Catholic France and Italy (no matter which side the Italians take in the war) deal with Islamic populations. Arguably it couldn't be much worse than the choices made OTL, and presumably in France at least there would be anti-clericists who might in reaction actually wind up more friendly with Muslims.

Alternatively, maybe the Catholics might get very Jesuitical, and start making distinctions between one kind of Muslim and another. The stronger Ottoman state seems the biggest barrier to that development though; the empire includes a wide range of Muslims from the more reactionary to the more progressive, so I suspect the geopolitics will incline the Curia to a blanket condemnation of all variants of Islam indiscriminately.

And that would have consequences in the USA obviously, with the African-American community including significant numbers of US Muslims and being broadly influenced by its culture even among the nominally Christian majority. Again, OTL there was in general a rift between Catholics and African-Americans (with exceptions, such as in Louisiana or I gather there was a major Catholic evangelical movement among African-Americans at one point) so aside from the exceptional cases that might be under more strain here, on the whole the practical result is a bit of a push. If we can assume that the Church is not broken by perhaps going out farther on a partisan geopolitical limb, allying more deeply with pro-Catholic and anti-Islamic nation-states at this juncture, and evolves roughly in parallel to OTL, then come the mid-20th century we can expect some ecumenicism and recantation of various forms of sectarian hate-mongering.

But in our current timeframe, the Baltimore Cathechism or its ATL equivalent will probably condemn all deviations from Catholic doctrine in harsh language and not only Muslims, but Jews and even Protestants would have grounds to feel pretty alienated by it.

I'm expecting the Franco-Russian-Austrian side to lose the war, pretty much. Insofar as the Curia hitches its wagon to those secular powers, it's going to be in for a rough ride.

Perhaps postwar, liberal and ecumenical movements will have traction within the Church somewhat earlier than OTL for that reason?

All very plausible. I have not the slightest clue about Catholicism in America at this point, but a stronger polarization according to geopolitical lines is likely. As we both saw, basically all Catholic powers of note here, with the possible exception of Spain, are on the same alliance (Italy obviously does not count as Catholic power in this context, her politics being very markedly hostile to a temporalist Church). This alliance is marginally less liberal than its Islamo-Protestant opponent. In the short-to-medium term, I can see Islam lumped into the condemnation of "modern" errors together with Protestant heresy, liberalism, socialism and other "subversive" ideas.
ITTL, Islam is an ideological force to be reckoned with, that any conteporary observer would see as potentially progressive and active, as opposed to the general of view from OTL. IOTL, it was possible to discount Islam altogether as a significant force for the future, to think of it as stagnant, "medieval", "semitic" and generally secondary to the world dynamics at large.
Not the case here. Scholarship by people like Renan or Goldziher (the latter, as a Jew, likely to become Ottoman citizen here) will be very, very different. The equivalent of the Renan/al-Afghani debate should be interesting reading (by the way, what's Jamal al-Din al-Afghani up to TTL? Introducing Abacarism into a Shiite frame in Persia?).

So well, things may go Crusade-nasty for a while. Poland and Ireland, if they end up with some degree of independence, will a convoluted religios politics. And God help whoever tries to sort the Balkans here.

 

[wannis]

A remark on Poland - I'm not sure whether the British-Prussian alliance would be going for an independent Poland as a war goal. Although instigating Polish unrest may weaken Russia and AH, Prussia has significant Polish-speaking territories at this time and would not want to give them wrong ideas, and I don't think Britain would be too enthusiastic about fuelling the nationalism of a Catholic people. I can only see support for Polish independence as a desperate measure in case the British-Prussian alliance would be clobbered by Russia / AH in the East and would be clutching for straws.

 

[Falecius]

Military planning in the Great War

The more I think about it, more seems it likely that Italy has joined a formal military alliance with at least North Germany before the war.
In a context where France and Austria are close allies, Italy's main problem will be safety, for which I see two paths: alliance with both, or alliance against both. There solid reasons why I think that the former is less likely than the latter, with Rome being a contention point. North Germany is a natural ally here, especially in connection with Britain.
Italy cannot hope to win with Austria and France at the same time, so their plan is playing defense, draining troops from the enemy in the hope the Royal Navy and the Prussian Army settle the score for them against busy enemies.
That's a perfect fit with North German need to avoid the full pressure of the combined land armies of her enemies focusing on her at once.

Franco-Austro-Russian military plan, if sensible, is likely to focus on knocking North Germany out the war early, and Italy immediately after, ensuring near-unstoppable dominance on the European landmass.
So, a largely offensive plan, possibly contemplating violation of Belgian neutrality, counting on superior numbers, strategic encirclement and élan.
North Germany will have to plan for a three-front war. I think their plan is going to be for defense in the East and West and offensive to the South, hoping to KO Austria ASAP and let the allies drain enough the others.
Everyone will be planning for a long, multi-sided conflict, at least if people are sensible (that's not necessarily the case; it wasn't IOTL).
Both North Germany and Italy will be in a strategic nightmare here, and the fight is going to be quickly existential for them; but it will be such for Austria and Russia as well.

 

[Falecius]

A remark on Poland - I'm not sure whether the British-Prussian alliance would be going for an independent Poland as a war goal. Although instigating Polish unrest may weaken Russia and AH, Prussia has significant Polish-speaking territories at this time and would not want to give them wrong ideas, and I don't think Britain would be too enthusiastic about fuelling the nationalism of a Catholic people. I can only see support for Polish independence as a desperate measure in case the British-Prussian alliance would be clobbered by Russia / AH in the East and would be clutching for straws.

That's quite likely, but I gather that the different geopolitical situation will give German nationalism a very different outlook; hostility with Austria and Russia alike will make German nationalism much more receptive towards Polish demands. Giving up part of Posen or find an arrangement for it within Prussia the Poles can get along with might be seen as acceptable price for reunifiying all of German lands (including Bohemia). OTOH, that would be a problem for those aiming at a mainly Protestant German state. Austria might play a Catholic Pan-German card ITTL.
It's going to be very tricky.

 

[wannis]

That's quite likely, but I gather that the different geopolitical situation will give German nationalism a very different outlook; hostility with Austria and Russia alike will make German nationalism much more receptive towards Polish demands. Giving up part of Posen or find an arrangement for it within Prussia the Poles can get along with might be seen as acceptable price for reunifiying all of German lands (including Bohemia). OTOH, that would be a problem for those aiming at a mainly Protestant German state. Austria might play a Catholic Pan-German card ITTL.
It's going to be very tricky.

I don't really see the situation becoming very different except in case of a catastrophic (for Prussia) turn of the war. The removal of the special status for the Duchy of Poznan had happened in 1849 (although the Prussian kings kept the title "Duke of Poznan"), and Germanisation of the Polish population had been Prussian policy for most of the 19th century even before the formation of the German Empire. Personally, I would be glad to see a more enlightened / less nationalist German attitude to Poland ITTL, but I don't think it's realistic, with the given POD and German politics not being changed very much up to the Franco-Prussian war.

 

[Falecius]

I don't really see the situation becoming very different except in case of a catastrophic (for Prussia) turn of the war. The removal of the special status for the Duchy of Poznan had happened in 1849 (although the Prussian kings kept the title "Duke of Poznan"), and Germanisation of the Polish population had been Prussian policy for most of the 19th century even before the formation of the German Empire. Personally, I would be glad to see a more enlightened / less nationalist German attitude to Poland ITTL, but I don't think it's realistic, with the given POD and German politics not being changed very much up to the Franco-Prussian war.

The change will occur later, if at all.
Note that I don't think German nationalism will be more enlightened in general, (frustrated nationalism hardly ever gets better because of frustration) just more willing to sort of compromise with the Poles because of bigger fishes to be fried elsewhere, including a couple of common enemies.
But it's not going to be straightforward, what with France using to be the traditional Polish protector for instance.

 

[Falecius]

I don't really see the situation becoming very different except in case of a catastrophic (for Prussia) turn of the war. The removal of the special status for the Duchy of Poznan had happened in 1849 (although the Prussian kings kept the title "Duke of Poznan"), and Germanisation of the Polish population had been Prussian policy for most of the 19th century even before the formation of the German Empire. Personally, I would be glad to see a more enlightened / less nationalist German attitude to Poland ITTL, but I don't think it's realistic, with the given POD and German politics not being changed very much up to the Franco-Prussian war.

As an addition to what said above, and upon further reflection, I'd say that North German official attitude towards Poland is likely to be shaped to a good extent by overall strategic goals, including military consideration.
ITTL, we have a scenario where North Germany probably won't consider in-depth advance into Russian-held territory as strategically feasible (not unlike Germany IOTL in very broad terms, only much worse).
Their offensive plans, I think, will be towards Vienna and possibly Paris (the latter not very likely) with little concern for occupation of large parts of Poland. That could orient the Germans against planning anything substantial about the Eastern border; IOTL and likely ITTL too, both Russia and Prussia/Germany were mostly happy with their border in Polish lands. While Russia is more consistently hostile ITTL, she would be rival to reconcile with if possible. The most serious quarrel is with France and Austria, which are the ones standing in the way of German unification.
If the war in Poland is fought defensively by the Germans, which is the most likely situation, the Polish question might be shelved by all powers involved anyway.
Russian military in 1893 will be probably more fearsome than its OTL equivalent, having finalized major reform and seen considerable investment after some major defeats (Russia is a "revisionist" power here, deeply unhappy with status quo, much more than IOTL).
Then, the German plan might be:
a) profit of slower Russian mobilization to advance slightly into border areas.
b) establish a defensive line and dig in deep there.
c) bleed the Russians as white as possible when they come in strength.
d) pray lines hold.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Wow, a lot to think about here!

I was thinking more on the lines of US/Liberia than US/Britain, but anyway.

Piratini wouldn't be in nearly as weak a position as OTL Liberia - it would be richer, more populous and militarily stronger - and Italy wouldn't be as powerful as the United States. So I'd anticipate that the relationship would be more nearly equal than USA/Liberia, although Italy would certainly be the senior partner.

Here, while the overall picture would be similar, the relationship would be perceived as special. Sharing a national hero of high symbolic value like Garibaldi, not to mention his personal political clout to help straighten things, will probably lead to some treaty sanctioning an overall closeness as desirable.

Fair point. The relationship between Italy and Piratini would be one that people in both countries would actually remark upon and see as a good thing. There would be some formal cooperation, but that would probably be less important than the sentimental regard the citizens of each country would have for the other - the unwritten alliance would be stronger than the written one.

EDIT: it's likely that TTLs Uruguay and Argentina will be a bit less Italian than OTL. I still lack numbers, but I think that in both countries, Italians were the more numerous immigrant community, followed in Argentina by Levantines. In this TL, Germans and Eastern Europeans may end with a higher proportion there with more Italians going to Piratini instead and Brazil absorbing a generally larger quota of immigrants all over, and less Levantines have reason to migrate (possibly a little less Italians too but it has to be seen). OTOH, probably more Germans will migrate; though I don't see a Germanized Uruguay for example, German culture will likely have a larger place throughout the Platine region.

On the other hand, Piratini isn't that big, and there were a lot of Italian emigrants during the second half of the nineteenth century. I'd also guess that Piratini won't be very industrialized, and that many Italians would go to São Paulo or Buenos Aires because there are more jobs. Not to mention that Brazil in TTL is offering incentives to Catholic immigrant workers, which would draw some immigrants in that direction.

I agree that there would be some diversion of Italians to Piratini, and they might become a plurality or even a majority there, but plenty of them would still go to Brazil and the Southern Cone, and I'd still expect Uruguayan and Argentine culture to be substantially Italian-influenced. The Germans would have a presence throughout the region, including Piratini where their OTL settlement dates to the 1820s.

The Levantines would definitely go to Argentina and Uruguay - in TTL, they'd probably be joined by Balkan Christian immigrants. The Catholic preferences might lead to fewer Arabs in Brazil, though.

And there's also the politics of an independent Entre Rios. The sensible thing to do is a regional block of Piratini, Uruguay and Entre Rios (who'll share a similar gaucho culture, at least to a point) that tries to balance both Argentina and Brazil and sort of leans towards Paraguay as the obvious alternative; but border bickering and diverging interest may prevent that, as Entre Rios will see a threat in Paraguay almost as much as in Argentina, while Piratini would be largely concerned with Brazil.

Thus far, their relationship has been a series of temporary alliances against whoever was the biggest threat of the moment, but the Third Platine War has tamed Paraguay somewhat, and the Great War may cause unpredictable developments.

I really doubt you'd see something as sweeping as what you're proposing; e.g. a liberal ruler that works with both the Bonapartists and Savoyards towards Italian political unification under the Papacy. Beyond the fact that I doubt you'd get the Church behind it, the Savoyards would never accept such a plan. By 1878 is too little, too late for such a proposal.

Not to mention the question of precedence: the Savoyards wouldn't want to be second within their own kingdom, while the Pope would never agree to be subordinate to any secular king. So I agree: a few faltering attempts at union, but no resolution until the 1890s.

As I've said before, the London-Berlin axis would have to make a good show about offering tangible aid to bring the Italians to their cause in the war, but they'll certainly have plenty of carrots to dangle in the Savoyard's eyes to try and lure them in - certainly more than a liberal, Imperial, France could, realistically, offer in return.

Neutrality is safer, but Italy as well as North Germany here will have a serious feeling of unfinished business with both Austria and France and is likely to be going to pick a side, especially if Crispi is in charge.

This Great War seems hardly ideological, but from an Italian POV, the Franco-Austro-Russian side is likely to be seen as the most reactionary of the two. So my bet is that Italy will reluctantly chose the riskier path: land war in the Alps from more or less the beginning, in the context of a pre-existing alliance with Britain and North Germany, to get Rome (that's going to be easy) and other irredenta, including Nice and probably Corsica. Eritrea might be in the cards as a secondary war aim, though probably not an achieved one (and few will care anyway).

Well, the ideal for Italy would be to stay neutral in the main conflict while using France's distraction to grab Rome. But even a limited war against Rome would require full mobilization, because Italy would have to guard the frontiers just in case France and Austria decided to invade. It would be very easy for the French and Austrians to interpret the mobilization as a threat and respond accordingly.

Also, Britain and North Germany - especially the latter - would want Italy on their side. If the Franco-Russian-Austrian military planners have any sense, they'd realize that the best way to win the war is to win quickly, because a long war would bring the German and British industrial superiority into play and give Britain a chance to build a land force. So the first months of the war would involve the Catholic alliance trying to overwhelm the North Germans with sheer numbers while keeping the British and Ottomans at bay. I think Falecius' outline of military planning is more or less correct. This means that the first few months of war would be fought on the defensive, on North German soil, and the Germans might promise almost anything to Italy if it takes some of the pressure off. If Italy figures that it will end up at war over Rome anyway, then it might jump in very quickly.

I've wondered before if there would be significant effects of the various Church thinkers contemplating the alt-forms of Islam. In particular, we have a stronger Ottoman state, and barring major changes in course we expect that Islamic empire to be allied to the North Germans and British in the coming war, pitting them against France and Russia, and if I haven't lost track of things, Austria.

So a monkey wrench would be if the Catholic Church is more vitrolically hostile to Islam across the board ITTL, which will have effects on how a still strongly Catholic France and Italy (no matter which side the Italians take in the war) deal with Islamic populations. Arguably it couldn't be much worse than the choices made OTL, and presumably in France at least there would be anti-clericists who might in reaction actually wind up more friendly with Muslims.

The complicating factor in France would be that Muslims have been serving in the French army for almost forty years. Some of the soldiers protecting the Pope are Muslim! As we've seen in the last French update, this has given the Muslim West Africans a very complicated relationship with the French right - some of the more populist and militarist elements on the right are pro-African and hence tolerant of Islam.

But I agree that, as Falecius says, the Church overall would see Islam as a subversive modernist influence and would oppose it more strongly than OTL. This couldn't help but influence the Catholic parties in France and Italy. It might affect Portuguese colonial policy too - there aren't many Muslims in the Portuguese colonies, but they might put restrictions on Muslim merchants and forbid proselytizing.

There would certainly be some dissent within the Church, especially among the more liberal faction; the war might, as you say, shake things up somewhat.

I see Italy marginally stronger and better off than IOTL overall (not very high bar indeed) obviously focused on getting Rome, with a more liberal streak in her politics, that get messier as a consequence, and, if wolf_brother is right in that Rome won't be resolved easily or quickly, Italy might be the place where TTL's *Kulturkampf takes place.

That's actually a very interesting possibility - if the Pope and the Catholic powers are the obstacles to completing the Risorgimento, then Italian politics might develop a strong anti-clerical streak. If TTL's more pragmatic Garibaldi becomes a more powerful political figure in the 1860s and 1870s, he might be a leader of the anti-clerical faction. Do you have any other ideas for who might lead this movement?

We also don't know if the sphere of interest in Tunisia that the Powers have given Italy ITTL has evolved into some sort of protectorate; I think that any colonial move of substance might be highly divisive in Italy here, even more so than OTL.

There was a steady influx of Italians to Tunisia throughout the nineteenth century in OTL, and I don't see that changing in TTL, so I'd expect that there would be a consensus within Italy to protect the national interest there. I doubt that Italy would make Tunisia an outright colony - more likely it would be a quasi-protectorate with extraterritorial rights for the Italian settlers.

Also, note that North Germany and Britain are Protestant, the OE is Muslim; no power in this alliance will care about the Pope, as opposed to Austria, France, Bavaria and Brazil (all of them Catholic powers) on the other side. That could add a nasty streak of religious war to the mix, which might affect Ireland in generally ugly ways. (OTOH, liberation of Poland could well be a secondary war aim for the Anglo-Germans).

A remark on Poland - I'm not sure whether the British-Prussian alliance would be going for an independent Poland as a war goal. Although instigating Polish unrest may weaken Russia and AH, Prussia has significant Polish-speaking territories at this time and would not want to give them wrong ideas, and I don't think Britain would be too enthusiastic about fuelling the nationalism of a Catholic people. I can only see support for Polish independence as a desperate measure in case the British-Prussian alliance would be clobbered by Russia / AH in the East and would be clutching for straws.

I doubt the North Germans would voluntarily give up Posen, but they might think they can control Polish nationalism, or even that an independent Poland carved out of Russia will provide an outlet for the Polish nationalists in their own territories. I could imagine them thinking of a dependent Polish nationalist movement as more a tool than a threat. They wouldn't necessarily be right, but plenty of countries have made similar miscalculations in OTL.

Besides, one of the ways to break the trench-warfare stalemate is to stir up trouble behind enemy lines: a Polish (or Irish, or Kazakh, or Arab, or Czech) uprising is potentially an excellent way to relieve some of the pressure on the main front. By the end of the war, nearly everyone will be inciting each other's minorities, and I don't think the Poles would be an exception.

I definitely agree that there will be a religious overtone to the war, especially among the more reactionary politicians on the Franco-Russian-Austrian side. And that would really put Ireland in a whipsaw. On the one hand, cooler heads would say "support Britain now and demand concessions later," but others would be whipped into a crusading fury, and you can guess which ones would get the French arms and money.

Scholarship by people like Renan or Goldziher (the latter, as a Jew, likely to become Ottoman citizen here) will be very, very different. The equivalent of the Renan/al-Afghani debate should be interesting reading (by the way, what's Jamal al-Din al-Afghani up to TTL? Introducing Abacarism into a Shiite frame in Persia?).

Thanks for introducing me to these names! Al-Afghani could definitely be one of Islamic modernism's bridges to Persia, although I think he'd be more likely to espouse Ottoman and Egyptian liberalism (especially the latter, which would mesh with his OTL ideas about the harmony of religion and science) than Abacarism. The Abacarist influence in Persia will come in via the Hadhramis and Central Asians, and there will also be cultural exchanges via the Caucasus.

Anyway, I hope to have the last 1892 map posted tomorrow - I've had a minor tech nightmare at the new office which has sucked up most of the free time I'd hoped to have this week, but it's mostly done now. After that, it will be time to move on to bigger and not-at-all-better things.

 

[Hnau]

Anyway, I hope to have the last 1892 map posted tomorrow - I've had a minor tech nightmare at the new office which has sucked up most of the free time I'd hoped to have this week, but it's mostly done now. After that, it will be time to move on to bigger and not-at-all-better things.

No problems here! I look forward to the Africa map... I've been trying my own in MS Paint based on your descriptions and it's been tough, I couldn't produce anything worth showing. However, when it comes to South America I made my own version based on B_Munro's that I like.