Malê Rising

[Shevek23]

...
[child]

Almost 100,000 views!

[/child]

Well, while I have enjoyed and encouraged and fervently looked forward to progress on many threads here, this is one of the very finest I've ever seen. It combines verisimiltude with a humaneness that is nevertheless starkly realistic.

So it's only a fraction of what you deserve IMO. An O that is not humble in this matter!

 

[Julius Vogel]

The Eritrean preacher I mentioned a few posts back did re-interpret the Book of Mormon as taking place in Africa, so this would seem to be a plausible development. (Great Zimbabwe or Kano as Zarahemla, anyone?)

Do you have a link to Zioneer's discussion of possible Mormon-Muslim relationships? And I'll take you up on that PM offer, probably when I get back around to the United States.



Well, the Boers did form alliances of convenience with African rulers (or, in the Nieuwe Republiek's case, would-be rulers) in OTL. The difference here is that Fourie's trekkers are a long, long way from home, and can't assimilate their territories into the South African Republic; instead, they and the Shona remain mutually dependent. Their survival depends on being citizens of the Mutapa kingdom, and the Shona have adopted them, but they don't consider themselves Shona... yet.

The logic of TTL's GSWA is that the colony is being settled at a time when the North German Confederation is increasingly distracted (tensions along the Bavarian border, the Russian court's turn to the hard right making people nervous) and can't make a large military commitment. The Germans did form alliances with the Herero in OTL, which is a tragic irony given what happened later, and did recognize the Rehoboth Basters' autonomy; given the colony's reduced strength in TTL, the Basters are getting a better deal and the relationships with the Herero are closer and more familial. Keep in mind that this isn't sweetness and light for the Herero: feudal relationships are mutual, but the landlords - in this case the German colonists, and to a lesser extent the Basters - are the bosses. Witbooi was right about what would happen to the Nama if they entered a similar arrangement.

And most of the Boers in GSWA did join up with the Germans as in OTL; the ones who joined the Basters were definitely in the minority.



The latter. The Shona prohibit intra-clan marriages, not inter-clan marriages - and since they have designated the Boers as a clan, they think it's wrong for Boers to marry other Boers. Some of the Boers, when they catch on, will finesse the issue by sending to the Transvaal for marriage partners (which would qualify, from the Shona point of view, as marrying into another Boer clan - the Springbok clan consists only of the Boers who settled in Mutapa). Eventually, some of them will start dealing with the issue the easier way, but that will take a couple of generations, and by then, Shona culture will also have changed.

BTW, it's up in the air whether this state retains its independence, but given British colonial practice in TTL, it will at minimum be its own colony, thus maintaining independence from the Ndebele.



White supremacy exists - this is the nineteenth century, after all - but it's much less dominant, given the greater relative military capabilities of (some of) the African states. Africa is still headed for a period of colonization, but in most of the continent, the whites will have to accommodate the Africans somewhat more than OTL. I've said in the past that interracial and intercultural peoples will be one of the major themes of this timeline, and the modestly different balance of power will be one of the factors that helps create and nurture them.



Unfortunately, it's hard to imagine Portugal not coming into conflict with neighboring colonial powers. The Portuguese were in sub-Saharan Africa centuries before other European colonialists (with the exception of the French in Senegal), and they claimed a lot of territory, but by 19th-century standards that territory was undeveloped and tenuously controlled. The neighbors will want some of it for themselves.

It may, of course, be possible to iron out the border disputes at TTL's *Berlin Conference, but then again it may not. At OTL's conference, the European powers were more or less in agreement about what colonialism should be, and disagreed mainly on borders; here, there will be ideological as well as territorial disputes - and the OTL rationale of suppressing the slave trade will also be absent.



They're related peoples, distinct from the Nguni-speakers who lived along the coast before the Mfecane - sometimes the term "Sotho-Tswana" is used to describe them.

Just out of curiosity, how did your brother come to learn Sesotho?



The existence of the Afrikaner Bond is per OTL, and it came into being for many of the same reasons. In TTL, they're a little more focused on their distinctness as an African (albeit white) people, with these guys being a more dominant influence than in OTL. In a way, TTL's Bond is an anti-colonial movement, with the Boers considering themselves the natives and Britain the colonial master. That doesn't translate into a common cause with non-white Africans at this point in time, but there are some hints (e.g., the definition of "Afrikaner" that is used in TTL's twenty-first century) that this will not always be the case.

[child]

Almost 100,000 views!

[/child]

Well without the events of the 1890s and the Second South African War, Afrikaner nationalism may not be so nasty, this is a good thing!

 

[Cuāuhtemōc]

I give my congratulations to you on hitting over 100,000 views.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

What happened to Livingstone and Stanley ITL? Stanley in particular is surely too fascinating a character to waste.

Livingstone's career would be similar to OTL: his missionary career in Africa began right around the time of the POD, and his personality would still lead him to explore the interior. There will be people in *Zambia and the Great Lakes who remember him.

Stanley is definitely a fascinating character, but given the changes to American history (especially the ACW), his formative experiences in the United States will be different, and King Leopold certainly won't be commissioning him to secure the Congo.

All right, here goes: The young John Rowlands comes to the United States, meets Henry Hope Stanley in Louisiana, and changes his name as in OTL. He enlists in the Confederate army and doesn't get captured, staying in active service until being invalided out due to illness. After the war, both the elder and the younger Stanley emigrate to Brazil, where they settle in São Paulo province. Our hero then enlists on the rebellious coronels' side when the Third Platine War breaks out, necessitating another change of scene after the imperial government retakes São Paulo. Hearing of opportunities to be had in Grão Pará, he takes a job scouting the interior for rubber and mining prospects. Thus he becomes...

STANLEY OF THE AMAZON!
​

We may hear of him when next we visit South America.

Similarly, what about Brazza? I realise that he was born ten years post-POD which is probably a problem, but his rather peaceful approach to Africa and his doomed attempts to be a humanitarian in the French Congo would probably play nicely in this timeline.

My rule-of-thumb policy is that anyone whose parents were born before the POD may (or may not) have an ATL sibling, assuming that the parents would plausibly meet and marry in this timeline. So there may be someone with Brazza's name, born at the same time (give or take a year), and with a similar but not identical appearance and personality. I'm not sure yet whether there will be such a person, and I may have other things in mind for him if there is, but there will be people like Brazza in the French Congo even if not Brazza himself.

Well without the events of the 1890s and the Second South African War, Afrikaner nationalism may not be so nasty, this is a good thing!

Nationalism of any kind always has the potential to be nasty, and while there won't be a Second South African War, the coming Great War has the potential to divide Boers against British (and against each other; I don't think I'm giving anything away by saying that the Orange Free State and the South African Republic may not be on the same side). Still, without Cecil Rhodes there will be nothing like the Jameson Raid, and the odds are that there won't be total war and concentration camps, so the conflict will leave less bitterness.

It's safe to say that Afrikaner nationalism will come in several different flavors in TTL, and that the one which will ultimately become dominant will be based on language and culture more than ethnicity (or, if you prefer, on an expanded definition of what Afrikaner ethnicity means).

 

[SenatorChickpea]

"Stanley of the Amazon"?


Yes.

 

[Future8]

I finally got around to reading some of the latest entries. I really like the last one-really excited to see how Mashonaland goes.

So, all this stuff about South America is making me really excited. When can we expect the next South America update?

 

[TaylorS]

This TL is f---ing amazing!

 

[Hnau]

The Eritrean preacher I mentioned a few posts back did re-interpret the Book of Mormon as taking place in Africa, so this would seem to be a plausible development. (Great Zimbabwe or Kano as Zarahemla, anyone?)

Do you have a link to Zioneer's discussion of possible Mormon-Muslim relationships? And I'll take you up on that PM offer, probably when I get back around to the United States.

I forgot to post that link. Here is the thread I was referring to. Though, reading through it in retrospect, I have modified my views quite a bit about what would be plausible. I'll send you a PM with a few thoughts so as to not bog down the thread.

 

[Thande]

I read this TL while I was on holiday, and I just wanted to post and say it is one of the finest I have ever read on this site. The only thing I can think of that's comparable is Jared's Lands of Red and Gold, and even then this is uniquely different to that, without the deeps-of-time biological PODs, it all takes place after the familiarities of events as recent as the Napoleonic Wars.

I particularly like how it balances its focus on West Africa with covering the worldwide effects, producing many interesting concepts along the way. I can also tell that the author has direct experience of West Africa, as I recognise much from my own limited experience via my great-uncle's travels there. For example, the thing about states pragmatically taking advantage of persecuted new religious movements by using them as administrators with unquestionable loyalty, because any revolution would start persecuting them again--that's still done today in West Africa.

Finally I also like the much more nuanced view of colonialism than one often gets, making it clear that 'imperialists' are not some monolithic bloc, that there is a whole ragbag of motivations both idealistic and cynical thrown into the mix, and just like the colonised, the colonisers are the usual mix of good and bad people. It's also much less either/or than most scenarios looking at colonialism: look at how the natives of many parts of Africa are, on paper, in a much better position to resist colonial encroachment, yet the European empires are actually bigger in TTL than they were by this point in OTL, because often colonisers would rather work with an existing functional native entity to bring forth trade than try and subvert it for the sake of conquest alone (unless, of course, they are bastards a la the Royal Niger Company here). I also like a lot of the ideas brought forth, Anglo-Omani Tanganyika is inspired, and I look forward to what is done with Congo.

I couldn't do google research on my kindle while I was on holiday due to being in one of the few parts of the UK where the internet is still summoned by rubbing sticks together, so can I inquire as to the historicity of Paulo Abacar and his men? Are they based on a real group of rebel slaves that in OTL never escaped Brazil or something?

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Thanks again to everyone. The comparison to Lands of Red and Gold is both flattering and daunting. I also apologize for the delayed update: I'd been hoping to post one this weekend, but I need a few more days to work through the Ottoman and Russian developments.

When can we expect the next South America update?

There will be one during the 1886-93 cycle - Grão Pará is due for a revolution.

I couldn't do google research on my kindle while I was on holiday due to being in one of the few parts of the UK where the internet is still summoned by rubbing sticks together, so can I inquire as to the historicity of Paulo Abacar and his men? Are they based on a real group of rebel slaves that in OTL never escaped Brazil or something?

Paulo Abacar is not historical - he's a composite character. The Malê Revolt, however, was quite real, and happened in Salvador in January 1835. In OTL, many of the Muslim slaves - who were, for good reason, seen as troublesome by their owners - were deported to Africa in the wake of the rebellion. In this timeline, the rebels still lose, but are able to retreat to the mountains, and ultimately to secure passage to Africa as a coherent whole rather than being sent there in small atomized groups. The rest is allohistory.

I'm also glad to see that the shades of gray I intended to draw in this timeline are coming through. For the most part, I've tried to avoid painting any one group or nation as the "good guys" or the "bad guys" (with the partial exception of the Malê, but even they have their ambitious men and manipulators) - there are heroes and villains in the world, but they tend to be few, and most collectives are, as you say, a mixed bag. This is not to say that there won't be heroic characters and villainous ones - I drew on several heroic archetypes for Paulo Abacar - but for the most part, the complexities of individuals and societies will (or at least should) take them beyond such Manichean portrayal.

 

[Thande]

Paulo Abacar is not historical - he's a composite character. The Malê Revolt, however, was quite real, and happened in Salvador in January 1835. In OTL, many of the Muslim slaves - who were, for good reason, seen as troublesome by their owners - were deported to Africa in the wake of the rebellion. In this timeline, the rebels still lose, but are able to retreat to the mountains, and ultimately to secure passage to Africa as a coherent whole rather than being sent there in small atomized groups. The rest is allohistory.

Thanks for clarifying that. Another reason I liked this TL--a good reason for liking any TL--is it taught me a lot about areas I didn't know a lot about before.

One question that occurred to me, are you going to do a (brief) bit about what happens with the North German Confederation in between the more inconclusive Franco-Prussian War and the 'Great War' you imply will begin in 1893? While I imagine it's not too relevant to the general thrust of the TL, I suspect things would be quite different politically to the OTL Second Reich due to the absence of Catholic Southern Germany and thus a much weaker Centre Party: it'll be Prussian conservatives vs. Saxon social democrats as the major political confrontation earlier on, probably more like France in fact.

 

[Shevek23]

....it'll be Prussian conservatives vs. Saxon social democrats as the major political confrontation earlier on, probably more like France in fact.

I'm very ignorant of the socioeconomic development of Saxony; I'm trying to rectify that but my browser is nearly paralyzed by an excess of open windows. I've just spent some time closing lots of them but probably not all the worst offenders, but that does seem better now.

OK, Wikipedia on the narrow subject of "Saxony" seems completely useless; it talks about the political status of the kingdom in relation to the successive Prussian hegemonic schemes but says nothing about the development of industry and the economy there.

Whereas the industrial heartland of Germany was mainly in the northwest, along the northern stretches of the Rhine. And later, in the first part of the 20th century I do know that along with those older industrial heartlands, another major stronghold of "Social Democrats" as the term applied then (that is, pretty much synonymous with Marxist Second Internationalists) was not Saxony but "Red Berlin." This is presumably because the Second Reich fostered extensive industrial development of the capital and environs, as a way of drawing industry into the heart of Prussia proper. (The western Rheinish industrial areas were of course overwhelmingly legally a part of Prussia too).

Now in the 20th century sense of Social Democrat, the Second Internationalist SD Party only became a factor to be reckoned with in the 1890s OTL--that is, they broke into respectable politics after some lag of the development of the industrial areas that provided their working-class organized labor base. I'm still in the dark just how industrialized Saxony ever was, but my impression is that they tended to lag both the heavily industrialized west and the belated but rapidly and extensively developing capital area. So it's hard to see Saxony as a stronghold of SDs in the 20th century radical sense.

But I suppose you are talking more about liberal Social Democrats, and I do believe that until surpassed by the heavy industry of the aforementioned factory regions, Saxony was fairly strong in overall economic development, by Continental European mid-19th century standards, and did stand out as more liberal across the board than Prussia.

And in the time period we are talking about, I am quite sure that radical leftist labor movements aspiring to break into politics somehow, generally by revolutionary means, are fermenting pretty hectically in the industrial west at least, but not so much in Saxony or Berlin, unless the Prussians are managing to foster industrial growth in that region to a degree comparable to OTL. And everywhere they'd be beyond the pale of mainstream politics.

So in strictly legal and electoral terms, I suppose you have touched on the formal balance of power. But both liberals and conservatives will be speaking and acting with a nervous eye cocked leftward and downward, at the restive working masses who are not quietly submitting to their humble roles. Their agititation may be illegal but it is having effects.

OTL I believe Bismarck belatedly found the Center useful for helping keep the potentially radical masses in check; a lot of the poorer working class were Catholics and Roman doctrine was helpful in diiverting some of them from radical programs. Without that, with the North Germans filling their factories with mostly Protestants or people ethnically not German at all, the radicals might be a bit more volatile.

Again I admit many of the formations of the 20th century that I am more familiar with are going to be embryonic here. But I do hold that successful industrial development will go hand in hand with worker radicalization. If North Germany is as developed per capita as the Second Reich as a whole was OTL by 1890--well, things might be a little cooler and less developed, because OTL the Reich as a whole was "ballasted" as it were by regions that were a bit more backward than the centers of industrialization. Some of those regions were northern and quite a lot of Germany's OTL industrialization was in the south, to be sure, but on the whole I suspect that if the regions that form North Germany are keeping pace with OTL, then per capita North Germany will be more developed than Germany as a whole OTL--and labor politics will be more explosive, the more so if kept underground as long or longer than OTL.

Whereas if North Germany is less developed, then they will be that much weaker in a big long hard war; Britain will have to do more of the heavy lifting. Since Jonathan has hinted that North Germany itself will be in dire straits, perhaps the chief European battleground of the war, it makes sense to guess that with incomplete unification North German industry has suffered a bit of a setback compared to OTL. Therefore labor politics will be a bit less high-pressure and hothouse-developed, and your rather traditionalist Prussian-Tory vs Saxon-Whig formula might be more dead on.

In addition to fleshing out what the nature of North German society is on the eve of the Great War, I'd be just as keen to learn what's up in the gaggle of South German states that will be confronting the Prussian-led hegemony. Are they considerably more backward than they were OTL, due to not having northern German investment nor the coordination of a unified Empire? Or will at least some of their monarchs foster some degree of industrialization to keep pace with their northern neighbors? To what degree will French or Austrian hegemony substitute for Prussian? How likely is it that even if handicapped by somewhat less strength than OTL and ultimately vulnerable to a massive French attack, the North Germans will have allies as well as enemies among the southern realms, and south Germany as well as north becomes a battlefield, as neighboring states turn on each other, some aligned with the north, some with France, some perhaps with Austria?

And by the way how is Austria coping with being between two fires, the frustrated but still (relative to Austria) highly industrialized Prussian hegemony and the much-sounder-than-OTL Ottomans to the south? Could it be that the challenge of facing a stronger Turkey is evoking a response in Austria in the form of a more effective kind of muddling through their liabilities, resulting in a Hapsburg empire that might well take a nasty beating in the upcoming war but will nevertheless have more cohesion and can survive it? Or under such heavier blows falling earlier will it shatter that much sooner?

I guess it's only fair to disclose I've pretty much taken the Anglo-Prussian-Turkish side in this upcoming war, but actually there is much that is beguiling about wishing the Napoleonic-south-Catholic German-Austrian side reasonably well--not so it costs the Anglo-Prussians or Turks anything major, but they are themselves an interesting and not so bad configuration. It's the Tsar I'd like to see take a long hard fall, but that's just my conviction that the Romanovs and the elite society they stood for was inherently rotten and might as well be blown away by some kind of radical populism or other.

But what's coming is a Great War, and I guess what I really want is for it not to come at all. Everyone's going to get hurt, I suppose.

 

[Thande]

Well I was just basing that take on political party distribution in the Kaiserreich on 1910s German election maps, doubtless it's an oversimplification. My point is that without Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden etc the Catholic-dominated Zentrum party will not be the major force in the politics of the NGC as it was the Kaiserreich. This changes the arithmetic of the Reichstag (or whatever it's called here) and makes the SPD more threatening to he established order than OTL. I might ask one of our German members for their opinion.

 

[wannis]

In the late 19th century OTL, the main industrial areas of Germany were Saxony (especially the area around Chemnitz), the Rineland,the Rheinpfalz (Rhine-Main area), Alsatia-Lorraine, Hesse, parts of Westphalia (Ruhr area), parts of Baden and Württemberg, of Silesia, of Nassau and of the Prussian province of Saxony. Except for the Rheinpfalz, Baden and Württemberg, they would be part of the NGF ITTL. Many areas in Germany that are today industrial powerhouses, especially in Bavaria, only got going after WWII, when the industrial areas in Eastern Germany were cut off by the iron curtain. An important question for the development of industry outside of the NGF ITTL is whether the Zollverein (Customs Union) would continue to function - as you can see here, IOTL most states of the later German Empire (including all the Southern states!) were already members before the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. Without the Zollverein, the industry in the Southern states would lose a big market and the question would be if A-H or France would be able and ready to take up the slack, or perhaps would see the Southern states as dumping ground for their own products and destroy the nascent industries there. I'd assume that Bismarck would keep the Zollverein going, in order to keep the Southern states sweet and to prepare their future integration into the German nation state.
On the Social Democrats - as Thande said, Saxony was a stronghold; the first two Social Democrat Reichstag deputies in 1871 came from Saxony, in 1874 6 of 9 came from Saxony, in 1877 7 of 12, and only in 1884 more SPD deputies came from elswhere, but Saxony still had the biggest block (5 of 24). Only in 1893 did Greater Berlin have the same number of SPD deputies as Saxony (both 7 out of 44).

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

One thing to keep in mind is that Han(n)over is also an independent entity in this timeline's NDB. Wikipedia isn't all that helpful on its nineteenth-century politics; apparently, King George V was very autocratic-minded, there was a legislature called the Ständeversammlung (Estates Assembly or Estates-General) that sometimes clashed with the king, the pre-1866 governments tended to be dominated by the conservative party, and Rudolf von Bennigsen was both a leader of the liberal opposition and a leader of the National Liberals during the NDB and Second Reich periods.

German Wikipedia gives some more detail about the Hanoverian legislature, which was apparently a two-house body in which the upper house contained lords spiritual and temporal while the lower house consisted of elected town and country representatives. (It seems a lot like the early nineteenth-century British parliament, which probably isn't surprising.) After 1848, representatives of industry, which I assume means industrialists rather than workers, were also represented in the upper house. It would seem that there was a property qualification for the franchise, at least in the country, but the article doesn't say much about voting rights (or else I'm missing something, which is entirely possible because my German sucks).

So it would seem that a surviving Hannover as part of the North German Confederation would have a relatively conservative internal political system and a dominant federal party which is allied with Bismarck's reformism. I wonder if, under the circumstances, Bismarck would use the National Liberals in Hannover to counterbalance the Social Democrats in Saxony, and whether this would be sufficient without the Zentrum. Also, as the socialists get stronger, there would presumably be an ideological split between the left and right of the National Liberals as in OTL, and the party would divide on measures like the anti-socialist laws.

Assuming that the National Liberals could play the role of the Zentrum, I could see things playing out much as in OTL. If not, then Bismarck might choose a dual strategy of stricter anti-socialist laws on the one hand, but more aggressive co-option of social democratic ideas on the other, resulting in a state that is more politically repressive but also has more progressive and comprehensive social welfare measures. Such a social-welfare state would go hand in hand with industrialization of north Germany and might drain off some of the socialists' support but I expect that, by the 1890s, the left's demands for a place in the political system would be hard to ignore.

In any event, I agree that Bismarck would continue the Zollverein, both as an institution that could lead to eventual union with the southern states and as a measure to increase the North German industries' markets. He would also, if anything, promote industrialization to an even greater degree than OTL, in order to facilitate military reforms and to compensate for the NDB's smaller size and population as compared to a united Germany. And this would, as Shevek23 guesses, accentuate labor politics.

Finally, as to the Great War: pace Shevek23, there will be no "good" or "evil" side (that will be one, among many, of the war's great tragedies) and there will be degrees of victory and loss. Also, in a conflict where the solutions to trench warfare will be at best partial, victory will depend as much on political conditions as military conditions: one of the key factors that will determine who loses will be whose political system breaks first, and even many of the winners will come out changed. Win or lose, Russia in 1900 will be a very different place from Russia in 1890, and the Tsar may very well take that fall.

Update most likely Thursday; in the meantime, I'll refer anyone who's interested to my Kingdom of Haiti stories (1, 2, thread).

 

[wannis]

Just a quick remark - Bismarck won't need to balance the Social Democrats in parliamentary terms; in his time IOTL, they were just a small group in the imperial diet, partially, because they were new, partially, because the diet over-represented rural areas to the detriment of the urban areas where the SPD was strong. As for the Prussian parliament, they were also only a small group, due to the three-class electoral system, which disadvantaged parties who were supported by the poor masses and favoured parties supported by the more wealthy. The "danger" of the Social Democrats consisted more in their influence on the workers and on their extra-parliamentary work for workers' rights, organising strikes, etc. As for the National liberals, that's exactly one of the groups Bismarck and his successors relied on. With Hannover continuing to exist, there will also be less of resentment - there probably won't be a "Welfian" particularist party. OTOH, Prussia will be somewhat less dominating.

 

[Shevek23]

Just a quick remark - Bismarck won't need to balance the Social Democrats in parliamentary terms; in his time IOTL, they were just a small group in the imperial diet, partially, because they were new, partially, because the diet over-represented rural areas to the detriment of the urban areas where the SPD was strong. As for the Prussian parliament, they were also only a small group, due to the three-class electoral system, which disadvantaged parties who were supported by the poor masses and favoured parties supported by the more wealthy. The "danger" of the Social Democrats consisted more in their influence on the workers and on their extra-parliamentary work for workers' rights, organising strikes, etc. As for the National liberals, that's exactly one of the groups Bismarck and his successors relied on. With Hannover continuing to exist, there will also be less of resentment - there probably won't be a "Welfian" particularist party. OTOH, Prussia will be somewhat less dominating.

I bolded the part where I would say "exactly!" On paper the far left is nothing yet. On the streets and in the factories--they exist.

Thank you for your very humbling lesson on Saxony's place in Germany's industrial development and associated politics. Would you say it is just as built-up as the western industrial areas?

Another thing to remember about the OTL Second Reich--the formally "Imperial" institutions, especially the Reichstag, were rather weak; the various local realms had a lot of powers, and Prussia being so vastly larger than even Bavaria and quite dwarfing the other realms, its institutions directly ran the vast majority of the country and indirectly, via both its influence on the nominally Imperial machinery and through sheer intimidation combined with capability, ran the other states too. (Count Von Zeppelin, for instance, was driven out of his military office in his native kingdom because he opposed the way the Prussian army was taking over.) So on paper, the Reichstag might have approached something like parliamentary democracy but what really mattered was the Prussian legislature, which was much more stacked against popular representation. Imperial institutions, like the administration of Alsace-Lorraine for example, were strong when Prussia needed or wanted them to be strong, but an inconvenient majority in the Reichstag could easily be bypassed if Prussia chose to. The Emperor also being King of Prussia, he could switch back and forth.

Here, there is no Empire as such, and I think this means the federal institutions are even weaker. The flip side is, the local realms have somewhat more meaningful autonomy, it won't be as easy for Prussian influence to get its way quite so automatically. Persuasion will be more important, and that's probably a good thing. Within the Federation Prussia is still the first among nominal equals by a very long road, the more so because the larger southern states are not in it.

I suspect the Federal institutions will grow in importance, because it is there that the persuasion will happen and deals will be worked out.

 

[wannis]

Thank you for your very humbling lesson on Saxony's place in Germany's industrial development and associated politics. Would you say it is just as built-up as the western industrial areas?.

You don't need to feel bad - even in (Western) Germany, many tend to forget about Saxony's role in industrialisation because it "vanished" behind the iron curtain and didn't get a place in the post-WWII reconstruction mythology as the Ruhr area did. From what I know, a difference between Saxony and areas like the Ruhrgebiet or Upper Silesia was that it was less about heavy industry and more about finished goods and engineering. Saxony was one of the centres of the German automotive industry before WWII.

I agreee with your assessment of the relative role of imperial and Prussian institutions. This is especially true for the first decades; later, there was a sentiment that "Prussia was the hegemon of Germany and then was swallowed by it", i.e. many members of the Prussian elites came to think of themselves as Germans first.

ITTL, as you said, the bigger Southern states aren't there as a counterweight; OTOH, Hannover is there and that takes quite a chunk out of Prussia's territory and population.

I suspect the Federal institutions will grow in importance, because it is there that the persuasion will happen and deals will be worked out.

I'd agree. Especially, if the NGF still has the goal to incorporate the Southern states, Bismarck and the Prussian leaders need to avoid giving the impression that the NGF is Prussia's plaything and allow the other states some serious participation in governing the Federation.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Here, there is no Empire as such, and I think this means the federal institutions are even weaker. The flip side is, the local realms have somewhat more meaningful autonomy, it won't be as easy for Prussian influence to get its way quite so automatically. Persuasion will be more important, and that's probably a good thing. Within the Federation Prussia is still the first among nominal equals by a very long road, the more so because the larger southern states are not in it.

I agreee with your assessment of the relative role of imperial and Prussian institutions. This is especially true for the first decades; later, there was a sentiment that "Prussia was the hegemon of Germany and then was swallowed by it", i.e. many members of the Prussian elites came to think of themselves as Germans first.

Hmmm. If the member states are relatively more important (which I agree they would be -- even though the German Empire's OTL constitution was the NDB constitution with the serial numbers filed off, symbolism matters), then would there be more pressure to reform the internal governing systems of the member states?

In OTL, Prussia had the three-class system right up to 1918. Saxony had a bicameral parliament with a House of Lords (Herrenhaus) as the upper chamber and a lower house elected under a property-qualified franchise. Hannover's government before annexation was similar to Saxony's, and would probably stay that way if it joined the NDB as a separate member state. The free cities (which are the only other states which matter a damn in terms of political and economic power) had municipal parliaments and universal manhood suffrage, but the mayors and city senates were indirectly elected.

Hamburg and Bremen would probably be acceptable to late-nineteenth-century democrats, but the others wouldn't. Would this timeline see widespread agitation to eliminate the three-class system (in Prussia) and property qualifications (in Hannover and Saxony), and to reduce the power of all three kingdoms' houses of lords? Note that while Bismarck would be able to respond directly to such agitation when it takes place in Prussia, he wouldn't be able to do so in Saxony or Hannover - and the death of King George V of Hannover, which occurred in 1878 OTL, would be a significant opportunity for democratization.

OTOH, Hannover is there and that takes quite a chunk out of Prussia's territory and population.

Especially, if the NGF still has the goal to incorporate the Southern states, Bismarck and the Prussian leaders need to avoid giving the impression that the NGF is Prussia's plaything and allow the other states some serious participation in governing the Federation.

Prussia would still outweigh all the others put together, albeit not by as much. Going by figures here, Prussia would have about 70 percent of the population of the NDB rather than 78 percent as in OTL. Hannover would be another Saxony-sized member state: big enough to have some clout, but nowhere near enough to challenge Prussia's position as boss.

On the other hand, given your reminder about Saxony's industrial strength, Saxony and Hannover would be able to punch above their weight economically, and the importance of the free cities for overseas trade and naval power might also help counterbalance Prussia. I expect that Prussia would be deliberately underrepresented in the Bundesrat as in OTL, making the consent of other member states necessary to pass federal legislation. And as you say, the need to avoid alienating the people of the southern states would make Prussia tread lightly.

I suspect the Federal institutions will grow in importance, because it is there that the persuasion will happen and deals will be worked out.

That, and because an industrializing country requires common institutions and economies of scale: railroads, canals, postal service, weights and measures. I expect there would be a movement to standardize contract and patent law, and to move more commercial matters to federal courts (the 1867 constitution didn't provide for such courts, but I bet they'd exist by the 1880s). And there would also be an increasing tendency to formulate a unified North German industrial policy, which would push economic decision-making toward the federal institutions. By the time of the Great War, I suspect the NDB would be an empire in all but name.

 

[joho6411]

I give my congratulations to you on hitting over 100,000 views.

Hey Jon, belated congrats on hitting 100,000 views,...sorry I'm so late. I hope that I can get to 100,000 views too. Joho