Malê Rising

[TFSmith121]

Humm; when was the Nicaraguan canal built?

The most recent world map is from 1930, and Africa has been mapped to 1955. Are there any volunteers to do a 1970 map? It's fine if you handle things like the Kingdom and Republic of Hawaii with annotations. If not, I'll update at least Africa at the end of this cycle.



The US built a canal across Nicaragua. There have been plans to build a competing one across Panama, but thus far, nobody's actually broken ground.

Humm; when was the Nicaraguan canal built?

My point being, if it was the US, and at any time when great power politics were being played, than the liklihood Hawaii doesn't end up under the Stars and Stripes seems - really - unlikely...

Central America, Hawaii, and Alaska provide (even today) an excellent buffer against any hostiles approaching the Pacific coast of the US, which was recognized pretty much throughout the Nineteenth Century. The section about the indepenent Hawaiian monarchy/republic prompted the question.

Again, there's more than enough oddities in the maleverse to explain almost anything, but simply from a geographic point of view, Hawaii is a pretty strategic place for the US.

Also, who ended up with Alaska? The US? The green is a little different.

As always, a good read.

Best,

 

[Al-numbers]

Humm; when was the Nicaraguan canal built?

My point being, if it was the US, and at any time when great power politics were being played, than the liklihood Hawaii doesn't end up under the Stars and Stripes seems - really - unlikely...

If I can remember, the king of Hawaii was a smarter man than OTL, and during the Great War both French and Britsh naval squadrons (whom were enemies at that point) had to honor a treaty protecting Hawaii from an American-backed coup. London and Paris weren't happy with what happened, but it ultimately led the way for the Pacific Treaty.

Then after the war, this man came along and got interested in the Pacific islands, making friends with the king and setting up business and religious links between the two nations. All in all, Hawaii had a more winding history than OTL.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

The update is on the previous page at post 6083, and Jord839's guest post is at 6074.

Wait, whatever happened to Charlie Razak during the Hawaiian Civil War? I know he's just a narrative character (okay, he's more than that. He and his mates were the windows in which we look into TTL's Hawaii) but something tells me he his job would put him right in the bullet's path during the fighting.

He was caught up in the fighting, but he survived. As of 1970, he's a sergeant in the Republic's national police. His wife is expecting a child.

Humm; when was the Nicaraguan canal built?

My point being, if it was the US, and at any time when great power politics were being played, than the liklihood Hawaii doesn't end up under the Stars and Stripes seems - really - unlikely...

American-backed filibusters made a play for Hawaii during the Great War, but were foiled by British and French sailors who were in port at the time. By the time the canal was built in the 1910s, the Pacific Treaty already guaranteed Hawaiian independence.

While I was writing this, sketchdoodle provided more detail.

The US is still influential in Hawaii - American trading companies are still there, the nobility has quite a bit of American blood, and the treaty gives the USN, along with other great-power navies, the right to anchor at Pearl - but annexation or even political hegemony is off the table.

The US does own some guano islands in the Pacific, and probably has a naval base at Johnston Atoll or someplace similar.

Also, who ended up with Alaska? The US? The green is a little different.

The US bought it from Russia at roughly the same time as OTL, and it gained statehood in 1947.

 

[TFSmith121]

Okay, thanks - just sort of jumped out at me as sort of

The update is on the previous page at post 6083, and Jord839's guest post is at 6074.



He was caught up in the fighting, but he survived. As of 1970, he's a sergeant in the Republic's national police.



American-backed filibusters made a play for Hawaii during the Great War, but were foiled by British and French sailors who were in port at the time. By the time the canal was built in the 1910s, the Pacific Treaty already guaranteed Hawaiian independence. The US is still influential - American trading companies are still there, the nobility has quite a bit of American blood, and the treaty gives the USN, along with other great-power navies, the right to anchor at Pearl - but annexation or even political hegemony is off the table.

The US does own some guano islands in the Pacific, and probably has a naval base at Johnston Atoll or someplace similar.



The US bought it from Russia at roughly the same time as OTL, and it gained statehood in 1947.

Okay, thanks - just sort of jumped out at me as sort of unexpected...various and sundry were sniffing around Hawaii from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, obviously. It's just too important a place - in an era defined by power politics - to be ignored.

Best,

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Okay, thanks - just sort of jumped out at me as sort of unexpected...various and sundry were sniffing around Hawaii from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, obviously. It's just too important a place - in an era defined by power politics - to be ignored.

It certainly was too important a place to be ignored, which is why the great powers decided to open it to exploitation by everyone rather than risk fighting another war over it. The Pacific Treaty was intended more as a means of making Hawaii and other Pacific islands into open economic colonies rather than guaranteeing their true independence, but as the imperial era passed away and as the construction of the treaty fell to the Court of Arbitration, it ended up doing more than its signatories had planned.

 

[birdboy2000]

When did El Salvador fall? Not sure if foreshadowing or I just can't remember/find that post.

 

[Workable Goblin]

It certainly was too important a place to be ignored, which is why the great powers decided to open it to exploitation by everyone rather than risk fighting another war over it. The Pacific Treaty was intended more as a means of making Hawaii and other Pacific islands into open economic colonies rather than guaranteeing their true independence, but as the imperial era passed away and as the construction of the treaty fell to the Court of Arbitration, it ended up doing more than its signatories had planned.

I'm not sure that it would be symmetrically important, though, now that I think about it. Controlling or dominating Hawaii is really important for the United States, because it's one of the few anchorages anywhere close to the West Coast, but for anyone else? Not as much. Sure, they will have economic interests there, but enough to risk angering the United States and endangering their interests there?

 

[Al-numbers]

I'm not sure that it would be symmetrically important, though, now that I think about it. Controlling or dominating Hawaii is really important for the United States, because it's one of the few anchorages anywhere close to the West Coast, but for anyone else? Not as much. Sure, they will have economic interests there, but enough to risk angering the United States and endangering their interests there?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I always thought that Hawaii would make a good stop-over point for the Pacific Rim countries. If a Johorean, Vietnamese, Chinese or Japanese national wants to expand his (or her) economic interests to the West Coast, Hawaii would make a good stop-over point in their launch to economic greatness. Besides that, it's good to have a place where different Powers (or aspiring ones) could meet and talk; a place that's neutral, roughly equidistant from their homelands, and safe enough to establish a foothold without stepping on too much toes.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

When did El Salvador fall? Not sure if foreshadowing or I just can't remember/find that post.

It's foreshadowing. When Azander12 left El Salvador in 1955, the regime was under siege and the country was on the verge of revolution. I'm assuming the fall occurred sometime between 1955 and 1970, probably toward the earlier end of that range; either I or azander12 will fill in some details later.

I'm not sure that it would be symmetrically important, though, now that I think about it. Controlling or dominating Hawaii is really important for the United States, because it's one of the few anchorages anywhere close to the West Coast, but for anyone else? Not as much. Sure, they will have economic interests there, but enough to risk angering the United States and endangering their interests there?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I always thought that Hawaii would make a good stop-over point for the Pacific Rim countries. If a Johorean, Vietnamese, Chinese or Japanese national wants to expand his (or her) economic interests to the West Coast, Hawaii would make a good stop-over point in their launch to economic greatness. Besides that, it's good to have a place where different Powers (or aspiring ones) could meet and talk; a place that's neutral, roughly equidistant from their homelands, and safe enough to establish a foothold without stepping on too much toes.

That, and the United States was embarrassed by the failure of the unsanctioned coup attempt, so it wasn't in much position to ask for more than it got. The Pacific Treaty protected existing American interests, left the door open for new ones and allowed naval anchorage, so the US didn't lose too much out of the deal, and it wasn't in the mood to oppose all the other great powers.

(Also, Hawaii being as it is has been part of the timeline for 75 years now and it's led to some pretty good storytelling, so I'm not going to relitigate the issue now. My reasons are sufficient unto me. )

 

[TFSmith121]

Okay, that's fine - just struck me as a question.

It certainly was too important a place to be ignored, which is why the great powers decided to open it to exploitation by everyone rather than risk fighting another war over it. The Pacific Treaty was intended more as a means of making Hawaii and other Pacific islands into open economic colonies rather than guaranteeing their true independence, but as the imperial era passed away and as the construction of the treaty fell to the Court of Arbitration, it ended up doing more than its signatories had planned.

Okay, that's fine - just struck me as a question.

As always, nice work.

Best,

 

[iddt3]

I wonder what the economic cost of all the Neo-Feudalism and post Westphalianism is? A large part of the reason for Nationstates formation was striping away the redundent layers of government and internal tariffs; It's much easier to trade from Paris to Berlin if you only move through one border on the way there, rather than 14. The shared sovereignty in many places, duplicated borders and heavy regionalism sort of inevitably lends itself to duplication of effort and bureaucratic bloat. Add in the survival of numerous minority languages and local customary law, and I suspect some aspects of international trade will end up an order of magnitude more complicated than OTL.

In a strange way this might prove to benefit the US and other mostly Westphalian large polities; they have large, relatively uniform internal markets with less regulation (even if they're much more regulated than OTL) which would tend to produce a leaner, meaner business culture than many of it's would be competitors on the world market. There is less globalism, and more specialization in industries, the complexities of working in a given region are higher, so it makes sense for most industries to focus on a specific region for competitive advantage, rather than expanding to as many regions as possible. In this specialization they're probably supported by sympathetic local governments who are more willing to intervene in the economy to support local companies. However, as we see OTL, that tends to lead to a holding action until the larger international market is so much stronger that the local one is suddenly and dramatically swamped. The "local" markets in TTL are in many cases quite a bit larger than OTL due to all the regional federations and what not popping up, but that will only take things so far.

At some point in TTL automation will start hitting, and unlike OTL there is no cheap labor to compete with it and slow it down via outsourcing. Instead of deindustrialization and automation in the developed world and industrialization in the developing world, you'll have sudden jumps, world wide, when individual industries become more cost effective to automate and thence start shedding jobs en masse, first locally, than more dramatically internationally as they become able to drastically undercut the prices of said industry in areas that did not automate. Like OTL I suspect the leaders in this process will be the places which have historically had high labor costs and relatively open markets which promoted internal competition, and that have lots of free capital to invest, so the US, as in OTL, but also the likes Britain and Germany. The European states are in a much better position in TTL, retaining large trade areas and having lots of capital sitting around. When automation becomes feasible, the place to invest in it is where the trained labor and infrastructure is best, the laws the most familiar, which will in most cases be the European homelands.

The big crisis of the Male world might not be a war, but economics and culture. Most of the world has settled on a humane economy which values local prosperity and dignity, and industrialization has spread far outside of it's European heartland. However, Capital I suspect is rather less evenly distributed, with most international investment and liquid capital still moving through the US and Europe, as there has been only a single, less disruptive world war to drain the accumulated wealth of being first on the industrialization track. Everyone is wealth-ier but Europe is wealth-iest. Technology marches on, and come the last twenty years of the twentieth century, I expect the current consensus to start to come under heavy pressure as it becomes necessary to pour massive amounts of capital into modernizing industries that in turn will generate massive unemployment. In Europe and America there are nonstate actors with the money to do this, and a large, and diversified enough economy that, especially at first, can absorb the newly unemployed. In much of the rest of the world, with it's specialized local economies, that will not be the case.

 

[Libertad]

For me, what I see is that many of these post-Westphalian entities are actually built to ease problems on international trade and creation of larger internal markets that would be far easier to regulate by a single set of bodies covering a larger area rather than by so many covering smaller areas on their own; creating the leaner and meaner business culture that you are talking about. Euro-American domination was way less, so there's more diversity and there has to be something that can create the connections and ease things up. The post-Westphalianism of TTL for me was built upon the more mature and organic social foundations less dependent on colonialism as seen IOTL that lead to the creation of so many states and proto-state structures throughout the world. To make things less complicated; you build institutions to harmonize things. I don't see redundancy and duplications of effort just because you see a Republic of Hawaii and a Kingdom of Hawaii co-existing together. As said in the last update; the Republic has its own jurisdiction and functions, the Kingdom has its own too. They don't duplicate each other's efforts, they complement each other. So I see no redundancy. Rather than so many bodies administering the Nile River and conflicting with each other; you only see a single set of bodies. Just because there are similar foreign offices for the Indian Republic, Madras, Hyderabad and then there's another foreign office for the entire AIDU doesn't mean that there are duplications of the same functions since eventually, as I see it, the AIDU would federalize itself more and those foreign offices would become more or like branches of the AIDU foreign office itself. I think it's too early making conclusions about this post-Westphalianism when it's not even on its final mature form. It's still the 1955-1970 period.

I also don't see "specialized local economies" around, or to last long, if they're still around in some places like Russia, etc. I see a great co-existence of democratic political diversity and international economic integration. I actually see the dismantlement of these things as globalization ITTL further moves on and the entire world integrates. The latest Oceania update is a testament to that. Non-state actors like multinationals are entering places that they wouldn't be around at this point in time IOTL and making investments. Business have a far larger influence ITTL, interestingly, than IOTL without the Cold War but its excesses was also tamed for good far earlier than OTL, since there wouldn't be much stigma on introduction of mature regulatory bodies on international capital as "communism" or "socialism". The regional federations were formed to ease business transactions between so many actors in a place and these federations are even interacting with each other already as I'm seeing.

The greater complexity of business law too internationally I think was bearable for the companies because of the greater cultural diversity present even in the developed lands of Europe and North America. And as the world moves to the 21st century, I don't think this complexity would continue. Again, we are still far away from totally judging post-Westphalianism since its final, mature form is still far away.

 

[Gorro Rubio]

I love how you handled the situation of Hawaii. The Kingdom-Republic may seem odd for us, but fits comfortably in the Maléverse.
Two questions:
Is Liechtenstein still a thing?
Are you going to visit the former Spanish colonies (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Fernando Poó and Río Muni) soon?

 

[Julius Vogel]

Fair enough; just seemed "awfully" Irish on first read ... and I see the Maori equivalents for north and south island(s) have been posted.

Best,

I've just caught up on the timeline after a week or two off, anyway, the reason why it feels so Irish is that was precisely the point! The man who set the names, William Hobson, did so in honour of Ireland, having being born in Ireland. He started off with New Leinster (Stewart Island), New Munster (South Island) and New Ulster (North Island) and some years later, this was replaced by the latter two, as the former is much smaller and lightly populated, so was subsumed into the South Island/Munster province.

On the wider point, I think it is absolutely up in the air as to what the naming of the islands would be in the 20th century. It does seem that no one was particularly attached to the Irish names mid 19th century, when they were abolished, so I would find it hard to believe anyone would be a century later. It seems the names preferred were the North Island, South Island/Main Island or the Mainland and Stewart Island. Provincial identity became more important IOTL and I would imagine it would here too initially.

Lots of things have happened too in this timeline, like say the Imperial Party and the war with India, which would rather have sullied the British brand. Maori are also far more assertive too mid century than they were OTL.

That being said, I would think it highly unlikely that a Maori name would be chosen for each island’s principal name, as opposed to an alternative official name as per OTL. A lot of people, to this day in NZ get rather pissy about Maori place names, either regarding the spelling (The infamous Wanganui H (Whanganui!) is the reoccurring example) or proposed changes (Mt Egmont/Mt Taranaki being one). That being said, I think it would have been possible to give /keep Maori labels if it had been official policy in the 1850s. It is the act of changing from English to Maori that would be problematic.

I would say, boring as it may sound, that the two islands would likely have their OTL names as states. The biggest issue being whether or not they be known as “The South Island” or simply “South Island”. In common use, the former is accepted, the latter is not, despite the latter being the orthodox rule in NZ English.

Either that or you go off on a frolic and commission new names entirely by way of public submission and then a referendum, sort of how such issues are dealt with now in NZ.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Okay, that's fine - just struck me as a question.

No problem - I always like to have my assumptions challenged. I've changed my mind plenty of times as a result of reader comments, just not on this.

I wonder what the economic cost of all the Neo-Feudalism and post Westphalianism is? A large part of the reason for Nationstates formation was striping away the redundent layers of government and internal tariffs; It's much easier to trade from Paris to Berlin if you only move through one border on the way there, rather than 14. The shared sovereignty in many places, duplicated borders and heavy regionalism sort of inevitably lends itself to duplication of effort and bureaucratic bloat. Add in the survival of numerous minority languages and local customary law, and I suspect some aspects of international trade will end up an order of magnitude more complicated than OTL.

For me, what I see is that many of these post-Westphalian entities are actually built to ease problems on international trade and creation of larger internal markets that would be far easier to regulate by a single set of bodies covering a larger area rather than by so many covering smaller areas on their own; creating the leaner and meaner business culture that you are talking about. Euro-American domination was way less, so there's more diversity and there has to be something that can create the connections and ease things up. The post-Westphalianism of TTL for me was built upon the more mature and organic social foundations less dependent on colonialism as seen IOTL that lead to the creation of so many states and proto-state structures throughout the world. To make things less complicated; you build institutions to harmonize things. I don't see redundancy and duplications of effort just because you see a Republic of Hawaii and a Kingdom of Hawaii co-existing together. As said in the last update; the Republic has its own jurisdiction and functions, the Kingdom has its own too. They don't duplicate each other's efforts, they complement each other. So I see no redundancy. Rather than so many bodies administering the Nile River and conflicting with each other; you only see a single set of bodies. Just because there are similar foreign offices for the Indian Republic, Madras, Hyderabad and then there's another foreign office for the entire AIDU doesn't mean that there are duplications of the same functions since eventually, as I see it, the AIDU would federalize itself more and those foreign offices would become more or like branches of the AIDU foreign office itself.

I'll agree with Libertad regarding the complexity of international trade. Remember that TTL's post-Westphalianism involves not only fragmentation of (some) states but the growth of international institutions above and alongside the states, many of which include customs or currency unions. Tariff barriers are coming down, not going back up. A comparison might be to the "Europe of the Regions" concept taken to what IOTL would be an extreme: many autonomous and overlapping regions, but all within the economic and tariff umbrella created by the union.

In an ideal world, I'd also agree with him on administrative complexity, but this isn't an ideal world. Theoretically, every entity should have its own unique jurisdiction, thus preventing duplication of effort, but such sharp lines can rarely be drawn in the real world. Even with the best of intent, there will be some duplication of functions as well as conflicting jurisdictions that have to be sorted out in court, and politics will ensure that intentions aren't always the best (for instance, in your example of the AIDU, both the union and its members will probably see turf protection as important). This occurs within Westphalian states too - Long Island, for instance, has a famously complicated map of municipalities and specialized water, fire, library, school and sewer districts, many of which overlap, and the jurisdictional rivalry between the NYPD and Federal law enforcement agencies is legendary - but there will be more of it in a post-Westphalian world. Post-Westphalian administration may be more efficient in some cases, as with the Nile watershed, but it will be less efficient in many others, and it will probably create a net drag on the economy.

I won't say much now about longer-term developments, both because (as Libertad says) we haven't yet seen post-Westphalianism in its mature form and because I still don't know what some of those developments will be. As I've argued before, though, part of the reason why the changing economy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has caused so much dislocation is that (a) capital is far more mobile than labor, allowing multinational companies to chase low-wage workers while the workers are much less free to cross borders in search of higher wages; and (b) multinational companies operate on a scale where there is little if any effective regulation. ITTL, both problems are alleviated somewhat, but not completely, and I'd expect that both will become matters of public debate during the shift to automated industries and an information economy. There will be some people arguing for the re-establishment of borders to capital flow, labor mobility or both, and others supporting greater integration and uniform commercial law (the latter of which has happened to a considerable extent IOTL) so that international capital can be regulated. Along the way, there will be obvious issues of regulatory capture and economic nationalism.

I don't necessarily think that the economic shift will lead to a capital shortage in the developing world, because (a) much of that world is connected by treaty to developed economies; (b) much of it has had half a century or even a full century to develop local capital; and (c) there's already a foundation of multinational investment to build on. I agree that Europe and the US would still have a built-in advantage, and the post-colonial countries with a shorter head start will suffer most, but by this time there's enough of a headwind of investment in the developing world that it wouldn't dry up entirely.

Anyway, we'll see much of this play out in the final cycle and the narrative epilogues.

Two questions:
Is Liechtenstein still a thing?
Are you going to visit the former Spanish colonies (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Fernando Poó and Río Muni) soon?

Liechtenstein is still independent - nobody bothered absorbing it after the Great War.

I'll visit the Philippines, Fernando Po and Rio Muni in this cycle (the Philippines will actually feature in the next update), and probably Puerto Rico and Cuba in the next.

On the wider point, I think it is absolutely up in the air as to what the naming of the islands would be in the 20th century. It does seem that no one was particularly attached to the Irish names mid 19th century, when they were abolished, so I would find it hard to believe anyone would be a century later. It seems the names preferred were the North Island, South Island/Main Island or the Mainland and Stewart Island. Provincial identity became more important IOTL and I would imagine it would here too initially. [...]

That being said, I would think it highly unlikely that a Maori name would be chosen for each island’s principal name, as opposed to an alternative official name as per OTL... I would say, boring as it may sound, that the two islands would likely have their OTL names as states. The biggest issue being whether or not they be known as “The South Island” or simply “South Island”. In common use, the former is accepted, the latter is not, despite the latter being the orthodox rule in NZ English.

So it would be the States of North Island and South Island ("State of The South Island" would be awkward, although it might be referred to colloquially as "The South Island"). I guess they'd be distinct enough from the Northern Territory and South Australia to work, although people might joke about the number of Australasian states with directional names. And then, somewhere between 1970 and 2000 or so, the two states might also adopt co-official Maori names. I'll defer to you on that.

 

[azander12]

It's foreshadowing. When Azander12 left El Salvador in 1955, the regime was under siege and the country was on the verge of revolution. I'm assuming the fall occurred sometime between 1955 and 1970, probably toward the earlier end of that range; either I or azander12 will fill in some details later.

I'll fill in the details on Central America (and perhaps the Roma) at some point; JE, let me know when you'd like a piece on that.

In summary on Central America though, the regime faced a similar revolt to Natal, with peasant rebels led by messianic Christian preachers and Fraternalist organizers from Honduras. The military wasn't able to contain the rebellion, and after some pretty exceptional bloodshed (probably killing something like 25% of the country's population), the regime fell. I'd imagine that the fallen elite would face outright attempted extermination, and I wouldn't rule out an evangelical Christian version of ISIS forming in the wreckage of the country. El Salvador might in fact be the location where the Consistory and International Court attempt militarized peacekeeping. In the long run, I'd imagine that El Salvador ends up as an extremely decentralized federation of Christian statelets with their own denominations, with some post-Westphalian influence from the Catholic and Mormon Churches in their respective cantons. It'll be Fraternalism taken to its logical end.

 

[Julius Vogel]

So it would be the States of North Island and South Island ("State of The South Island" would be awkward, although it might be referred to colloquially as "The South Island"). I guess they'd be distinct enough from the Northern Territory and South Australia to work, although people might joke about the number of Australasian states with directional names. And then, somewhere between 1970 and 2000 or so, the two states might also adopt co-official Maori names. I'll defer to you on that.

From memory, Australians don't really use the "state of XX" nomenclature, so perhaps it would not sound that awkward. I don't think I've ever heard any Australian say anything along the lines of "I'm from the state of Texas".

I suspect no one would really ever need to say "The State of the South Island", they would either say simply "the South Island", or the "state government of the South Island".

Another solution would be to handwave the word 'state' in Australia entirely and just use 'province', like OTL New Zealand or Canada. South Island/The South Island Province doesn't sound quite as silly!

The other solution is to, somehow, make it possible to give the islands Maori names earlier on and protect that status either as sole or alternative name.

 

[TFSmith121]

Interesting ... how did "New Ireland" for the former German

I've just caught up on the timeline after a week or two off, anyway, the reason why it feels so Irish is that was precisely the point! The man who set the names, William Hobson, did so in honour of Ireland, having being born in Ireland. He started off with New Leinster (Stewart Island), New Munster (South Island) and New Ulster (North Island) and some years later, this was replaced by the latter two, as the former is much smaller and lightly populated, so was subsumed into the South Island/Munster province.

Interesting ... how did "New Ireland" for the former German colony get into the mix? Consolation prize, or just to be expected alongside New Britain?

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

No problem

No problem - I always like to have my assumptions challenged. I've changed my mind plenty of times as a result of reader comments, just not on this. .

No problem...

Best,

 

[iddt3]

No problem - I always like to have my assumptions challenged. I've changed my mind plenty of times as a result of reader comments, just not on this.





I'll agree with Libertad regarding the complexity of international trade. Remember that TTL's post-Westphalianism involves not only fragmentation of (some) states but the growth of international institutions above and alongside the states, many of which include customs or currency unions. Tariff barriers are coming down, not going back up. A comparison might be to the "Europe of the Regions" concept taken to what IOTL would be an extreme: many autonomous and overlapping regions, but all within the economic and tariff umbrella created by the union.

In an ideal world, I'd also agree with him on administrative complexity, but this isn't an ideal world. Theoretically, every entity should have its own unique jurisdiction, thus preventing duplication of effort, but such sharp lines can rarely be drawn in the real world. Even with the best of intent, there will be some duplication of functions as well as conflicting jurisdictions that have to be sorted out in court, and politics will ensure that intentions aren't always the best (for instance, in your example of the AIDU, both the union and its members will probably see turf protection as important). This occurs within Westphalian states too - Long Island, for instance, has a famously complicated map of municipalities and specialized water, fire, library, school and sewer districts, many of which overlap, and the jurisdictional rivalry between the NYPD and Federal law enforcement agencies is legendary - but there will be more of it in a post-Westphalian world. Post-Westphalian administration may be more efficient in some cases, as with the Nile watershed, but it will be less efficient in many others, and it will probably create a net drag on the economy.

I won't say much now about longer-term developments, both because (as Libertad says) we haven't yet seen post-Westphalianism in its mature form and because I still don't know what some of those developments will be. As I've argued before, though, part of the reason why the changing economy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has caused so much dislocation is that (a) capital is far more mobile than labor, allowing multinational companies to chase low-wage workers while the workers are much less free to cross borders in search of higher wages; and (b) multinational companies operate on a scale where there is little if any effective regulation. ITTL, both problems are alleviated somewhat, but not completely, and I'd expect that both will become matters of public debate during the shift to automated industries and an information economy. There will be some people arguing for the re-establishment of borders to capital flow, labor mobility or both, and others supporting greater integration and uniform commercial law (the latter of which has happened to a considerable extent IOTL) so that international capital can be regulated. Along the way, there will be obvious issues of regulatory capture and economic nationalism.

I don't necessarily think that the economic shift will lead to a capital shortage in the developing world, because (a) much of that world is connected by treaty to developed economies; (b) much of it has had half a century or even a full century to develop local capital; and (c) there's already a foundation of multinational investment to build on. I agree that Europe and the US would still have a built-in advantage, and the post-colonial countries with a shorter head start will suffer most, but by this time there's enough of a headwind of investment in the developing world that it wouldn't dry up entirely.

Anyway, we'll see much of this play out in the final cycle and the narrative epilogues.



Liechtenstein is still independent - nobody bothered absorbing it after the Great War.

I'll visit the Philippines, Fernando Po and Rio Muni in this cycle (the Philippines will actually feature in the next update), and probably Puerto Rico and Cuba in the next.



So it would be the States of North Island and South Island ("State of The South Island" would be awkward, although it might be referred to colloquially as "The South Island"). I guess they'd be distinct enough from the Northern Territory and South Australia to work, although people might joke about the number of Australasian states with directional names. And then, somewhere between 1970 and 2000 or so, the two states might also adopt co-official Maori names. I'll defer to you on that.

Fair enough. I think the world of Male is certainly better than ours in many ways, and very much more humane, but I expect that in some areas they'll encounter problems we never did. Also, I might have missed it, but most of the new international organizations seem very much more focused on politics and culture than trade; I see lots of free trade areas popping up, but they certainly don't all appear to be created equal, and my impression was that they were largely mutually exclusive, outside of a few special cases which prosper.

My concern is that the majority of the global economy has slipped into a comfortable, heavily invested and well explored rut of Industrial prosperity, with much of said prosperity insulated from market shocks by interventionist governments/unions. So if the global economy gets a shock a la the 70s oil crisis/stagflation that resists amelioration by the existing systems while sectors of the global economy automate, you might have a nasty domino effect as local industries are insulated from outside competition long enough so that when that competition reaches a critical mass they're suddenly at risk of being out competed on their home turf. Perhaps that crisis will be the one that cements internationalism and the post-Westphalian world, but all it takes is one large enough region playing with too unfettered capitalism to risk upsetting the whole apple cart.