Malê Rising

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Thanks, y'all.

Great update Jonathan! I've loved Belloism since your first installment on it, and it's a joy to see it affecting the world at large. This timeline is turning out to be quite unique! Thanks so much for putting so much work into it!

Belloism seems to have spread very widely very quickly, I suppose having its leader established in Mecca early preaching to pilgrims helped with that...

Mecca was a good central point for propagation of Belloist doctrines, which is how the Bedouins learned of it. Belloism was also helped to spread by the patronage of influential people - Riyad Pasha in Egypt and the Sultan in Bornu. In the Fulani states, the people are already used to one version of revolutionary Islam - Abacarism - and are receptive to combining it with others, although the "Abacarist Belloism" that some of them adopt will be more Abacarist than Belloist.

In any event, Hnau, I believe I've mentioned that Belloism will ultimately be the more widespread of the two - Abacarism has the answers to the great political questions, and will inspire people to seek freedom and fight oppression, but Belloism provides a way of living and praying day to day. Belloist ideas will cross over to the non-Muslim world in much the same way as Buddhism and other "Eastern philosophies" in OTL, and there will be many people throughout West Africa who are Abacarist in their politics and doctrine but Belloist in their lifestyle.

The only real thing I'm wondering about is Moldavia, Serbia and Wallachia; unlike the rest of Rumelia, they were'nt full parts of the Empire, but rather Tributary States, so I'm not really sure why they'd even be represented in the Ottoman Parliament anymore than say the Marshall Islands would've been represented in the U.S. Congress.

Fair point - Serbia, Romania and Montenegro weren't represented in the Ottoman parliament OTL, and they'd probably see participating in this one as compromising their semi-independent status. Maybe, given that this timeline's Ottoman parliament is somewhat more powerful than OTL's, the Serbs and Romanians (and Montenegrins) elected delegates who serve essentially as observers and ambassadors rather than actual members.

One more thing I should mention is that, unlike OTL, the Ottoman parliamentary deputies are elected from strictly geographic districts rather than by millet - i.e., there are no separate representatives for Lebanese Christians and Lebanese Muslims, although there are a couple of constituencies where Christians are in the majority. I'm assuming that this would lead the Lebanese Christians to participate in the election, unlike OTL, in order to prevent "their" seats from being taken by Muslim candidates. Likewise with Crete, although the Orthodox Cretans were nationalist enough that they might still boycott the election.

Anyway, we're getting to a critical point for the Ottomans, so I'd like to throw out the following for discussion:

Thus far, I've been going on the assumption that conflict with Russia can be deferred into the 1890s. The idea is that the liberal government will grant autonomy to the Christian-majority sanjaks of Bulgaria and, after winning the Aceh war, spend some political capital by letting the Serbs and Romanians go; also, the modernization of the tax system will include the abolition of different tax rates for Muslim and Christian millets. Thus, no uprisings in Herzegovina and Bulgaria and no chain reaction leading to the Russo-Turkish War, although tensions between Russia and the Ottoman Empire would gradually escalate over the status of the OE's remaining European territories.

The thing is, I'm not sure the geography and politics are right.

The Ottomans could certainly let Serbia and Romania go - for all intents and purposes, they were gone anyway - but they couldn't do the same for Thrace and Macedonia without losing their corridor to Albania. What's more, they couldn't even give these territories autonomy. It's one thing to create a special status for the Bulgarians, who wouldn't want to join a third country, but if the Thracedonians are given a similar status, they'd immediately start to create facts on the ground in preparation for enosis. Also, these territories had substantial Muslim minorities (I believe some sanjaks even had Muslim pluralities or majorities) who the Ottoman state couldn't simply abandon.

Bosnia, likewise: there's a substantial Serb population there, and the outgoing Serb state will want to expand to include the Bosnian Serbs, but the Ottomans won't want to give up such a rich province with a large Muslim population.

So I'm not sure coming to terms with the Serbs, Romanians and Bulgarians would solve the OE's Balkan problems even temporarily. Instead, what might happen is that the newly-independent Serbs show their gratitude by fomenting rebellion among their coethnics in Bosnia, and the Thracedonians, who are enraged that they're not getting the same deal as the Bulgars, rise up in rebellion, leading to pogroms against the local Muslims, massive retaliation by the Ottoman army, and other nasty 19th-century stuff. If the Russians are looking for a fight, that might draw them in - granted, the Thracedonians aren't Slavs, but Russia saw itself as the protector of the Orthodox Greeks too, and they might see a chance to grab Bulgaria into the bargain.

So is there any way to avoid war with Russia without the Ottomans totally abasing themselves, or is it pretty much bound to happen? If so, it should be fairly easy to engineer a Turkish win given that Hussein Avni Pasha will still be in the picture. That would have some interesting effects on the domestic balance of political power, but who ever said the Ottomans' road to modernization would be a smooth one?

Also, what exactly is anachoresis, a search of Wiktionary and Wikipedia did'nt bring-up anything except some species of Butterflys.

Peasants fleeing their fields during Ptolemaic times when taxes were too high. (The same term was also used, later, for a religious hermit's withdrawal from the world.)

 

[God-Eater of the Marshes]

Yikes! This TL has certainly progressed while I've been away. I've more or less caught up with it now (probably need to re-read some things) and I must say: this is great. I constantly admire your attention to detail, especially in a field of history not often researched. Kudos dude, keep it coming.

 

[Iori]

Anyway, we're getting to a critical point for the Ottomans, so I'd like to throw out the following for discussion:
-snip]

This thread, and principally the map within it might be of use to you for development here-on out.

I don't remember if it's been posted here before or not, but I figure better safe than sorry.

Peasants fleeing their fields during Ptolemaic times when taxes were too high. (The same term was also used, later, for a religious hermit's withdrawal from the world.)

Ah, ok, you learn something new every week.

 

[Neoteros]

This is probably the best AH i ever followed here.
By the way, Jon, you seem to know more about Africa and Islam than all the other people here put together, are you from there?

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

This thread, and principally the map within it might be of use to you for development here-on out.

I don't remember if it's been posted here before or not, but I figure better safe than sorry.

Thanks. I'd been looking for that map - Ridwan Asher posted a link to it here before, but I'd lost track of where.

Anyway, it looks like the Thracedonian problem is solvable, at least in the short term. Thrace has a Muslim plurality, and the area around Skopje would be included in the Bulgarian autonomous area. On the other hand, that Bulgar-plurality sanjak next to Salonika and the one centered on Monastir would probably be left out of the autonomous region, so that the Ottomans won't lose their land corridor if the Bulgarians gain independence later.

The Greeks will be harder. It may be possible to placate them, at least for the time being, by selling Greece the Aegean islands (subject to permanent Ottoman naval basing rights) and the heavily Greek areas around Ioannina. The problem there, aside from the domestic political fallout, is that Ioannina has a significant Muslim minority (although most of it is concentrated up north), and any cession of those lands to Greece would have to involve guarantees that the Muslims won't be molested and that their civic rights will be respected. I'm not sure that would be doable in the 1870s - even if the Greek government agrees, the people on the ground might not, and a pogrom would mean war. Also, the Greeks won't be content with just Larissa and Ioannina, and a purchase might only whet their appetites - assuming, of course, that they could afford the asking price.

And the Serbs will still want Bosnia, as will the Austrians.

Hmmm, maybe a war in the 1870s is unavoidable - if the Ottomans win, they'll be able to draw the borders and unload the unwanted territories on their own terms, whereas giving up Ionia without a fight would only make them look weak. And an Ottoman-dictated postwar settlement, even one where Greece gets a few new provinces in return for an indemnity, won't leave anyone very happy, setting up the subsequent conflict with Russia (over pan-Slavic and Greek aspirations) and Austria (over Bosnia).

Any chance of getting an independent, or at least autonomous, buffer city-state or free port at Salonika? The Ottomans might see a mostly-Jewish free city as a way to keep some control over traffic to the region. But it's probably a stretch.

In any event, since the demographic trends favor the Muslims, any Ottoman Empire that can hang onto the Balkan corridor in the short term should be able to keep it over the long term. I doubt the situation would be a very comfortable one, though, unless there's some solution to Balkan nationalism. We've got a while to figure that one out.

Yikes! This TL has certainly progressed while I've been away. I've more or less caught up with it now (probably need to re-read some things) and I must say: this is great. I constantly admire your attention to detail, especially in a field of history not often researched. Kudos dude, keep it coming.

By the way, Jon, you seem to know more about Africa and Islam than all the other people here put together, are you from there?

Thanks to both of you!

Neoteros: it's nice of you to say so, but there are several Muslims on this board who know much more about Islam than I do. I'm not from Africa, although I've been there a few times and have many West African colleagues - I've just had a fascination with it for more than 20 years as well as some scholarly and professional interest.

I definitely think Africa deserves more attention (both here and elsewhere), so keep watching this space.

 

[Iserlohn]

Any chance of getting an independent, or at least autonomous, buffer city-state or free port at Salonika? The Ottomans might see a mostly-Jewish free city as a way to keep some control over traffic to the region. But it's probably a stretch.

When Danzig could become like that during the Napoleonic Wars, then just follow the "rule of cool" once. I would even have a flag ready

Also in regards to the Franco-Prussian War: Fascinating, North Germany should also be weakened economically by this, since the Gründerzeit is essentially butterflied away with the missing French reperations and the new concessions to France.

 

[wannis]

On the Ottomans and the Balkans - I don't think that, without losing a war or the headache of a serious uprising, even a reformist government could survive being seen as giving away large swathes of territory. It might be possible to recognise that Ottoman souzerainty in areas like Serbia or Romania was only nominal anyway and grant them sovereignty (maybe as part of a deal on some other matter), but e.g. giving the Aegean islands or Thessaly to Greece without getting anything in return or being forced? That looks like political suicide to me. Now, if that would be (say) two-three generations down the line, in the context of a democratic Ottoman Empire an attitude of "if you don't want to belong to us, then go your own way" would be thinkable and we could get a parallel to the more-or less voluntary dissolution of the European colonial empires or to the granting of dominisonship to the British settler colonies. But I think it's too early for that in the 1870s. If there is no Russian-Turkish war, I'd assume that the reformist government may go for more participation and devolution, but I wouldn't bet that this would satisfy the Balkan nationalists, who still would be instigated and sponsored by Russia and the other European powers. If there's a war and it goes well for the OE, the nationalistic pressure might be decreased in two ways - 1) less people will see the OE as a sinking ship, both on the Balkans (so they will engage more in its nascent democratic institutons) and outside (so there will be less instigation to revolt) and 2) there would probably be the opposite of the migrations of OTL - instead of Turks / Muslims fleeing from the newly independent areas to the rump OE, separatists from the OE might flee to their "home countries" (e.g. from the Aegean Isles to the Greek mainland), out of fear of reprisals or as a deliberate ethnic cleansing.

 

[Faeelin]

Are these territories even majority Christian at this point? There were plenty of Muslims in the region OTL...

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Also in regards to the Franco-Prussian War: Fascinating, North Germany should also be weakened economically by this, since the Gründerzeit is essentially butterflied away with the missing French reperations and the new concessions to France.

On the other hand, without the French reparations, there may not be an economic bubble leading to a crash in 1873. So, rather than a weakened economy, the result might be slower but steadier growth - less during the early 1870s but possibly more during the later 1870s and 1880s.

I also think Bismarck would still push through his social insurance schemes as a means of weakening the Social Democrats, especially after the French socialist parties start to make inroads after 1877.

On the Ottomans and the Balkans - I don't think that, without losing a war or the headache of a serious uprising, even a reformist government could survive being seen as giving away large swathes of territory. It might be possible to recognise that Ottoman souzerainty in areas like Serbia or Romania was only nominal anyway and grant them sovereignty (maybe as part of a deal on some other matter), but e.g. giving the Aegean islands or Thessaly to Greece without getting anything in return or being forced? That looks like political suicide to me.

I was envisioning a situation where the Ottomans did get something in return - the Greeks would pay badly-needed cash for Thessaly and the Aegean islands, and would have to accept an Ottoman commissioner with power to intervene on behalf of the Muslim minority. But upon further thought, I agree that this would be a step too far even for a liberal government - it's one thing to let Serbia and Romania become independent, given that they were independent in all but name anyway, but something else entirely to give away (or even sell) territory that is an integral part of the empire. I doubt either public opinion or elite opinion would stand for it, and there would probably be a coup in short order.

So I think we're headed for war - the Bosnian Serbs and the Greeks of Thessaly will rebel upon learning that they won't get the deal the Bulgarians did, "volunteers" from Greece and Serbia will join the rebellion, the Ottomans will send in the army to put the rebellions down, and the Serbs will appeal to the Tsar to protect his Slavic brothers. No doubt there will also be many atrocity stories to inflame the Russian public, some of which may even be true.

This is a war that the Ottomans are likely to win, given that (a) Hussein Avni Pasha will still be in command of the armies; (b) Romania, which has already achieved independence, will be neutral rather than fighting on the Russian side; and (c) Bulgaria will mostly be quiet. To be sure, Greece may join or be dragged into the war, but I don't think that would be enough to tip the balance against the Ottomans.

The question is what happens afterward. In OTL, the European powers were really keen on ending Ottoman rule over the Balkan Christians; for instance, even after the Ottomans won the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, the powers still made them give up Crete. Granted, the "sick man" perception had sunk in much further by 1897 OTL than in the 1870s, and a victorious Ottoman Empire after a war with Russia will be seen very differently - but I still suspect the powers would force a ceasefire rather than allowing a complete Ottoman victory, and would demand some kind of concessions to the Christians.

What I'm seeing here - and tell me if I'm off base - is a settlement under which Greece is made to pay an indemnity (partially subsidized by Britain) in exchange for Crete and Thessaly becoming quasi-independent duchies under joint Greek and Ottoman administration. Some neutral princes, possibly German or French, would be brought in as titular dukes. At the same time, Britain will sweeten the deal for the Ottomans by guaranteeing against any further territorial losses and taking a hard line on financial sanctions against Russia. Nobody will be very happy about this, setting up a rematch some years later.

If there's a war and it goes well for the OE, the nationalistic pressure might be decreased in two ways - 1) less people will see the OE as a sinking ship, both on the Balkans (so they will engage more in its nascent democratic institutons) and outside (so there will be less instigation to revolt) and 2) there would probably be the opposite of the migrations of OTL - instead of Turks / Muslims fleeing from the newly independent areas to the rump OE, separatists from the OE might flee to their "home countries" (e.g. from the Aegean Isles to the Greek mainland), out of fear of reprisals or as a deliberate ethnic cleansing.

I'd also guess that, instead of Balkan Muslim emigration to the United States as in OTL, there will be more Balkan Christian emigration. I think you're right, though, that an Ottoman Empire which is seen as strong and becoming stronger will induce at least some of the Greeks and Bosnian Serbs to moderate their separatism and take part in its government.

Are these territories even majority Christian at this point? There were plenty of Muslims in the region OTL...

The map linked by Iori at comment 563 provides a good overview - Muslims were a majority or plurality in most of Bosnia, Albania and Thrace, and a minority - often a small one - in the Bulgarian heartland and in Thessaly. The demographic trends generally favored the Muslims in the areas where they were already a plurality, but I'm not sure this would be the case in the Greek and Bulgarian regions absent an organized program of settlement.

 

[The Sandman]

I think the Ottomans would have to get something more significant in order to accept giving up Crete and Thessaly to a country they just soundly defeated after it backstabbed them during a major war. Fortunately, the British actually have something they can offer: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the modern-day UAE were all under varying degrees of British protection/control at this point. Since nobody has any major use for oil in 1880, nobody knows there's going to be a major use for it in the near future, and nobody knows about the quantity and quality of those deposits in the Persian Gulf, it seems reasonable that Britain could see its way to giving the Ottomans a bunch of Muslim territories that really don't have that much to offer economically or militarily.

On another British-related note, perhaps butterflies could result in the New Territories being permanently ceded to Britain a la the rest of Hong Kong, rather than the OTL 99-year lease? Why the British never did so when they had the chance IOTL is frankly beyond me.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

I think the Ottomans would have to get something more significant in order to accept giving up Crete and Thessaly to a country they just soundly defeated after it backstabbed them during a major war. Fortunately, the British actually have something they can offer: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the modern-day UAE were all under varying degrees of British protection/control at this point. Since nobody has any major use for oil in 1880, nobody knows there's going to be a major use for it in the near future, and nobody knows about the quantity and quality of those deposits in the Persian Gulf, it seems reasonable that Britain could see its way to giving the Ottomans a bunch of Muslim territories that really don't have that much to offer economically or militarily.

Alternatively (or in addition), the Ottomans could be compensated by being awarded Azerbaijan and the other Muslim parts of the Russian Caucasus - and even the Crimea? - with Russian Armenia and Georgia becoming "independent" vassal states. The creation of an Armenian homeland might also tamp down Armenian nationalism within the empire, at least for a while.

EDIT: And here's another ethnic map of Ottoman Europe, drawn in 1877.

 

[Faeelin]

I'm honestly unsure of why the Ottomans are losing Crete and Thessaly. They lost it because of the defeat in the Russo-Turkish War, no?

 

[wolf_brother]

There's no bleeding way the British gave up its ports along the Persian Way, and there's no way that the Russians gave up the caucuses after they finished conquering them. Beyond that, there's no absolutely no reason for the Turks to accept it, especially not in return for territory that's been there's for centuries. And the Arabs and Circassians themselves won't accept Turkish suzerainty anymore than they were accepting of the British or Russians IOTL.

I agree with Faeelin; why are the Turks losing Crete and Thessaly ITTL when they're going to be so much stronger than IOTL?

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

I'm honestly unsure of why the Ottomans are losing Crete and Thessaly. They lost it because of the defeat in the Russo-Turkish War, no?

There's no bleeding way the British gave up its ports along the Persian Way, and there's no way that the Russians gave up the caucuses after they finished conquering them. Beyond that, there's no absolutely no reason for the Turks to accept it, especially not in return for territory that's been there's for centuries. And the Arabs and Circassians themselves won't accept Turkish suzerainty anymore than they were accepting of the British or Russians IOTL.

I agree with Faeelin; why are the Turks losing Crete and Thessaly ITTL when they're going to be so much stronger than IOTL?

The Ottomans lost Thessaly after losing the 1877-78 war, but they lost Crete after winning the 1897 war. That isn't a misprint: they beat the Greeks handily, but still had to accept the formation of a "Cretan State" under a Greek high commissioner.

The thing is that the European powers really didn't like the idea of Muslims ruling Christians, and even though some of them supported the Ottomans for strategic reasons, they still wanted to get the Balkan Christians, and particularly the Greeks, out from under "the yoke." I don't expect that their attitude would be much different in this timeline, especially if there are lurid atrocity stories about Ottoman troops murdering and raping their way through Thessaly (and there would almost certainly be such stories, whether or not there was any truth to them).

Granted, an Ottoman Empire that has just beaten Russia will be much stronger than in 1897 OTL, and won't be as easy to push around, but it will still be only partway through its reform and modernization process and will still need the powers' goodwill. So while the Ottomans will get a better deal - Greece and Russia will have to pay through the nose, the empire will get a net territorial gain by picking up Azerbaijan, and Thessaly will become quasi-independent rather than being ceded directly to Greece - I still think the powers will make them give up the territories where Greeks are a commanding majority.

The reason Russia will give up the Caucasus is that there will be Ottoman boots on the ground there, and that nobody but the Tsar will care who rules the Azeris or Chechens. And while the Circassians won't like the Sultan any better than the Tsar, the Azeris are a Turkic people, and there was already a Chechen exile community in the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1850, so they might not mind.

Agreed that the Trucial States are a non-starter, though.

 

[wolf_brother]

Perhaps then an independent Circassian state, under dual Russian/Turkish protection, similar to what you seem to have outlined for Thessaly, would be more likely than direct annexation into Turkey.

 

[wannis]

I like the idea of the OE getting the Crimea, probably restoring the Crimean Khanate as a vassal state - it would actually be a restitution, which would sell very well both on the streets and in the court of Istanbul. This would also chime in with the British policy of keeping the Russians away from the Bosporus.
EDIT: Of course, a loss of that scale would have interesting repercussions in Russia...

 

[Cuāuhtemōc]

Doesn't the island of Crete and Thessaly have large enough Muslim communities that would object to having their lands ceded away? Will there be a large movement to pack up their bags and head to Ottoman Thrace and Anatolia as there was in OTL?

 

[The Sandman]

The British haven't extended direct control over the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and emirates yet. Given that this is before oil was a thing and therefore there really isn't anything much of value in the Gulf, I'm not sure why the British would care about turning those bits over to the Ottomans, especially since the ports at Aden and Karachi can still pretty much lock down the Gulf at will. If they really feel the need to have a base on the Gulf at this point, they can always pressure Oman into giving them what they want.

Also, Crete is getting handed over, because at the end of the day the British can threaten to use the Royal Navy to enforce that decision. Thessaly is much harder to justify without open British intervention into the war.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Doesn't the island of Crete and Thessaly have large enough Muslim communities that would object to having their lands ceded away? Will there be a large movement to pack up their bags and head to Ottoman Thrace and Anatolia as there was in OTL?

There weren't very many Muslims in Thessaly at this time - a few pockets, and that was about it. They might leave, or the presence of an Ottoman commissioner might make them comfortable enough to stay, depending on what happens on the ground.

Crete did have a large Muslim minority, on the order of 40 percent. What happens there will depend in large part on whether the island's Christian population seizes on the war as an opportunity to rebel, and whether the powers then decide to intervene "to prevent a massacre." If Crete stays quiet - possibly because the late 1870s is too short a time since the suppression of the last revolt - then the Ottomans will keep it. If there's a rebellion, then the powers will take over.

Given the OE's stronger position, though, the "Duchy of Crete" won't be a de facto Greek ethnic state as in OTL; instead, it will have both Greek and Ottoman high commissioners and a binational legislature and civil service. Of course, we all know how well that worked out in Cyprus...

Perhaps then an independent Circassian state, under dual Russian/Turkish protection, similar to what you seem to have outlined for Thessaly, would be more likely than direct annexation into Turkey.

I like the idea of the OE getting the Crimea, probably restoring the Crimean Khanate as a vassal state - it would actually be a restitution, which would sell very well both on the streets and in the court of Istanbul. This would also chime in with the British policy of keeping the Russians away from the Bosporus.

EDIT: Of course, a loss of that scale would have interesting repercussions in Russia...

An independent Circassian imamate as an Ottoman vassal makes sense - I think that would be acceptable to both the Ottomans and the Circassians. A restored Crimean Khanate would be a lot of fun, but might be tough to accomplish - I can easily see the Ottomans taking advantage of (or fomenting) Azeri and Chechen revolts to go on the offensive in the Caucasus, but getting a force across the Black Sea to attack the Crimea would be much harder. Maybe it could happen if the Russians are beaten badly enough, and if their choice is between giving up the Crimea and paying a truly crushing indemnity.

I'd definitely expect a loss of that scale - or, for that matter, any loss at all - to have major effects in Russia: there would be a scramble to modernize the army, the Tsar's legitimacy would be weakened, and revolutionary elements would be made correspondingly stronger. I'd expect the Tsar to be able to survive in the short term by the usual Romanov methods, but subsequent events - like, for instance, a big war in the 1890s - could change that dramatically.

Also, Crete is getting handed over, because at the end of the day the British can threaten to use the Royal Navy to enforce that decision. Thessaly is much harder to justify without open British intervention into the war.

I was thinking more in terms of a peace brokered by a coalition of powers, somewhat like what happened in 1878 and 1897 OTL - basically a Congress of Berlin, only with the Ottomans on the winning side. Bear in mind that Britain would be Greece's patron but would want to weaken Russia, so it would push for a deal punitive to Russia and favorable to Greece; in fact, one which would essentially make Russia compensate the Ottomans for what they're giving up to the Greeks.

 

[wannis]

The British haven't extended direct control over the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and emirates yet. Given that this is before oil was a thing and therefore there really isn't anything much of value in the Gulf, I'm not sure why the British would care about turning those bits over to the Ottomans, especially since the ports at Aden and Karachi can still pretty much lock down the Gulf at will. If they really feel the need to have a base on the Gulf at this point, they can always pressure Oman into giving them what they want.

Before petrol, wasn't the main reason why Britain was interested in the Gulf emirates simply to curb piracy? So they probably don't mind under whose rule the area is as long as the pirates are kept down. An OE that projects power as far as Indonesia is probaly able to do that. OTOH, I doubt that the OE would see these desert specks as worthy compensation for Thessaly and the Aegean islands.