Wow, thanks for all the comments! Fortunately I'm on a conference call this morning, so I have plenty of time to answer them.
Once we accept that the British (or a tragically large number of them) cannot handle the idea of the torch being passed to a greater populace, one that makes the peoples of the British Isles just several of many in the Empire, but with cultural heritage strongly shaped by them--but not exclusively--then we look to what happens to the ordinary people of the colonies as the criterion of good or bad. And compared to OTL, both West (and southern!) Africa and India look to be taking off as independent peoples on a much sounder basis than OTL. In terms of development of democratic, economic and working multicultural institutions, they are on firmer and higher ground.
True enough. But they're also going to reach a critical point in their demands for self-rule at a time when the British are less willing to accept facts than they were during the 1947-60 period in OTL. India, in particular, will reach that point when a reactionary government is in power in London, and will do so precisely because of that government's policies.
So India and the African colonies - not to mention Southeast Asia, which will have a greater measure of autonomy under British rule than it did in OTL under the French - will indeed be better set up to function as independent countries, but the struggles before they get there might in some cases be quite a bit worse. They'll be worth it... in the end.
In particular I hope India pulls loose of the Empire without fragmenting off pieces of Pakistan, due to a stronger bond between Muslim and Hindu independence fighters.
There won't be a Pakistan or Bangladesh, but there might be a few holes in the map, for reasons that will become clear around 1915-20.
As for West Africa, I expect that a transAtlantic relationship to South Carolina and African America in general will synergistically strengthen both parties on both sides of the Atlantic, and provide alternatives for West Africans seeking their own path of modernization--and leverage for African Americans. On that basis Liberia will be a stronger nation too.
There are also the Coaster peoples knitting the West African ports together economically and to some extent culturally, who have managed to operate under the colonial empires' radar and/or make themselves useful enough to stay in business.
Omar's story is looking hopeful to me. I suppose he won't be coming back for Marie-Claire, any more than Umar Abacar wound up marrying the English girl he knew. Marie-Claire will find her own life, the way the English girl wound up in India as a major mover and shaker. Maybe her life will be more obscure, but decent--and the better for crossing Omar's path.
He won't marry her, especially since while she isn't
quite old enough to be his mother, she's a good fifteen years his senior. She was a doctor at a field hospital where he spent some time after being wounded in action. Her relationship with him was a maternal and teaching one - she noticed he was interested in medicine, so when he got well enough to help, she put him to work. Eventually he got sent back to the front, but the idea of a career in medicine stayed in his mind.
Marie-Claire has returned to private practice at this point, and we may hear from her again. We
will see Omar again, but as stated above, I won't say where.
Would there have been any Carribean Legionaires at all? My impression was, the prestige of the Catholic Church was even more fatally entangled in the abuses of the Spanish regime there than in the Philippines. But I don't really know. Were Cuban national liberationists also anticlerical across the board, or like the Filipinos was there some basis of islander Catholicism that protested Castilian rule but embraced the Faith?
I'm not sure what the situation was in OTL, but TTL is a different environment - the liberal Spanish government granted autonomy to Cuba and Puerto Rico in the 1870s, so there's less nationalist-establishment tension.
What happens in Puerto Rico and Cuba will depend in large part on what happens in Spain. If Spain continues on a moderate, liberal course, they may stay. But if it turns into something that the Cubans and Puerto Ricans don't want to be part of - whether because an ultra-right-wing government takes power, because a radical left-wing one does, or because the country descends to a state of low-grade civil war - then they'll reconsider, and at that point, the United States may or may not get involved.
And as you mention, nearly all the Spanish factions are on thin ice.
You know, the Whitening thing in Brazil was mentioned before, but actually I think it might well be a global trend in this timeline. It's still likely for Brazil, but in this timeline we also have the Cape Dutch coopting the mixed race peoples (pretty much all the Afrikaans speakers had a white ancestor somewhere) and the racial-mixing-Swedish-sect in East Africa. I could easily imagine that being one strand of progressive thought toward the problem of race at the opening of the century.
It will definitely be a strand - money whitens, and politics might also whiten if (as in the Afrikaners' case) the adoption of nonwhites is necessary to ensure a group's dominance or keep it relevant. I'm guessing there will be a fair amount of this in the Portuguese colonies, which are still under a ramshackle, early 19th-century type of administration.
Of course, there will be others who want no part of such thinking, either because they refuse to accept nonwhites at all or because they don't see "whitening" as necessary or desirable. Look for this as a conflict in southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, parts of east Africa.
A million dead?
OTL India had 74,000 dead in the Great War. This implies staggering mobilization. How does this not result in India immediately start bombing British garrisons as soon as things get messy?
For now, the veterans are tired of war and happy to be demobilized, and as long as the "partnership raj" looks like it might work, they'll give it a chance.
Once things go bad, though, the veterans will be a major force - and some of them will have less patience than others.
Also, what of basketball?
Hmmm, not sure. I assume something like it would exist, maybe with different rules - given the evidence of the Mesoamerican ball games, someone's bound to get the idea of throwing a ball through a hoop.
With the earlier Great War and Fellowship of Comrades-in-Arms etc it might be that *British sports get spread about and popularised sooner amongst a wider range of people. I would suspect that having lots of young armed fit men in close proximity would require a lot of distracting sports to be put on by the high command or the local hosts.
So more cricket and rugby in central Europe, Africa and southeast Asia (I'd really like to get sevens going in Fiji and Australasia). How big was (association) football at this point? Might be interesting if some rugby variant became the leading world sport in its place.
I actually hope things go wrong somewhere- this TL has been rather optimistic/benign, free of many of the great tragedies that struck both OTL Africa and the OTL rest of the world.
This WWI was much more destructive than OTL's WWI, and with the destruction and death spread over a much larger area. India suffered far more war casualties compared to OTL, Africa was far more devastated by the war, South America had its own upheavals; the only continent to not be significantly touched by the war was North America (Australasia had its share of the war dead). There's been plenty of tragedy.
Agreed. Though it looks like it'll be turning into a better world, it has paid a price for progress.
Again, agreed. And of course, there's the earlier spread of AIDS; that ought to be enough grimdarkness to satisfy people who are into that sort of stuff.
As I've said before, part of this is my fault - I've told the story of the Great War mostly through narratives, and much of the worst of it has happened offstage. Now that we're about to revert to a mostly-academic format (albeit probably with more narrative interludes than before), the conflicts will be more front and center.
Those who like this timeline for its hopefulness will find much to like about the twentieth century; those who want to see more conflict will also find much to like. The Great War has overturned all the nineteenth-century verities just as our own First World War did, and while that opens the door to a better world, it also means many disputes over what happens next.
Right now, the following conflicts, at minimum, are brewing:
- In the British Empire, the proponents of a federal arrangement against those who prefer Britain to be a master dominating its possessions, both of whom will be part of a larger dispute over social hierarchies. This will be a growing background issue during the 1900s and become very sharp in the 1910s.
- The Ottoman Empire will have several fault lines: proponents of real democracy against those who favor the quasi-democratic status quo; centralists against autonomists; peripheral nationalisms (especially Arab nationalism) against supporters of a unified Ottoman identity. These are already starting, and all of them have religious overtones.
- China: reactionaries against reformers against radical peasants and regional separatists. Islamic reformism will play a (limited) part, so some of this will happen onstage.
- Messy borders in eastern Europe: this will be one of the regions that becomes a laboratory for post-Westphalianism, and the process by which that happens won't be pretty. It already isn't pretty in what's left of Hungary, and these conflicts will continue intermittently well into the century.
- Catholic reaction versus Catholic liberalism versus laicism - a big deal in Italy, Spain, France and Belgium (where the ultramontanes and the military are currently in power), and possibly Austria and elsewhere. Maybe Brazil eventually, and even the Philippines.
- Decolonization in Africa, which will involve both the independence struggles and internal conflicts (including Oman/Zanzibar, where much of the interior is a "colony" of the coast). This will start to heat up in the 1910s and continue until after independence in the 1940s-50s, and will be peaceful in some places but less so in others. Likewise for the Dutch East Indies, where things will get intermittently violent.
No doubt others will develop as the century progresses - at the moment, I only have firm plans out to the early 1920s. Russia will probably become contentious at one time or another, although I'm not certain. Plenty of hope, but plenty of conflict.
The first "academic" update on the postwar shakeout will hopefully be ready by the end of the week; if not, then sometime over the weekend.