Major Confederate victory at Shiloh

bugwar

Banned
The Tide Turns at Shiloh

Ok. Johnston planned for a right hook at Shiloh, moving the Northern forces away from their supply point at Pittsburg Landing, and towards the west, into the swampy terrain of Owl and Snake creeks.

Let us assume that that Johnston realized his subordinate Beauregard didn’t have the same dedication to the battle plan that he had, and as such, remained in the rear to direct the reinforcements and let Beauregard move out with the lead units to inspire them.

As such, Polk’s force continued moving on the Confederate right flank, reinforcing Crittenden in the push to drive the Union away from Pittsburg Landing.

By evening of the first day, the Rebels were successful in their attack, pinning and shattering two of the Federal divisions against Owl Creek, and driving back the U.S. forces elsewhere.








During the night, Grant withdraws his remaining forces to the north side of Snake Creek.
Buell arrives with his 15,000 (relatively) fresh troops by (completed by 4 a.m.), and reinforces Grant along their eastern flank.
The two Yankee leaders plan to assault in the morning on their left, and drive the exhausted Confederates away from Pittsburg landing.

Johnston has his own plans though.
Thanks to the reconnaissance provided by Forrest, he knows not only that Buell is on the field, but also that the Yankee right flank (Sherman’s Division) is isolated from the remainder of the Union lines.

He redeploys half of his army to attack Sherman, and turn the Union flank.




In the morning, both sides attack. On the Confederate right, Crittenden and Pope fall back from the weight of the Union advance, but maintain their order.

Sherman, isolated, has his division falter, then rout. He too falls back and reestablishes a defensive position two miles north with the help of the newly arriving division commanded by Crittenden.
The Rebels continue to push this new line back, threatening to turn the Union right.

Buell, fearful of being cut off from his supplies by the Confederate advance, breaks off the main attack to salvage his command.
Grant has no choice but to join in the retreat.
By evening of the second day, the Confederates and Federals are camped outside of Crump’s Landing.
During the night, the Union withdraws north to Savannah. Johnston elects not to pursue with his exhausted troops.









Grant's career suffered in the aftermath of Shiloh.
Henry W. Halleck combined and reorganized his armies, relegating Grant to the powerless position of second-in-command.
Emboldened by the victory at Shiloh, A.S. Johnston diverted Halleck’s glacial advance on Corinth with his invasion of Kentucky in June, 1862.
The Confederate drive through the bluegrass state after the win at Shiloh attracted a large number of local Confederate sympathizers to the ranks.
This additional force was enough so that at the battle of Perryville in September, 1862, Johnston was able to turn a tactical victory into a strategic one.

The twin victories of Perryville and Sharpsburg shocked the Northern electorate in the November elections, providing a large influx of Democratic congressmen inclined towards a peaceful resolution of the bloody conflict.

What is more, thanks to the victories, Britain and France offered to mediate the conflict, and with that diplomatic development, Confederate independence was all but assured.
 
Ok. Johnston planned for a right hook at Shiloh, moving the Northern forces away from their supply point at Pittsburg Landing, and towards the west, into the swampy terrain of Owl and Snake creeks.

Let us assume that that Johnston realized his subordinate Beauregard didn’t have the same dedication to the battle plan that he had, and as such, remained in the rear to direct the reinforcements and let Beauregard move out with the lead units to inspire them.

As such, Polk’s force continued moving on the Confederate right flank, reinforcing Crittenden in the push to drive the Union away from Pittsburg Landing.

By evening of the first day, the Rebels were successful in their attack, pinning and shattering two of the Federal divisions against Owl Creek, and driving back the U.S. forces elsewhere.








During the night, Grant withdraws his remaining forces to the north side of Snake Creek.
Buell arrives with his 15,000 (relatively) fresh troops by (completed by 4 a.m.), and reinforces Grant along their eastern flank.
The two Yankee leaders plan to assault in the morning on their left, and drive the exhausted Confederates away from Pittsburg landing.

Johnston has his own plans though.
Thanks to the reconnaissance provided by Forrest, he knows not only that Buell is on the field, but also that the Yankee right flank (Sherman’s Division) is isolated from the remainder of the Union lines.

He redeploys half of his army to attack Sherman, and turn the Union flank.




In the morning, both sides attack. On the Confederate right, Crittenden and Pope fall back from the weight of the Union advance, but maintain their order.

Sherman, isolated, has his division falter, then rout. He too falls back and reestablishes a defensive position two miles north with the help of the newly arriving division commanded by Crittenden.
The Rebels continue to push this new line back, threatening to turn the Union right.

Buell, fearful of being cut off from his supplies by the Confederate advance, breaks off the main attack to salvage his command.
Grant has no choice but to join in the retreat.
By evening of the second day, the Confederates and Federals are camped outside of Crump’s Landing.
During the night, the Union withdraws north to Savannah. Johnston elects not to pursue with his exhausted troops.









Grant's career suffered in the aftermath of Shiloh.
Henry W. Halleck combined and reorganized his armies, relegating Grant to the powerless position of second-in-command.
Emboldened by the victory at Shiloh, A.S. Johnston diverted Halleck’s glacial advance on Corinth with his invasion of Kentucky in June, 1862.
The Confederate drive through the bluegrass state after the win at Shiloh attracted a large number of local Confederate sympathizers to the ranks.
This additional force was enough so that at the battle of Perryville in September, 1862, Johnston was able to turn a tactical victory into a strategic one.

The twin victories of Perryville and Sharpsburg shocked the Northern electorate in the November elections, providing a large influx of Democratic congressmen inclined towards a peaceful resolution of the bloody conflict.

What is more, thanks to the victories, Britain and France offered to mediate the conflict, and with that diplomatic development, Confederate independence was all but assured.

I LOVE IT!!!!! MORE PLEASE
 

TFSmith121

Banned
US and CS forces were almost equal on the first day, and

the Army of the Tennessee was on the defensive, with a strong reserve artillery position, and warships in support.


Then Buell's forces come into line the next day.


When an army of 45,000 men attacks an army of 49,000, and both forces have roughly the same level of experience, training, organization, and equipment, the smaller force is not going to win...


Especially when the larger army is reinforced the next day by another 18,000...


Best,
 

bugwar

Banned
the Army of the Tennessee was on the defensive, with a strong reserve artillery position, and warships in support.
The Army of Tennessee was taken by complete surprise on the first day, did not develop that artillery position until near the end of the day,
and the supporting warships did little other than keep both sides awake most of the night.

Then Buell's forces come into line the next day.
Yep. The NEXT day. Until then, Grant is on his own.
Buell was not keen to cross the river that night and join Grant at Shiloh in the first place, despite assurances that the landing was secure.
I doubt that Buell would have tried an amphibious assault if the Confederates held the area.


When an army of 45,000 men attacks an army of 49,000, and both forces have roughly the same level of experience, training, organization, and equipment, the smaller force is not going to win...
I believe that Seven Days and Chancellorsville are prime examples of smaller forces with “...same level of experience, training, organization, and equipment...” defeating larger ones.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi

in 1862, under Grant and AS Johnston, respectively; compare and contrast with each other, and then with the Army of the Potomac under (injured) Hooker or the AotP under McClellan vis a vis Army of Northern Virgnia under Lee.

More than a few of these things are not like the others...

Grant (1861-65) was a superb combat commander; great determination, strategic and operational leadership, good adminstrator, ability to get the best from his subordinates, and ruthless.

Hooker (1861-64) was a good combat commander, solid organizer, but not as good at balancing as Grant by a long shot and - when suffering what probably amounted to an undiagnosed TBI at Chancellorsville - unable to turn over the army to a subordinate.

McClellan (1861-62) was an excellent administrator, probably the best of the quintet, but a poor combat commander.

Lee (1861-65) was an inspiring figure, able to get the best from his subordinates, solid operationally, but lacking at the strategic level and, honestly, with a mixed record as a combat commander.

Johnston's record (1861-62) is limited in comparison, but he certainly was a professional and capable enough, but his decision to attack at Shiloh came too late to really take advantage of the distance between the two US armies; if he had been able to hit CF Smith's force when it first set up camp, he might have won a solid victory, but it would not have been a war winner.

Best,
 

bugwar

Banned
...same level of experience, training, organization, and equipment...


Ah.
OK, if you had included in your original criteria an attribute of ‘leadership’, then you have a better argument.
Pity it wasn’t there.

But to continue, while Grant is a very good leader, at Shiloh he was (like just about everybody else on both sides) still learning the rules to success.

Grant (1861-65) was a superb combat commander; great determination, strategic and operational leadership, good adminstrator, ability to get the best from his subordinates, and ruthless.

At Shiloh, his “...strategic and operational leadership, good adminstrator,...” might be subject to some debate as:

1. Grant's troop dispersement on the forested plateau at Pittsburg Landing was highly questionable.
Holding the advance were two untested divisions—Sherman's on the right astride the Corinth and Hamburg-Purdy Roads and Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss on the left across the Eastern Corinth road.
The three combat-tested veteran divisions, those of Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand (promoted to major general on March 21), Stephen A. Hurlbut, and William H. L. Wallace camped in the rear, closer to the landing.

2. By Saturday evening, April 5, the Federals were aware that a Southern army was concentrating at Corinth; Grant placed enemy strength between 60,000 and 80,000.
Confederate cavalry patrols had become bold, advancing up to the very edge of the Union encampment. Despite this knowledge, a business-as-usual atmosphere prevailed in the Northern camps.
The Federal divisions took few precautions to secure themselves against attack. No field fortifications were built. No cavalry screen was pushed out in the direction of the enemy.
The infantry pickets posted on the roads to Corinth, where the Confederates were known to be, were too close to give sufficient notice of a Confederate advance.

3. Grant, likewise, missed the warning signs. On the dark rainy night of April 4 he severely injured his ankle in a fall from a horse at Pittsburg Landing.
Although now on crutches, he visited the front the next day. Apprised of enemy activity by Sherman, Grant remained confident his front was secure.
That night, as he sat in the Cherry home awaiting the arrival of Buell's army, Grant penned a note to Halleck:
"I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place."

Even with those mistakes, he never displayed a lack of determination, unlike a lot of senior leaders on both sides.
In my opinion, that characteristic alone was what got him through the first day at Shiloh, and ultimate victory in the battle.

Imagine how bad things would have gone for the Federals if Buell had been in charge on the first day of Shiloh, with Grant bringing up the Army of Ohio reinforcements?
The fight would have been a slam dunk for the Confederacy.

That is Grant’s strength. That and learning (mostly) from his mistakes.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
"Organization" includes the command staff, in my

book...

I agree with your assesment of Grant's strength; I cut him some slack regarding the first day's results because CF Smith basically selected the ground and laid out (as much as anyone did) the position prior to his arrival.

Interesting point about Buell; although his leadership was hardly inspiring, I'd expect that if simply the CGs were swapped (not the armies themselves) the AotT would have still held at Shiloh; I don't see Buell abandoning the field after the first day if Grant's AotO was coming up fast...

Probably faster than historically, actually.

Best,
 
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