Main Reason for the Lopsided Coalition Victory in 1991 Persian Gulf War

Main Reason for the Lopsided Coalition Victory in 1991 Persian Gulf War?

  • Superior Coalition Technology

    Votes: 26 27.7%
  • Superior Coalition Tactics/Leadership

    Votes: 25 26.6%
  • Iraqi Incomeptence

    Votes: 43 45.7%

  • Total voters
    94

Ak-84

Banned
The failure of the Iraqi Army in 1991 was basically a failure of leadership. Another example would be the French in 1940 or the Indians in 1962 or the Americans in North Africa. In 1991 they did everything they could to fight to the enemy's advantage. Starting with their deployments leaving their right flank exposed like that in a "fuck me" position. Interestingly during the actual battle (IIRC) three Iraqi divisions turned around under heavy fire and engaged the Allies, they were destroyed, but they helped the bulk of the Iraqi forces escape.

Problems with leadership can doom even the best armies; take a look at the failure of the United States Military to impose its Nations will on two small countries in the last 15 years for illustration.

The rest of the example, including a pre-2003 triumphant article, are nonsense. While the Iraqi's did not cover themselves in glory in 2014 versus ISIS and there were systemic problems, as more sober and less derisive analysis have pointed out, ISIS was a whole new level of batshit insane. Here for instance
But the Islamic State was also a deadlier enemy than even the U.S. military faced during the 2003–2011 occupation. During the I.S. assault on Ramadi, the terror group leveled a fortified Iraqi position by smashing through a concrete blast wall with an armored bulldozer.

“And what [the Islamic State] did was then shot through this gap a series of five-ton trucks, each one of them — they used seven in this main attack

Or more detail

if we’re to believe the accounts, really were at the receiving end of a well-planned, well-executed attack by the Islamic State that involved a number of very, very large explosive car bombs, some of which were said to be the sides of those in the Oklahoma City bombing, literally kind of leveling blocks or at least large buildings, an assault that any military force would have a hard time with.
 

Ak-84

Banned
They were facing Arabs. Arab military culture simply is not suited to fight conventional manouver wars in the western manner, plain and simple.

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

This was written in 1999 and the points they make has been thoroughly reinforced the past 2 decades, not to mention observations that go as far back as WWI.
This would be the same Arabs who the U.S has nearly bankrupted itself fighting the last 16 years,
 
The failure of the Iraqi Army in 1991 was basically a failure of leadership. Another example would be the French in 1940

The Iraqi leadership was surprisingly strong at high levels. They put a concentrated reserve of their best troops in the ideal spot, and when they got wind of the left hook, quickly moved to block it, something above the 1940 French in terms of both deployment and reaction time. It wasn't their fault old export T-72s with less-than-ideal ammo couldn't handle the Abrams horde. If they'd been stronger and the Coalition forces weaker, it'd be halted for a time, the escape would be cleaner (so no hand-wringing about the failure to catch them) and it'd be talked of as a successful use of a large reserve.

The low-level performance, on the other hand, was nightmarishly and consistently bad.

Problems with leadership can doom even the best armies; take a look at the failure of the United States Military to impose its Nations will on two small countries in the last 15 years for illustration.

Ah, but that's an inherently political problem, compounded by political factors (hi, Iran and Pakistan). Militarily, the US utterly crushed the insurgents attempts to hold ground conventionally in Fallujah and broke its back by the time of the withdraw. Certainly, there've been many tactical defeats and blunders, even the best military forces are still human. But the mammoth kill/loss ratio and declining casualties by the time of the withdraw speaks for itself tactically. Now insurgents have proven often more capable than large conventional forces on a one-one level, but that's both relative and due to a combination of other factors[1]

[1]Those factors
-There's a degree of self-selection and motivation to fight in inherently smaller insurgencies. Handpicked forces like the Republican Guard under Saddam and the special forces units in have displayed higher proficiency than their other countrymen too in a conventional context.
-A lot of the other factors that hinder conventional warfighting are either a lot less relevant in an insurgency (combined arms difficulties because the force isn't big enough that it would become an issue), or more beneficial (secrecy and compartmentalization of information being extremely useful for staying hidden but poor for large-scale coordination)

This would be the same Arabs who the U.S has nearly bankrupted itself fighting the last 16 years,

Ah, but did the Iraqi insurgents ever gain the ability to get anything close to a Dien Bien Phu on the Americans? Is it the issue of military prowess or the issue of trying to put a shattered Humpty Dumpty that was only held together by a strongman's lash back together again?
 
I'd suggest reading "Arabs at War" by Kenneth Pollack. He takes a scholarly approach to analysing the various conflicts involving Arab states from 1948-1991, while still keeping it interesting.

To summarize, there are a lot of nuances to why the Iraqis lost, but the main factors were poor enlisted training, lack of a long-service NCO corps, junior and field officer complacency, incompetence and communication (essentially lying to their superiors about what was going on), nonexistent maintenance, and very poor technical skills. Overall senior leadership and strategic planning were reasonably good, and the equipment, if it had been maintained and used properly, wasn't bad.

Also, the western forces (particularly the UK, US, and French) were lavishly well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. The National Training Center, for example, was actually considered harder than actual combat by US soldiers who had gone through it before fighting in the Persian Gulf War.
 
I'd say the most important difference was training, which is similar to, but subtly different from Tactics/Leadership
(You could have the World's best Tactics and Leadership but if your troops aren't trained .....)
 
The Iraqi leadership was surprisingly strong at high levels. They put a concentrated reserve of their best troops in the ideal spot, and when they got wind of the left hook, quickly moved to block it, something above the 1940 French in terms of both deployment and reaction time. It wasn't their fault old export T-72s with less-than-ideal ammo couldn't handle the Abrams horde. If they'd been stronger and the Coalition forces weaker, it'd be halted for a time, the escape would be cleaner (so no hand-wringing about the failure to catch them) and it'd be talked of as a successful use of a large reserve.

The low-level performance, on the other hand, was nightmarishly and consistently bad.



Ah, but that's an inherently political problem, compounded by political factors (hi, Iran and Pakistan). Militarily, the US utterly crushed the insurgents attempts to hold ground conventionally in Fallujah and broke its back by the time of the withdraw. Certainly, there've been many tactical defeats and blunders, even the best military forces are still human. But the mammoth kill/loss ratio and declining casualties by the time of the withdraw speaks for itself tactically. Now insurgents have proven often more capable than large conventional forces on a one-one level, but that's both relative and due to a combination of other factors[1]

[1]Those factors
-There's a degree of self-selection and motivation to fight in inherently smaller insurgencies. Handpicked forces like the Republican Guard under Saddam and the special forces units in have displayed higher proficiency than their other countrymen too in a conventional context.
-A lot of the other factors that hinder conventional warfighting are either a lot less relevant in an insurgency (combined arms difficulties because the force isn't big enough that it would become an issue), or more beneficial (secrecy and compartmentalization of information being extremely useful for staying hidden but poor for large-scale coordination)



Ah, but did the Iraqi insurgents ever gain the ability to get anything close to a Dien Bien Phu on the Americans? Is it the issue of military prowess or the issue of trying to put a shattered Humpty Dumpty that was only held together by a strongman's lash back together again?
I'm just curious does anyone know if the Iraqis T72's with the ammunition they were provided with could have been expected to routinely destroy the U.S. M1 tanks if they had used suitable tactics (ie. Flank shots, volley fire etc.)
 

Ak-84

Banned
I'd suggest reading "Arabs at War" by Kenneth Pollack. He takes a scholarly approach to analysing the various conflicts involving Arab states from 1948-1991, while still keeping it interesting.

To summarize, there are a lot of nuances to why the Iraqis lost, but the main factors were poor enlisted training, lack of a long-service NCO corps, junior and field officer complacency, incompetence and communication (essentially lying to their superiors about what was going on), nonexistent maintenance, and very poor technical skills. Overall senior leadership and strategic planning were reasonably good, and the equipment, if it had been maintained and used properly, wasn't bad.

Also, the western forces (particularly the UK, US, and French) were lavishly well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. The National Training Center, for example, was actually considered harder than actual combat by US soldiers who had gone through it before fighting in the Persian Gulf War.
I would suggest never reading that, unless you are a Breitbart reader. It was racist clap trap when published in the early 2000's and is the same now, when people should know better.

Coller said:
Ah, but that's an inherently political problem, compounded by political factors (hi, Iran and Pakistan). Militarily, the US utterly crushed the insurgents attempts to hold ground conventionally in Fallujah and broke its back by the time of the withdraw. Certainly, there've been many tactical defeats and blunders, even the best military forces are still human. But the mammoth kill/loss ratio and declining casualties by the time of the withdraw speaks for itself tactically. Now insurgents have proven often more capable than large conventional forces on a one-one level, but that's both relative and due to a combination of other factors[1]

[1]Those factors
-There's a degree of self-selection and motivation to fight in inherently smaller insurgencies. Handpicked forces like the Republican Guard under Saddam and the special forces units in have displayed higher proficiency than their other countrymen too in a conventional context.
-A lot of the other factors that hinder conventional warfighting are either a lot less relevant in an insurgency (combined arms difficulties because the force isn't big enough that it would become an issue), or more beneficial (secrecy and compartmentalization of information being extremely useful for staying hidden but poor for large-scale coordination)
Well, unfortunately War is an inherently political game. The US Military has spent the last decade blaming everyone upto and including Big Foot for its failures; not facing the real systemic problems its had. The U.S Military was given a job, which was to pacify Iraq and also given obscene amounts of money to do so. They failed miserably and have been making excuses since. And there was of course an encore in Afghanistan.
 
I would suggest never reading that, unless you are a Breitbart reader. It was racist clap trap when published in the early 2000's and is the same now, when people should know better.

How so? Former Iraqi officers interviewed agreed on many of the cultural problems (Woods, Murray, The Iran Iraq War, Chapter 1, ref. 13). Innumerable Iraq War veterans, including many who are certainly not Breitbart-ites politically, have also backed a similar view from their personal experience.

Well, unfortunately War is an inherently political game. The US Military has spent the last decade blaming everyone upto and including Big Foot for its failures; not facing the real systemic problems its had. The U.S Military was given a job, which was to pacify Iraq and also given obscene amounts of money to do so. They failed miserably and have been making excuses since. And there was of course an encore in Afghanistan.

And what would you do it in its place (Besides saying "don't go")? Name the specifics. See how many are political and how many are military/tactical.
 
I would suggest never reading that, unless you are a Breitbart reader. It was racist clap trap when published in the early 2000's and is the same now, when people should know better.
What specifically was racist or clap-trap about it? It examined cultural reasons why the Arabs had such poor military success, but I don't remember anything racist about it.
 
The Iraqi leadership was surprisingly strong at high levels.

Minor point of order: but the a key role in any strategic military leadership is to nurture a better military ethos in their subordinates. So the Iraqis High Command does probably bear responsibility for it's failure to do that. Besides that issue though, you are correct that Iraqi strategic leadership was doing the best they could at their own jobs given how pants their operational and tactical leadership was.

What specifically was racist or clap-trap about it? It examined cultural reasons why the Arabs had such poor military success, but I don't remember anything racist about it.

Point of order, but Pollack never goes as far as blaming Arab culture as the reason for Iraqis (and other Arab armies) problems. Indeed, he doesn't really offer any explanation as to why the Arabs have had the problems they had... he just lays out what the problems were. A cultural explanation is indeed one of the explanations I've seen advanced elsewhere and it is potentially valid: Sometimes an era of war does just shaft a particular culture. For example, the Scots got really boned by 17th and 18th century warfare against the English - they were too independent and couldn't see the point in lining up so someone else could get them killed. As a result they rarely formed large effective armies and those they did couldn't hold together for long enough.

An alternative I have seen advanced is actually much more political, although obviously this also can get tied up in the cultural issue above: the artificial nature of Arab states as post-colonial states inhibits their ability to inspire much non-enforced loyalty from their lower echelon personnel as said personnel simply do not identify with the state. Interestingly, the Arab states which have derived greater actual legitimacy from their population (Egypt and Jordan) have also demonstrated the greater competence in their wars then other Arab states. It also explains how ISIS managed competent tactical leadership back in their heyday in 2014-15: they've tied their identity to being an Islamic (even if it's an interpretation of Islam that is extraordinarily disgusting) army, not an Arab one, and this difference lets them produce much more non-enforced loyalty and motivation from their soldiers.
 
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Minor point of order: but the a key role in any strategic military leadership is to nurture a better military ethos in their subordinates. So the Iraqis High Command does probably bear responsibility for it's failure to do that. Besides that issue though, you are correct that Iraqi strategic leadership was doing the best they could at their own jobs given how pants their operational and tactical leadership was.



Point of order, but Pollack never goes as far as blaming Arab culture as the reason for Iraqis (and other Arab armies) problems. Indeed, he doesn't really offer any explanation as to why the Arabs have had the problems they had... he just lays out what the problems were. A cultural explanation is indeed one of the explanations I've seen advanced elsewhere and it is potentially valid: Sometimes an era of war does just shaft a particular culture. For example, the Scots got really boned by 17th and 18th century warfare against the English - they were too independent and couldn't see the point in lining up so someone else could get them killed. As a result they rarely formed large effective armies and those they did couldn't hold together for long enough.

An alternative I have seen advanced is actually much more political, although obviously this also can get tied up in the cultural issue above: the artificial nature of Arab states as post-colonial states inhibits their ability to inspire much non-enforced loyalty from their lower echelon personnel as said personnel simply do not identify with the state. Interestingly, the Arab states which have derived greater actual legitimacy from their population (Egypt and Jordan) have also demonstrated the greater competence in their wars then other Arab states. It also explains how ISIS managed competent tactical leadership back in their heyday in 2014-15: they've tied their identity to being an Islamic (even if it's an interpretation of Islam that is extraordinarily disgusting) army, not an Arab one, and this difference lets them produce much more non-enforced loyalty and motivation from their soldiers.
I apologize, it has been probably ten years since I read the book. I'm probably confusing my conclusions with what he stated in the book. I suspect there is a mixture of both of the alternatives, cultural and political.
 
This would be the same Arabs who the U.S has nearly bankrupted itself fighting the last 16 years,

Correct, read my statement again (and the article I linked to) you'll note that I said conventional war, meaning two large opposing organizations. Arabs are quite good at fighting wars without fighting it so to speak. They realize that they don't have to to win any battles, they just have to be enough of a nuisance untill the enemy decides its not worth it, which is what has happened.
 
If i'm to quickly comment on the OP question, i would rank first the crushing numerical superiority of the US and co, then the technological superiority and THEN the iraqi misgivings, which of course there were plenty as well. If one is really interested in getting an accurate as possible image of what happend to Iraq, one has to also document oneself on what the iraqi view is as well. Some of you might be familiar with these two works (written by the americans, based on captured iraqi documents in and after 2003)
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484530.pdf
http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/01/SH-AADF-D-000-396-English-Not-OCR.pdf

If the only source one is using is the chest thumping self-congratulatory western (mostly american) narrative, it's a pointelss exercise as far as genuine history is concerned. It's been a while since i've read the 1991 account, imo a very simplistic review is basically Saddam wanted to conserve as much of his military (and his regime) as possible, hence ordering the air force to evacuate to Iran, and the enforced timidity of iraqi ground forces which for most of the war sat and did nothing while being continually attrited by the americans.

Imagine if he went all crazy and ordered a preemptive strike in January (or even much earlier, in August-September) with everything he got against the saudis and any american bases in range. Oh, of course Iraq will not "win the war" or anything like that, it's impossible, but what would have happened is the iraqi military and leadership including Saddam himself would have gone in a blaze of glory so to speak, taking with them at least the 15,000 US casualties that they were expecting. Iraq would obviously have been occupied in 1991... this however bringing us to the post-2003 US occupation, and what happened since.

Oh and btw, just a short comment regarding Iran - Iraq war. Iran was a foe with a far larger population and hence manpower, and a much more advanced military in 1980 having the latest american gear, despite the mullahs doing their best to thoroughly wreck it. Actually, Iraq did pretty well, they initially took considerable territory from their much larger, better equiped foe, they were then indeed pushed back as Iran mobilized it's manpower, but when it came to the iranians trying to occupy Iraq, they were succesfully checked and methodically and ruthlessly bled try. It is only in the second half of the eighties that the iraqis finally achieved technological superiority (because they could ressuply much better than the iranians did), and after that things got so bad for Iran that they were evicted from most of the iraqi territory they initially occupied and had to concede and make peace. Of course the war was an economical and human catastrophe for both side, but the point is Iraq held off a much larger foe which initially had every advantage in manpower AND technology.
 
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