The 1940s French had alot of buried everything at their disposal. They also appeared to have a "deep and deeper bunkers mentality" where the defending army loses the will to fight offensively or to even defend in fluid situations.
Very true, but there is more to combat than size, especially after 1940 and the rise of mobile warfare. Numbers were not nearly as important as how the assets are used and how well trained the users are.
June 1941: German and Soviet forces are numerically equal. Soviets may have actually out numered the Germans in tanks and aircraft. Some Sovet tanks were actually superior.
1967 and 1973: Israelis are heavily out numbered and do not have a technological advantage
1973: Israelis place alot of confidence in their mini maginot line on the Suez. Purported "incompetents" quickly make breaches. Some Israeli fortifications are destroyed, others are simply bypassed.
Very true, but the defenders need to be strong everywhere, the attackers can concentrate. Tactically, the bunker army may feel it is winning, until breaches develop that they cant plug and the strategica battle goes mobile.
True, the by 1945 very experienced Soviets usually recommended 7-1 local advantages for break through attacks against fortified opponents.
Go check the statics on the late war and the soviets were only loseing 3 to 1 in battle loses by that time and the were on the offensive in 44 and 45 .