Maginot Line Question

I recently read a history suggesting that the Maginot Line was a poor idea, not because of the strength or weakness of the line but because the intent to hold with steel and concrete, instead of manpower, failed and something on the order of forty French divisions were needed to garrison it.

Any sources on the manpower needed to hold the line?
 

burmafrd

Banned
It was not all that strong a position anyway. Just as a feint the germans attacked and broke through relatively easily. I remember reading a comment from one german general that if they had known how really weak the line was they would have done a one two punch in the north through the ardennes and in the south.
 
AFAIK the part of Maginot Line that was broken hadn't been finished before WW2, but I can be wrong.
Personally, I believe the Line wasn't so bad idea - it was a good shield for France. However, nobody wins the battle only with shield, it takes also a sword. And French Army in 1940 could hardly be called a sword (with some exceptions). Also, the Line had bad influence on French generals and politics making them think only in terms of defense, without any serious thinking of manouvres. OTOH, the Maginot Line might have been an effect of that defensive school from the times of WW1, not the reason of it.
 

burmafrd

Banned
An area in the Vosges mts considered weak was broken through, but another area was also attacked-between St. Avold and Saarbrucken, and also penetrated, though that took a couple of days. In the military histories that I have seen, the actual construction of the Maginot line was very flawed- the armaments were not that great, and the spacing was too wide between strong points. The german West Wall, called the Siegfried Line, was considered a much stronger work. But it too was broken through in 1944. As Patton said, "Fixed fortifications are a monument to the arrogance of man: if the oceans and mountains can be penetrated, anything built by man will fail"
 

Redbeard

Banned
The intention of the Maginot Line was to avoid the attritional battles along the French-German border like in WWI and leaving the French field army with an operational area it was more likely to be able to handle (N. France and Belgium). In that context the Maginot Line was a huge success that worked exactly as intended, the problem was that the field army failed utterly.

The parts taken by the Germans late in the campaign were outflanked and not finsihed. The Germans had put considerable resources in an attack on the Maginot Line, not at least the huge guns/mortars of 50-80cm calibre. Such guns would probably have made at least parts of the fortifications vulnerable, but the guns would themselves be very vulnerable (and few in numbers).

Fortifications are allways vulnerable if you only perform a inactive/static defence, but in case of a German main attack on the Line, the French would not just have sit it out. Their doctrine called for counterattacks, both with air and land forces, and "plugging" breakthroughs faster than they could expand (in the difficult terrain inside the fortified area). This was the kind of warfare the French Army excelled in, but it was totally unprepared for the fast moving operations of Belgium and N. France.

It is not true that the French Army had forgotten how to attack - the offensive, both limited and all-out was an important part of the doctrine, but the French counted on meticolously planned and executed operations utilising massive firepower rather than swift movement, and personal initiative was seen as a threat and not an asset. Had the French field army in 1940 been given time to gain its cohesion my best prediction is that the Germans would have met a meatgrinder. But the French were not given that time - as orders for this or that defensive position or counterattack was issued (by courier) - the German armoured columns already was there (lead and co-ordinated by radio), and the result was complete chaos in the French ranks and disillusion and defaitism quickly spreading from the top to the bottom - of course reinforced by personal initiative not being allowed - so everybody waited for orders that either didn't arrive or were hopelessly out of context. No army could or can survive such a treatment.

I haven't got the numbers here, but from earlier dives into the subject I recall that the Maginot Line was surprisingly cheap, and avoiding its cost wouldn't have bought enough extra field forces (land or air) to put the French in a better position in 1940. Besides much of its cost was labour intensive construction that could not easily be transformed into building tanks or planes - or refined doctrines.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
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