MacArthur loses the Formosa vs Phillipines debate

Looking at the map my first thought is about establishing a airbase/s close enough to support such a action? Second thought is the same for a logistics base? Third is how this supports action vs Japan?

For the first & second Macs South pacific campaign has brought the US logistics tail relatively close to the PI, but Formosa is a step further & the residual japanese forces on the PI lie along that route. The USN advance across the central Pacific was also a step removed from Formosa in late 1944. However you cut it extra time is necessary to capture & establish a logistics/airbase close enough to support a large scale invasion of Formosa.

Formosa is useful if you want to attack the Japanese territory on Chinas coast. It is a bit far from Japan itself, actually as far if not further than the Marianas islands, so only VLR bombers like the B29 or B24 can use it vs Japan. Really neither PI nor Formosa provided a good base for directly attacking Japan. Islands that are inside easy single & twin engine range of Japan are needed. That short a range also makes the task of supplying a invasion force on the Japanese home islands easier.

Unrelated to invading Japan is the large home army of Fillipinos. By latter 1944 a fairly good net work of intelligence agents had been stood up, and a underground of agents for evacuating downed flyers or inserting US raiders was in place. then there were the Fillipino guerillia fighters. Formosa lacked much of that sort of thing.
 
So in fall 1944 Taiwan is attacked, rather than the Phillpines. What happens next?

How will the national psyche of the Filipinos be like if their country isn't liberated?

Politics, politics, politics. 1944 was an election year. Nimitz told FDR an invasion of Formosa would take place in January of 1946.:eek: Fifteen months later than MacArthur's timetable for the Philippines. Add on a much more friendly native population, a huge (by this time) guerilla army, better terrain than Formosa's rugged hills:( It was not logistically possible for the US Navy to pull off an invasion of Formosa (so close to Japanese occupied bases in China) so much earlier in the war. I honestly don't know what Nimitz was thinking.

Snuff the Obama talk, unless you want this thread de-railed and sent to Chat;)
 
.... I honestly don't know what Nimitz was thinking.

My take is Nimitz did not want to 'do' Formosa at all. his 1946 estimate may have been a worst case given to shut off the Formosa proposal. ...but I could be wrong here. Anyone with the books at hand to tell us where the Formosa proposal actually came from?
 

Japhy

Banned
My take is Nimitz did not want to 'do' Formosa at all. his 1946 estimate may have been a worst case given to shut off the Formosa proposal. ...but I could be wrong here. Anyone with the books at hand to tell us where the Formosa proposal actually came from?

It was a worst-case. The Goal was never Formosa because Nimitz knew Formosa was useless for the war effort and would drag the US onto the Mainland where no one wanted to fight a war. The goal was to skip all that noise in the Philippines and go direct for Iwo and Okinawa. 1946 on Taiwan was about dealing with the Japanese on the mainland in 1946 when it was presumed they'd be doing a crazy holdout thing and going to the Mainland became a necessity.
 
Not going to happen.

Even if Nimitz was putting a worst case spin on it, Formosa was bigger, better defended, & more populous, & not necessary, when taking Iwo Jima & Okinawa were on the right road. (IMO, Luzon & Leyte were a complete waste of effort, & besides the delay from taking them materially lengthened the war, thanks to forces bound there which didn't arrive, but ended up on Iwo or Oki, instead.:eek::rolleyes:)
 
Not going to happen.

Even if Nimitz was putting a worst case spin on it, Formosa was bigger, better defended, & more populous, & not necessary, when taking Iwo Jima & Okinawa were on the right road. (IMO, Luzon & Leyte were a complete waste of effort, & besides the delay from taking them materially lengthened the war, thanks to forces bound there which didn't arrive, but ended up on Iwo or Oki, instead.:eek::rolleyes:)

Still more useful than invading Formosa. And there were politics involved as well, such as the need to avenge Corregidor and Bataan.
 
John Farson said:
Still more useful than invading Formosa. And there were politics involved as well, such as the need to avenge Corregidor and Bataan.
Manila & P.I. are not the direct route to Tokyo, so I'd question "useful". As for "need", I doubt that, too. Nations & governments don't routinely take revenge, tho the publics may want it.

Ending the war sooner was the morally correct option for the U.S. fighting men who'd be getting wounded, & killed, by the delay, not to mention the Japanese ones, nor to mention the Japanese civilians.
 
Politically very difficult as the PI were US territory before the war. Skipping them to go to Iwo Jima would have been very controversial. Not only would not going to liberate a former territory look bad to nationalists but because of Mac Arthur's famous "I shall return" statement look like an act of bad faith. Of course the plan was to take the PI after it is cut off and Japan occupied but it would still look bad right before the 1944 elections.
 
Politically very difficult as the PI were US territory before the war. Skipping them to go to Iwo Jima would have been very controversial. Not only would not going to liberate a former territory look bad to nationalists but because of Mac Arthur's famous "I shall return" statement look like an act of bad faith. Of course the plan was to take the PI after it is cut off and Japan occupied but it would still look bad right before the 1944 elections.

What he said. The Pacific campaign was not purely a military affair. Even without Mac, the U.S. public would be vocally demanding that the defeats of 1941-42 be avenged, something that FDR would be very conscious about. Also, the U.S. campaign in the Philippines did serve to end the Japanese occupation sooner, and no one deserved to live a moment longer in those conditions than necessary.
 
Politically very difficult as the PI were US territory before the war. Skipping them to go to Iwo Jima would have been very controversial. Not only would not going to liberate a former territory look bad to nationalists but because of Mac Arthur's famous "I shall return" statement look like an act of bad faith. Of course the plan was to take the PI after it is cut off and Japan occupied but it would still look bad right before the 1944 elections.
MacArthur didn't speak for the U.S. government, so bad faith is of no moment. (Nor is is exactly remarkable a government changes its mind, as witness promises by one U.S. administration to South Vietnam, reneged on by another...)

The political fallout IMO is overblown; it's 1944, not 1994. Congress, & the public, didn't have the influence on decisions we take for granted.

Furthermore, if P.I. were bypassed, the battles of Iwo Jima & Okinawa would be over before the elections...& we'd be talking about the prospect of Japan's surrender by Christmas. Tell me that wouldn't be politcally popular.:rolleyes:
 

Japhy

Banned
Its worth pointing out that Luzon and Layte were on the way, or at least are on the way from the direction of the South-West Pacific Zone. It is natural from the campaign up the Solomon and across the coast of New Guinea to shoot for Manila as it brings everyone up into the same General area as Nimitz' command. It may not be the most brilliant move objectively, but its not as if that sort of sweeping movement doesn't seem simple and advantageous at the time.

In contrast going for Taiwan means that that South West Area supply chain and layered structure is redundant, as well as shifting at least part of US focus towards eliminating at that point now-dangerous Japanese holdouts on the China coast.
 

The Sandman

Banned
Go for Mindanao first in order to have airfields with which to pound the refineries and oil wells on Borneo instead of having to mount extreme-range raids from New Guinea. This also gives you air coverage over the rest of the Philippines, and there's some actual infrastructure available on Mindanao to support troops and planes.

Other good targets might have been the Andamans and Timor. Again, the goal is to bring the major ports and oil-related infrastructure of the DEI and Malaya within range of large numbers of Allied aircraft.

New Guinea was a waste of resources after the end of the Kokoda Trail campaign, and shouldn't have been done. Use those ships and troops for Timor instead, or just send them entirely out of the theater.
 
What he said. The Pacific campaign was not purely a military affair. Even without Mac, the U.S. public would be vocally demanding that the defeats of 1941-42 be avenged, something that FDR would be very conscious about. Also, the U.S. campaign in the Philippines did serve to end the Japanese occupation sooner, and no one deserved to live a moment longer in those conditions than necessary.(1)

1) Not to mention providing large air bases to interdict shipping traffic between Japan and their possessions in the DEI, Malaya, and French Indo-China.

MacArthur didn't speak for the U.S. government, so bad faith is of no moment. (2) (Nor is is exactly remarkable a government changes its mind, as witness promises by one U.S. administration to South Vietnam, reneged on by another...) (3)

The political fallout IMO is overblown; it's 1944, not 1994. Congress, & the public, didn't have the influence on decisions we take for granted. (4)

Furthermore, if P.I. were bypassed, the battles of Iwo Jima & Okinawa would be over before the elections...& we'd be talking about the prospect of Japan's surrender by Christmas. (5) Tell me that wouldn't be politcally popular.:rolleyes:

2) His promise was taken as a matter of policy by the public. It was never disavowed by FDR. He would have lost control of the US House of Representatives in 1942 had he done so.

3) Promises made to a corrupt venal independent government (South Vietnam) in a war lasting 15 years involving American troops taking 56,000 American lives and twenty times as many Asians. Saigon had its chance to clean up its act, but its leaders were too busy collecting bullion. Contrast that to promises made to an American territorial government and their people. The people of that land who were suffering under Japanese occupation and despite that maintaining a strong guerilla resistance under the expectation of an eventual American liberating fleet and army.

4) The Congress and the public had a lot more influence over decisions back then. The lobbyists hadn't taken over yet. Gerrymandering was mostly a Southern symptom in those days. And 1944 was an election year. FDR may have been a lock, but those House and Senate seats were not. If Roosevelt wanted his spending programs passed he needed the support of a Democratic Congress facing two elections in WWII.

5) Japan's surrender by Christmas 1944!? Wow. I've been served up some fat pitches before, but...:rolleyes: I think I'll let other others take that one. I don't want to be greedy.

Go for Mindanao first in order to have airfields with which to pound the refineries and oil wells on Borneo instead of having to mount extreme-range raids from New Guinea. This also gives you air coverage over the rest of the Philippines, and there's some actual infrastructure available on Mindanao to support troops and planes.

Good arguments all. But they are predicated on a military POV only. Liberating the Philippines was as equally a political action. Landing at Leyte, while not as sound logistically or operationally as Mindanao, allowed for a more rapid series of landings in the more population rich island of Luzon. Meaning an earlier liberation of more Filippinos (like in Manila:() and the PoW camps in the interior.

Also, the idea was to break land based Japanese airpower in the Philippines before the IJN could interfere (done, mostly) and then crush the IJN fleets when they arrived (done, mostly). The occupation of the Philippines wasn't about getting strategic bombers bases to hit anything in the DEI. The Allied B-24s in Australia and New Guinea were already doing a good enough job of that. Between the sabotage done by the Dutch oil crews before the oilfields were taken by the Japanese, the piss-poor job the Japanese did of repairing the wells, and what the Allied B-24s in Australia and New Guinea did to those fields in turn, by the time the Australian Army invaded the DEI in early to mid-1945 there wasn't anything left of those Dutch oilfields but ruins.

Those American bomber bases (to be) in the Philippines were for...see my response at top to John Farson

The Sandman said:
Other good targets might have been the Andamans and Timor. Again, the goal is to bring the major ports and oil-related infrastructure of the DEI and Malaya within range of large numbers of Allied aircraft.

The Andamans would have been a good idea, but the Royal Navy was too busy for most of the war. By the time they were finally ready to make the jump (Operation Dracula) the war was over. The distances for the logistics for Timor were just too extreme earlier in the war. And too many narrow restricting island channels for the Allied navies to have proper freedom of movement. Even in the Philippines it was basically all down to the Surigao and San Bernadino Straits. Forcing the USN to operate to the east and the IJN to the west.

The Sandman said:
New Guinea was a waste of resources after the end of the Kokoda Trail campaign, and shouldn't have been done. Use those ships and troops for Timor instead, or just send them entirely out of the theater.

It's not a question of troops, or even ships so much. New Guinea was the only place where land based American air power could be fully brought to bear against the Japanese. And after Kokoda, the US Navy was busy in the Central Pacific. The South West Pacific campaigns in New Guinea allowed for a strategic diversion that the US could afford and the Japanese couldn't. If Timor had been attempted after Kokoda, and the Japanese Navy had chosen (if timed right) to respond in full, MacArthur's little fleet and invasion forces could have faced destruction with most of the US Navy thousands of miles away in the Marshalls.:eek:
 
usertron2020 said:
Not to mention providing large air bases to interdict shipping traffic between Japan and their possessions in the DEI, Malaya, and French Indo-China.
Not a useless place, but not one of prime importance, I suggest.
usertron2020 said:
His promise was taken as a matter of policy by the public. It was never disavowed by FDR. He would have lost control of the US House of Representatives in 1942 had he done so.
In 1942, yes. With a change in Japan's government in '44 (after the fall of Saipan) & with the U.S. visibly closer to Japan TTL than OTL...

Nor was there ever an express promise MacArthur, or anyone, would "return" before Japan was defeated...
usertron2020 said:
Promises made to a corrupt venal independent government...
Not arguing for equivalence, by any means, only that a promise isn't carven in stone.
usertron2020 said:
maintaining a strong guerilla resistance under the expectation of an eventual American liberating fleet and army.
How strong that was is for another thread. And defeat of Japan would liberate them as readily, & faster IMO.
usertron2020 said:
The Congress and the public had a lot more influence over decisions back then. The lobbyists hadn't taken over yet. Gerrymandering was mostly a Southern symptom in those days. And 1944 was an election year. FDR may have been a lock, but those House and Senate seats were not. If Roosevelt wanted his spending programs passed he needed the support of a Democratic Congress facing two elections in WWII.
And Congress in '44 would not have tried to highjack FDR's conduct of the war. (Thought about it, yes...:rolleyes:)
usertron2020 said:
Japan's surrender by Christmas 1944!? Wow. I've been served up some fat pitches before, but...:rolleyes: I think I'll let other others take that one. I don't want to be greedy.
Talking, not necessarily achieving. Why? Take 6mo off the OTL schedule, Iwo is invaded in July '44 & secure in under a month. Okinawa about a month later, also secured in about a month. Next step is looking like Downfall...or Japan starts trying to get the SU to arrange surrender terms (while OP-20G eavesdrops)--& FDR says, "You can keep an Emperor, just not that one.", & the war ends by Xmas (or in early '45).

Or maybe Japan stalls into March or April:rolleyes:...& people begin to starve.:eek::rolleyes:
usertron2020 said:
they are predicated on a military POV only. Liberating the Philippines was as equally a political action.
I suppose, in the main, mine fail for the same reason. I would argue, however, minimizing casualties by shortening the war trumps the political gain of liberation. (IDK if that was a consideration at the time; we're more casualty-averse now.)
usertron2020 said:
Japanese Navy had chosen (if timed right) to respond in full, MacArthur's little fleet and invasion forces could have faced destruction with most of the US Navy thousands of miles away in the Marshalls.:eek:
Which would put paid to MacArthur's SWPA adventures, & put the subs in Hawaii, where they belonged, & the war would be shorter for it. As Joe Rochefort said of Pearl, cheap at the price.
 
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