MacArthur Dies

I suppose MacArthur's death butterflying away the Inchon Landing depends on to what extent it was really his plan?

Possibly, I said. It was his plan to the extent that he was the driving force behind its execution. The next man might well adopt the same plan or something similar; anyone looking at a map of Korea could see the vulnerability of the North Korean supply lines to that sort of disruption and come to the same conclusion he did. But not every commander would be as willing as he to risk landing there in those conditions.
 

Geon

Donor
...and if he fell down the staircase on 2 December and broke his neck?

Would the Japanese attack on the Philipines have been different? B-17 not lined up for parade hours after PH, etc etc?


Ivan

This is an even better scenario as far as MacArthur haters are concerned because it means MacArthur becomes a footnote in history rather then becoming a martyred hero in a strafed PT Boat. Another commander probably does not go into "shock" and do nothing for 24 hours and the B-17s survive to get some licks in and then possibly be evacuated for use elsewhere. In addition I think Luzon and Corregidor hold out longer. Food supplies that were left on the docks when MacArthur evacuated to the Rock might get there and to the defenders of Luzon which means the Japanese have to spend more effort taking Luzon and Corregidor. Whether this would have an impact on the rest of the war I leave to others more knowledgable in these matters!

Geon
 
...and if he fell down the staircase on 2 December and broke his neck?

Would the Japanese attack on the Philipines have been different? B-17 not lined up for parade hours after PH, etc etc?


Ivan


I think the very serious damage Mac was personally responsible for in 1941 was in upending the 20 year old Plan Orange. Orange said ground forces would gather on Bataan at the outset of invasion. Food, ammunition, etc would all be brought along, as they, like troops, were mostly nearby in vicinity of Manila. Mac decides mid 1941 he wants troops (and materiel) dispersed all over Luzon, to fight the Japanese on the beaches. So when Japanes easily brush aside defenders at & near beaches, its a scramble to get the troops back to Bataan from all over Luzon. Most of the men get there, but most of the materiel is destroyed or abandoned. So troops are on half rations more or less immediately on reaching Bataan. Mac is only one to blame for that.

But wouldn't the Army Air Corps commander in Phillipines be the one responsible for not sending bombers at Taiwan, or dispersing them, once word of PH arrived? Wouldn't the air commander be the one to have some reasonable CAP over the airfields when Japanese flew over? Mac made enough foolish moves entirely on his own to blacken his reputation-shouldn't a subordinate's mistake be blamed on the subordinate?
 

The Sandman

Banned
A better use for the Aussies might be trying to recapture the Lesser Sunda Islands, assuming they can't be held against the initial invasion, then use them as airbases and submarine ports to smash Japanese traffic in and around the DEI and Malaya. Unlike the New Guinea or Philippines campaigns, this would make a useful contribution to the war effort.
 
I think the very serious damage Mac was personally responsible for in 1941 was in upending the 20 year old Plan Orange. Orange said ground forces would gather on Bataan at the outset of invasion. Food, ammunition, etc would all be brought along, as they, like troops, were mostly nearby in vicinity of Manila. Mac decides mid 1941 he wants troops (and materiel) dispersed all over Luzon, to fight the Japanese on the beaches. So when Japanes easily brush aside defenders at & near beaches, its a scramble to get the troops back to Bataan from all over Luzon. Most of the men get there, but most of the materiel is destroyed or abandoned. So troops are on half rations more or less immediately on reaching Bataan. Mac is only one to blame for that.

But wouldn't the Army Air Corps commander in Phillipines be the one responsible for not sending bombers at Taiwan, or dispersing them, once word of PH arrived? Wouldn't the air commander be the one to have some reasonable CAP over the airfields when Japanese flew over? Mac made enough foolish moves entirely on his own to blacken his reputation-shouldn't a subordinate's mistake be blamed on the subordinate?

He did have some poor subordinates but he does carry the blame for some of the bad planning in the air operations, particularly in respect of delaying authorisation for bombing missions.
 

Hoist40

Banned
War Plan Orange did not include the 100,000 man Philippine Army which was not part of the US Army until Roosevelt called it up to active duty in late July 1941 after he cut off oil to the Japanese. The Philippine Army was for the defense of the Philippines when it became independent in 1946.

Because Roosevelt refused to call up the Philippine Army in Sept 1940 when he called up the US National Guard and Reserves the Philippine Army was unprepared for war. Due to Roosevelt starving the Philippines of money and weapons the Philippine Army did not even have the bases to call up its 30 regiments at one time, it took until September to call up the first 10, November to call up the next 10 and it was not until Dec 8 when the last 10 were called up.

Roosevelt also failed to send money early enough to improve US airbases until too late. Clark airbase and Del Monte airbase were the only two which were large enough to handle B-17's and Del Monte could barely handle the 16 B-17's sent there. So there was no place to disperse the rest of the B-17's at Clark Airbase, the B-17s at Del Monte were the dispersed planes. Also the money had not been available to create more taxi ways and dispersal points or revetments at Clark or any other bases.
 
To be crude, MacArthur's death probably rather shortens the Pacific War and ensures the USA devotes its total military strength to finishing the war in Europe, as opposed to a final staggered finale in the Pacific. MacArthur had only one unambiguously brilliant stroke, and it was not something he did in WWII, and had much more to do with Kim Il Sung's tactical idiocy and Walton Walker's pugnacity than anything that sniveling idiot in the Dai Ichi did. MacArthur's WWII performance......the less said of it the better.
 
I suppose MacArthur's death butterflying away the Inchon Landing depends on to what extent it was really his plan?

If a Korean War happens as per OTL, hopefully the guy replacing MacArthur as occupation general in Japan does basic military matters like drilling his troops and expecting them to march and understand one joins an army with the possibility of fighting and dying a horrible death as the expected purpose of soldiering, not living high on the hog in Tokyo partying with three mistresses and riding in big cars all over the place. Korea in 1950 was a MacArthur special in all the worst ways. And if this one factor changes, the US Army will still lack a means to handle the T-34, the real North Korean ace in the hole, but it would actually do damage *before* Walter gets to Pusan. Admittedly the USA will see North Korea pushing it to something like Pusan and think "ZOMG COMMIE WAVES" because like German generals US generals never lose wars, they're only stabbed in the back by treacherous civilians. :rolleyes: OTOH, if the USA does a better job actually defending there would not even be necessarily any wisdom in an Inchon gamble outside the USMC desire to prevent its final obliteration in nuclear-age budgeting.

Possibly, I said. It was his plan to the extent that he was the driving force behind its execution. The next man might well adopt the same plan or something similar; anyone looking at a map of Korea could see the vulnerability of the North Korean supply lines to that sort of disruption and come to the same conclusion he did. But not every commander would be as willing as he to risk landing there in those conditions.

OTOH, someone else in Japan might actually use an army in peacetime to do things like drilling and marksmanship training, not what MacArthur did. Which was neither. Sure, US forces were understrength and all that in 1945-50, but some of the things Dugout Doug did in Japan with his real job, running the military, was just plain idiocy. That he compounded this by committing his troops piecemeal, which is military logic 101 failure, is above and beyond that. MacArthur looks brilliant nowhere in 1950 Korea. Inchon would have been less necessary had he used his army like a tactician should, had he done so the USA would not have had the grave crisis it had IOTL, had that been so, the USA would not have overreacted to MacArthur's benefiting from Walton Walker's victory.

War Plan Orange did not include the 100,000 man Philippine Army which was not part of the US Army until Roosevelt called it up to active duty in late July 1941 after he cut off oil to the Japanese. The Philippine Army was for the defense of the Philippines when it became independent in 1946.

Because Roosevelt refused to call up the Philippine Army in Sept 1940 when he called up the US National Guard and Reserves the Philippine Army was unprepared for war. Due to Roosevelt starving the Philippines of money and weapons the Philippine Army did not even have the bases to call up its 30 regiments at one time, it took until September to call up the first 10, November to call up the next 10 and it was not until Dec 8 when the last 10 were called up.

Roosevelt also failed to send money early enough to improve US airbases until too late. Clark airbase and Del Monte airbase were the only two which were large enough to handle B-17's and Del Monte could barely handle the 16 B-17's sent there. So there was no place to disperse the rest of the B-17's at Clark Airbase, the B-17s at Del Monte were the dispersed planes. Also the money had not been available to create more taxi ways and dispersal points or revetments at Clark or any other bases.

Yes, yes, just like German generals US generals can do no wrong, only the civilians do wrong. :rolleyes:

MacArthur should have planned for the army he had, not the one he wanted. Any explanation relying on Dolchstosslegende still impales itself on this factor alone.
 

Cook

Banned
MacArthur hijacked the war effort to appease his own personal vanity in the Philippines; without him, I have a hard time seeing the United States wanting to run two separate major offensive strategies at once. The focus would be on the Navy's Central Pacific plan.
That’s not quite correct. The pre-war Rainbow war plans projected an offensive campaign along northern Papua New Guinea, using that as a springboard to reclaim the Philippines and isolating the Japanese home islands. MacArthur’s hijacking was just in claiming the concept was his. Since until mid-1944 the majority of troops fighting in the Pacific are Australian you are bound to have an offensive campaign based on a counter attack by the forces that have stopped the Japanese in PNG and the Solomon’s. And since the American’s had the resources available, a second offensive in the central Pacific is highly likely.
 
...and if he fell down the staircase on 2 December and broke his neck?

Would the Japanese attack on the Philipines have been different? B-17 not lined up for parade hours after PH, etc etc?


Ivan

If Doug dies BEFORE Pearl Harbor, then chances are close to 100% that whoever replaced him is going to give Breterton the OK to attack once they get the word of the attack.
 

Hoist40

Banned
Yes, yes, just like German generals US generals can do no wrong, only the civilians do wrong.
So you are saying the civilians can do no wrong and generals must fight with an Army that was untrained and badly supplied by that civilian and the civilian behavior cannot be pointed out.

It was not the military who picked a fight with the Japanese

It was not the military who put the fleet into Pearl Harbor against the militaries recommendation.

It was not the military who refused to call up the Philippine Army to active duty and supply it with money and arms

It was not the military who split the US fleet into two, moving half of it to the Atlantic leaving the fleet in the Pacific much weaker

It was not the military who cut of oil, trade and financial ties to Japan which everyone knew set the clock ticking toward war and the suddenly reverse policy and call up the Philippine Army to active duty and rush supplies to the Philippines when it was too late.

This was all done by a civilian named Roosevelt and he was the person most responsible for the defeats suffered by the US in the first six months of the war.
 

Cook

Banned
If Doug dies BEFORE Pearl Harbor, then chances are close to 100% that whoever replaced him is going to give Breterton the OK to attack once they get the word of the attack.
The snag being that the Americans had no knowledge of targets on Formosa to bomb. Their intel was absolutely nil.
 

Cook

Banned
This was all done by a civilian named Roosevelt and he was the person most responsible for the defeats suffered by the US in the first six months of the war.
And here was me thinking the Japanese were responsible.
 
So you are saying the civilians can do no wrong and generals must fight with an Army that was untrained and badly supplied by that civilian and the civilian behavior cannot be pointed out.

It was not the military who picked a fight with the Japanese

It was not the military who put the fleet into Pearl Harbor against the militaries recommendation.

It was not the military who refused to call up the Philippine Army to active duty and supply it with money and arms

It was not the military who split the US fleet into two, moving half of it to the Atlantic leaving the fleet in the Pacific much weaker

It was not the military who cut of oil, trade and financial ties to Japan which everyone knew set the clock ticking toward war and the suddenly reverse policy and call up the Philippine Army to active duty and rush supplies to the Philippines when it was too late.

This was all done by a civilian named Roosevelt and he was the person most responsible for the defeats suffered by the US in the first six months of the war.

Yes, yes, yes. Just like how Ludendorff and Manstein were defeated by that bungling idiot Hitler, so is it with the US Army: it has neither the maturity nor the responsibility to ever admit it's made up of human beings that can make mistakes. It must always be treachery, it cannot be that the US Army suffered from a poor battlefield leadership.

1) No, the civilians were angling for a fight with the Germans. It was Japan that picked a fight with the USA, the civilians were pushing the military into a war it never wanted, with Germany on the side of the British Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The US Army and Navy could have cared less about Hitler when that was going on.

2) Putting the fleet in Pearl Harbor was a valid move as a display of US strength and resolve. The problem is Japan wasn't thinking on those lines so the display was irrelevant in practice. In any event every WWII Army had to do what its civilian masters told it, bar Japan. And we know how well that military dictatorship did.

3) At a point in time when the USA was not willing to call up US troops of US citizens and arm them, that the USA was not going to do this in the Philippines is hardly surprising. The Philippines did not have a strong military force even on paper.

4) Erm, that split predated WWII by a period going all the way back to the start of the US Navy. This point is flat out nonsense and bollocks.

5) On the contrary, the feeling was that this would deter Japan from a war, amplified by the long-term buildup of the B-17s. The problem was nobody realized Japan was able to organize a massive simultaneous pan-Pacific Offensive. Anybody that did would not have said it for fear of being sacked.

6) I thought that the Japanese Army and Navy had a little something to do with those defeats myself, but what do I know? :rolleyes:
 
It is more interesting to assume MacArthur dies before Dec. 8, 1941 but less of a POD for the PT Boat or sub evacuation from the Phillipines to fail. All sorts of better defense of the Phillipines would occur while doing worse is harder to imagine. Japanese losses of troops and ships would be considerably higher while the poor logistical planning/supplies available in Japanese planning become more critical the longer the war is fought there. The recent bio of Russell Volckman, "American Guerilla" by Mike Guardia is pretty intriguing on these possibilities, Volckman being one of the regulars abandoned by Mac who saw surrender as a fatal option and built up a quite sizable resistance operation throughout the war in Luzon, helping considerably in the OTL liberation of the Phillipines but then obscured by Mac's ego. Shows how better dispersal of supplies and troops into the boondocks instead of a starve-out on Corregidor could well have happened...draining the Japanese of more resources for all of their other campaigns.

You'd wonder if Eisenhower would be sent back there given he'd been Mac's long-suffering number 2 in the Phillipines up until recently, helped train the Phillipine Army and would have an excellent grasp of the situation. Boy does that butterfly a lot of things.

Wouldn't the Australian troops and fleet then either be much more available for the Malaysian/Burma campaigns and perhaps the Kra Peninsula/Singapore defense or earlier liberation? That seems significant in both creating Japanese problems and reducing British/Indian ones.

A Central Pacific campaign focus, retaking some portion of the Phillipines to serve as a logistics center for Filipino resistance and an airbase/PT Boat/subbase to tie down Yamashita's army there, and I'd wonder how the casualties in taking Taiwan would compare to Okinawa and Iwo Jima?

Maybe this all allows Marshall's plan for a 1943 invasion of France instead of the sideshows and splintering of forces with more troops, landing craft, supplies, fighters, etc. available for D-Day instead of Pacific campaigns that don't happen without MacArthur.
 

Hoist40

Banned
It was Japan that picked a fight with the USA,
The Japanese were fighting the Chinese when Roosevelt started to rattle sabers.
Putting the fleet in Pearl Harbor was a valid move as a display of US strength and resolve.
Without supply ships, troop transports, repair ships, oilers, and a marine force putting the fleet into Pearl Harbor was empty saber rattling. The fleet could not carry out War Plan Orange without those support ships so putting the Fleet into Pearl actually showed incompetence and removed the fleets most important ability, that of movement so that the Japanese could plan for months to attack since there was no place else for the fleet to be within thousands of miles.
At a point in time when the USA was not willing to call up US troops of US citizens and arm them, that the USA was not going to do this in the Philippines is hardly surprising. The Philippines did not have a strong military force even on paper.
The US had called up its reserves, National Guard and started the draft in September 1940, yet Roosevelt refused the request of the President of the Philippines and the senior US Army commander in the Philippines to call up the Philippine Army at the same time. This was after Roosevelt had already started to saber rattle at the Japanese and when the Philippines was the US most vulnerable possession.
4) Erm, that split predated WWII by a period going all the way back to the start of the US Navy. This point is flat out nonsense and bollocks.
No it was not, in 1940 there was only one major US fleet and it was commanded by Admiral Richardson. After Richardson complained personally to Roosevelt about keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor he was fired and the Navy was reorganized with Kimmel getting the new Pacific Fleet and a new Atlantic fleet being created in Feb 1941
5) On the contrary, the feeling was that this would deter Japan from a war, amplified by the long-term buildup of the B-17s. The problem was nobody realized Japan was able to organize a massive simultaneous pan-Pacific Offensive. Anybody that did would not have said it for fear of being sacked.
Which is it, everyone feeling that it would prevent war or were they just shutting up after seeing Admiral Richardson fired by Roosevelt for speaking.

 
 
 
 
And there was much rejoicing by future Alt Historians.....or MacArthur living is one of those fixed points that cannot be altered no matter what happens...like the bog standard trying to asassinate Hitler in the 30's....MacArthur will always live.
 
The Japanese were fighting the Chinese when Roosevelt started to rattle sabers.

At the Germans, yes. Roosevelt did not want a war with Japan and Germany at the same time. He did not know as we know in hindsight that the USA really could wage a strong two-ocean offensive war.

Without supply ships, troop transports, repair ships, oilers, and a marine force putting the fleet into Pearl Harbor was empty saber rattling. The fleet could not carry out War Plan Orange without those support ships so putting the Fleet into Pearl actually showed incompetence and removed the fleets most important ability, that of movement so that the Japanese could plan for months to attack since there was no place else for the fleet to be within thousands of miles.

War Plan Orange was as bad a plan as the Soviet MP-40 concept. The battleships lost at Pearl were all but two raised to fight again, the Japaense missed the carriers. In a 1941 open battle Japan kicks US ass, so it was either the one or the other variety of asskicking, which Japan wins by superior concentration of carriers and superior carrier planes.

The US had called up its reserves, National Guard and started the draft in September 1940, yet Roosevelt refused the request of the President of the Philippines and the senior US Army commander in the Philippines to call up the Philippine Army at the same time. This was after Roosevelt had already started to saber rattle at the Japanese and when the Philippines was the US most vulnerable possession.

Those decisions were extremely unpopular and nowhere near sufficient to put the USA in fighting trim.

No it was not, in 1940 there was only one major US fleet and it was commanded by Admiral Richardson. After Richardson complained personally to Roosevelt about keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor he was fired and the Navy was reorganized with Kimmel getting the new Pacific Fleet and a new Atlantic fleet being created in Feb 1941

Which is it, everyone feeling that it would prevent war or were they just shutting up after seeing Admiral Richardson fired by Roosevelt for speaking.

The latter. The USA did not want or need a war with the Japanese when it was angling for a war with the Germans, while the US Military was focused on the war in the Pacific at the expense of the Atlantic. The USA never accepted any actual concept of a European war, you can see this in its entire approach to it, but in reality the USA was forced by strategic logic to focus on Germany first. What it never did was aim for Japan first.
 
It seems a lot of people think along the lines that I did - that without having MacArthur playing at demi-godhood, there would have been no dual strategy in the Pacific, and with it, the consequent diversion of resources. When you get down to it, after Australia was safe and sound, it's hard to make a justification for anything MacArthur did in purely military terms.

MacArthur's campaigns happened because MacArthur was MacArthur and he had an army; that this army would be dismantled and MacArthur sidelined was politically inconceivable. So, Mac got his own theater offensive, with its consequent drain on the resources of both King's offensive and Europe.

Ultimately, I don't see Mac's death in 1942 ending the war earlier. It just means a lot of irrelevant fighting never takes place, and with it lower American and Japanese casualties.

The idea that Mac's death might make him a martyr, and therefore make invading the Philippines a political necessity never occurred to me, but I have to admit it makes sense. It's plausible certainly. What I did realize is that if Mac died and there was no invasion of the Philippines -- King lets the Japanese army sit there in isolation -- then the result is a prolongation of that particularly nasty occupation. I doubt the Filipinos would have appreciated it.
 
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