Luftwaffe wins Battle of Britain, No Sealion

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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They are withdrawing to reconstitute the squadrons and to move the airfields out of easy bombing range. The still fight, but having to come from farther north, it is harder to protect London and the coast. It would be a defensive pause that would see heavy bombing of targets in Southern England with marginally effective air defense. The UK had minimum levels of fighter that had to remain ready to cover the fleet during Sea Lion.

I have searched and searched for mention of this plan and found no record of it other than in the RAF's own history files and all that says is a suggestion was made and that both Dowding and Park would'nt do it. All it does is lead the German's to believe they have cleared the skies and the next phase of the invasion plan begins. If Dowding and Park both recognised the error in withdrawing North of the Thames surely others can too ??
 

sharlin

Banned
Thing is you're relying on German recon which was never that good over England, and the Abwher (or how ever its spelt) and they were almost criminally incompetent or in some cases actively working against the Nazi's.
 

Deleted member 1487

Thing is you're relying on German recon which was never that good over England, and the Abwher (or how ever its spelt) and they were almost criminally incompetent or in some cases actively working against the Nazi's.

AFAIK recon wasn't the problem, but rather analysis of the information gathered.
 
Reading Churchill's World War 2 Volume II, Their Finest Hour makes mention of exactly this plan. Should further resistance by RAF prove impossible, the squadrons would pull out to the airfields beyond the combat range of LW (or at leat first class LW fighters). If the invaion became imminent they'd transfer south again and expand their utmost effort to stop it.
 
Reading Churchill's World War 2 Volume II, Their Finest Hour makes mention of exactly this plan. Should further resistance by RAF prove impossible, the squadrons would pull out to the airfields beyond the combat range of LW (or at leat first class LW fighters). If the invaion became imminent they'd transfer south again and expand their utmost effort to stop it.
In that case my question still stands ...

IF this plan ever existed rather than it just being a notion in Churchill's mind why wasn't it put into motion on 6/7th September 1940 when the British armed forces were sent notification that the invasion was expected within 24 hours?

And why do the RAF's official records state that when the suggestion to pull back north of the Thames was made that both Dowding and Park refuse to contemplate it?

Without new airfields where would the squadrons of 11 Group have gone, I know they could fly from pretty rough air strips but they couldn't operate without the command, communication and repair facilities.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I have searched and searched for mention of this plan and found no record of it other than in the RAF's own history files and all that says is a suggestion was made and that both Dowding and Park would'nt do it. All it does is lead the German's to believe they have cleared the skies and the next phase of the invasion plan begins. If Dowding and Park both recognised the error in withdrawing North of the Thames surely others can too ??

Reading Churchill's World War 2 Volume II, Their Finest Hour makes mention of exactly this plan. Should further resistance by RAF prove impossible, the squadrons would pull out to the airfields beyond the combat range of LW (or at leat first class LW fighters). If the invaion became imminent they'd transfer south again and expand their utmost effort to stop it.

In that case my question still stands ...

IF this plan ever existed rather than it just being a notion in Churchill's mind why wasn't it put into motion on 6/7th September 1940 when the British armed forces were sent notification that the invasion was expected within 24 hours?

And why do the RAF's official records state that when the suggestion to pull back north of the Thames was made that both Dowding and Park refuse to contemplate it?

Without new airfields where would the squadrons of 11 Group have gone, I know they could fly from pretty rough air strips but they couldn't operate without the command, communication and repair facilities.

Churchill is famous for exaggerations/falsehoods that make him look better. I would guess the RAF archives are correct, and Churchill made up this idea to make himself look better post war. Take a list of things Churchill said that are not true.

1) Italy was not important to winning WW1.

2) Losing Jutland could have cost the UK WW1.

3) Defense of wisdom of Gallipoli.

4) The economic issues post WW1 are other people fault. Despite him being the Finance Minister when they went back on the gold standard, it was someone else to blame.

5) Others cut the UK defense budget, and he saved it. Sure at times he called for large defense budgets, but he also support cuts at various times.

In short, he is a politician, and his "factual" statements should be taken with the same skepticism we give Clinton, Bush II or Obama.
 

amphibulous

Banned
Churchill is famous for exaggerations/falsehoods that make him look better. I would guess the RAF archives are correct, and Churchill made up this idea to make himself look better post war.

But this wouldn't.

And the RAF always kept strong reserves in the NW and Wales.

And no has quoted the RAF archives, only given his interpretation of what they say - and I believe this is the person who believes that Sealion would launch automatically, without any human discussion, once the Germans believed that RAF were below a specified limit...
 
11 group ceased operations from 2 airfields for a while, Manston and another one I'd have to look up. They operated from Eastchurch as well but withdrew. They ceased operations at Biggin Hill for a couple of hours. They had no plan to withdraw as long as the bases were tenable, but they had a plan to withdraw from those that couldn't operate.
 
But this wouldn't.

And the RAF always kept strong reserves in the NW and Wales.

And no has quoted the RAF archives, only given his interpretation of what they say - and I believe this is the person who believes that Sealion would launch automatically, without any human discussion, once the Germans believed that RAF were below a specified limit...

I have quoted the actual text ... A little further back in this thread and if you read carefully I have actually said more than once that withdrawal north of the Thames would signal to the Germans that the skies in the south were clear and the next phase of the invasion plan would begin. Not the physical landings but the softening up of naval targets. Dowding and Park also recognised this which is why they didn't do it when it was suggested.
 
winning the BoB and then not launching Sealion seems kinda... pointless. What's the use of driving the RAF to the north? The Luftwaffe can't keep up the pace for months on end, and when/if Barbarossa comes around, the LW hammering Britain will likely have to withdraw anyway, and the RAF just goes back home...
 

amphibulous

Banned
winning the BoB and then not launching Sealion seems kinda... pointless.

So you're proposing that a disasterous military operation...

http://www.philm.demon.co.uk/Miscellaneous/Sealion.htm

To get the first wave across, the Germans gathered barges and tugs, totally disrupting their trade in the Baltic. Eventually, 170 cargo ships, 1277 barges, and 471 tugs were gathered. These were, inevitably, bombed by the RAF (about 10% being sunk before they dispersed again). The barges were mainly those designed for use on the Rhine, with a shallow freeboard. They sink in anything above Sea State 2. The wash from a fast-moving destroyer would swamp and sink the barge. (Correct: the RN could sink the lot without firing a shot).

..Finally, the barges were under-powered for open water operations, and required towing. The basic unit was a tug towing two barges, and travelling at 2-3 knots, in the Channel, which has tides of 5 knots. Given that the distance that the far left of the invasion had to cross, a minimum of 85 miles, the poor bloody soldiers would be wallowing for a minimum of 30 hours in an open boat, and expected to carry out an opposed amphibious landing at the end of it.

The most comical element of the plan, however, was that for manoeuvring the flotilla. The plan was that this huge mass of towed barges would proceed in column until reaching a point ten miles from the landing beach, then wheel and steer parallel to the coast. When this was complete, the vessels would make a 90 degree turn at the same time, and advance in line towards the coast. This was to be carried out at night, and controlled and co-ordinated by loud hailers. There had been no chance to practise the operation, and there was less than one skilled sailor per vessel.

If this seems to be a nightmare scenario, and a recipe for disaster, it is as nothing compared to other elements.

...One single main exercise was carried out, just off Boulogne. Fifty vessels were used, and to enable the observers to actually observe, the exercise was carried out in broad daylight. (The real thing was due to take place at night/dawn, remember).

The vessels marshalled about a mile out to sea, and cruised parallel to the coast. The armada turned towards the coast (one barge capsizing, and another losing its tow) and approached and landed. The barges opened, and soldiers swarmed ashore.

However, it was noted that the masters of the boats let the intervals between the vessels become wider and wider, because they were scared of collisions. Half the barges failed to get their troops ashore within an hour of the first troops, and over 10% failed to reach the shore at all.

The troops in the barges managed to impede the sailors in a remarkable manner - in one case, a barge overturned because the troops rushed to one side when another barge "came too close".

Several barges grounded broadside on, preventing the ramp from being lowered.

In this exercise, carried out in good visibility, with no enemy, in good weather, after travelling only a short distance, with no navigation hazards or beach defences, less than half the troops were got ashore where they could have done what they were supposed to do.

The exercise was officially judged to have been a "great success".


..should be undertaken to provide a rationale for a previous one?
 

Deleted member 1487

winning the BoB and then not launching Sealion seems kinda... pointless. What's the use of driving the RAF to the north? The Luftwaffe can't keep up the pace for months on end, and when/if Barbarossa comes around, the LW hammering Britain will likely have to withdraw anyway, and the RAF just goes back home...

My OP:
So hypothetically say the Luftwaffe wins the Battle of Britain and the RAF withdraws to the north of Britain to rebuild and still contest Luftwaffe raids over Southern Britain.

But in the meantime Coastal and Bomber Command smash up the Rhein barges so badly that Sealion is called off.
So Germany cannot launch an invasion, but the fall out of the RAF having to move their bases north on politics is severe.
The fear of 'unfettered' German bombing of London war a major fear pre-war and the public and policymakers that were not Churchill panicked at the thought of the Luftwaffe bombing London continuously and the public would revolt. What would the effect of this be?

What effect does this have on Churchill? Is this enough to force a vote-of-no-confidence and topple him, or will he survive, or will there even be a vote?
Its not that Sea Lion is not ordered, but that because of RAF operations against the boats that would launch the invasion, the invasion becomes impossible.
So the Luftwaffe continues bombing British cities and has a better time of its without the RAF flying out of bases in the OTL Number 11 Group airfields.

So you're proposing that a disasterous military operation...
..should be undertaken to provide a rationale for a previous one?

I think he is saying that the two operations are inextricably linked, so that you cannot have one without the other, as it would make the other pointless. Of course my OP explained the situation so that Sea Lion is not an option.
 
wiking, the problem is that this requires the Luftwaffe to be run to the point of exhaustion and heavy losses only to have the unspeakable called off after the damage is done.
 
So hypothetically say the Luftwaffe wins the Battle of Britain and the RAF withdraws to the north of Britain to rebuild and still contest Luftwaffe raids over Southern Britain.

But in the meantime Coastal and Bomber Command smash up the Rhein barges so badly that Sealion is called off.
So Germany cannot launch an invasion, but the fall out of the RAF having to move their bases north on politics is severe.
The fear of 'unfettered' German bombing of London war a major fear pre-war and the public and policymakers that were not Churchill panicked at the thought of the Luftwaffe bombing London continuously and the public would revolt. What would the effect of this be?

What effect does this have on Churchill? Is this enough to force a vote-of-no-confidence and topple him, or will he survive, or will there even be a vote?

Combine with your altered Plan Z thread, and you probably have a plausible "Germany wins the Western Front" scenario brewing, if Hitler doesn't make too many demands of the UK.
 
wiking, the problem is that this requires the Luftwaffe to be run to the point of exhaustion and heavy losses only to have the unspeakable called off after the damage is done.

Britain is still bombing Germany, though, and did so OTL throughout the Blitz. Even if the Brits have to pull north of London and concentrate production of fighters, there's still a lot of bombers in the RAF and they'll still bomb Germany, if with a diminished frequency. As long as that keeps on, Hitler will throw the LW into the cauldron until Barbarossa.

One question that comes to mind is, if the LW still has local air superiority over Kent and Sussex in late May 1941, will Hitler order a larger force to stay behind than OTL? Would this have any effect in Russia? Probably not IMO, but who knows?
 

Deleted member 1487

Britain is still bombing Germany, though, and did so OTL throughout the Blitz. Even if the Brits have to pull north of London and concentrate production of fighters, there's still a lot of bombers in the RAF and they'll still bomb Germany, if with a diminished frequency. As long as that keeps on, Hitler will throw the LW into the cauldron until Barbarossa.
The RAF had about 400 bombers, almost exclusively medium bombers with two engines, not strategic bombers. This was about a quarter of the Luftwaffe's bomber total.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_report
They were also terribly inaccurate and missed their targets by many miles, something they didn't really realize until late 1941 and weren't really effective until 1943.
Bomber Command was a farce at this point in the war and they were lucky if they hit more than open fields.
Now I don't disagree that Hitler would keep hitting Britain, he had to do something to get them to leave the war.

One question that comes to mind is, if the LW still has local air superiority over Kent and Sussex in late May 1941, will Hitler order a larger force to stay behind than OTL? Would this have any effect in Russia? Probably not IMO, but who knows?
No, but if the fighting over Britain remained high, the LW might not deploy as much or at all to the Mediterranean, which means Britain is hit much harder, as the shift of LW bombers in 1941 really affected the ability of the LW to generate effective amounts of sortees on a regular basis.

wiking, the problem is that this requires the Luftwaffe to be run to the point of exhaustion and heavy losses only to have the unspeakable called off after the damage is done.
If the result is a deal with Britain its well worth it. The damage was done IOTL anyway though and Sea Lion wasn't a viable option then either. Plus the LW ran the BoB very badly, so even with better management there were better results than OTL on the table for equal damage to the LW.

Combine with your altered Plan Z thread, and you probably have a plausible "Germany wins the Western Front" scenario brewing, if Hitler doesn't make too many demands of the UK.
Well, Germany would need more than Uboats to beat Britain and if the LW is diverted fighting the BoB, then its not bombing the areas that were really vulnerable: British western ports like Liverpool. Fighting the BoB would mean the Germans cannot defeat Britain, probably even with more uboats, though it would delay Britain pretty badly in their build up. In that thread AdA mentions the only scenario I think is possible for Britain to negotiate, so I'll let you look it up there rather than rehashing the argument here.
 
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The only reason I can see for the Brits to move their planes out of range of the Luftwaffe would be if they ran very low on experienced pilots and wanted to (a) Conserve the remaining pilots for an all-out effort in the event of an invasion, and (b) Allow inexperienced pilots to integrate into depleted squadrons without getting shot to pieces before they got enough flying time to be competitive.

Downsides of the strategy: (a) It would allow unopposed Luftwaffe bombing of key industrial sites. (b) It would have some degree of negative impact on British civilian morale if the fighters that had been defending the cities suddenly disappeared. (c) It would allow the Germans to bring in dive bombers--much more accurate than level bombers of the period but dead meat in the face of fighter opposition. That last would be very significant.

The original question was what impact German control of the air over southern England without a Sealion would have on Britain. Would it force the Brits to negotiate?

Answer: If the Brits kept their nerve at the leadership level, not just Churchill but other top leaders of the major parties, then air superiority wouldn't gain the Germans much. The Brits would get new pilots up to speed, and renew the battle, assuming that the Germans kept bombing.

The German had to win the battle in the British leadership's minds--convince enough of the leadership that Britain had to negotiate. The Germans had an uphill battle to do that, for several reasons: (1) The Brits became significantly less vulnerable to invasion as the summer wore on and their experienced troops received equipment and new divisions got trained. (2) The Brits had significant knowledge of German weaknesses due to ability to decode Enigma. (3) The threat of invasion was only credible until mid-October at latest, due to the weather. (4) Weather would probably also mitigate the blitz in the winter months. The Luftwaffe was a fair-weather air force.

At least some of those German problems would have to go away for temporary air superiority to convince the Brits to negotiate. Some possibilities (1) If less of the Brit army got away at Dunkirk that would leave the Brits vulnerable to a relatively small-scale German landing longer and would put some additional pressure on the Brits to negotiate. (2) If the Germans found out about French and Polish successes on Enigma and increased security, the Brits would know far less about the progress of German invasion plans, and feel more pressure to negotiate. (3) If the German invasion of France started earlier--mid-March or early April but had a similar result, the longer time an invasion was possible would put additional pressure on the Brits to negotiate. An earlier invasion would have depended on different weather patterns in early spring 1940.

Align all of those factors the worst possible way for Britain and it's possible the British leadership would have lost its nerve and negotiated, but I'm skeptical. The bottom-line problem is that they knew they couldn't trust Hitler to abide by any treaty he signed. That being the case, what advantage was there to negotiate with him?
 
Just once in awhile - it would be nice to see a thread where the RAF do better!! For example :

- LM not in charge of 12 Group,
- no Fifghter area tactics,
- cannons that work,
- a bigger pool of pilots & training system,
- and more plentiful supply of the Dixon round ( usually referred to as de Wilde).
 
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