"Britain can take"1 it refers to a film produced by the Ministry of Information in 1940, which had been originally titled “London can take it”2 and produced for the American public. The film portrays a rather happy go lucky picture of Britain during the early stages of World War II. Did this film, with its bold statement, fit the feeling of the nation at the time though?
The bombardment, or Blitz, of British cities by the Luftwaffe between September 1940 and May 1941, has been idolized and ‘mythologized’ in the popular memory and imagery as one of Britain’s finest moments of togetherness and national unity. The raids by the German Luftwaffe were mainly concentrated on British urban industrial cities and ports, killing approximately 66,000 civilians (amount killed by end of war through bombing)3, from all walks of life. Clausewitz argued that the population's ‘involvement determined the intensity with which the war would be waged,’4 making this, in a sense, a ‘people’s war’
This essay explores how the statement "Britain can take it" was in fact misleading and does not portray the actual feeling of the nation and its state of morale at the time. Although the phrase does perhaps create an illusion of social unity at the time, which was created by the use of films and other media to portray positive morale, there was a growing disenchantment in urban areas, which found themselves "unable to take it," so to speak. In looking at the statement “Britain can take it”, we can examine whether this idea was overly exaggerated and by referring to the reports of the government agencies of the time, such as Mass Observation (M.O.), the Ministry of Information (M.O.I.), and the historiography of the event, we can see that Britain was not really taking it.
There has been a continuing historiographical debate as to whether the Blitz really did bring about a national unity and the idea that `Britain can take it’. The war-time generation of historians depicts the blitz as the turning point in British history; A. J. P. Taylor believed that it marked a ‘coming of age’5 for Britain and that the mutual suffering moved people towards a more heightened Sense of social solidarity, and that ‘Britons found themselves’6. The generation of historians born after the war though have been able to write with a more critical detachment regarding the popular image of the Blitz and the myth of Britain can take it, here amongst a heightening social tension and class based resentment, a rather bleaker outlook surrounding the Blitz is formed, an outlook perhaps for many of the population that would leave them with a feeling of hopeless, being ill-informed and at worst defeatism.
The Blitz brought into play the civilian population of Britain for the first time, although bombing raids had occurred during the First World War nothing on the scale of this had transpired before7. A. Calder saw it as unique and definitive moment in the history of Britain where the civilian population came together to fight a common foe8, the Blitz though for many of the population would mean the shattering of a normal life, with sleepless nights coupled with the possibility of emerging after the all clear to find their homes destroyed. The Government using the M.O.I would give an outward appearance that all was well and that Britain could take it, this was accomplished by the release of numerous forms of public propaganda such as posters, films and radio broadcasts which portrayed high spirits, normality and the will to carry on, all transpire to give an illusion maintaining that the civilian populations morale was at an all-time high. To bolster this illusion the government produced daily reports on morale, which contained research from the M.O.9 This continuing morale was seen by Pointing to be the work of the government rather than actual feelings of civilians10. A public image therefore seems too emerged that Britain could face the challenges of the blitz, along with the threat of invasion. Films therefore like ‘Britain can take it’ bolstered these illusions, the reality though was a different matter.
Past historiographical accounts have led to the myth of a Blitz spirit arising, Historians such as Calder and Marwick in early studies regarding Britain during the Second World War suggest that morale was robust and showed no weakness11, these ideas on morale would be later revised by historians by involving a more in-depth study of M.O reports and intelligence reports which would show a new and completely different picture of the state of morale in Britain. These reports were compiled from numerous areas around the country and showed a rather bleaker picture involving the actual state of morale than the government of the time portrays in the media. Reports from Coventry and other industrial cities and ports such as Southampton, Plymouth, Birmingham and Merseyside all showed that after sustained bombing many people found ‘their world was turned upside down’12.This was also the case in other cities and of course would have an effect on morale. Reports of defeatism, talk of being let down by the Government and the possibility of surrender shows that the idea of a high state of morale was in fact a myth.
Responses from the public recorded after bombing raids is arguably the best evidence of a lack morale and faith in the government. Accounts from Coventry saw ‘A great depression and open signs of hysteria’13 , Bristol recorded people feeling ‘Let down by the Government’14. Plymouth recorded signs of the population being unable to stand the bombing and that “Sooner or later the morale of other towns will go‘15. Many M.O. reports showed people for the first time ‘Arguing for immediate surrender’16. These feelings of perhaps hopelessness and feeling that the Germans could not be stopped seems to be a widespread theme in the cities that sustained nightly bombing raids during the Blitz. ‘He comes when he wants’17 was perhaps another of the major fears of the wartime population, as the Luftwaffe seemed to be able to attack at any time and in any place destroying cities and lives indiscriminately.
Morale though and the ability to take the nightly raids as we have discussed is really a small part of the state of the British civilians mind set. The Strain of sleepless nights caused by the continual raids were for many just as cruel as the killing and maiming which occurred during attacks18 a M.O report on the 16th of October recorded ‘Sleep! You couldn’t sleep. We can’t go on like this, can we?’19 Sleepless nights due to bombing would eventually wear away at morale; add to this the worries of the ability to purchase food, the general cost of living and the lack of news from the Government, all would contribute to a state of low morale within the civilian population. Morale therefore for many people was not just striving against the nightly air raids, but also the daily struggle of living in a country at war.
In conclusion although the statement “Britain can take it” is perhaps a true reflection of the outward appearance of the civilian population, that was taken on and portrayed by the Government and media of the time. The facts and reports that we have shown portray a picture which is far removed from the idea of “Britain can take it”. The wartime population in Britain was under a constant threat of being killed or made homeless from the nightly bombing raids add to this an on-going threat of invasion throughout the early years of the war, it is not surprising a picture of a population with low morale and belief in victory has now emerged. We are not saying that all the civilian population showed a less than resilient outlook in the early years, but merely stating that high morale was not always as wide spread as the Government made it out to be.
The myth of a Blitz spirit that has been documented and commented on by early post war historians, has now been revised using the feelings and thoughts of the civilian population of the time recorded in M.O reports and also the M.O.I, it shows a much clearer portrayal of civilian morale, that is far from the idea of “Britain can take it”. The idea of Britain could take it seems to be a collective idea formed out of early post war historians and the myths that have arisen from a growing collective myth that surrounded the country during the Second World War. Britain as we have discussed could not take it in some areas.
Bibliography
Calder, A. The Myth of the Blitz, (London 1991).
Clausewitz, C Von. “On War”. Trans M Howard, (Princeton 1976).
Jones, E. Public Panic and Morale: ‘Second World War Civilian Responses Re-examined in the Light of Current Anti-terrorist Campaign’ Journal of Risk Research, Vol.9, (January 2006).
Jones, E. Civilian Morale During the Second World War: Responses to Air Raids Re-examined, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 17 No.3 (2004)
Mackay, R. Half the Battle, Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, Manchester University Press,(UK 2002)
Ponting, C. 1940 Myth and Reality. Ivan R Dee (1991).
Stansky, P. The First Day of the Blitz, Yale University Press (London 2007).
Townsend, C & E. War Wives: A Second World War Anthology (Grafton Books 1989)
Taylor, A.J.P. English History, 1914-45, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1965).
Watt, H and H Jennings. “Britain Can Take it!” 1940. BFI Archive,
http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/23675 (Accessed 15/10/10).
Watt, H and H. Jennings. “London can take it!” 1940. BFI Archive,
http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/15190 (Accessed 15/10/10).
1.) Watt, H and Jennings, H. “Britain Can Take it!” 1940. BFI Archive,
http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/23675 (Accessed 15/10/10).
2.) Watt, H and Jennings, H. “London can take it!” 1940. BFI Archive,
http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/15190 (Accessed 15/10/10).
3.) P. Stansky, The First Day of the Blitz, Yale University Press (London 2007). P 12.
4.) Clausewitz, C Von “On War” Trans M Howard, (Princeton 1976) P 89
5.) A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-45, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1965).
6.) Ibid A. J. P. Taylor
7.) Op.cit. P. Stansky, pp. 5-6
8.) A. Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London 1991) pp1-5
9.) E. Jones, Public Panic and Morale: ‘Second World War Civilian Responses Re-examined in the Light of Current Anti-terrorist Campaign’ Journal of Risk Research, Vol.9, (January 2006) p59
10.) C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality. Ivan R Dee (1991). pp138-143
11.) E. Jones, Civilian Morale During the Second World War: Responses to Air Raids Re-examined, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 17 No.3 (2004)
12.) C and E Townsend, War Wives: A Second World War Anthology (Grafton Books 1989) p289
13.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Coventry 19.11.40 in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality. P164
14.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Bristol 11.12.40 in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality P164
15.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Plymouth in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality P164
16.) R, Mackay . Half the Battle, Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, Manchester University Press,(UK 2002) P77
17.) From M.O. File report 449 Ibid R, Mackay p76
18.) Ibid R, Mackay p69
19.) From M.O File Report 408 ‘Human Adjustments in Air Raids’ Ibid. R, Mackay P70