Luftwaffe wins Battle of Britain, No Sealion

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Deleted member 1487

So hypothetically say the Luftwaffe wins the Battle of Britain and the RAF withdraws to the north of Britain to rebuild and still contest Luftwaffe raids over Southern Britain.

But in the meantime Coastal and Bomber Command smash up the Rhein barges so badly that Sealion is called off.
So Germany cannot launch an invasion, but the fall out of the RAF having to move their bases north on politics is severe.
The fear of 'unfettered' German bombing of London war a major fear pre-war and the public and policymakers that were not Churchill panicked at the thought of the Luftwaffe bombing London continuously and the public would revolt. What would the effect of this be?

What effect does this have on Churchill? Is this enough to force a vote-of-no-confidence and topple him, or will he survive, or will there even be a vote?
 
If this happens before Operation Compass, hypotetically you got a situation where the UK would considder a peace proposal with Germany. What that proposal would contain i do not know.

AFter Compass, the Germans are gonna need to do a lot more then just bomb London to get them to surrender. War if Africa will drag out, Afrika Korps joins in and then you get PH.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The fear of 'unfettered' German bombing of London war a major fear pre-war and the public and policymakers that were not Churchill panicked at the thought of the Luftwaffe bombing London continuously and the public would revolt. What would the effect of this be?

They didn't panic during the Blitz. Why would they panic now?
 

Deleted member 1487

They didn't panic during the Blitz. Why would they panic now?

Because at this point London had yet to really be bombed and no one was sure if London could 'take it'. The momentous fact that the RAF was so badly mauled that it had to abandon bases in the South would IMHO have some political fall out, the question is whether it was enough for force a vote of no confidence.
 

Pangur

Donor
Because at this point London had yet to really be bombed and no one was sure if London could 'take it'. The momentous fact that the RAF was so badly mauled that it had to abandon bases in the South would IMHO have some political fall out, the question is whether it was enough for force a vote of no confidence.

Even if London was leveled (pure ASB that) why would that force a vote of confidence?


IMHO MP`s who would not normally support Churchill would support him.
 
Driving the RAF north and 'winning' the Battle of Britain is just going to be one more defeat in a string of them. It is not decisive and I can't see it forcing Churchill out of power and so long as Churchill is PM there is no chance for a peace settlement. British cities take more of a beating, RAF reprisal bombings are fewer as the British need to focus on fighter production and defense, moral is lower but is a long way from broken. Overall no significant changes.

Needing a victory for political reasons the British might be slightly more aggressive against the Italians in Africa.
 

Deleted member 1487

Even if London was leveled (pure ASB that) why would that force a vote of confidence?


IMHO MP`s who would not normally support Churchill would support him.

That's the way Churchill felt, but the question is whether that was true. During OTL Blitz there were lots of riots and strikes across the country calling for an end to the war according to the book by Angus Calder:
"The Myth of the Blitz".
Increase the pressure or the panic by things like the 'leveling of London' or the RAF 'abandoning England' and its likely that the pressure on the government forces a change in leadership. I may be wrong, but that is the impression I've gotten of the situation in Britain in 1940.
 
That's the way Churchill felt, but the question is whether that was true. During OTL Blitz there were lots of riots and strikes across the country calling for an end to the war according to the book by Angus Calder:
"The Myth of the Blitz".
Increase the pressure or the panic by things like the 'leveling of London' or the RAF 'abandoning England' and its likely that the pressure on the government forces a change in leadership. I may be wrong, but that is the impression I've gotten of the situation in Britain in 1940.

Can you cite any other books with similar premises? While I realize that propaganda shades the truth, Calder himself may have had a soupcon of an agenda.
 

Deleted member 1487

Can you cite any other books with similar premises? While I realize that propaganda shades the truth, Calder himself may have had a soupcon of an agenda.

"Dunkirk the Necessary Myth" by Nicolas Harman doesn't really focus on the Blitz per-say, but talks about the morale of the British people and how fragile it really was leading into the Battle of Britain, which a loss there could have serious effects on.

1940: Myth and Reality
Clive Ponting
http://www.amazon.com/1940-Myth-Reality-Clive-Ponting/dp/1566630363

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/blitz_01.shtml#three
The Myth of the Blitz
The account of the Blitz - as Britain's major cities experienced a sustained and unrelenting bombardment by Nazi Germany - has been etched into our country's conscience ever since the war years. The question has to be asked, however, as to whether the subsequent victory in the war, and the following 60 years, have coloured the way in which it is now generally seen?

Our heritage industry has encouraged a 'Myth of the Blitz', that differs from the reality of wartime experience. The myth is that we all pulled together, that spirits were up as young and old, upper and lower classes muddled through together with high morale under the onslaught of the Nazis.

But the 'Myth of the Blitz' is just that - a myth. As members of the establishment were able to take refuge in country houses, in comfort and out of the way of the bombs, or in expensive basement clubs in the city, the lower-middle and working classes were forced to stay in the cities and face up to the deadly raids with inadequate provision for shelter.

It was a time of terror, confusion and anger. Government incompetence - almost criminal in its extent - displayed what was almost a contempt for ordinary people. It was time for the people to help themselves to the shelter they needed. It was a time of class war.

Since the end of World War One, air attack had been seen as the warfare of the future. Predictions about the unstoppable destructive power of bombing had been terrifying. Nothing seemed safe, as industrial and domestic buildings were equally threatened. There was a real fear that society would quickly collapse, under a concerted bombing campaign. Provision of shelter from the anticipated bombing was a major issue of concern.

At first no one in authority seemed concerned about the people of Britain's towns who, unlike the upper classes, could not leave their homes and find shelter in the country. Hitler had provided large, sanitary and comfortable indestructible shelters for his people, but in this country it was a different story.

The government had understood that the safest means of shelter seemed to be deep underground shelters, so a shelter for the use of government officials was built in the disused Down Street tube station. It was fitted out with bathrooms, offices and living quarters, and it remains in place to this day - forgotten and dusty.

Finsbury, in London, was a communist borough and its councillors also recognised the need to shelter its people safely. However, a pre-war scheme designed by pioneering engineer Ove Arup to build deep shelters in its garden squares was halted.

The government expressed concern that a deep shelter system might create a 'deep shelter mentality': the fear that hordes of people might descend into the bowels of the earth and never come out, rendering them useless to the war effort and hampering war production. Unfortunately, the shelter that the government actually provided for the people was a lot more meagre.

http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/406/britain-can-take-it-rethinking-british-morale-in-1940
"Britain can take"1 it refers to a film produced by the Ministry of Information in 1940, which had been originally titled “London can take it”2 and produced for the American public. The film portrays a rather happy go lucky picture of Britain during the early stages of World War II. Did this film, with its bold statement, fit the feeling of the nation at the time though?


The bombardment, or Blitz, of British cities by the Luftwaffe between September 1940 and May 1941, has been idolized and ‘mythologized’ in the popular memory and imagery as one of Britain’s finest moments of togetherness and national unity. The raids by the German Luftwaffe were mainly concentrated on British urban industrial cities and ports, killing approximately 66,000 civilians (amount killed by end of war through bombing)3, from all walks of life. Clausewitz argued that the population's ‘involvement determined the intensity with which the war would be waged,’4 making this, in a sense, a ‘people’s war’
This essay explores how the statement "Britain can take it" was in fact misleading and does not portray the actual feeling of the nation and its state of morale at the time. Although the phrase does perhaps create an illusion of social unity at the time, which was created by the use of films and other media to portray positive morale, there was a growing disenchantment in urban areas, which found themselves "unable to take it," so to speak. In looking at the statement “Britain can take it”, we can examine whether this idea was overly exaggerated and by referring to the reports of the government agencies of the time, such as Mass Observation (M.O.), the Ministry of Information (M.O.I.), and the historiography of the event, we can see that Britain was not really taking it.

There has been a continuing historiographical debate as to whether the Blitz really did bring about a national unity and the idea that `Britain can take it’. The war-time generation of historians depicts the blitz as the turning point in British history; A. J. P. Taylor believed that it marked a ‘coming of age’5 for Britain and that the mutual suffering moved people towards a more heightened Sense of social solidarity, and that ‘Britons found themselves’6. The generation of historians born after the war though have been able to write with a more critical detachment regarding the popular image of the Blitz and the myth of Britain can take it, here amongst a heightening social tension and class based resentment, a rather bleaker outlook surrounding the Blitz is formed, an outlook perhaps for many of the population that would leave them with a feeling of hopeless, being ill-informed and at worst defeatism.

The Blitz brought into play the civilian population of Britain for the first time, although bombing raids had occurred during the First World War nothing on the scale of this had transpired before7. A. Calder saw it as unique and definitive moment in the history of Britain where the civilian population came together to fight a common foe8, the Blitz though for many of the population would mean the shattering of a normal life, with sleepless nights coupled with the possibility of emerging after the all clear to find their homes destroyed. The Government using the M.O.I would give an outward appearance that all was well and that Britain could take it, this was accomplished by the release of numerous forms of public propaganda such as posters, films and radio broadcasts which portrayed high spirits, normality and the will to carry on, all transpire to give an illusion maintaining that the civilian populations morale was at an all-time high. To bolster this illusion the government produced daily reports on morale, which contained research from the M.O.9 This continuing morale was seen by Pointing to be the work of the government rather than actual feelings of civilians10. A public image therefore seems too emerged that Britain could face the challenges of the blitz, along with the threat of invasion. Films therefore like ‘Britain can take it’ bolstered these illusions, the reality though was a different matter.

Past historiographical accounts have led to the myth of a Blitz spirit arising, Historians such as Calder and Marwick in early studies regarding Britain during the Second World War suggest that morale was robust and showed no weakness11, these ideas on morale would be later revised by historians by involving a more in-depth study of M.O reports and intelligence reports which would show a new and completely different picture of the state of morale in Britain. These reports were compiled from numerous areas around the country and showed a rather bleaker picture involving the actual state of morale than the government of the time portrays in the media. Reports from Coventry and other industrial cities and ports such as Southampton, Plymouth, Birmingham and Merseyside all showed that after sustained bombing many people found ‘their world was turned upside down’12.This was also the case in other cities and of course would have an effect on morale. Reports of defeatism, talk of being let down by the Government and the possibility of surrender shows that the idea of a high state of morale was in fact a myth.

Responses from the public recorded after bombing raids is arguably the best evidence of a lack morale and faith in the government. Accounts from Coventry saw ‘A great depression and open signs of hysteria’13 , Bristol recorded people feeling ‘Let down by the Government’14. Plymouth recorded signs of the population being unable to stand the bombing and that “Sooner or later the morale of other towns will go‘15. Many M.O. reports showed people for the first time ‘Arguing for immediate surrender’16. These feelings of perhaps hopelessness and feeling that the Germans could not be stopped seems to be a widespread theme in the cities that sustained nightly bombing raids during the Blitz. ‘He comes when he wants’17 was perhaps another of the major fears of the wartime population, as the Luftwaffe seemed to be able to attack at any time and in any place destroying cities and lives indiscriminately.

Morale though and the ability to take the nightly raids as we have discussed is really a small part of the state of the British civilians mind set. The Strain of sleepless nights caused by the continual raids were for many just as cruel as the killing and maiming which occurred during attacks18 a M.O report on the 16th of October recorded ‘Sleep! You couldn’t sleep. We can’t go on like this, can we?’19 Sleepless nights due to bombing would eventually wear away at morale; add to this the worries of the ability to purchase food, the general cost of living and the lack of news from the Government, all would contribute to a state of low morale within the civilian population. Morale therefore for many people was not just striving against the nightly air raids, but also the daily struggle of living in a country at war.
In conclusion although the statement “Britain can take it” is perhaps a true reflection of the outward appearance of the civilian population, that was taken on and portrayed by the Government and media of the time. The facts and reports that we have shown portray a picture which is far removed from the idea of “Britain can take it”. The wartime population in Britain was under a constant threat of being killed or made homeless from the nightly bombing raids add to this an on-going threat of invasion throughout the early years of the war, it is not surprising a picture of a population with low morale and belief in victory has now emerged. We are not saying that all the civilian population showed a less than resilient outlook in the early years, but merely stating that high morale was not always as wide spread as the Government made it out to be.


The myth of a Blitz spirit that has been documented and commented on by early post war historians, has now been revised using the feelings and thoughts of the civilian population of the time recorded in M.O reports and also the M.O.I, it shows a much clearer portrayal of civilian morale, that is far from the idea of “Britain can take it”. The idea of Britain could take it seems to be a collective idea formed out of early post war historians and the myths that have arisen from a growing collective myth that surrounded the country during the Second World War. Britain as we have discussed could not take it in some areas.

Bibliography

Calder, A. The Myth of the Blitz, (London 1991).

Clausewitz, C Von. “On War”. Trans M Howard, (Princeton 1976).

Jones, E. Public Panic and Morale: ‘Second World War Civilian Responses Re-examined in the Light of Current Anti-terrorist Campaign’ Journal of Risk Research, Vol.9, (January 2006).

Jones, E. Civilian Morale During the Second World War: Responses to Air Raids Re-examined, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 17 No.3 (2004)

Mackay, R. Half the Battle, Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, Manchester University Press,(UK 2002)

Ponting, C. 1940 Myth and Reality. Ivan R Dee (1991).

Stansky, P. The First Day of the Blitz, Yale University Press (London 2007).

Townsend, C & E. War Wives: A Second World War Anthology (Grafton Books 1989)

Taylor, A.J.P. English History, 1914-45, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1965).

Watt, H and H Jennings. “Britain Can Take it!” 1940. BFI Archive, http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/23675 (Accessed 15/10/10).

Watt, H and H. Jennings. “London can take it!” 1940. BFI Archive, http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/15190 (Accessed 15/10/10).

1.) Watt, H and Jennings, H. “Britain Can Take it!” 1940. BFI Archive, http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/23675 (Accessed 15/10/10).

2.) Watt, H and Jennings, H. “London can take it!” 1940. BFI Archive, http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/15190 (Accessed 15/10/10).

3.) P. Stansky, The First Day of the Blitz, Yale University Press (London 2007). P 12.

4.) Clausewitz, C Von “On War” Trans M Howard, (Princeton 1976) P 89

5.) A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-45, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1965).

6.) Ibid A. J. P. Taylor

7.) Op.cit. P. Stansky, pp. 5-6

8.) A. Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London 1991) pp1-5

9.) E. Jones, Public Panic and Morale: ‘Second World War Civilian Responses Re-examined in the Light of Current Anti-terrorist Campaign’ Journal of Risk Research, Vol.9, (January 2006) p59

10.) C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality. Ivan R Dee (1991). pp138-143

11.) E. Jones, Civilian Morale During the Second World War: Responses to Air Raids Re-examined, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 17 No.3 (2004)

12.) C and E Townsend, War Wives: A Second World War Anthology (Grafton Books 1989) p289

13.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Coventry 19.11.40 in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality. P164

14.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Bristol 11.12.40 in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality P164

15.) From M.O.I 1/292 Reports on Plymouth in C. Ponting, 1940 Myth and Reality P164

16.) R, Mackay . Half the Battle, Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, Manchester University Press,(UK 2002) P77

17.) From M.O. File report 449 Ibid R, Mackay p76

18.) Ibid R, Mackay p69

19.) From M.O File Report 408 ‘Human Adjustments in Air Raids’ Ibid. R, Mackay P70
 
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So hypothetically say the Luftwaffe wins the Battle of Britain and the RAF withdraws to the north of Britain to rebuild and still contest Luftwaffe raids over Southern Britain.
I've never understood where the withdrawal to the North has come from. I haven't come across this plan anywhere other than on this site. I'd be interested to know the source of this information so I can add it to my research.

Why wasn't this plan implemented on 7th Sept when "Invasion Alert No. 1" was issued - basically the military was told that the invasion was only hours away?
 
The other thing here is define 'north'!?

If and it's a big if, the airfields of 11 Group were so damaged to be untenable as operational. Then any withdrawal to re-group to the 'north' would merely be to North of London e.g. Duxford, Hendon and Brize Norton. Still enabling the RAF to cover London, but not so far forward. And perhaps still with the aim of re-occupying Biggin Hill & Tangmere etc.

All the RAF had to do was stay in the 'ring', keep plugging away scoring points, it was the Lw who needed to land big blows - the knockout-punch, as time was on the side of the RAF.
Whilst, the LW could have done a little better, e.g. intel, it wouldn't have made that much difference. It was the RAF doing worse that could have made the difference e.g. no RDF, no Merlin, no RAFVR, and no Park.
 
The other thing here is define 'north'!?

If and it's a big if, the airfields of 11 Group were so damaged to be untenable as operational. Then any withdrawal to re-group to the 'north' would merely be to North of London e.g. Duxford, Hendon and Brize Norton. Still enabling the RAF to cover London, but not so far forward. And perhaps still with the aim of re-occupying Biggin Hill & Tangmere etc.

All the RAF had to do was stay in the 'ring', keep plugging away scoring points, it was the Lw who needed to land big blows - the knockout-punch, as time was on the side of the RAF.
Whilst, the LW could have done a little better, e.g. intel, it wouldn't have made that much difference. It was the RAF doing worse that could have made the difference e.g. no RDF, no Merlin, no RAFVR, and no Park.
So basically the RAF move to air fields outside the range of the Bf 109 and stay there safe in the knowledge that their new bases are secure? Wouldn't this then be the signal the LW were looking for to start the next phase of the attack, naval targets ready for invasion as the LW would claim they had won at the very least local air superiority over southern England?
 
If your talking a date of September 15th when Germany wins the BOB in the air, but Hitler has cold feet about actually invading (perhaps a practice invasion exercise goes terribly bad or something) then Britain still has a strong negotiating position, the French fleet is neutralized largely, several vichy colonies are turning, Italy hasn't done anything terribly threating and several mid-east convoys are on the way. The Canadians are sitting in Kent ready to repulse an invasion and defences are building up all the time.

On the downside though, London and all the southwest can be bombed at will, night bombing can continue everywhere, and the Germans could move through the med or even through spain, and the uboat war and FW200 attack is just get started with unknown results.

Really for starters Hitler has to make a public pronouncement with exact terms. Britain can't accept anything where:

1) Germany get her colonies back (future world wide uboat bases can't be tolerated)
2) The French, Belgian or Dutch channel ports are occupied by Germans
3) Norway is occupied by the Germans.
3) Germany is allowed to build a huge fleet.

But if the Germans terms can comply with the above. I suppose its possible.

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I think a German torpedos fixed POD would be much more scary for Britain, if Ark Royal, Nelson and Warspite were sunk by this point, Britain might get concerned about the strategic naval balance trending against her and the uboat menace far more scary that the actual reality.
 
... Wouldn't this then be the signal the LW were looking for to start the next phase of the attack, naval targets ready for invasion as the LW would claim they had won at the very least local air superiority over southern England?

Yes, in the FUBAR mess that is German High Command, the Luftwaffe will continue to attack ports that the army will want to use during the invasion. The Navy will continue to plan for a small front invasion while the army's plans will assume a wide front invasion. And none of the parties will talk to each other.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think a German torpedos fixed POD would be much more scary for Britain, if Ark Royal, Nelson and Warspite were sunk by this point, Britain might get concerned about the strategic naval balance trending against her and the uboat menace far more scary that the actual reality.
Write a TL about it. That would be interesting to read. I'll help with info if you need it.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-wooden-torpedoes.shtml
As expected, the Norwegian seas were filled with Allied ships. Almost immediately, the U-boats began attacking. Every day and every hour, U-boats were attacking warships or were being attacked themselves. Day in, day out, night after night, the U-boats fired their torpedoes one after another, relentlessly against their targets. Not one of them exploded. Their efforts remained completely fruitless. Worse yet, when the data was analyzed back at BdU, it was found that four attacks were launched on the battleship HMS Warsprite, fourteen on cruisers, ten on destroyers, and a further ten on transports – yet only one transport was sunk. Discounting marginal attacks, Donitz concluded that had the torpedoes not failed, the U-boats would have “probable sinkings” of one battleship, seven cruisers, seven destroyers, and five transports. In summary, about twenty enemy warships had escaped certain destruction because of torpedo failures.

By the end of the Norwegian campaign, the men of the U-boat Force had lost all faith in their torpedo and had not much heart to resume the fight. On April 19, Prien refused to attack when he spotted a convoy of ten transports and several destroyers. He still had four torpedoes left, but had so little faith in them that he sailed away silently. Upon his return, in explaining his refusal to attack, he told Donitz that he “could hardly be expected to fight with a dummy rifle”.

In another incident on October 30, the U-56 under Wilhelm Zahn spotted the battle group Nelson, Rodney and Hood. Carefully eluding the escorts, Zahn attacked and fired three torpedoes at Nelson, and heard two of them thump harmlessly on the target’s side. Worse yet, the third torpedo detonated prematurely and alerted the escorts. Zahn was so demoralized by the incident that Donitz granted him extended leave upon his return.

Also the Nelson would have been sunk with the leadership of the Admiralty and fleet on board, including Churchill!
http://acepilots.com/ships/nelson.html
31 Oct 1939 - On board Nelson, The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, discussed the use of the main fleet bases at Scapa Flow, Loch Ewe and Rosyth. They determined to return to Scapa in the spring of 1940 when its defenses would be complete.

http://www.historyorb.com/date/1939/october/30
Today in History for 30th October 1939
German U boat fails on attack of English battleship Nelson with Winston Churchill, Dudley Pound & Charles Forbes aboard

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Royal_Oak_(08)#Special_Operation_P:_the_raid_by_U-47
Günter Prien also fired several duds and missed the chance to sink more ships on the Scapa Flow raid:
 
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Write a TL about it.

Thought about it. Its a tricky TL to write due to the butterflies. Lets say the Ark Royal is sunk by U39 on September 14th. This with the loss of Courageous, could well put the Royal Navy on lockdown. The British could well keep anything larger than destroyer size in port (at least in the North Sea area, relying on submarines themselves, making the north sea sort of a WW1 style no mans land.

That could change Norway, even the composition of hunter groups assigned to track the Graf Spee, which could change the Altmark incident, British agressiveness toward Norway, German responses etc...

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Deleted member 1487

Thought about it. Its a tricky TL to write due to the butterflies. Lets say the Ark Royal is sunk by U39 on September 14th. This with the loss of Courageous, could well put the Royal Navy on lockdown. The British could well keep anything larger than destroyer size in port (at least in the North Sea area, relying on submarines themselves, making the north sea sort of a WW1 style no mans land.

That could change Norway, even the composition of hunter groups assigned to track the Graf Spee, which could change the Altmark incident, British agressiveness toward Norway, German responses etc...

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No Norway campaign means 25% of the Ju52 fleet is saved, along with 25% of the German fleet including 50% of her destroyers. Also the Fallschirmjäger aren't revealed as a force, so perhaps they aren't slaughtered as badly as IOTL in the Netherlands. Further losses to Uboats and the RN shuts down some of their involvement in Greece...which saves even more of the Ju52 fleet, all of the very experience pilots, and of course the paratroopers. You're right about butterflies, but you can decide on which ones you want with a coin flip or D10 role...

Also the North Sea was a no man's land after the Norwegian campaign IOTL, so might be ITTL earlier. That would save the German BCs from getting damaged and locked down in repairs instead of appearing in the Atlantic before 1941. It would be interesting to see if the British continue with their HK groups and whether they pull even more escorts away from convoys to guard their capital ships on these missions...
 
Yes, in the FUBAR mess that is German High Command, the Luftwaffe will continue to attack ports that the army will want to use during the invasion. The Navy will continue to plan for a small front invasion while the army's plans will assume a wide front invasion. And none of the parties will talk to each other.
Well kind of I guess except by Naval targets I don't mean the Channel ports specifically as there are far more juicy targets out there, in fact the Channel ports in particular Dover would be near the bottom of the list.

The slight problem with this scenario (in my mind at least) is that the withdrawal of 11 Group to the North of the Thames is that this would be a signal to the LW that they had won and therefore preparations for the final part of Sea Lion would begin. You can't have a victory in the air without Sea Lion.

The furthest south that you could station your fighters to be out of range of the Bf 109 is RAF Wittering a full 130 miles from the coast. Attacks in the Channel and on the South Coast would have a good 30-45 minutes of unhindered time in the air before the British fighters show up unless you are prepared to put up more frequent patrols or scramble the fighters when the LW was mid-Channel rather than at the coast as was common practice. This puts an even bigger strain on the pilots than they are already under. The only reason I can see for 11 group moving into the Midlands is if the airfields were so badly damaged that they could no longer support air operations ... not because they were losing too many fighters or pilots as they are probably going to lose those anyway. All you would achieve by moving north is giving away the advantage of quick response and a shorter range.
 
The question has to be asked did the German population, who were in receipt of a much heavier bombardment in the later war years agitate for a change of government? they did not and I think the UK would act in the same way, localised grumbling with loss of morale but the majority still in good spirits.

While the areas being bombed in the UK may well be suffering low morale, that does leave a lot of the rest of the country free from LW attacks with no associated loss of morale.
 
snip
The slight problem with this scenario (in my mind at least) is that the withdrawal of 11 Group to the North of the Thames is that this would be a signal to the LW that they had won and therefore preparations for the final part of Sea Lion would begin. You can't have a victory in the air without Sea Lion.

The furthest south that you could station your fighters to be out of range of the Bf 109 is RAF Wittering a full 130 miles from the coast. Attacks in the Channel and on the South Coast would have a good 30-45 minutes of unhindered time in the air before the British fighters show up unless you are prepared to put up more frequent patrols or scramble the fighters when the LW was mid-Channel rather than at the coast as was common practice. This puts an even bigger strain on the pilots than they are already under. The only reason I can see for 11 group moving into the Midlands is if the airfields were so badly damaged that they could no longer support air operations ... not because they were losing too many fighters or pilots as they are probably going to lose those anyway. All you would achieve by moving north is giving away the advantage of quick response and a shorter range.

I just don't see it would/could have happened i.e. a cocious decision to withdraw north. However, it's possible the Lw could think there had been a withdrawal. If the normal rotation of Squadrons, had happened at the same time and that the replacement ones got delayed - that in itself seems organisationally unlikely - but not impossible. But then the Germans get 'screwed'!
 
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