Luftwaffe Victory over Britain, Sealion Plausible?

I woudn't let an old BoB pilot hear you say the Bf109 was just chaff over 50% of aircraft lost were down to the Bf109 with only 15% destroyed by bombers. That is why orders were issued not to engage LW formations that contained only Bf109's.
That, and fighters could only kill aircraft, they couldn't do much else.

The bombers were good for attacking the infrastructure the fighters needed to operate from but not at putting aircraft and pilots out of action ... and that is what the LW needed to do to gain air superiority.
You blow an airstrip up and the fighters that operate from that strip are useless.

Also, the Germans overconfidently assumed they'd actually beaten Fighter Command, so they wouldn't have continued anyway.
 
That, and fighters could only kill aircraft, they couldn't do much else.

You blow an airstrip up and the fighters that operate from that strip are useless.

Also, the Germans overconfidently assumed they'd actually beaten Fighter Command, so they wouldn't have continued anyway.

Time and time again it was proved the airstrips could be repaired ... a knockout blow on an airfield occurred when the services, electricity, gas, telephones etc. were taken out whether it was inside or outside the limits of the base but even then repair times were quite short. Disruption to landing and take off was restricted more often than not by unexploded bombs than by exploded bombs.

Even if an airfield was put out of action temporarily 11 Group had plenty of spare capacity for short term operations.
 
So you're saying it was the bombers that were the chaff then? Of no use but to draw FC into a melee?

It's not quite as simplistic as that as both fighters and bombers were essential to bring down Fighter Command ... but on many missions YES the bombers were the decoys. Why else would the LW have fielded formations comprising of 1/3 bombers and 2/3 fighters with the fighters usually in the lead position. The bombers were there to draw the British fighters into the air so they could be attacked by the Bf109's, if the bomber force got through then it was a bonus. If they wanted to attack a specific target the mix of aircraft was different. For example low level attacks by fighter bombers of Epro 210 or attacks further inland would contain fewer Bf109's and had more Bf110's. You only have to look at the plan for the 7th September to realise this ... the LW's plan was to bomb London to draw (what they thought) was the last of the Spitfires and Hurricanes in the air so the could be destroyed by the German fighters.
 
In the long run the better production figures for the Brits would be crucial but at this stage in the battle the Germans did appear to be winning or at worst were on equal terms. That advantage was lost on 7th September without the Germans even realising it.
But that's the key point, isn't it? Because of lack/failures of intelligence, the LW went into the battle without any clear idea of FC strength, resilience or its control system, which meant that not only could a strategy (let alone the correct one!) not be formulated with confidence, but also that they were unable to judge the results of the strategy that they had chosen.

With the usual overclaiming of kills, they were unable to understand why the offensive was having no apparent effect (from their POV) on FC. This naturally led the LW to decide that its strategy for the Battle was wrong and needed to be changed, resulting in the incoherent flip-flopping from radar sites to airfields to cities etc. My impression is that without confidence in its own strategy and unable to measure reliably the effects of the offensive, the LW was doomed to failure because it could not identify what was working and what wasn't before autumn began closing in.
 
But that's they key point, isn't it? Because of lack/failures of intelligence, the LW went into the battle without any clear idea of FC strength, resilience or its control system, which meant that not only could a strategy (let alone the correct one!) be formulated with confidence, but also that they were unable to judge the results of the strategy that they had chosen.

With the usual overclaiming of kills, they were unable to understand why the offensive was having no apparent effect (from their POV) on FC. This naturally led the LW to decide that its strategy for the Battle was wrong and needed to be changed, resulting in the incoherent flip-flopping from radar sites to airfields to cities etc. My impression is that without confidence in its own strategy and unable to measure reliably the effects of the offensive, the LW was doomed to failure because it could not identify what was working and what wasn't before autumn began closing in.

You are absolutely correct in my opinion, which is why I would love to see what would have happened if they had listened to Sperrle prior to Sept 7th as he knew Fighter Command wasn't on its last legs. If he had been able to persuade his fellow commanders that a switch of targets to bomb London was NOT the right choice I think things would have been quite different.
 
You are absolutely correct in my opinion, which is why I would love to see what would have happened if they had listened to Sperrle prior to Sept 7th as he knew Fighter Command wasn't on its last legs. If he had been able to persuade his fellow commanders that a switch of targets to bomb London was NOT the right choice I think things would have been quite different.

Not knowing LW politics of this time, I've no idea how likely that is. But it does show that Goering(?) was pushing for an attack on London, and that decision is more likely to come as time goes by and the strategy of operating against airfields appears to be ineffective. So I don't see it simply as a decision for the 7th Sept alone, the decision to stay on airfields would have to be made every day from then on, and every day in which heavy losses continue to be sustained to no detectable effect on FC performance strengthens the case for a change of strategy. There's also the argument that the switch to London would force the last few fighters out into a "decisive battle", which means that there's a fairly convincing argument to switch to London even if the airfield attacks are having a detectable effect!

Given that the attempt to gain air superiority was decided to have failed in mid-September, I'm not convinced that only another week is enough to change that decision. A month, sure, looking at your attrition figures, that's plausible - if the LW is capable of that decision. But a week seems less so.
 
I recieved a message yesterday from an interested reader regarding the information I have placed in this thread as follows ...

... buts whats the Source, book, ISBN, pamphlet, article
The figures I have quoted do not come from a single source as there is so much out there regarding the BoB including many sources that contradict each other. As part of a timeline I am currently involved in writing (Ready to be shot out of the sky) I set out to compile as much data as possible so that I could analyse the campaign myself rather than relying on other peoples opinions and conclusions.

The following list of sources is not exhaustive; many others have been used in my research of the subject and to fill in specific holes that the following sources hint at. For instance where there are confused or conflicting details of downed RAF aircraft other sources have been accessed to give clarity. I have always consciously avoided referencing personal biographies and autobiographies of historical events or books that contain the authors analysis of events as they can tend to be a little one sided and lead the reader down a path guided by the author despite them often being a very good read and full of useful information … but I have found that information regularly needs to be verified.

The Battle Re-Thought – A symposium on the Battle of Britain; Sponsored jointly by the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell dated 25th June 1990. To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the battle a seminar was held at Bracknell on 25th June 1990 attended by 300 delegates. Those present included students of the RAF Staff College, serving airmen, historians, men who were involved in the battle and a group of similar delegates from Germany. The morning session was devoted to six papers presented to those gathered covering various aspects of the battle and the afternoon involved group discussion between those present about the aspects presented in the morning. This 120 page document contains edited text of the talks and a summary of the main discussion points.

The Defence of the United Kingdom, Basil Collier 1957 (Part of the History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Series). This publication provides details of the actions taken by the UK to ensure that threat of invasion was negated including not only those taken during the war but also the thinking behind the strategies devised between the wars. It includes a wealth of knowledge gleaned from official War Office documents, for which the author was given full access, including very useful maps and illustrations.

RAF Aircraft L1000-N9999. James Halley. Air Britain
RAF Aircraft P1000-R9999. James Halley. Air Britain
RAF Aircraft T1000-V9999. James Halley. Air Britain
RAF Aircraft W1000-Z9999. James Halley. Air Britain
This series of books contain listings of aircraft built and supplied to the Royal Air Force. The listings include delivery dates by month and year, the registration number of each plane, the units the aircraft served in and what the final fate of the aircraft was.
For example –

  • P2535 was a Hawker Hurricane delivered in November 1939 which served in 85 squadron and was lost in France in May 1940.
  • P2681 was a Hawker Hurricane Delivered between Nov ’39 and July ’40 which served in 245 Sqn, 238 Sqn, 59 Operational Training Unit (OTU), 55 OTU, 9 Flying Training School, 116 Sqn, 245 Sqn, 87 Sqn, 55 OTU before being retired on 27th May 1944.
http://www.spitfires.ukf.net – a comprehensive listing of Spitfire/Seafire aircraft which expands greatly and adds more detail to the entries found in the RAF Aircraft listings above.

www.the-battle-of-britain.co.uk – a good site that includes a list of all pilots who took part in the Battle of Britain and a summary of the actions they were involved in.

www.raf.mod.uk – a good source for all things Royal Air Force which includes a useful section on the Battle of Britain particularly useful as a tool for cross referencing other sources and checking information found elsewhere. Includes summaries of each days action, the targets, the state of the RAF and statistics.

www.battleofbritain1940.net – The Battle of Britain Historical Society website. An excellent website that includes a chronology of the Battle of Britain in detail describing the major actions of each day and providing useful background information on the strategies used and the equipment involved. It also provides eye witness accounts from those involved and relevant passages from the numerous books written on the subject by a number of different authors.

www.naval-history.net – a good source of information relating to naval operations, ship movements, battles and air attacks.

www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar - a series of individual articles written by various authors on the events of World War 2.

www.pastscape.org.uk – contains information on historical sites across England.

In his opening introduction to the Symposium on the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshall Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris spoke of an exercise he had been asked to conduct, See Adler –
“… I will tell you one thing about this exercise which I hope will give you food for thought. I was detached as a member of the Directing Staff to write a big appreciation exercise on the Battle of Britain and after a week I sought an interview with the Assistant Commandant. I said ‘I am awfully sorry, but I have applied all the usual considerations to the exercise – such as factors affecting the attainment of the aim and the balance of the forces – and the Germans must win. What do I do? He said ‘Go and fudge it!’, so I did and it has been fudged ever since.

This brings me to the only other thing that I am going to say in the short time that I have been allotted. We really do want to know not only why we won, but whether we did win. So please do not toe the party line when you are studying and reporting on this exercise. If you are merely going to repeat what everyone else has said – and there are twenty-eight new books this year on the subject (1990) – it really is rather a waste of time. But if you can think of anything original that might possibly have affected the battle, for heaven’s sake bring it up. I know that I reflect the views of the Commandant and the Directing Staff in saying this.”
 
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