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for the record, most produced French aircrafts of 1940 were Potez 630 and MS-406, a thousand of them in both case.
So it wasn't as if they were 5000 fighters or bombers to be taken over by the Luftwaffe. A large chunk of the French Air force was either obsolete or shot down (for the most modern types) or american types.
By the spring of 1940 the French aircraft industry had been reorganized & retooled. it was on the edge of a massive production run. Exactly which types & numbers I'm unsure of.
Should have had existing sources in place.
Makes more sense to keep an intact factory producing than shipping material a long distance away for an untested design.
Keep making LeO 451-01s
Hypothetically The Germans could have taken advantage of the capabiliy of the French aircraft industry as it stood in may 1940. But...
>Portions had been damaged/sabatoged when the factories were over run in May and June. This was particularly the case in the subcontractors level where plants making things like wheels, instruments, electrical motors/generators, tubes, electric wire, ect...
>A portion of the feed stock for the components had been contracted from the US. Extruded aluminum stock to be fashioned into frame, or rolls of sheet aluminum, or copper stock for extruding electric wire were a few items. Replacement for those sources would have to be found, which did not take away from other essential production, and for which a period of retooling would be required.
>This previous overlaps into raw materials. France neither had a mass of Aluminum ingots lying about ready for use, there was some, but not several years, or even a years worth; nor did Germany had a massive supply from elsewhere. Given a finite supply of aluminum the net increase from French production is not going to be significant since sending the stuff to French plants reduces it to German plants.
>Prevent the random looting by German industry in the summer - winter 1940. This was condoned up to the highest levels including Goering who controled large swaths of German industry. To prevent this you need to have a clear policy ready before France falls & the will to execute it. That is the Germans must plan for a event they did not expect, and nazis must stop being nazis.
>French production goals depended on ethusiastic workers doing their patriotic best. Thats unlikely when working for the Germans. There are also questions of labor cost. In the winter of 1940-41 the German reich & occupied zones were already experiencing food shortages, stringent rationing, and scarce consumer essentials. The nazis were busy rewarding the favored Germans by ensuring Europes remaining goodies went to them. To keep the French labor force compensated a hefty portion of the declining stocks of stuff has to remain in France & good Germans do without.
>Following on that is the problem of the not inconsiderable number of leftists in the French labor force remaining reliable after 22 June 41. Production slowdowns & sabatoge are inevitable.
I'm guessing the autum & winter of 1940 is spent reviving partial production in French factories. This means a decline in German production vs OTL during 1940 & early 41. In 1941 there is a small rise in aircraft delivered to the German AF over that of OTL, but nothing spectacular. That runs its course & given the finite supply of aluminum and key alloys then production in 1942 is no better than OTL.
So are the French aircraft really good enough to justify any of this? Or would it be better to use the French industry to make parts for German designs?