Luftwaffe strategic bombing targets during Barbarossa?

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The Luftwaffe, absent ASB intervention, is never going have a sustained strategic bombing campaign. The question is with a modest number of heavy long range bombers can they put a spoke in the Soviets wheel? Can they do enough damage to disrupt the movement of troops and goods west and bureaucrats and factories east? Can they potentially hit enough electrical generating facilities and put them out of commission for long enough to disrupt production and or movements? Are there canal locks within range and can they be damaged badly enough to slow things down?

If the Luftwaffe can do enough of the above, then the Germans have a shot at coming to some sort of successful conclusions with the Soviets.

If the question is, can the Luftwaffe do the sort of damage the Allies were able to do to Germany, then the answer is clearly no.

I don't think the claims of the strategic bomber wing (~100) is ASB. Question is how weak the Soviet ability to interdict really was. If they strike with impunity, then its OK. If they loos 5% per sortie (not a high number), then it takes a lot of effort to keep it going.
This and the targets as asked for is the key questions here.
 
I don't think the claims of the strategic bomber wing (~100) is ASB.

There is also an issue of how does this bomber wing fare in BoB. My money is that it gets wrecked. And maybe puts the German on a track to develop a long range fighter, seeing as the bombers themselves were woefully inadequate to achieve anything of note without adequate fighter cover.
 
If the purpose of Barbarossa was to destroy the Soviet Army in the field in one season, then the logical use of strategic bombers is to support the army by preventing movement of Soviet reserves.

If Barbarossa fails and a long war beckons, then it makes sense to switch to industrial targets.
 
Hi Wiking, I knew this thread reminded me of something, and then I remembered it was a song:

Whitesnake – Here I Go Again Lyrics

I don't know where I'm goin'
But I sure know where I've been
Hanging on the promises in songs of yesterday
An' I've made up my mind, I ain't wasting no more time
Here I go again, here I go again

Tho' I keep searching for an answer
I never seem to find what I'm looking for
Oh Lord, I pray you give me strength to carry on
'Cause I know what it means to walk along the lonely street of dreams

Here I go again on my own
Goin' down the only road I've ever known
Like a drifter I was born to walk alone
An' I've made up my mind, I ain't wasting no more time


It goes on.
I have to admire your persistence in trying to find new ways to rewrite LW History while keeping it close to thecnically realistic changes.
Cheers.:cool:
 
was there ever widespread use of incendiaries along rail lines, especially in more forested areas?

or simply heavily forested areas behind Soviet lines?
 

Deleted member 1487

There is also an issue of how does this bomber wing fare in BoB. My money is that it gets wrecked. And maybe puts the German on a track to develop a long range fighter, seeing as the bombers themselves were woefully inadequate to achieve anything of note without adequate fighter cover.
How? In 1941 the VVS was wrecked and unable to offer proper resistance. They lost over 21k aircraft in less than 6 months. German bombers were pretty much able to operate with impunity within a couple of weeks of the start of the campaign. The Soviets lacked an integrated air defense system outside of Moscow, had virtually no radar, a lack of radios, and did not have much in the way of gun laying computers for AAA. So they really just lacked the ability to confront any sort of strategic bombing campaign outside of Moscow. That and their fighters lacked sufficient hitting power to drop a heavy bomber within a reasonable amount of time; they also didn't have experience fighting through a bomber box and the heavies had a lot more defensive firepower than a He111.

The bombers aren't ready for the BoB in the scenario I laid out and aren't used as such; they'd appear as a unit by 1941 for the Blitz, but that's about it.
 
The bombers aren't ready for the BoB in the scenario I laid out and aren't used as such; they'd appear as a unit by 1941 for the Blitz, but that's about it.

Ah, ok, that is a slightly different ball game, then. So they sprang to life in 1941, too late for BoB, just in time to get some flying experience in the blitz. I'd forget about the industrial targets. If the Germans are still planning for a short war, then it won't really matter whether or not they achieve the miracle of putting a dent into Soviet industrial capacity.

I still think interdiction/infrastructure is the best bet for them.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ah, ok, that is a slightly different ball game, then. So they sprang to life in 1941, too late for BoB, just in time to get some flying experience in the blitz. I'd forget about the industrial targets. If the Germans are still planning for a short war, then it won't really matter whether or not they achieve the miracle of putting a dent into Soviet industrial capacity.

I still think interdiction/infrastructure is the best bet for them.

From earlier:
How about this as a POD, somewhat of a variation on the usual:
Wever lives and issues the Bomber A spec, but buys demonstrators of the Ural Bombers and allows continued development of the Ju89 as a back up to the He177. When the war comes early, Hitler told everyone to expect war in 1942, the He177 is not ready, so the developed Ju89 is put into production; it cannot enter production until after France though, so is produced from mid-1940 on in place of the Fw200 and Do217 for Barbarossa until the He177 is deemed ready enough to replace it. So come Barbarossa the Luftwaffe has gained enough intelligence on the USSR and has planned for a strategic bomber campaign (unlike OTL when they didn't bother to start gather strategic bombing intelligence until 1942). They only one functional strategic bombing due to need to have some be used in the Atlantic for naval operations and keeping new production as a reserve, rather than form another active wing for use in the East.

Let's say because of the POD Wever has control over the bombing campaign, so doesn't have to do these prestige raids that Goering liked. He's got a highly specialized and well trained unit and won't waste them on terror raids or put them against high risk targets like Moscow directly due to its extreme defenses (it was the most well defended target the LW faced until Britain got its air defenses together).

Basically the deal is that the war comes early in 1939, Wever having allowed the Ju89 to continue to develop puts it into production to have something until the He177 is ready, which gets the first operational Ju89B unit ready late in 1940 and does some night operations during the Blitz only to then get to participate in Barbarossa when the focus shifts East.
 

Deleted member 1487

Does anyone have any info about USAAF bombing of rail yards so we can compare what it took to put them out of commission and what could be expected from a strategic bomber wing in terms of rail interdiction?
 
This is an interesting discussion. For the sake of argument I will accept the notion that the completely hypothetical "developed Ju89B" would have the capabilities described, and I believe the OP is correct in presuming that by the time of Barbarossa, the Germans would have only been able to produce enough of them for one heavy bomber wing (100-150 aircraft).

My biggest problem believing this would have a significant impact on the Soviet war effort is the limited number heavy bombers Germany would have available for the effort. Despite the attractive idea that the Germans would maintain a sustained offensive against truly valuable targets (power generation and grid hubs, rail hubs, tank factories), this would likely mean that this small force is often further subdivided to attack individual targets. The record of the much more capable Allied bombing campaign against Germany shows that small forces of heavy bombers bombing from high or medium altitudes were not ideal tools for targeted strikes against small strategic targets. Better send several hundred and just plaster the general area with bombs (or Mossies and medium bombers). Also, the Soviets would have these targets defended with AA and what few high-altitude interceptors they still had available after the initial German invasion. Wever (or whoever) might remain committed to the strategy, but eventually Hitler would insist they be used en masse against high value symbolic targets to kill as many soviets as possible. Also, it is reasonable to believe that attrition (from both combat and accidents) would whittle the force down.

I might be underestimating the ranges involved, but could these bombers not be better used to attack lend-lease ports like Murmansk from bases in Finland? Presumably Soviet air defenses in eastern Karelia and the far north would be much less numerous than in the western USSR where the power and transportation grid was. Or the Crimean oilfields?
 

Deleted member 1487

My biggest problem believing this would have a significant impact on the Soviet war effort is the limited number heavy bombers Germany would have available for the effort. Despite the attractive idea that the Germans would maintain a sustained offensive against truly valuable targets (power generation and grid hubs, rail hubs, tank factories), this would likely mean that this small force is often further subdivided to attack individual targets. The record of the much more capable Allied bombing campaign against Germany shows that small forces of heavy bombers bombing from high or medium altitudes were not ideal tools for targeted strikes against small strategic targets. Better send several hundred and just plaster the general area with bombs. Also, the Soviets would have these targets defended with AA and what few high-altitude interceptors they still had available after the initial German invasion. Wever (or whoever) might remain committed to the strategy, but eventually Hitler would insist they be used en masse against high value symbolic targets to kill as many soviets as possible. Also, it is reasonable to believe that attrition (from both combat and accidents) would whittle the force down.

I might be underestimating the ranges involved, but could these bombers not be better used to attack lend-lease ports like Murmansk from bases in Finland? Presumably Soviet air defenses in eastern Karelia and the far north would be much less numerous than in the western USSR where the power and transportation grid was. Or the Crimean oilfields?

In the East the LW was consistently able to strike at low to medium altitudes and get good effect, while outside some heavily defended areas like Moscow or Leningrad there was not significant AAA threat. In 1941 the Soviets were so badly disrupted that getting a coherent defense going was not really possible (they lose 21k aircraft in less than 6 months). I don't think the Germans would do anything but deep rail interdiction because most of the industrial targets our out of range, too well defended, and didn't matter in the knock out campaign to end the war in 1941. Bombing Smolensk rail yards is an easy target, as is going after any number of other rail targets. Hitler IOTL was very hands off of LW operations and the prestige bombing of Moscow was by Jeschonnek AFAIK, not ordered from above and I've read the USAAF campaign studies on the Luftwaffe during Barbarossa, plus a few other books on the subject. So Wever really does have free reign to do the missions he wants as per OTL. Murmansk wasn't really a significant issue until late in 1941, so bombing it achieves nothing of value in June-September.

At that point its the interdiction of Minsk and Smolensk is far more important to the war effort. There weren't Crimea oil fields AFAIK at this time. Bombing Sevastopol might be useful, but that was too heavily defended and the Ju89s too few to risk. At this point Bf110 escort would be enough against the VVS if they wanted to run deeper missions, but Me109s with drop pods existed and could escort the bombers to Minsk and Smolensk if there were fears of Soviet fighters. Also the Soviet fighters lacked helpful anti-bomber weapons at this point, so shooting them down or getting close enough to break into a bomber box is going to be nearly impossible in 1941.
 
Sorry, but I was not completely clear that the OP was specifically and only about the possible effect of a limited LW strategic bombing campaign against key rail yards and other theatre targets in the initial stages of the campaign.

Yes, having a hundred or so heavy bombers on hand would be useful. But (since as you say the VVS wouldn't be a major factor) couldn't much the same have been accomplished by much larger available numbers of Ju88s, Bf110s, and other relatively high-speed twin engine multi-purpose types stripped down for extreme long range point attack missions at low altitudes?

Or am I missing something?
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorry, but I was not completely clear that the OP was specifically and only about the possible effect of a limited LW strategic bombing campaign against key rail yards and other theatre targets in the initial stages of the campaign.

Yes, having a hundred or so heavy bombers on hand would be useful. But (since as you say the VVS wouldn't be a major factor) couldn't much the same have been accomplished by much larger available numbers of Ju88s, Bf110s, and other relatively high-speed twin engine multi-purpose types stripped down for extreme long range point attack missions at low altitudes?

Or am I missing something?
It wasn't explicitly in the OP that that was the only option, but over the course of discussion the general consensus was that going after anything industrial is a waste of time during Barbarossa and anything outside of the central theater is a waste of time.

As to lighter bombers doing the same, yes enough of them could, but none had the range, payload, and defenses to survive that a strategic bomber did; that and the lighter bombers were fully occupied with support for the advance at short/medium ranges. The entire point of the strategic force is that they do go and do things to a degree that the light stuff couldn't. Besides there already wasn't enough of the light stuff to send them deep. So the Ju89s have a unique role here of being only tasked with deep strikes and having the ability to put large payloads on that target with fewer bombers and are able to survive the odd interception better than the He111, Do17, or even Ju88.
 

Deleted member 1487

An interesting point out using bombers to assist a ground campaign via interdiction:
Canadian Military History
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-23-2012
Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan
Robert Vogel
McGill University
Perhaps the only answer to the question raised here is that one cannot attribute the victory to any specific branch of the Allied services. The Allies hoped for a quick victory and, despite their experience in Italy, they believed that it was possible to win such a victory with the minimum of infantry casualties because ofwhat tanks and aircraft were supposed to accomplish. They became extremely worried in June and July when infantry casualties mounted alarmingly without any large territorial gains: it looked briefly as if a major battle of attrition would develop in Normandy, similar to those fought in the 1914-1918 war. That could be construed as showing the failure of the interdiction plan, just as the final break-out could be attributed to its success. Both assertions are really exaggerations. The interdiction plan was of considerable importance and helped the Allied cause. It did not fully succeed in blocking either German reinforcements or German supplies but it helped to slow them down. It deprived the enemy of much flexibility and initiative. In other words it was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the victory. In the final analysis the Allies still had to fight on the ground and learn how to beat a stubborn and sometimes skilful enemy who remained in the field despite everything that the air forces accomplished.

So in terms of having a strategic bomber wing used to bombard Soviet major rail hubs to aid the ground forces, like with Normandy it would be a major assist above and beyond OTL, especially when used to interdict Soviet mobilization efforts and offensives as the Minsk and later Smolensk pocket is closed. Alone its not going to defeat the Soviets or prevent them from mobilizing or fighting, but to paraphrase the above article it slows down their reinforcements and supplies and deprives them of much flexibility and initiative. In the extreme chaos and losses of Barbarossa adding extra pressure on their overloaded transport system to a degree it did not experience IOTL would cause major issues, especially before the Soviet managed to regain their balance and properly adapt to the Luftwaffe.
 
So in terms of having a strategic bomber wing used to bombard Soviet major rail hubs to aid the ground forces, like with Normandy it would be a major assist above and beyond OTL, especially when used to interdict Soviet mobilization efforts and offensives as the Minsk and later Smolensk pocket is closed. Alone its not going to defeat the Soviets or prevent them from mobilizing or fighting, but to paraphrase the above article it slows down their reinforcements and supplies and deprives them of much flexibility and initiative. In the extreme chaos and losses of Barbarossa adding extra pressure on their overloaded transport system to a degree it did not experience IOTL would cause major issues, especially before the Soviet managed to regain their balance and properly adapt to the Luftwaffe.

Except for the fact that, unlike with Normandy, the Luftwaffe does not have the quantity of aircraft, proper doctrine, or the required amount of time to do any meaningful damage before the ground forces overrun Smolensk anyways, rendering the entire investment into it a waste. The fact that they'll be operating beyond fighter escort range and at low-mid altitude over a target with some ~30 flak guns will also rapidly drive up losses. The bulk of Soviet air to air victories in summer 1941 came against bombers flying beyond their fighter cover, after all.

As for accuracy: assuming a single 60 plane raid, each Ju-89 will be able to carry either three 500 pound or six 250 pound bombs for a total of either 180 or 360 bombs. Going by the average accuracy of WW2 level bombing (0.25-0.30%) that works out to an average of one bomb hitting the target in a raid.
 
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was there ever widespread use of incendiaries along rail lines, especially in more forested areas?

or simply heavily forested areas behind Soviet lines?

Does anyone have any info about USAAF bombing of rail yards so we can compare what it took to put them out of commission and what could be expected from a strategic bomber wing in terms of rail interdiction?

also like to know how rail lines fared when Soviets set forest fires, assume large damage but that might not be the case?
 

Deleted member 1487

Except for the fact that, unlike with Normandy, the Luftwaffe does not have the quantity of aircraft, proper doctrine, or the required amount of time to do any meaningful damage before the ground forces overrun Smolensk anyways, rendering the entire investment into it a waste.

The fact that they'll be operating beyond fighter escort range and at low-mid altitude over a target with some ~30 flak guns will also rapidly drive up losses. The bulk of Soviet air to air victories in summer 1941 came against bombers flying beyond their fighter cover, after all.

Smolensk was in fighter escort range with drop tanks. The Me109F had a lot longer range than the E-series of 1940, so they could do it. Also this is an ATL where the proper doctrine does exist. If FLAK is that much of an issue they can fly higher, the 1941 bombsights were the equal of the Norden:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotfernrohr_7
 
Also this is an ATL where the proper doctrine does exist.

Via the German ubermenschens will to power, apparently, given that there is absolutely nothing that would prevent the Germans from falling into the same trap as literally everyone else (including themselves) did IOTL. As I observed a page earlier, this is not a Nazi or a German issue... it is a human one. Then again, you seem to love giving the Nazis inhuman levels of perfect foresight and decision making so that isn't anything new...

If FLAK is that much of an issue they can fly higher, the 1941 bombsights were the equal of the Norden:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotfernrohr_7
And they'll be just as accurate: 1 bomb hitting for the occasional 60 plane raid. Not going to make a jot of difference.
 

Deleted member 1487

Via the German ubermenschens will to power, apparently, given that there is absolutely nothing that would prevent the Germans from falling into the same trap as literally everyone else (including themselves) did IOTL. As I observed a page earlier, this is not a Nazi or a German issue... it is a human one. Then again, you seem to love giving the Nazis inhuman levels of perfect foresight and decision making so that isn't anything new...

And they'll be just as accurate: 1 bomb hitting for the occasional 60 plane raid. Not going to make a jot of difference.
Oh here we go again with the Ad Hominem. Given Wever's rejection of Douhet pre-war the Luftwaffe doctrine was already on a different, balanced path. Wever recognized the need to hit a target like a rail yard repeatedly to keep out knocked out due to the ease of repair. Whether that means hitting it multiple times a week is up for debate, but its not going to be a one off type raid due to the understand in 1935 doctrine that a target like a rail yard requires follow up if you can't knock out a bridge or tunnel to shut things down for an extended period. And besides the postulated raids would just be a heavier version of the medium bomber strikes on rail yards meaning the issue won't be not knowing how to handle heavy bombers for a rail strike; the Germans demonstrated proficiency with that in France and Poland IOTL and again during OTL Barbarossa. Per the capabilities of the bomber they'd be able to handle 8x 500kg bombs as suggested in the OP of the bombers carrying 4 tons of bombs.

Eventually of course as you said the Germans would overrun Smolensk, but they'd be able to do a lot of damage to Soviet forces drawing supply/mobilizing via it from June and into late July when it finally fell. They can go after alternate targets in the meantime and after as needed like Velyki Luki, Orel, Tula, Bryansk, or whatever. Even Kharkov.

As for accuracy: assuming a single 60 plane raid, each Ju-89 will be able to carry either three 500 pound or six 250 pound bombs for a total of either 180 or 360 bombs. Going by the average accuracy of WW2 level bombing (0.25-0.30%) that works out to an average of one bomb hitting the target in a raid.
Where are those numbers from and what altitude were they flying at against what FLAK and fighter defenses? The Soviets lacked AA radar, gunlaying computers, and combat experience in 1941. Those USAAF numbers were at 25k feet, not 14k ft against much worse AA defenses than existed at Smolensk or any other target save Moscow in 1941. Also a major problem was individual bombers not lining up their own attack runs with USAAF bombing, they would drop once the lead bomber dropped, which badly scattered bomb loads. The Germans had different doctrine, like what the USAAF eventually adopted by the end which increase bombs on target, which was letting each bomber make its own run with its own bombsight, rather than just aiming with one bomber and having the rest press release based on that.
 
Wever recognized the need to hit a target like a rail yard repeatedly to keep out knocked out due to the ease of repair.

I don't see anything in that doctrine calling for relentless restrikes or concentration of focus or anything like that. You can find pretty words similar to Wever's about concentration of effort and the need to strike at industrial and transport targets in manuals written by the USAAC or RAF in the late-1930s and early-1940s. But no concentration of focus or relentless restrikes. Nor did any of those words prevented them from falling into the same targeting trap. Wever is not some air power god, he is only just as human as every other air force general at the time.

What will happen, given that the Luftwaffe is only human and its planners are only human, is that this bomber wing will be hitting one target for a few days and then another target elsewhere for another few days. And so-on. Because of this mayfly attention span, the damage done is totally inadequate to change anything. Barbarossa goes on as per IOTL.

Whether that means hitting it multiple times a week is up for debate, but its not going to be a one off type raid due to the understand in 1935 doctrine that a target like a rail yard requires follow up if you can't knock out a bridge or tunnel to shut things down for an extended period.
Even "multiple times a week" is not adequate enough. We're talking literally once a day, endlessly, with (since we only have a single wing to work with) no time to rest and maintain the planes.

And besides the postulated raids would just be a heavier version of the medium bomber strikes on rail yards meaning the issue won't be not knowing how to handle heavy bombers for a rail strike;
And how well did those work out, hmm?

the Germans demonstrated proficiency with that in France and Poland IOTL and again during OTL Barbarossa.
In tactical close air support, not in strategic bombing or logistical interdiction.

Per the capabilities of the bomber they'd be able to handle 8x 500kg bombs as suggested in the OP of the bombers carrying 4 tons of bombs.
So then we're not talking about the Ju-89 (which could only carry a payload of 1,600 kilograms, or 3 500 kg bombs) but some completely new bomber that the Germans have magicked up without sucking the necessary resources, factory space, machine tools, and personnel from some other part of their air, or ground, or naval force. Okay...

But guess what? That still only gives you a average of slightly less then 1.5 bombs landing on target in a 60 bomber raid.

Eventually of course as you said the Germans would overrun Smolensk, but they'd be able to do a lot of damage to Soviet forces drawing supply/mobilizing via it from June and into late July when it finally fell.
Except for the fact that the Germans will just not be doing enough damage.

Where are those numbers from and what altitude were they flying at against what FLAK and fighter defenses?
US air raids in 1944-45 against both Germany and Japan, British air raids against Germany in 1941, and German air raids against Britain in both 1941 and 1944.

The Germans had different doctrine, like what the USAAF eventually adopted by the end which increase bombs on target, which was letting each bomber make its own run with its own bombsight, rather than just aiming with one bomber and having the rest press release based on that.
German level bombing during the BoB, Blitz and Baby Blitz (that last especially) was not any more accurate than American or British level bombing. During the BoB, German Heinkels regularly completely missed entire airfields and did so while bombing from much lower altitudes than the Americans and British would later use when over the Reich, so clearly that did not make as much of a difference as you claim.
 
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