Luftwaffe strategic bombing targets during Barbarossa?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

Hypothetically is the Luftwaffe had a single operational wing of strategic bombers (between 100-120 aircraft) what sort of targets would they likely have gone after in 1941 against the USSR? For the sake of argument let's say that to pay for them they did not produce a similar number of Fw200 Condors and Do217s. Let's say that they developed the Ju89 into a workable strategic bomber from 1937 on so that by 1941 they have 100-120 in service with a 4 ton payload and a combat radius of 800 miles (they can reach out to 800 miles and return).

Someone made a developed idea for one:
http://www.fronta.cz/junkers-ju-89b
 
I remember reading that there were some very critical points about power generation and distribution: hitting them would stop almost every factory.
 

Deleted member 1487

I remember reading that there were some very critical points about power generation and distribution: hitting them would stop almost every factory.
Most of those would be outside of the acceptable range, as they were around Moscow and would be too well defended for unescorted bombers from bases in Germany; by late 1941 they could be targeted though, but I'm curious about what could be hit in June-August from bases in Germany.
 
June - August it would most likely be most profitable for the Germans to try to interdict railway lines on the East-West axis. If they succeed, not only would they stop reinforcements of the Red Army and cut them off from supplies, but slow down the evacuation of the factories to Siberia.
 

Deleted member 1487

From Konigsberg they could reasonably reach targets as deep as Moscow (about 600 miles deep) and still have fuel wiggle room.
 

Deleted member 1487

June - August it would most likely be most profitable for the Germans to try to interdict railway lines on the East-West axis. If they succeed, not only would they stop reinforcements of the Red Army and cut them off from supplies, but slow down the evacuation of the factories to Siberia.
What about just bombing the big tank factories in Kharkov?
 

Deleted member 1487

Even better if they could be captured while loaded on the trains...
Except they probably couldn't move quickly enough and the Soviets would destroy it first. Besides they did capture Soviet tank factories and never used them IOTL AFAIK. Could 100 strategic bombers carrying 4 tons of bombs each (really probably with a ~65% operations ratings, so 65 operation strategic bombers at any one time) do that much to interdict Soviet rail lines that deep?
 
Electric power generation is the way to go. These are point targets, with specialized equipment that can't be repaired or replaced easily in the USSR at that time. Rail lines are notoriously hard to interdict, however any large marshalling yards, especially around Moscow are easier to hit. With transportation its not that you will put them out of service for much time (unlike electric generation facilities), but you'll disrupt and slow down movement. Every bit of manufacturing that can't move east, every bit of material and personnel who can't move west in a timely fashion is a big plus for the Nazis. Another potential set of targets are locks on the internal waterway system, canals were a big way of moving stuff around the USSR.

IMHO a rational German bombing campaign is less likely than actually having the bombers. Adolf and Fat Herman would probably waste a good deal of time and effort dropping bombs on the Kremlin or the Hermitage. The Luftwaffe campaign against the UK never had a sensible target list. Before anyone jumps up and down, the Allied list (especially "de-housing" night attacks) was not always smart, but there was a much greater attempt to identify key areas, and they had way more resources to play with.
 

Deleted member 1487

How about this as a POD, somewhat of a variation on the usual:
Wever lives and issues the Bomber A spec, but buys demonstrators of the Ural Bombers and allows continued development of the Ju89 as a back up to the He177. When the war comes early, Hitler told everyone to expect war in 1942, the He177 is not ready, so the developed Ju89 is put into production; it cannot enter production until after France though, so is produced from mid-1940 on in place of the Fw200 and Do217 for Barbarossa until the He177 is deemed ready enough to replace it. So come Barbarossa the Luftwaffe has gained enough intelligence on the USSR and has planned for a strategic bomber campaign (unlike OTL when they didn't bother to start gather strategic bombing intelligence until 1942). They only one functional strategic bombing due to need to have some be used in the Atlantic for naval operations and keeping new production as a reserve, rather than form another active wing for use in the East.

IMHO a rational German bombing campaign is less likely than actually having the bombers. Adolf and Fat Herman would probably waste a good deal of time and effort dropping bombs on the Kremlin or the Hermitage. The Luftwaffe campaign against the UK never had a sensible target list. Before anyone jumps up and down, the Allied list (especially "de-housing" night attacks) was not always smart, but there was a much greater attempt to identify key areas, and they had way more resources to play with.
Let's say because of the POD Wever has control over the bombing campaign, so doesn't have to do these prestige raids that Goering liked. He's got a highly specialized and well trained unit and won't waste them on terror raids or put them against high risk targets like Moscow directly due to its extreme defenses (it was the most well defended target the LW faced until Britain got its air defenses together).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Air_Defence_Forces#Service_during_Second_World_War
A classic example of a major political organization of defence and industrial center was the defence of Moscow. It was carried out by the 1st Air Defence Corps and the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps PVO. As part of these formations at the beginning of massive Nazi air raids had more than 600 fighters; more than 1,000 guns of small and medium calibers; 350 machine guns; 124 fixed anti-aircraft barrage balloons; 612 stations; and 600 anti-aircraft searchlights.[citation needed]
That means raids against Moscow area electrical facilities are off limits until they can get enough fighters in the region to properly escort the bombers. So in June-August electrical targets that matter are just too far away to go after.

Tank industry evacuation:
http://www.o5m6.de/Military Plants and Evacuation_russian.jpg
 
Last edited by a moderator:

nbcman

Donor
Rail interdiction in Minsk Smolensk area. The Nazis were more interested in 1941-2 in capturing (plundering) industries as opposed to damaging them. Railways to a certain extent were expendable due to the different gauge.
 

Deleted member 1487

Rail interdiction in Minsk Smolensk area. The Nazis were more interested in 1941-2 in capturing (plundering) industries as opposed to damaging them. Railways to a certain extent were expendable due to the different gauge.

Here are the major rail routes:
DnieperIcebridge01Lg.jpg



railway_belarus.jpg
 
Strategically bomb the railwaylinesin Moscow so that the flow of troops, supplies and equipment will be seriously hampered until they build secondary lines away from Moscow and then hunt those down...

Anything that slows down the logistical might of the soviet rail lines will grind the sinews of soviet arms from fully reaching the front lines for awhile.
 

Deleted member 1487

Strategically bomb the railwaylinesin Moscow so that the flow of troops, supplies and equipment will be seriously hampered until they build secondary lines away from Moscow and then hunt those down...

Anything that slows down the logistical might of the soviet rail lines will grind the sinews of soviet arms from fully reaching the front lines for awhile.
Germany is going to have to fight them somewhere, why not further West?
 
Electric power generation is the way to go. These are point targets, with specialized equipment that can't be repaired or replaced easily in the USSR at that time.

plus the added bonus that the germans helped constructing many of them, so they are aware of locations and details
 
The Germans would be better off committing those aircraft to supporting the ground advance rather then wasting time, fuel, and ordinance on something they were not at all good at. Not even targetting the electrical power stations is going to produce much in the way of results given the inadequate number of bombers, lack of appropriate doctrine, and the resiliency of such targets.
 
the problem tho is Hitler - he'd probably get his knickers in a twist over some Soviet bombing raid on Berlin and say 'go flatten Moscow' to his bomber force
 
Using high altitude four engine bombers against tactical targets did not work well (usually) in WWII. BTW as far as range goes, you can base bombers in Helsinki or elsewhere in Finland, or do some version of shuttle bombing using Helsinki for refuel/rearm.
 

Deleted member 1487

Using high altitude four engine bombers against tactical targets did not work well (usually) in WWII. BTW as far as range goes, you can base bombers in Helsinki or elsewhere in Finland, or do some version of shuttle bombing using Helsinki for refuel/rearm.
Its not high altitude though, more like 4-5km in the East due to lack of high altitude interception ability and outside of Moscow ineffectual AAA. The USAAF only needed to go high altitude due to the strength of German air defenses in 1943-45 (night time raiding for the RAF), which outside of Moscow, did not exist in the USSR in 1941.

Also Finland wouldn't necessarily be willing to do that.

The Germans would be better off committing those aircraft to supporting the ground advance rather then wasting time, fuel, and ordinance on something they were not at all good at. Not even targetting the electrical power stations is going to produce much in the way of results given the inadequate number of bombers, lack of appropriate doctrine, and the resiliency of such targets.
So you're in the deeper rail interdiction camp?

the problem tho is Hitler - he'd probably get his knickers in a twist over some Soviet bombing raid on Berlin and say 'go flatten Moscow' to his bomber force
He didn't do that until well after the Soviet attempts to bomb Germany stopped. Even then it was more a LW initiative than Hitler's orders; he let the LW had a lot of leeway in operations. As per the general scenario this unit is Wever's baby he can do what he wants with it.
 
So you're in the deeper rail interdiction camp?

That would probably be the best contribution, even though given the difficulties of destroying rail-lines with strategic bombers it would probably not noticeably alter the course of the campaign.
 
Top