Ludendorff dead-reduced 1918 offensives work

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Deleted member 1487

To go along with my earlier post, lets say that Ludendorff, the dictator of Germany in WW1 in all but name is killed in, lets say, a car crash. This would be in early 1918, lets say January. The final offensives are planned, but without Ludendorff's insistence on holding Belgium in the peace and a semi-competent strategist at the helm, could Germany manage to negotiate peace?

Several things would have to happen, MICHAEL and GEORGE or GEORGETTE would have to succeed in taking the rail hubs at Amiens and Hazebrouck. I am reading Zabicki's seminal work on the 1918 offensives and these would be necessary to cause the allies to even begin to think about peace. This would cripple the allied supply situation in the British sector and most likely cause a massive pull back to the channel ports.

Now, assuming that this goes down with reasonable efficiency (ie. no more than the casualties suffered OTL, preferably less), what would the French do? Would Clemanceau ever consider peace and would the French soldiers be demoralized seeing their ally defeated and appearing to be leaving the continent?

Assuming that the hardliners in the German government can be reined in, could a reasonable peace be achieved (ie status quo in the west, maybe Lorraine to France)?
 
The important thing would be the political action, the peace offensive to accompany the military offensive. The Poilus were not fighting for Alsace-Lorraine, they fought to remove the invader from their homeland.
Once the invader promised to go home on his own if granted an honourable peace, the French soldiers most probably would have stopped fighting (going into self defense mode and remaining otherwise inactive).
Whether this alone would have sufficed to stall British and American belligerence, is another question.
 
The important thing would be the political action, the peace offensive to accompany the military offensive. The Poilus were not fighting for Alsace-Lorraine, they fought to remove the invader from their homeland.
Once the invader promised to go home on his own if granted an honourable peace, the French soldiers most probably would have stopped fighting (going into self defense mode and remaining otherwise inactive).
Whether this alone would have sufficed to stall British and American belligerence, is another question.

If the French stopped fighting? I would imagine they'd be unable to do all that much, without being able to count on French support as well. If France starts negotiating peace with Germany on a pre-war status quo peace (at least re: Europe), then the British and Americans are out of a battlefield.
 

Deleted member 1487

I was thinking about that, would the allies stop fighting if the French are out by June 1918? The Americans have not even had a chance to fight yet, but have gotten their goal: an end to unrestricted uboat attacks. The Kaiser is likely to get kicked out anyway, as the Germans are going to demand true representation in their government. But the Brits, what about them?

Are they going to go after the ottomans more? Or will the people demand peace? Llyod George is the peace candidate, so that brings the idea that he will try to negotiate peace.

AH is also an interesting issue and what will happen to Italy without gaining its OTL gains.
 
To go along with my earlier post, lets say that Ludendorff, the dictator of Germany in WW1 in all but name is killed in, lets say, a car crash. This would be in early 1918, lets say January. The final offensives are planned, but without Ludendorff's insistence on holding Belgium in the peace and a semi-competent strategist at the helm, could Germany manage to negotiate peace?

Several things would have to happen, MICHAEL and GEORGE or GEORGETTE would have to succeed in taking the rail hubs at Amiens and Hazebrouck. I am reading Zabicki's seminal work on the 1918 offensives and these would be necessary to cause the allies to even begin to think about peace. This would cripple the allied supply situation in the British sector and most likely cause a massive pull back to the channel ports.

Now, assuming that this goes down with reasonable efficiency (ie. no more than the casualties suffered OTL, preferably less), what would the French do? Would Clemanceau ever consider peace and would the French soldiers be demoralized seeing their ally defeated and appearing to be leaving the continent?

Assuming that the hardliners in the German government can be reined in, could a reasonable peace be achieved (ie status quo in the west, maybe Lorraine to France)?

I've read that book as well, it was really quite good. Interestingly enough, after the reading that book, I also posted my thoughts and a possible scenario (in this thread):

Having read parts of the book, The German 1918 Offensives: A case study in the operational level of war by David Zabecki, I think the Germans could have knocked the BEF out of the war with some changes to the operational plans.

First, there were several mistakes and problems that led to the ultimate failure of the 1918 offensives, I'll mention a few key ones:

1) No operational objectives were defined for the operation. The goals of the offensives were vague and no specific goals were stated.

2) The Germans focused on the engagement and destruction of Entente troops directly in battle, while ignoring indirect methods of destroying and neutralizing enemies, such as logistical centers.

3) The artillery methods and tactics developed by Colonel Georg Bruchmueller, were not fully implemented across the troops engaged across the offensive. Bruchmueller was placed in charge of artillery in the Eighteenth Army, but formations such as the Seventeenth Army did not implement many of his methods. If Bruchmueller's methods are implemented in all formations, greater successes would definetly be achieved.

4) The several attacking forces in each operation were not weighted properly troop wise, leading to the main offensive forces lacking enough troops.

Here is what I think should be done (based off of many of David Zabecki's assesments) to achieve the defeat of the BEF in the 1918 offensives:

The two main operational objectives of the offensives should be the cities of Amiens and Hazebrouck. These two cities were key railroad choke points in the BEF's rail system, which lacked depth. If these two are taken, the BEF will be effectively cut off from supplies coming from the Channel ports, and it will be unable to continue fighting.

Operation Michael should be tasked with the capture of Amiens, and a strengthened Operation Georgette should be tasked with the capture of Hazebrouck.

Operation Michael would be launched first. On the tactical level, the operation should remain relatively the same, but on the operational level, the clear objective of Amiens would be present, and all forces would be working towards that goal. Once Amiens is captured, it must be successfully defended against the inevitable British counterattacks.

Once Amiens has been captured, Operation Georgette should be launched. For Georgette to succeed, more divisions from other areas of the Western Front should be taken to reinforce Georgette. In this scenario, Operation Mars will not be launched, so the artillery and manpower it took can be used in the Georgette offensive. The main focus of the Georgette offensive would be Hazebrouck, but a secondary objective should be the securing of the Flanders hills in order to secure the flank and to threaten the Ypres salient.

If both Hazebrouck and Amiens can be held for a significant amount of time, the BEF will not able to recieve supplies, and it will be effectively neutralized. If the BEF is taken out, the Germans would be in a strong position to sue for a negotiated peace, or a new offensive against the French could be launched, which would be more risky. The main problem with a negotiated peace would be Ludendorff. The restoration of Belgium would be a main Entente point in any negotiations, but Ludendorff and many others wanted to annex it and refused to give up captured territory. Possibly ITL, Ludendorff is convinced of the need to make peace by his advisors, so he is less annexationist, or maybe some form of coup removes him from power and puts peace elements in.
 
If the BEF was taken out, the French would have sued for peace. (The AEF was not yet strong enough in spring of 1918 to substitute for the BEF.)
However, it will not be that easy to take out the BEF. They'll fall back on the Channel ports and continue fighting. The 1918 BEF was far too large and strong to be annihilated by the German army.
 

Deleted member 1487

That is the crux of the matter, would the French panic and sue for peace if they lost touch with the British army when they are forced to withdraw to the channel ports? The obvious block is Clemanceau, but he can be toppled by a vote of no confidence. Especially if the Germans are able to follow up with a successful attack near Verdun, they French may well call it quits if the Germans offer a decent peace, ie withdraw from France and Belgium, but keep AL. The Americans would never get to even fight.
 
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