Low interwar US defense spending - a bad attitude or reasonable assessment

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
In this an article (originally provided by David Tenner on SHWI) relevant to many what-ifs about the late
> 1930's, appeasement, etc.: Bear F. Braumoeller, argues in "The Myth of
> American Isolationism" that the US failure to do more to stop Hitler in the
> 1930's was less a symptom of isolationism than of a belief that Germany was
> economically too weak to be really dangerous; it just did not have the
> capacity to fight a major war for very long. This belief was neither
> unique to the US nor unreasonable:
>

>
> https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/10561317/webPDFs/Braumoeller2010.pdf

David quoted the most relevant points here:
"Absent hindsight, the conclusion that Germany was not to be feared was a
reasonable one at the time. Germany’s economy was operating very nearly at
full steam even during peacetime, and the failure of the bond market and
near depletion of foreign reserves in late 1938 indicated that the
overtaxed German economy would not sustain the strains of mobilization for
long (Harrison 1988; Tooze 2006: chapter 9). Germany was deficient in
nearly every category of strategic raw materials except coal: its shortages
in such obviously crucial materials as iron ore and petroleum, as well as
in nickel, manganese, and molybdenum (all important for the production of
steel), were critical. A shortage of hard currency ruled out the option of
trading for sufficient quantities of these commodities to make up the
shortfall. In the period between September of 1937 and February of 1939, no
more than 58.6% of German armament orders could be met by industry due to
shortages of material and capacity (Murray 1984:16; Ellis 1993:273-274). A
recent summary of Roosevelt’s assessment of German strength in the late
1930s is illustrative: ‘‘While he recognized that the Nazis were clearly
acquiring the power to do some damage beyond their borders, he detected
numerous signs below the surface that Hitler’s rearmament program was
engendering political and economic difficulties’’ and felt that it
‘‘brought with it the high probability of bankruptcy.’’ (Casey 2001:7-8)

"German land and air forces reflected this disarray. The Luftwaffe was the
most impressive branch of the service numerically, but its numbers mask the
fact that the majority of the aircraft produced through mid-1937 were
trainers, and most of the bombers and fighters were obsolete. At the time
of the invasion of France, Germany could only muster 2,439 tanks against
the 4,200 fielded by the French, British, Belgians and Dutch--nothing near
the usual 3:1 ratio recommended for success in offensive operations. Nor
were German tanks qualitatively superior; in fact, quite the opposite
(Tooze 2006:371). The fact that Germany’s unorthodox gambit through the
Ardennes worked to devastating effect and most likely saved them from
collapse should not obscure the fact that no sober observer at the
time on either side thought it could succeed.

"Of more direct relevance to the US, perhaps, Germany’s surface navy was in
abysmal shape. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the ability of Germany to project
power over water as late as 1939 was virtually nil. The entire fleet
consisted of a total of 102 vessels, 57 of which were U-boats. Only two
battleships were in service (although the massive Bismarck would soon be
launched--and sunk). The Navy possessed no aircraft carriers. The German
experiment with superheated steam engines for larger vessels had produced
little success and mechanical difficulties were commonplace. These factors
limited the range of the larger ships to about 1,000 nautical miles; even
if Germany had had aircraft carriers, therefore, it would not have been
able to bring air power to within striking distance of the American
mainland. Although Nazi U-boats were capable of disrupting a considerable
amount of sea traffic, they were useless for transporting equipment or
troops in any significant number. Admiral Raeder remarked of his country’s
surface fleet that ‘‘even at full strength, they can do no more than show
that they know how to die gallantly.’’24 [in a footnote, Bruamoeller
writes, "The remark referred to an Anglo-German conflict, but the numbers
suggest that German prospects in a naval war with the United States were
little better."] Given that the United States had, in the previous year,
decided to increase its fleet by 20% to include a total of 21 battleships,
seven aircraft carriers, 40 cruisers, and 252 destroyers, Germany simply
had no hope of being able to wage any sort of war in the Atlantic in the
foreseeable future. Even if the United States stood still, Germany would
need 12-15 years to catch up (Stegemann 1991).


"...The Anschluss had done little to ease Germany’s chronic shortages; nor
did the Munich agreement, though it left Czechoslovakia defenseless. The
seizure of Prague on March 15, 1939, was a different matter. Czech
industries had stockpiled raw materials, Czech armament factories were
well-supplied and were not dif?cult to utilize, existing Czech munitions
were quite substantial, and plunder from the Czech national bank combined
with pro?ts from the sale of some Czech arms alleviated Germany’s hard-
currency problems. Germany’s capabilities had also been ampli?ed by
doctrinal innovation in the use of air power and, as Poland soon
discovered, mechanized land power.26 Nevertheless, in early 1940 it still
seemed likely that Germany’s bid for hegemony had run its course. The
Allied blockade, though imperfect, nevertheless cut Germany off from vital
strategic supplies. Germany immediately lost access to 43% of its imported
iron ore, and in the 9-month sitzkreig following the invasion of Poland,
Germany’s petroleum reserve fell by a third. Combat operations for any
substantial period were inconceivable. A review of American diplomatic
communications during this time mostly reveals discussions of a European
settlement, the form that such a settlement should take, and the problems
to be dealt with in the postwar period (FRUS 1940:I, 1-135; Murray
(1984:328-330)."

Responding to this article in the very first post, David cites a paper arguing that US policy was genuinely proportionate to the demonstrated threat all along, rather than willfully underprepared to deal with foreign adversaries.

There are good points in this. The US had fewer exposed interests around the globe before WWII than after WWII. It also had more reasons to think that relatively benign powers (the British and French Empires) formed a sufficiently strong buffer between the US and potential adversaries before WWII. After the fall of France and exhaustion of Britain through the course of WWII, the objective strength of any such buffers was clearly much less.

So, according to the argument, it was only the freak event of the defeat and conquest of France in 1940 that justified, not only psychologically, but also objectively, the American build-up of major expeditionary forces for global service. Before that point, there was simply no need.

This is valid, but only up to a point.
Circumstances for the US indeed changed quite a lot with the Fall of France. (& its Pacific corollaries, which facilitated Japanese occupation of French Indochina. & which was compounded by the absorption of the USSR in defense after Barbarossa). But, it is a mistake to attribute to American strategy a consistency that only changed as drastically as global circumstances.

WWII clearly was a strategic watershed for the US, with undeniable major differences in America's innate risk-tolerance, attitudes, preferences and priorities before and after the war.

America before WWII was basically content with carrying much less military "insurance" of its national interests before the war than it was after.

Even if we regard the German Blitzkrieg of 1940 and conquest of France as a fluke event that would have been imprudent to plan for, the situation in the Pacific in 1941-1942 starkly demonstrates America's stinginess prior to WWII in purchasing military insurance coverage.

Japan was such an industrial pygmy compared to the United States that the 6 months of initial Japanese victories and conquests from Pearl Harbor onward simply never should have happened.

America before WWII judged that its fleet, its industry and its latent military *potential* alone were sufficient to deter an attack against the United States and even its string of more exposed interests in the Western Pacific. In other words, America's innate assets were sufficient strategic "insurance". Actually existing forces and infrastructure-in-place sufficient to repel attacks on the American empire (the metropole and its dependencies) were not a priority. US lawmakers and executives at the time would have judged the maintenance of such forces to be a distortion of a sensible household budget for the USA that would misallocate excessive resources to armed "insurance".

Turns out that the US ended up suffering the loss of several overseas territories and dependencies for several years. As a colonial power, America failed in fulfilling one of the few redeeming features of colonialism, protecting the colonies against the depredations of others. It had miscalculated its adversaries' capacity for strategic stupidity.

After WWII the US attitude towards the need for military insurance went to the other extreme, and perhaps was somewhat excessive for objective circumstances. America wanted a large military establishment and a navy and air force second to none, ever since WWII. America's priorities were different, its risk tolerance was lower, it preferred, if it was to err at all, to err on the side of over-investing in military (and diplomatic) insurance. This was clearly a sea-change in American attitudes that was remarkably persistent after the WWII watershed.

Countries have "mood swings" and this is a great illustration of it.

Re-imagine American history without this mood-swing, or at least less of it. A history where America kept a fairly tight equilibrium more in tune with its objective threat environment.

Before World War II, if America had been willing to invest in military insurance even at the level of the lowest spending Cold War years (like 1948-1949), or half of that, it probably would have made a substantial strategic difference in Europe and the Atlantic in the late 1930s and 1940s. The strategic difference in the Pacific would have been huge, and I would argue, decisively so.

Such a level of investment in military resources for the navy, air and ground defense for the United States and its dependencies like the Philippines and Guam, would have prevented Japan from successfully invading or occupying any of them. In all probability this level of American military capability would have deterred from Japan from attacking the United States at all, or otherwise risking war with the US. It probably would have made the embargo of Japan a viable policy for eventually backing out of China without a US-Japanese war at all.

Post-World War Two, a US at greater equilibrium and less of a "spare no expense" attitude towards defense would have been satisfied with the deterrent power of local ground forces and its own air and naval power to deter Soviet aggression. Even if US forces were used as a stopgap for the first decade after WWII, the US would have passed the buck for local ground defense to its recovering European and Japanese allies no later than 1960 or so.

The US would have invested substantially less in defense and more on other priorities.

With more self-assurance about the ability to keep the world order and balance of power tolerable, the US would likely have been less deferential in trade disputes with allies that were seen as too precious to risk during OTL's Cold War and post-Cold War.

I'm pretty confident in the post-WWII scenario and downright certain of the pre-WWII Asia-Pacific scenario.

Thoughts?
 
I certainly agree with the assessment of the interwar years. But the other thing that you have to take into account since WWII is the desire of the nations of western Europe not to want to spend the money for their own defense.
 
I certainly agree with the assessment of the interwar years. But the other thing that you have to take into account since WWII is the desire of the nations of western Europe not to want to spend the money for their own defense.

Isn't that just the classic of paying for a common good ?
(Ie why pay when the small difference you make will not make any or much of a difference ?)

The same could be said of many other groups, the British empire dominions (CAN/SA/AUS/NZ) in the inter war era as an example.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The Philippines, of course, were already on the road

The Philippines, of course, were already on the road to independence; the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1932, IIRC, and until the WT regime expired, the U.S. was treaty-bound not to further fortify the PI or Guam.

Oahu and the Canal Zone were the only significant overseas positions, and they were heavily fortified and garrisoned in the interwar period.

It is also worth noting that a lot of Interwar era U.S. spending went into R&D and the like, which tended not to show up in the field forces until mobilization began in 1940, largely because of the stockpiles from the WW I mobilization that remained in hand, in some categories, in useful numbers until WW II.

Best,
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Philippines, of course, were already on the road to independence; the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1932, IIRC
,

Yes- the Philippines was put on track for independence in 1944 when the act was passed in 1934.

Of course, prudent planning would have taken into account-

a) the possibility of a war with Japan before 1944
b) the possibility even with an independent Philippines of a continued naval base lease or special diplomatic relationship with the Philippines post-independence
c) the question of whether or not Japanese aggression against the Philippines in the early years of Philippines independence in the mid 1940s would have been something the US could tolerate. (As a former colony of the US, was American indifference from 1944 realistic? Aggression against it would be a blow to American prestige at least as great as letting a violation of the Monroe Doctrine stand, even though the territories was not geographically in the western hemisphere).

and until the WT regime expired, the U.S. was treaty-bound not to further fortify the PI or Guam.

The treaty was effectively dead from the Second London Naval Conference in January 1936. Japanese actions and rhetoric from then through the early stages of the China War demonstrated a notable lack of self-restraint on Japan's part and should have been a signal that an arms race in the Pacific was "game on". Yet even with five years warning, the United States pursued its fleet build-up in such a manner that Japan had a window for operational success in 1941-1942. Considering the industrial imbalance between the US and Japan, it was an unforced error to allow this to happen.

Also, I'm not sure if the Washington treaties said much about allowable equipment and size of mobile defense forces (Filipino or American) even when there was some reason to hope for preservation of that framework.


Oahu and the Canal Zone were the only significant overseas positions, and they were heavily fortified and garrisoned in the interwar period.

It is also worth noting that a lot of Interwar era U.S. spending went into R&D and the like, which tended not to show up in the field forces until mobilization began in 1940, largely because of the stockpiles from the WW I mobilization that remained in hand, in some categories, in useful numbers until WW II.

That's a good point, and there were benefits from the ability to produce later at a higher tech level. I had always thought that the US military, especially its Army, had a rather large "brain" for it's scrawny "body".
 

Delta Force

Banned
The United States hasn't really had any nearby threats since the early 1800s. In such a situation, investing in a strong peacetime military wasn't really a priority. By the 20th century the United States started funding major defense research during times of peace, but the thought was always that a war would be foreseeable and the United States could surge to produce a military force if required. Any attack against the United States would have to come from over the seas, so maintaining a strong Navy was the only major priority.

Interestingly, for a short period after World War II, there was an attempt to return to isolationism once again, with the Air Force nuclear deterrent safeguarding the country.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
You know who funded the Philippine Commonwealth Army, right?

,

Yes- the Philippines was put on track for independence in 1944 when the act was passed in 1934.

Of course, prudent planning would have taken into account-

a) the possibility of a war with Japan before 1944
b) the possibility even with an independent Philippines of a continued naval base lease or special diplomatic relationship with the Philippines post-independence
c) the question of whether or not Japanese aggression against the Philippines in the early years of Philippines independence in the mid 1940s would have been something the US could tolerate. (As a former colony of the US, was American indifference from 1944 realistic? Aggression against it would be a blow to American prestige at least as great as letting a violation of the Monroe Doctrine stand, even though the territories was not geographically in the western hemisphere).



The treaty was effectively dead from the Second London Naval Conference in January 1936. Japanese actions and rhetoric from then through the early stages of the China War demonstrated a notable lack of self-restraint on Japan's part and should have been a signal that an arms race in the Pacific was "game on". Yet even with five years warning, the United States pursued its fleet build-up in such a manner that Japan had a window for operational success in 1941-1942. Considering the industrial imbalance between the US and Japan, it was an unforced error to allow this to happen.

Also, I'm not sure if the Washington treaties said much about allowable equipment and size of mobile defense forces (Filipino or American) even when there was some reason to hope for preservation of that framework.






That's a good point, and there were benefits from the ability to produce later at a higher tech level. I had always thought that the US military, especially its Army, had a rather large "brain" for it's scrawny "body".

You know who funded the Philippine Commonwealth Army, right? Until 1941, it was not the (US) War Department...

The US had written off the PI by WW I, essentially, in the event of war with the Japanese. The PCA was structured tp provide a militia force that, essentially, would be able to turn to guerilla warfare in the event of an invasion, to the point that - if the US was no longer in garrison - the Japanese wouldn't bother with the PI.

Best,
 
It's not unreasonable to maintain a small defense force if you can expand it quickly enough in times of crisis. I think the USA had enough big (slow to build) stuff like battleships, carriers and cruisers that they can't be considered to be totally unprepared.
 
Top