Lord Gort - dunderhead or saviour?

The point I was making was that during the reduction of the pocket the Germans didn't really have to worry about the new French lines because they were incapable of offensive action.

They could (and did) defeat both in detail because the French in the South were unable to influence events in the North.
They could be defeated in detail, sure, but the French lines proved pretty tough in Fall Rot. If a longer Dunkirk battle allows the French armies to bounce off a German offensive rather than merely holding it for a few days before collapsing (because they're better dug in), giving way but not giving in, the next line is going to be reinforced even more, and eventually we're back to WW1-style fronts after an initial shocking reverse for the Allies.

So putting the question differently, can Gort and the BEF extend their stay in Flanders enough to allow the Weygand Line to hold? I've no idea, because I don't have a clear picture how much time it'd take for the allies to reinforce the Weygand line more than the Germans can beat through anyhow.
 
[QUOTE="avernite, post: 12864231, member: 79864")

So putting the question differently, can Gort and the BEF extend their stay in Flanders enough to allow the Weygand Line to hold? I've no idea, because I don't have a clear picture how much time it'd take for the allies to reinforce the Weygand line more than the Germans can beat through anyhow.[/QUOTE]

Short & long answers are NO. The few ports available were inadequate to supply the BEF. What those ports could sustain could not cover them all simultaneously. Logistically a Flander enclave is unsustainable with the resources of the Brits and French of 1940.
 
Reading Brooke's diaries, I couldn't help but form the impression that the deployment of the BEF to France in 1939 was a mistake. Politically it was probably needed to reassure the French. However, the forces weren't needed until after the Germans invaded France or the Low Countries. In 1914 the BEF showed up after the invasion of Belgium was underway.

Holding the BEF in reserve in southeast England would have been easier on logisitics and on morale. But they also would have allowed the Allies much more flexibility to respond to contingencies when the Germans began their offensive. They could have been sent to the Netherlands instead of the French 7th Army, deploying across the North Sea from England. They could have constituted the reserve which the Allies lacked. Of course they might of also have wound up in Norway!

But I have wondered if the BEF and the Dutch might have been able to keep a foothold in Holland, which actually has defensible terrain. The main problem with this, in that the BEF is not in Belgium or France, would have been partially made up with more flexibility in deployment of the 7th Army, and more than made up if the reaction was to adopt the Eschaut Plan instead of the Dyle Plan. And it would have made the difficulties in cooperating with the Belgians less relevant.

To make this more relevant to the topic, as CIGS Gort did have a say in the plans for the initial deployment.
 
They could be defeated in detail, sure, but the French lines proved pretty tough in Fall Rot. If a longer Dunkirk battle allows the French armies to bounce off a German offensive rather than merely holding it for a few days before collapsing (because they're better dug in), giving way but not giving in, the next line is going to be reinforced even more, and eventually we're back to WW1-style fronts after an initial shocking reverse for the Allies.

So putting the question differently, can Gort and the BEF extend their stay in Flanders enough to allow the Weygand Line to hold? I've no idea, because I don't have a clear picture how much time it'd take for the allies to reinforce the Weygand line more than the Germans can beat through anyhow.

I think what ever might have been is a non-starter as the British had been shocked at the poor state of the French Army during the Phoney war period as the BEF was building up in France and what little faith they had left was used up during May - not helped by the criminally ineffective French high command - principly Gamelin who had already decided how the Germans were going to attack and dismissed any and all intelligence as to how they were actually attacking until it was too late and then did very little to effectively counter it.

As far as I am concerned Gamelin was the Best commander Germany had during the Battle for France.

So at the end of the day - it does not matter what the BEF does so long as Gamelin is preparing for and then fighting a different battle to the one that actually took place.

My armchair strategy is to tell Belgium to let the French army in to help defend their borders with Germany or to 'sling their hook' and the same to the Netherlands and 'promising' them that French forces would not come to their aid if they were invaded before giving the Entente permission to move in.

Send 7th Army to help the Netherlands army (As per the plan) and the 3 French armies to reinforce the Belgian army as an administrative move.

However Keep the Majority of the BEF (might not be possible politically but certainly would make sense given its mobility), the majority of the DCRs and DLMs and reserve Divisions held back - as a large reserve force.

As for British forces deploying directly from the UK - the BEF in May 1940 in France was about 500K strong while the British army was far larger - in June 1940 it was 1.6 million strong (obviously much of this was units still training and forming up in the UK) and so there was an opportunity for units to be shipped to the Netherlands - but the main German effort is going to be to knock France out of the war ASAP and so the British were right in deploying the BEF to France.

With no need to rush into Belgium after the Germans had attacked with the most mobile and best formations - the main defensive positions can be held by Cat A and B infantry Divisions - dug in in depth and having familiarised themselves with the local area etc with the mobile formations held in local reserve and strategic reserve.
 
I think what ever might have been is a non-starter as the British had been shocked at the poor state of the French Army during the Phoney war period as the BEF was building up in France and what little faith they had left was used up during May - not helped by the criminally ineffective French high command - principly Gamelin who had already decided how the Germans were going to attack and dismissed any and all intelligence as to how they were actually attacking until it was too late and then did very little to effectively counter it.

As far as I am concerned Gamelin was the Best commander Germany had during the Battle for France.

So at the end of the day - it does not matter what the BEF does so long as Gamelin is preparing for and then fighting a different battle to the one that actually took place.
*snip*
I suppose that's a fair enough point, but Gamelin HAD been booted out, so the French were clearly making the point that they, too, thought the high command should do better.

And, of course, I was looking at what Gort could do. He can't make the French troops fight much better, and choosing to not-deploy the BEF probably isn't his choice either (though he could argue for something else). What he does have the ability to do is choose what the BEF does once the fighting starts on May 10th. The first few days are probably a wash (only a brilliant or very lucky commander could fix things by that point, and even by the start of the phoney war Gamelin was probably too big an obstacle to resolve by a single person), but Gort made the choice between withdrawing for a cross-channel retreat and doing something else.

Other posters praised him for choosing retreat, I wonder if he could have managed more than just save the British expeditionary forces - with the very specific question, which I hope someone can help answer, of 'how long did the Weygand line need to become formidable enough to repulse a German offensive'. If that's months, Gort probably made the right choice to withdraw. If it's days, perhaps even a different strategy that sees much of the BEF destroyed (but slowly) would be the overall better choice. Inbetween, there's space for choices that see the BEF fight longer and take more losses in combat but also hold out longer (and still, eventually, withdraw when supplies really run out).
 
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Other posters praised him for choosing retreat, I wonder if he could have managed more than just save the British expeditionary forces - with the very specific question, which I hope someone can help answer, of 'how long did the Weygand line need to become formidable enough to repulse a German offensive'. If that's months, Gort probably made the right choice to withdraw. If it's days, perhaps even a different strategy that sees much of the BEF destroyed (but slowly) would be the overall better choice.

Long months. Look at the numbers, France had lost roughly 30% of its ground combat strength. Germany was still better than 90%. The density of defending units on the front was far below any viable capability.

In between, there's space for choices that see the BEF fight longer and take more losses in combat but also hold out longer (and still, eventually, withdraw when supplies really run out).

The supplies were already near run out. The 'Panzer Corridor' had cut away the supply line. The Brits had a few days worth on their vehicles, and a few days more in the forward depots. My take is some artillery regiments had run out by the time they reached the coast. Vehicles were being abandoned for lack of any spare parts.
 
I don't think that Gort was any worse than a lot of the German generals, who were also working on the basis of their experience in WWI: it's just that being on the winning side covers a multitude of sins.
 
I don't think that Gort was any worse than a lot of the German generals, who were also working on the basis of their experience in WWI: it's just that being on the winning side covers a multitude of sins.

Good point. Most German army commanders thought the Sickle Cut manuver would fail & were carrying contingency plans for that in their pockets. Even Guderian thought it a miracle they got to the breakout so easily.
 
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