Looking for Constantinople "What If"

Hia folks

I'd like to know if anyone has made a "What If" or "alternate timeline" for this situation: Emperor Justinian of the Byzantine Empire decides to abandon his insane idea of recovering Rome and Italy from the "barbarians", focusing instead in the East.
 
If I was him first I would try to elimate the threat of nomads and I would also try to reform the government and the defensive of the empire and finally kill the Persian
 
It's possible that Justinian didn't really had the notion of recovering the West before Belisarius' victory against Vandals : would it have been harder to defeat them or even the opportunity itself not being there, you might have a different approach (altough, at this point, supporting allies and claimants, would it be only for reinforcing a Nicean "commonwealth" would still be there)

On the other hand, without some changes in Persia, and at least the notion that border regions could be reinforced, Justinian is likely to not really change from his policy of stabilisation with Sasanians. And while, as @Wolttaire says, he could have focused on Nomas they were too remote of foes and strategically unthreatening to really be a concern.
So, as long nothing changes in Persia, you'd still have conflcits (if more limited in scope and objectives) in Central Romania.
 
Hia folks

I'd like to know if anyone has made a "What If" or "alternate timeline" for this situation: Emperor Justinian of the Byzantine Empire decides to abandon his insane idea of recovering Rome and Italy from the "barbarians", focusing instead in the East.

It really wasn't an insane idea, taking north Africa was very successful and paid for itself, and if it hadn't been for his distrust of Basillius its very likely Italy would have been taken years earlier and without the devastation that made the conquest not worth it. Only taking southern Iberia wasn't worth it.
 
It's possible that Justinian didn't really had the notion of recovering the West before Belisarius' victory against Vandals : would it have been harder to defeat them or even the opportunity itself not being there, you might have a different approach (altough, at this point, supporting allies and claimants, would it be only for reinforcing a Nicean "commonwealth" would still be there)

On the other hand, without some changes in Persia, and at least the notion that border regions could be reinforced, Justinian is likely to not really change from his policy of stabilisation with Sasanians. And while, as @Wolttaire says, he could have focused on Nomas they were too remote of foes and strategically unthreatening to really be a concern.
So, as long nothing changes in Persia, you'd still have conflcits (if more limited in scope and objectives) in Central Romania.
watch up to one minute the nomads were a big threat and eliamting them or at the minium setting up a buffer zone would be good for Rome
 
It really wasn't an insane idea, taking north Africa was very successful and paid for itself, and if it hadn't been for his distrust of Basillius its very likely Italy would have been taken years earlier and without the devastation that made the conquest not worth it. Only taking southern Iberia wasn't worth it.

I'll admit I don't know much about the era, but I'm told the whole efort neary bankrupt the Empire and bled it of it's best troops.
 
I'll admit I don't know much about the era, but I'm told the whole efort neary bankrupt the Empire and bled it of it's best troops.

That was mainly Italy, Belisarius had been winning quickly and without big devastation, but Justinian feared him and his success and replaced him, this caused the war to go much worse and needlessly drag on for years longer than it should have and devastated large sections of Italy making them economically useless after the conquest.
In short if Justinian dosn't recall Belisarius and lets him take all Italy years early, then the empire gets an economically vibrant and easily defensible conquest years earlier than it ended up getting the devastated wreck Italy became. Also this means the veteran armies in Italy can be moved back to the Persian border years earlier and massively change the balance of power in the east, possibly under their amazing general Belisarius. Also the empire wont have been spending money to support the army fighting for years in Italy.
 
Justinian just has to keep a cool head about Belisarius. Yes, like any other outstandingly successful Roman general he could become a threat to his boss' livelihood, but as long as he's discreetly kept under surveillance for potential treasonous behavior and a plan to assassinate him is kept ready to go at a moment's notice, Belisarius should be left to do his job as he sees fit.
 
watch up to one minute the nomads were a big threat and eliamting them or at the minium setting up a buffer zone would be good for Rome
More or less like what happened with Barbaricum between the IIIrd to Vth century, the pressure was essentially coming from Persia : it doesn't mean that it didn't played an important role eventually, but it wasn't their presence itself that provoked the loss of Balkans but wars with Sasanians which forced relocation of forces and resources.
The Danubian border was secondary for Constantinople on this regard, and didn't represented a strategical threat in itself. Hence why Justinian perpetuated the traditional Roman policy consisting of playing Barbaricum's peoples against others.
 
It really wasn't an insane idea, taking north Africa was very successful and paid for itself
Barely : small scale wars with Berbers were costly, both in men and local resources and when the situation settled a bit, Constantinople seems to have increasingly neglected the region, as it doesn't appears in imperial mentions.

and if it hadn't been for his distrust of Basillius its very likely Italy would have been taken years earlier and without the devastation that made the conquest not worth it.
It's an explanation often said, but the problem isn't as much a defiance towards Belisarius, than the prevention of Justinian to avoid having a single commander-in-chief (hence the disputes, disagreement and lack of coherence in Roman chain of command in Italy) for the whole army which more often than not represented an important political threat, from one hand, and the total incompetence of Theodabald in another (to the point he probably sold his surrender early on). Goths had enough ressources and tactical management to partly recover from heavy losses.

Note that while the war was costly, Italy wasn't utterly doomed and ravaged, and could have fairly recovered : thing is, Justinian couldn't plan for the plague epidemic (which touched the Med in the same way Black Death did in wider Eurasia and North Africa), and didn't planned for the very heavy and costly resuming of Persian wars the way it did.

Of course, having a better set of objectives, more limited from the beggining, would have helped and probably with the same geopolitical result IMO but on safer grounds.

Only taking southern Iberia wasn't worth it.
It was, at the contrary, made in a model that included strategical objectives (preventing Goths to intervene in North Africa) and clarity (remaining essentially limited to the coast without important fortifications, relying on naval supply)
 
It really wasn't an insane idea, taking north Africa was very successful and paid for itself, and if it hadn't been for his distrust of Basillius its very likely Italy would have been taken years earlier and without the devastation that made the conquest not worth it. Only taking southern Iberia wasn't worth it.
Belisarius. Yes, I agree about Italy. If you read Procopius' Gothic Wars, you'll see that the war was largely won by AD 540, four years into the invasion/liberation. The Ostrogoths offered to cede everything south of the Po, but Belisarius refused. I wrote a conference paper on it back in the 90s as a young Doctoral student. 540 was before most of the damage to Italy, including the cutting of the aqueducts of Rome in the sieges of the mid 540s. The war dragged on until 562 as it was and the Lombards brought in as Roman mercenaries late on. They were so impressed by Italy, according to Agathias' Histories, that they decided to invade in 567. Much of the negative impact could have been averted, if the terms of 540 had been accepted.
 
Barely : small scale wars with Berbers were costly, both in men and local resources and when the situation settled a bit, Constantinople seems to have increasingly neglected the region, as it doesn't appears in imperial mentions.


It's an explanation often said, but the problem isn't as much a defiance towards Belisarius, than the prevention of Justinian to avoid having a single commander-in-chief (hence the disputes, disagreement and lack of coherence in Roman chain of command in Italy) for the whole army which more often than not represented an important political threat, from one hand, and the total incompetence of Theodabald in another (to the point he probably sold his surrender early on). Goths had enough ressources and tactical management to partly recover from heavy losses.

Note that while the war was costly, Italy wasn't utterly doomed and ravaged, and could have fairly recovered : thing is, Justinian couldn't plan for the plague epidemic (which touched the Med in the same way Black Death did in wider Eurasia and North Africa), and didn't planned for the very heavy and costly resuming of Persian wars the way it did.

Of course, having a better set of objectives, more limited from the beggining, would have helped and probably with the same geopolitical result IMO but on safer grounds.


It was, at the contrary, made in a model that included strategical objectives (preventing Goths to intervene in North Africa) and clarity (remaining essentially limited to the coast without important fortifications, relying on naval supply)
Yes, I respect your knowledge of Late Antiquity, as always, and agree with you that limited goals would have been best. Sicily was an easy conquest too of course, so that will have encouraged the Imperial government. Plague and long campaigns with expensive mercenaries were major factors in the exhaustion of the Empire.
 
I would not stupid idiots asshole to the Sasssasinds first off and second I would have North Africa conquered earlier so it would be more integrated into the empire maybe in the earlier invasions and Ostrogoth King was actually going to completely surrender the whole of Italy in the early stage of the war then war started in the east
 
IIRC Belisarius rejected the 540 terms because he knew that the Goths would simply invade again as soon as Roman armies left the area and would have a major logistical advantage, so those terms had a low chance of being accepted no matter what.
 
IIRC Belisarius rejected the 540 terms because he knew that the Goths would simply invade again as soon as Roman armies left the area and would have a major logistical advantage, so those terms had a low chance of being accepted no matter what.
Can you verify that from Procopius? I don't recall that at all though it has been a long time. My copies are in the office, so I can't check until Monday. The Ostrogoths had been badly beaten and would have lost most of their kingdom. I think that your prognosis of their chances in a renewed invasion after that are optimistic. Besides, the Empire would have left a garrison. Had peace been signed, I don't think that the Goths would have broken it lightly.
 
Can you verify that from Procopius? I don't recall that at all though it has been a long time. My copies are in the office, so I can't check until Monday. The Ostrogoths had been badly beaten and would have lost most of their kingdom. I think that your prognosis of their chances in a renewed invasion after that are optimistic. Besides, the Empire would have left a garrison. Had peace been signed, I don't think that the Goths would have broken it lightly.
They would have then sent troops back after the invasion to strength the area
 
Can you verify that from Procopius?
(Sorry for the bad translation, I can't find the text in English)

There's an hint of Belisarius divergences in chapter 22/4.

As soon Justinian knew the king of Persians broke the truce, he decided to make peace ith Goths, and to call back Belisarius to give him the command of the Eastern army. He gave their leave to Vitiges' envoys, that where in Constantinople, and promised them to send of his own in Ravenna, to negotiate the peace in fair terms for both nations.[...]

But most of it is in the chapter 29.

Dominicus and Maximinus, senators of Constantinople and evoys of Justinan, then arrived, with capacity to make peace, if Vitiges kept half of his treasury and would rule in the country, beyond the Po, and that the Emperor would take the other half of treasury and would take tribute of all the land on this side of Po. These envoys, after having communicated their letters to Belisarius, went to Ravenna, where Vitiges and Goths accepted the conditions.

Belisarius grew immensly unpleased, that the honor of a plain and complete victory was taken from him, and that he was deprived from the glory of a new triumph. When the envoys came back from Ranevva, he refused to confirm the peace treaty, and filled, by this refusel, Goths of suspicion and defiance; as such they argued they wouldn't make peace if Belisarius wouldn't sign it and would swore to maintain it. This general, told that there were leaders that accused him to be unwilling to end the war because of schemes he was involved in against the Emperor, gathered all the commanders, and in presence of Dominicus and Maximinus, spoke them so.

I know enough, and I think you know as much as I do how much war success and uncertain and dubious. The hope for victory is extremely decieving. It flee to who think hold it, and switch side with who were seemingly defeated. It's why when peace is discussed, not only reasons that gave oneself the advantage should be considered, but also infidelity of luck and instability of events. It's what forced me to gather you as for we'll examine cautiously what's more advantageous for the Emperor's interests, nothing could be blamed on me anymore, as there's nothing more ridicule than being silent when there's a lot of possibilities and there's liberty to choose any as we would want; and then to shout and blame, when happens some unfortune. You know what are imperial tought, and what is Vitiges' resolution when it come to peace. If you are really certain it is useful to the State, please tell it so without fear. But if you think it is possible to take all of Italy and to destroy all the Gothic power there, don't hide your opinion.
After this speech, commanders declared they shared Justinian's opinion, and that for them, nothing could be done anymore against the ennemy. Belisarius asked them to write down their opinion, as they wouldn't be able to deny him, which they quickly did.

While this happened among Romans, Goths pressured by hunger, and bothered by the rule of a ruler as unfortunate as Vitiges, didn't surrendered only in fear of being enslaved and deported to Constantinople. The more powerful among them discussed to give the kingdom to Belisarius, and begged him to accept it. Nothing was further than the general's will to make himself king without Justinian's agreement, who he pledged obedience, and he had a natural aversion of tyranny. He still pretended to consider barbarians' proposal, in order to benefit from it, altough Vitiges wasn't pleased at all. He was opnely overjoyed by this and reasurred Belisarius that nothing was to fear from him. Then this general gathered once again all the commanders, and asked them if it wasn't a great advantage to take Vitiges, to take all Goths as prisonners, and to rule over all Italy. They cofnessed it would be an immense benefit for the Empire, and asked him to do all of these things if he knew how. Right then, he send trusted people to Vitiges, and to the nation of Goths, to ask them to do what they promised. As hunger didn't allowed them to hold out any more, they sent envoys to Romans, with orders to speak only to Belisarius, to make him swear that they would be unharmed, and that he would be king of Italians and Goths, and then to go to Ravenna with his army. Belisarius promised, taking an oath, everything the envoys asked from him, exception made of what mattered to the kingship of Italy, on which he said to them, that he would swore to Vitiges and Goths, and that he would put his word on any oath they would ask from him. They couldn't concieve that he would be willing to refuse a crown, thinking he passionately wanted it, invited him to come in Ravenna. Then he sent Bessas, John, Narses, that he considered as personal foes, each on separate place, to search for weapons as there were not in the land they came alltogether. They obeyed to his orders, and went with Athanase, recently arrived from Constantinople.

When I witnessed the entry of the Roman Army in Ravenna, this tought came to be that neither virtue or strength, or by having more men that great things are achieved, but by a hidden decision of God that make do as he wishes, without encountering any obstacle to the execution of his will. While Goths outnumbered Romans in number and strength, while there was no fight after city's doors were opened, and that there wasn't anything before them that would terrify them, they nevertheless submitted to the rule that was imposed to them by an handful of people, and this rule wasn't unsupportable for them


The Ostrogoths had been badly beaten and would have lost most of their kingdom. I think that your prognosis of their chances in a renewed invasion after that are optimistic. Besides, the Empire would have left a garrison. Had peace been signed, I don't think that the Goths would have broken it lightly.
At this point, still, Justinian have to deal with a troubled situation in Persia and needs troops and generals. It's possible that Romans would have eventually needed to rely regionally on Gothic's good will that would still have held a rich land relatively untouched by war (Frankish campaigns in Italy so far having been more small scale raids, and not really successful ones) and, which might have been problematic too, in connection to other Barbarians as Lombards or Franks that, would the Roman armies gone away, wouldn't have felt as threatened by imperial retaliation.
Even in less than favourable's conditions, IOTL Totila did a great job taking back the initiative for Goths (it could be argued that without Theodabald, Goths would have put more of a fight right from the beggining), so I don't think that Belisarius was that wrong arguing that Goths could have taken back ground from Northern Italy at all. Now, if campaigns against Persians are quick enough, I agree there's much less chances for Goths being able to pull something on the long run.
 
Top