Look to the West Volume VIII: The Bear and the Basilisk

296.2

Thande

Donor
From: “Mme. Mercier’s Diaries, Volume III: Exile’s Return” (1978, authorised English translation 1981)—

February 14th 1926.

It is the day of Saint-Valentin, or so the calendar says. I remember those days when René and I would be one another’s valentines, and then the long years when my heart hurt to see me left alone as all around me celebrate their love.[5] Now, I barely think of it either way. I find myself barely thinking of anything but the war. It is almost three years since Bertrand asked me to join the coalition government as a triumvir. In that time, the world has gone mad all around me.

I look back on the pages of my diary to that time. I thought things were terrible then. Our boys were fighting the Belgians in the mud of the Meuse, fearful of steerables dropping death-luft on our cities.[6] On paper, things should be better now. No-one can threaten us in Paris, and though the casualty lists are terrible, at least the conflict is safely a long way from us, in Poland. Yet progress eluded us for so long. In recent months, we finally had hope of a resolution, but now...

I drink my cup of foul faux coffee. Things were bad enough when the Societists and the Ottomans cut off the supply, but now Cuba has collapsed into civil war as well. Few Russian ironsharks now prowl the Atlantic, though Povilskaja still, frustratingly, fights on. But even when convoys are safe from the enemy, plague quarantine slows them and there is a focus on military essentials. I am wealthy enough to afford the inflated prices of the Guinea beans, of course. But I must show solidarity with the people in some small way.

I look back on those days again, and it breaks my heart. I think of Renée as a cheeky young girl, calling me old-fashioned. Three years have passed. She should be dressing in unsuitable clothes with rouge on her face, dancing with unsuitable boys to dreadful modern music, shocking me and sticking her tongue out when I tell her to focus on her studies, not to throw away years of Cytherean progress. Instead, she works on a factory line, her face free of makeup, her hair wrapped up in a scarf, as determined as I am to prove that none shall say the political class did not pull their weight. I can feel the shape of that future that could have been, that should have been, and I weep. My daughter should not have had to sacrifice her youth on an altar of war. If le petit pasha had not seen fit to burn the world over Khiva.[7] If the Shah-Advocate had not used the last war as an excuse to push into what Pasha sees as his territory. If Hiedler had not shot David Braithwaite. If, if, if...

Ferbuary 15th 1926.

Valéry shocked me today. I want to blame the influence of Diane, that bloodthirsty girl with all her lurid paperbacks she reads when she thinks I’m not looking. Every day I miss poor Anne-Marie. I must send flowers to her grave once more. If only she was the only one I had lost to la peste noire. There have been times over the past years where I think our girls would be safer if they joined their boyfriends and husbands in the trenches in Poland than if they stayed here. No matter how much we drench our sewers in the green poison, if one rat, one flea is missed and bites you, you are in the hands of the good God. There is no cure, only prevention. Dr Vicaire and his colleagues give us hope now, hope of a new wonder treatment; but it is too late for so many.[8]

I digress. Valéry still fills his head with notions of glory, no matter how long the casualty lists extend. He dreams of fighting in Poland, even in Gavaji, where that fool Chambord has killed so many brave young men of Pérousie to no effect. I have given up trying to reason with him. He is a boy, and he is eleven. I wish I could be confident that this war will not last long enough for him to fight in it...

February 16th 1926.

Extraordinary scenes. I was called in for a meeting by the Duc himself. Again I was struck at how the mobiles on the street now seem to have reverted to the coal and steam of my youth, as all the spirit and sun-oil is directed to the armed forces. Many have even returned to the horse and cart; it makes Paris look like a half-hearted period film trying to depict the ancien régime before the Revolution. At least my veil has come in handy again.

But, the meeting. I must paint a picture with words, before they fade from my memory. More than usual, I am conscious of living through history.

All are there, around the table in the Maison de Montmartre with its vast, now faded map of Europe. It is of little real purpose, as I recall Marshal Picotin commenting, and I have seen the far more detailed maps which the Army uses. I can see the holes where the pins marking the battle lines against Belgium once stood; it is so easy to forget that that foe is defeated, her lands reduced to occupation zones. Or it would be, if I did not have to manage so many minor clashes between the different occupation troops. Over in the east, we see the remaining fronts against Russia. The Front, truly, for we spare little attention for the English and Scandinavians with their limited success in Finland. True also to the south and east, where grey pins mark the Ottoman-Russian fronts along the Black Sea and, almost off the edge of the map, in Anatolia. Grey for limited intelligence, outdated, for neither Constantinople nor Petrograd sees fit to issue us reliable updates on their progress.

It matters little, for all eyes are on the concentration of pins cutting Poland in half. The Russians are finally ejected from the last of German territory, as Ruddel has crowed (one would think the Bundeskaiser would make more of it). But since that brief hope of the Italians and their wonder rockets of the future, now reality has set in. The Russians have conceived how to corrupt the Photel beams that the Italians use to guide their rockets (or so I am told; Valéry, with his young mind full of whirring wheels and giant engines, would probably understand it better). Both sides use death-luft, and both sides have countermeasures, masks, filters, rubber suits. It is hell out there, though at least it is not the hell we had until recently.

I look at the map. The window of the great Rose Room is at the south end. The pins are tall, not flush with the table. They cast shadows. In a lump of German territory west of the river Oder, a crescent shape shows on the map with brighter colours than the surrounding area. It marks the place where pins stood almost unmoving for nearly two years, as men were fed into a meat grinder that slaughtered them to no purpose. We cannot allow that ever to happen again.

And yet, as the Duc speaks of ending the war, I find myself troubled. It is the terrible logic of war, that same logic that led Leclerc to form the Protocol of armed neutrality. Once begun, it is very difficult to stop. If fought to a standstill, the only humanitarian outcome would be to end it by any means necessary—but neither side is willing to give way without a prize, or else all those deaths were meaningless. And so it continues. It is like M. Migaud’s observation of the two men imprisoned in a cell with two locks, each with one of the keys.[9] I have never thought myself a woman of blood. The thought of the slaughter in the trenches sickens me. But we cannot be seen to be the side that breaks first.

Henri-Louis (as I sometimes call him in the privacy of my mind) is now in his seventies, a bluff gentleman of the old school whose jollity conceals a keen mind. Or at least, that is how he was when I first met him. I recall he wanted to call me ma chérie all the time; it took me a while to train him out of that. But he means well, and if he slipped today and talked to me like I was some slip of a girl in the ’Sixties, I would not hold it against him.[10] The Duc has almost physically shrunk from the weight of the world upon his shoulders, sagging into his chair, his medals gleaming dimly on his uniform. No-one speaks of it, but present in all our minds like a dark raincloud overhead is the knowledge of what happened to his only predecessor.[11]

Also present were, of course, Bertrand (looking none too well himself), fellow triumvir Thierry Vachaud (I would never have thought to have sympathy for a Noir leader, but he has sacrificed his party’s unity for this war), Controller-General Alain Guibal and a confidential secretary from the Auxiliaire, the only other woman present.[12]

One way in which the Duc’s age has shown is his tendency to ramble. Even Bertrand, no mean waffler himself, looked impatient as he took a while to come to the point. We already knew the situation, of course, but he felt the need to set it out in black and white.

“After so much blood, sweat and tears, we have finally pushed the Russians out of Germany,” Henri-Louis recapped bluntly, pointing at the map. “We needed a victory, a strong position, before we could negotiate, so we do not look like the weak party. Now we’ve done it. So let’s damn’ well end this bloody awful war.”

I glanced at Bertrand. What the Duc wasn’t saying was as important as what he was. If that had been strictly true, we’d have been negotiating with the Russians at least a month ago. He wanted negotiation now because our hopeful breakthrough had slowed to a crawl, not because it had succeeded.

Bertrand spoke diplomatically. “You know that, and I know that, your grace.[13] But does Pasha know it?” He glanced at the grey, forgettable woman from the Auxiliaire. “Please report, mam’zelle. I remind everyone that this information is sub rosa the highest level, and repeating it outside this meeting would endanger our agents.” He said the phrase in a rattled-off, perfunctory manner; all present understood that, and had heard him say it many times.

The nameless woman gave a sharp nod behind her large, face-obscuring glasses. “There is intrigue in the Winter Palace, as always. The Tsar has sunk into depression as the anniversary of his son’s death on the Ottoman front has just passed. In the Soviet, those with ties to the RLPC possess growing concern over the Tsar’s lack of urgency over the American attack on Yapon two weeks ago, and his refusal to deploy reinforcements to General Zhdanovich as he appears to be gaining the upper hand over the Americans in Kamchatka. General Pichegru, the exiled Meridian commander who was the Tsar’s advisor in the earlier part of the war, has fallen out of favour due to his warnings about what the Societists may be planning, which the Tsar is not willing to hear. There are whispers of an alignment with the dowager—”

“Yes, yes,” the bluff Duc cut her off, much to my annoyance. “You see? He’s depressed, mourning his loss. Of course the bastard doesn’t care about the millions of others he’s consigned to an early grave. Uh, pardon my language.” He actually made a point of not addressing that last part to me, which I half-appreciated, though I doubt the Auxiliaire woman was too shy about it either. “Now’s the time to get him to agree to a ceasefire.”

I spoke up. “M. le Duc, there’s a problem. A ceasefire, while we negotiate for an armistice, a treaty...”

“Quite so, ma— Madame,” the Duc nodded, quickly covering his slip. I suppressed a smile.

I tried to explain. “Pasha has one great empire. With the Belgians, Abyssinians and Matetwa out of it, all the other Vitebsk allies border Russia and are under his thumb. He only has to satisfy one group.” I suppose technically that wasn’t true, given what the Auxiliaire girl was saying about his discontented Company people, but never mind, I was making a point. “If we negotiate, we need to get all our allies on side, and if the fighting ceases, we lose the sense of urgency. There’s already grumbling about what should happen to Belgium, as you know, and if our boys are no longer fighting alongside the Germans and Italians on a daily basis...”

“Eh? What do you mean?” the Duc said. I know he knew what I meant, he was just trying not to confront it. He depserately wants this to be over. I cannot blame him for that.

Vachaud spoke up. “She means,” he said, a little rudely I thought, “that we’re only holding together as a team because of a common enemy. Take that away, even temporarily, and our alliance cracks—and then if your ceasefire ends, Pasha can exploit those cracks.” Noir to the core, Vachaud always refuses to use any forms of noble address to the Duc, as though he’s raising a bloody flag over the Bastille.[14]

As always, the Duc affects not to notice. “Yes, yes, but dash it, surely we can hold them together that long,” he complained. “We need to put together a deal that’ll let, eh, Pasha sign up to it and save face. Something he can call a victory, or he won’t go for it.”

Guibal bit his lip. “You’re correct, your grace, but the trouble is, I can’t see any way we can do that. Uh, I believe the Russian rhetoric has started focusing on holding us, I mean, the ‘Protocol’,” he crooked his hands to imply guillemets [speech marks] and made everyone smile, “off on all fronts. He can say he fought us all to a standstill, maybe. But is that a victory?”

“There’s Persia,” Vachaud pointed out.

Bertrand gritted his teeth, looking at me. I knew what he was going to say. “Look, our strategy has always been,” he began, and proceeded to explain something I had conceived myself, with René, years ago, as though I didn’t know about it. That irked me, but I suppose the others needed a refresher. Besides, we did take some inspiration from some earlier policy work under Leclerc.

The strategy for containing Russia had begun with the observation that it seemed likely we could not directly confront the Russians if they expanded into Asia. If they were able to take Constantinople, or more of India, or indeed Persia, there was only so much an expeditionary force could achieve—as we had seen, though we cold-bloodedly pretended to the Persians that our force was anything more than a delaying tactic. The Russians were the ones with the railways and the supply lines to overwhelm us, and it was a wonder Persia had lasted so long as it had.

No, to contain Russia (the argument went), we needed to be able to take territory vital to Russia elsewhere, fight them to a standstill, and then force them to retreat from their new conquests in order to get it back, forcing status quo ante bellum. It had always been something from the cold minds of bloodless diplomats, careless of all those who had to die in the process. I thought I had understood that when we conceived it, thinking of the first Great War.[15] I fear that, even then, I was too naïve.

The Duc frowned. “I know the policy, M. Cazeneuve,” he said sharply. “And we have succeeded. We have occupied territories vital to the Tsar all across the world. We can offer to return some of them in exchange for his withdrawal from Persia.”

Bertrand exchanged a look with me, and I spoke. “That is the problem, your grace,” I said. “We have not occupied those lands. Our allies have. And our influence over them...”

There is a world map there, too, on the wall, not so faded as it does not face the sun. I did my best to summarise briefly, and tried not to treat the Duc as a child, knowing his keen mind is still there behind the bags under his eyes and the sagging shoulders. “The Italians and Scandinavians took Erythrea—and they both want to get all of it at the peace treaty. The Cape Dutch have failed to do much against Povilskaja, even after the Matetwa left the war after clobbering the English.” Everyone smiled slightly at the English being taken down a peg or two, even though I do admire M. Gris and his charming wife. “Bengal drove the Russians from Ceylon and, ah, Pendzhab. The Americans drove them out of North America. That idiot Chambord has failed to take Gavaji. The Ottomans, not even our allies, have Greece and the lands around the mouth of the Danube. The Germans have Czechosilesia, ah, Bohemia back, and the English and Scandinavians have the lands occupied in the Baltic.”

I pressed my palms together, trying to avoid the Duc’s weary, red-rimmed stare. “The only territory one could say we French control is part of the lands occupied in Poland, along with the Germans and Italians. And the only pressure we can exert is to say we could stand our troops down and the front could collapse, erasing all the gains we have spent—spent an ocean of the blood of our young men to pay for.” I hated that my voice cracked, but maybe I would have been a monster if it didn’t. “Do you really think Dresden and Rome would believe us if we threatened to do that?”

The Duc’s frown deepened. “Madame, what are you saying?”

“She’s saying,” Vachaud interjected (again), “that we cannot negotiate with Pasha if all the cards we want to trade are held by our partners, some of them now barely participating in the war and none of them very susceptible to pressure from us.”

“But surely...” the Duc shook his head. “M. Guibal, what about economic pressure?”

Guibal shook his tired head. Having done his job myself during the economic contraction of—nom d’un nom d’un nom, can it be a decade ago?!—I knew how hard he had been working. “Some of our allies have some economic dependence on us, oui, your grace. But we are blessed and cursed to fight on the side of democratic and representative governments. All our allies’ leaderships have anti-war opposition forces breathing down their necks. If we push, we will simply topple those governments and bring their oppositions to power.”

I knew he was the expert in this, having briefed us on it just recently; from speaking to his financial counterparts in our allies’ governments, he knew about their growing oppositions. Just as bloody Vincent and his so-called Rubis group here had formed out of an alliance of anti-war people across parties to oppose the national government, the same was true elsewhere. In England, M. Gris has M. Lightfoot and his so-called Democrats. In Germany, Ruddel has both the monarchist Treuliga and the Niedderad breakaway from his own party. In Scandinavia, the Copper Party has taken control of the national legislatures and is calling for representation in the imperial one. Even in America, M. Gilmore struggles with les Marleys and Eleanor Cross, whom I met once in Cygnia. I wish such a good Cytherean had not nailed her colours to the anti-war mast. But M. Gilmore is probably the least in trouble, as America’s fortune of war has been the most positive of our alliance. It seems likely that, with all these alliances and oppositions across party lines, political landscapes across the world are going to be irrevocably changed by this war.

“But, par Dieu!” The Duc abruptly leapt to his feet like a man half his age, pulled out his marshal’s baton and slammed it down on the map. “We cannot fight in this plague-ridden house forever! We must have peace or all shall be lost!”

The sound of the baton echoed throughout the room, silencing all else. It would have had a lot more effect on me if he hadn’t tried this same trick about a dozen times over the past three years. Nonetheless, I found my gaze drawn to the letters inscribed on the baton: TERROR BELLI, DECUS PACIS. Terror in War, Ornament in Peace. It could have been said as much about the man who held that baton as the ornament itself. The Duc wanted an end. I could not blame him.

Vachaud broke the silence. “Could we launch a full-scale mission to take Povilskaja?” he suggested. “That might be sufficient to force concessions, to start the game of chaises musicales as we swap these damn spots on a map back and forth.”

Bertrand closed his eyes and shook his head. “That would have been a good idea a year ago,” he said harshly. “Now we have burned all our goodwill for such missions on that Gavaji farce. Dammit, you were right about Chambord, Héloïse. I should have listened to you.” I took no pleasure in his admission.

“We have to try,” the Duc insisted. “Pasha’s position may be weaker than we think.” The Auxiliaire girl, carefully neutral, nonetheless almost twitched at this piece of wishful thinking. “Russia cannot be entirely self-sufficient, they will have their own opposition forces...”

“But they are not democratic, so they are in the shadows,” Guibal said. “So harder to predict, I would imagine,” he gave the Auxiliaire woman a sidelong look. “What isn’t hard to predict is our own opposition forces.”

Bertrand gritted his teeth. “You’re not wrong. I spoke to M. Rouillard.” I almost sat up in surprise. Camille? Unlike Vincent and his opposition group, Camille had done his best to stay neutral, half-retiring, trying not to exacerbate the split between my wing of the Diamantines and Vincent’s. “He has had enough. His nephew died two weeks ago, in our push trying to rescue the Germans when they lost Czestochowa. If we do not open negotiations now, as M. le Duc desires, he will cross the floor to the Rubis group.”

I wasn’t standing, yet I still felt I had sat down heavily. Camille, the man who had helped me manage that idiot Bouchez as Controller-General, who had become Prime Minister but had always respected my insights, who had given the insight we needed to deal with the Pérousien question—at least, until that moron Chambord has torn it open again. I want to see it as a betrayal, but I cannot. I cannot blame him. What would I think if Valéry were old enough to fight, and had...

“Then we must negotiate,” I said hollowly.

Vachaud closed his eyes. “I agree.”

“So do I,” said Guibal. “Though I fear what will come to pass. Belgium will arise as a question, mark my words. Last week, in the English Parliament, M. Lightfoot pulled out some ancient treaty saying—”

“That Belgium would be carved up, with England taking Zeeland and Holland, France Flanders and Artois—which we didn’t already have at the time—and the rest going to the Dutch Stadtholder, yes, I know,” I cut him off, visibly surprising him. “Louis of Nassau, near the start of the Eighty Years’ War. I don’t think that’ll wash nowadays. The Germans want all the industry and coalfields, for a start. We’ve managed to keep the argument down while the war goes on, but—”

“Enough,” the Duc said tiredly. “I fear you are all correct. And yet, we have no choice. The world is dying outside our narrow focus on this conflict. I do not just mean the plague. D’Orléans in Spain has gone haring off on this madcap scheme after a lost ship, Pérousie is in uproar about Chambord, the Bisnagis are on strike, we have handed over Guiana to the Americans.” He closed his eyes. “We need to end it, gentlemen—and lady,” he added quickly. “Just end it. I’ll accept being judged harshly by our grandchildren, if we can ensure we’ll have any.”

I know this is a mistake, and yet, I cannot see any other option...

February 17th 1926.

We heard back almost immediately from our approach (via Bavaria, of course) with a Russian response. Noncommittal, but not unresponsive. The Russians want Vienna to host instead, with secrecy. An odd choice, but I do not see why not. Perhaps they think a Danubian environment will engender more hostility to the Ottomans...

February 18th 1926.

I wrote to Bertrand today, using circumspect language, but warning him we cannot negotiate alone for long. If our allies discover this—and the Russians could reveal it at any time—it will go very poorly for us. Perhaps that is why they are so keen to talk. Or perhaps I am too pessimistic, and the Duc is correct. Maybe they really are that desperate.

February 19th 1926

Woke to bizarre news from America. Some sort of plot to trigger a stock market run and profit off it, as I recall happening during the last war? The work of Russian agents, even, ready to reveal our secret negotiations? But surely they would wait till we had at least met for the first time, or else we could simply deny everything as a feint?

The alternative is more shocking. The alternative...would be that the news is true. Impossibly true...





[5] St Valentine’s Day, in the modern sense, originated in England and was not a major celebration in France until the nineteenth century. Like OTL, it has crossed the Channel with the help of the cultural influence of America, though one should bear in mind it probably looms larger in Mercier’s mind than the average French person.

[6] The Belgians did not start using death-luft until some months after Mercier became Foreign Ministress, but she is painting a picture of the overall time.

[7] This is a dysphemism for Tsar Paul which has caught on with the French leadership (as we’ll see). It has a double meaning, essentially calling him a jumped-up little man (Pasha is the Russian diminutive for Pavel/Paul, like ‘Paulie’ in English) and also simultaneously a strutting oriental despot (Pasha as in the Ottoman title, which has been seen negatively after the Ottomans’ activities against the Greeks and Armenians).

[8] Mercier is referring to Peptobrim drugs (the TTL name for Sulfa drugs) which are currently being developed by Raymond Vicaire and his colleagues in Germany and England, as mentioned in Part #292. As a senior member of the government, she has been briefed on this still secretive research, but it is approaching wide-scale deployment.

[9] This is a TTL logical/philosophical problem akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Its creator is Auguste Migaud, the Pérousien-born philosopher who knew Camille Rouillard (and therefore Mercier) as mentioned in Part #275 of Volume VII.

[10] I.e. the 1860s. Mercier picks this decade because it would have been when the Duc was a child or teenager.

[11] I.e. Napoleon Bonaparte, the only previous wartime Dictateur, who died in office towards the end of the Popular Wars (Part #143 in Volume III).

[12] Recall that the Auxiliaire, short for Bureau Auxiliaire des Statistiques, is the euphemistic title of the French intelligence agency.

[13] In this translation, the forms of address are (sometimes, inconsistently) rendered into English equivalents (i.e. how one would address an English duke) rather than literally translated.

[14] Some would question implicitly equating these two, but recall that Mercier is from a conservative background and was formerly in the National Party.

[15] I.e. the Pandoric War, but it has not widely been given this name yet. Mercier here implies that she guesses that the conflict of the Black Twenties might become known as the Second Great War. Note that in OTL, the term ‘Great War’ was sometimes given to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth century, before this name was transferred to the 1914-18 war.
 
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A possible partition of Belgium, a possible end to the war and something wrong in America, certainly an interesting update.

Isn't Dresden the capital of the Bundesreich?
My moneys on Caroline exploding with/or without Combine involvement.
Regardless OTL Deep South is about to have a VERY different kind of black flag variety flying and dominating the land (this is my attempt at a little word play joke absolutely no offense is intended and I apologize if anyone does not find it funny and welcome tips on improving my wordplay and joke skills)

Remind me what’s the status of Halloween in LTTW?
 
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A Poland-for-Persia trade seems doable as a means of restoring major parts of the status quo ante. It would absolutely require German support, and in turn require the Germans to give up the Polish occupied territory, but even there it's not as though they fought "over Poland" specifically until very recently-- for two years the front was in the Germans' own territory on the Oder, and the recent expansion into Poland is just a side effect of that. No doubt the Germans will want some guarantee Russian troops will never be parked in western Poland again, this could call for a demilitarized zone or even the permanent dedication of Poland to Bavaria style neutrality.

Besides that, the Germans have the prospect of unification with the Belgian Rhineland, which could create the sense that there was a real victory for the German nation here, it could even be a specifically liberal victory by making these lands into their own sub-kingdom, where it might be as liberal as Grand Hesse. With its industrial concentration, possible involvement of labor groups in anti-Belgian political causes, and the disappointments of national unification it might even be the site of a Mentian renaissance (!) or a Mentian-Societist electoral/street conflict pitting their organizational strategies directly against each other... something tells me the Societists could find gainful employment and social acceptability in the manner of Mussolini's squadristi**, putting together veterans as strike-breakers and private police to suppress rural dissent, since they technically support the class system; they could ironically be very fascist in their image and methods, glorifying the strong male Human and his critical acceptance of the class hierarchy as a means for the good of all, his "me ne frego" sense of duty... support for their anti-national agenda could then come from the concept that the idea of "Germany" is no longer sufficient to protect that hierarchy or point it toward its natural purpose of producing greater prosperity under wise and august leadership.

And then there's the much more dubious prospect of bringing the Czech lands back in... there may be many "Bohemian" exiles with claims on confiscated property in these lands, one would prefer not to let them revenge themselves on the Czechs but if rebuffed they could yelp loudly about a "stolen victory." It's a Carolina-tier headache for sure-- but again, between those two acquisitions and possible guarantees in Poland, the Germans can argue they gained... something, they had their heroic defense and now they're done, it's okay even if the French stop things now.

It's arguably the French who will be more disappointed with the peace, as ironically nearly every major member of the Protocol (ENA, Bengal) has gained something, while they have lost or are losing their entire formal and informal empire to fire-sale, alienation, or both. They laugh, but France is right there with England and Ireland... with these countries you can't even call the war a net loss, because that implies there was some gain to counterbalance the loss. And this from a war in which France never actually expected to gain any territory, only to reinforce the influence they had... now even that's gone.

--

**The Soviets through the 1920s considered organizational methods to be their main gift to the world socialist movement, this formed the essence of the Third International-- the Comintern was specifically to export the previously obscure methods and terminology of the Leninist party, to set up organizations structured like it from France to America to China, defining themselves for the first time as "Communist", where the previous generation of parties preferred the less provocative "Socialist" or "Social Democrat" (and also turned name into fact by actually becoming less provocative/more parliamentary/"bourgeois" over time, joining pro-WWI coalitions and leaving wartime worker discontent as a political orphan). Not only that, but the Comintern parties were to share in the same narrative by not only mirroring each other's beginnings but also each other's policies-- rooting out Trotskyists in Russia would be accompanied by declaring disfavored sections of other countries' Communist parties to be "Trotskyist" and enacting the same history in miniature, keeping up the sense of a worldwide movement not just in the general motions but even in the specific actions, on a scale of resolution down to the individual year or the individual month. In other words, the Soviets were only too eager to publicize (certain "safe" basic facts and premises of) their internal disputes, even before the sanitized show-trial version of history could be written up.

But the story of Societist organizational methods TTL is so obscure that even our account of the Pandoric Revolution is a self-admitted fiction... so it's possible that world Societist parties have even been left to wholly come up with their own methods to make up for the absence of information, although in the worst case this could mean that Combine agents and foreign sympathizers can barely even communicate since they have totally different vocabularies, guiding theories, and priorities. If on the other hand these other parties do know a lot about the "secret history" of the Combine, there's no way that all of this memory could have been wiped out. Or, the Societist parties don't actually know anything but also don't come up with anything themselves, retaining the "flexibility" to restructure their founding myths, models of thought, everything as soon as the winds in Zon1urb1 shift... of course this comes at the cost of, you know, alienating anyone actually interested in free thought. But loyalty to the world revolution through its incarnation in the current prevailing mood of one specific (very temperamental) country, up to the point of writing off one's own tactics and starting from square one several times over, wasn't unheard of in pre-WWII Communist movements or post-WWII ones.
 
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A Poland-for-Persia trade seems doable as a means of restoring major parts of the status quo ante. It would absolutely require German support, and in turn require the Germans to give up the Polish occupied territory, but even there it's not as though they fought "over Poland" specifically until very recently-- for two years the front was in the Germans' own territory on the Oder, and the recent expansion into Poland is just a side effect of that. No doubt the Germans will want some guarantee Russian troops will never be parked in western Poland again, this could call for a demilitarized zone or even the permanent dedication of Poland to Bavaria style neutrality.

Besides that, the Germans have the prospect of unification with the Belgian Rhineland, which could create the sense that there was a real victory for the German nation here, and the much more dubious prospect of bringing the Czech lands back in... there may be many "Bohemian" exiles with claims on confiscated property in these lands, one would prefer not to let them revenge themselves on the Czechs but if rebuffed they could yelp loudly about a "stolen victory." It's a Carolina-tier headache for sure-- but again, between those two acquisitions and possible guarantees in Poland, the Germans can argue they gained... something, they had their heroic defense and now they're done, it's okay even if the French stop things now. It's arguably the French who will be more disappointed with the peace.
It is, indeed, unclear what the ostensibly victorious French can gain from this mess.
 
Didn’t Bavarian neutrality at one point involve being viewed as a TTL term for Gurillas infested country?

And isn’t losing the oversees empire despite winning the war kind of what both OTL world wars ended up doing to Britain and France in OTL?
 
296.3

Thande

Donor
From: “The First Interbellum and the Black Twenties” by Stuart McIntyre and Jemima Clarke (1982)—

Most historiography, including (or especially) that published in America itself, portray the Societist ‘Rubicon’ attacks of February 18th/19th 1926 in two ways, often combined. Firstly, that the attack was the result of a diabolically-complex and longstanding scheme on the Societists’ part. Secondly, that the Americans’ ineffectual response was the result of long complacency and mismanagement, ultimately due to a failure to take the Societists seriously as a threat. Despite difficult relations between America and France after the war (and a tendency for America to view France as a declining power in the Second Interbellum), this depiction was backed up by French interpretations of the conflict. This was not least because portraying the Societists as superhuman planners also helped excuse France’s own contemporaneous failures in Iberia.

The first of these assumptions has come under heavy fire in recent years, not least because of the publication of Societist on-the-ground sources such as Markus Garzius’ Memoirs of the First Born. While Garzius obviously did not have the ear of the Combine’s strategic planners, he was at the forefront of the lead-up to the conflict, and it is clear from his descriptions that there was no brilliantly-planned strategy behind his orders. Some broad strokes might have been established by planners in the First Interbellum, but not to the degree that the Americans like to pretend.

The second assumption is more difficult to shift, and even the most iconoclastic historian would concede that there is, at least, a grain of truth to the idea that Societist success was born in part of American failure to plan for a Societist threat. Nonetheless, at the very least, this assumption deserves a more nuanced look. One is frequently left with the distinct impression that America’s First Interbellum governments forgot entirely about the existence of the ‘blank space on the map’ (as some French analysts called it), and conducted their military planning as though there was no possibility of a threat from the south. This is fundamentally unfair, and represents an attempt by a later generation of politicians and generals to pass the blame onto their forefathers. It is no coincidence that Lewis Faulkner was frequently depicted as the biggest offender in complacency towards the Societists; after all, unlike some of his contemporary political opponents such as Thomas Gedney, he was no longer around to defend himself.

If we are to truly understand how America viewed the Societists as a potential threat in the First Interbellum, a good place to start is Peter Randall’s 1918 monogramme Analysis of Threat Force 2. This is frequently confused with ‘War Plan Black’, the Americans’ strategic plan for war with the Societist Combine, but it is simply that the 1921 iteration of that plan drew on Randall’s work (and at that, in a rather imperfect and patchy manner). The plan had already existed, and bore a suspicious resemblance to parts of War Plan Gold, the pre-Pandoric War plan for war with the UPSA and Hermandad. While it is fair to say that revising this plan in line with changing tactics and technology was clearly not a priority for the Americans (in contrast to War Plan Green, the plan for war with the Russian Empire) it would therefore be inaccurate to claim that the Societists had not been considered as a threat at all. Indeed, the euphemistic title of Randall’s monogramme, invoking ‘Threat Force 2’, implies the Societists were viewed as the second greatest threat to the Empire after Russia. Ergo, it is certainly not valid to claim (as some did in hindsight) that the Americans were more concerned (pre-Treaty of Bermuda) with a potential war against France and her allies to reclaim the British Isles.

Commander Randall did his work at the Naval Research Centre in Falmouth, South Massachusetts, New England. Though far in body from the potential theatre of activity in any future war with the Societists, his mind dwelt firmly in the lands under the Black Flag, pondering what scraps of information trickled out via dissidents fleeing to French Guiana. He also looked in detail at the Societist wars in the Nusantara, and to a lesser extent Africa (though these were less likely to involve naval combat, other than on the rivers). The fact that the most influential analysis of the Societist threat came from the Imperial Navy is suggestive. The Army was far less concerned with the idea of fighting the Societists on land, as it seemed any major clash of this sort was a pipe-dream along the lines of reclaiming Venezuela (which, prior to its appearance in Gilmore’s rhetoric in October 1925, had barely been discussed). In the First Interbellum, the Army’s planners were focused on the future war with Russia to eject her from North America, and their plans ultimately proved highly effective despite the ‘black swan’ event of the plague intruding into them. It was only when the Army was called upon to attack Kamchatka, a step that few would have considered possible before the war, that they ran into problems. Regardless, the point is that it seemed as though land clashes with the Societists would be limited to the tiny area of the Isthmus of Panama, as well as Caribbean island-hopping fights (like those Bartley had pioneered in the Pandoric War) in which small groups of strike marines would be more important than mass formations using modern protguns. In order for the Societists to threaten the ENA on land, they would first need to challenge the Caribbean’s claimed status as an ‘American lake’, and that would mean naval combat—hence, Randall’s plans.

Randall is guilty of many of the same assumptions of others in his era attempting to understand the Combine. He frequently saw it as merely the UPSA and Hermandad under new management, with a thin veneer of ideological rhetoric over the top. (Ironically, this is rather similar to the far-fetched accusations made by the Konkursum ad Kultura movement during the Silent Revolution!) Despite making too many comparisons to antebellum Meridian government and corporate activities, Randall often drew valid conclusions from flawed assumptions nonetheless. For example (like many analysts) he had an exaggerated notion that the Combine was particularly eager to reunite the remaining former Hermandad lands, in preference over other territories. This was based on his (accurate) reading that Alfarus had an especial desire to crush the Philippine Republic and its Refugiados, but Randall drastically misread Alfarus as overly emotional and irrational. Perhaps, as he was mainly focused on military matters, he missed the trademark Alfaran pragmatism that had given rise to Dual Thought. In practice, Alfarus would act in the interests of the Combine as a whole, which meant viewing opportunities more neutrally.

Indeed, Commander Randall’s primary thesis was to portray the Combine as opportunistic (like those same pseudopuissant corporations). The Combine would regard weakness and division as an opportunity to expand, at the expense of those who were weak and divided. He considered the examples of the Nusantara and Africa here, again drawing comparisons with how the UPSA and Hermandad had gradually taken over much of the Nusantara with the Batavian Republic, suborning Sulu, Mataram and other states. While the comparisons were not always valid, the overall conclusion was. Randall painted a picture of the Societists as Kazakh or Dzungar horse-nomads facing a Jacobin Wars-era European infantry. Troops who panicked and broke would be easy prey for the horsemen, but those who formed a disciplined bayonet square would repel their attacks. Just as horses would shy away from a wall of steel, Randall argued that the Societists would not pick a fight with a strong nation. Instead, they would nibble around the edges of division and weakness, seeking to slowly expand their power. Randall also noted that Societist Pacifism, though clearly insufficient to prevent them from seeking conflict at all, would tend to favour looking for quick victories to avoid having to justify large body counts. The Combine, he argued, was unlikely to become involved (by choice) in a long and grinding conflict like the Pandoric War (and, indeed, as the Black Twenties had become).

There was a lot of truth in Randall’s analysis, but it had two major flaws. Firstly, he neglected to consider the distinction between a nation’s core territory and its subordinate allies. The ENA had a number of these, such as Mexico, Guatemala (still theoretically bound together as New Spain), New Ireland, Jamaica and Cuba. When writing about the potential for naval combat with the Societists in the Caribbean, Randall essentially portrayed the latter two as though they were just offshore provinces of the Empire. Perhaps he was influenced by how the Pandoric War had escalated from a clash on the border of a debatably-Hermandad-aligned nation (Siam) and concluded that this was the reading that future conflicts would take. So, for example, he assumed by default that a Societist attack on Cuba would draw an American response as immediate as if the Societists had attacked Boston or Philadelphia. With this assumption in mind, it seemed to validate the Army’s position that they were unlikely to play a key role in any war with the Societists—it would take place safely far away and on the seas.

The second, and more fundamental, flaw was more one of mindset. Randall’s argument that the Societists would shy away from a long and brutal war with a great power was, essentially, correct; Alfarus might consider it if he saw it as vital to the Combine’s survival, but otherwise would not favour it as a deliberate choice. Randall’s failure stemmed from chauvinism, a reluctance to seriously consider different nations on the same balancesheet, while the Societists’ ideology led them to a quantitative analysis free from the same preconceptions. Randall, a proud and patriotic American, would never put the ENA on the same level as, say, the Sulu Sultanate. By definition, the Societists would not attack such a nation as the ENA. His analysis was not merely a self-congratulatory justification for complacency, that war with the Societists was impossible (as is sometimes claimed) but it did assume that any war would escalate from a clash elsewhere in the world, and would therefore be decided in the seas of the Caribbean. Fundamentally, the Societists would never desire such a war deliberately, and therefore were highly unlikely to fire the first shot.

What Randall did not dream of was that the ENA would ever be in a position where the Societists’ cost-benefit analysis would justify such an attack. He could not have foreseen that the long-heralded war with Russia would spread to Asia, the Army a victim of its own success; that the plague would weaken the Empire and severely compromise the ability to move troops from place to place; that France would gift her Caribbean possessions to the Empire to keep her in the war. Tellingly, Randall does mention in passing that the most likely conflict with a great power that the Societists might consider was with France, in order to take Guiana and its dissidents—which he knew that Alfarus coveted.

Randall was far from stupid. But his analysis was always seen through the lens of American exceptionalism. Even then, the Societists themselves (it would appear) did not dream of how far they would end up going when they launched their initial attacks—again, undermining the idea of a grand plan. In order to support this assumption, at present our best source is, once again, likely Markus Garzius...

*

From: “Memoirs of the First Born: The Authorised and Annotated Edition with Commentary” by Markus Garzius, edited and annotated by Albert Whitley and Maria Aydenia (1987)—

I had learned that in the northern hemisphere, Undecember is usually a cool month. Here, it is similar to Quintember [July] in Zon1Urb1. Nonetheless, the climate is pleasant enough, in this city whose inhabitants then miscalled Pensacola. Under the old bandit cartel divisions, this was the capital of what they called the Province of West Florida. I am proud that I played my small part in ensuring that this region of Zone 4 was rearranged into its proper state of governance. It was only through Dual Thought, awareness of the flawed status quo while knowing the true state this land should aspire to, that I and my colleagues were able to ensure the journey was successful. A level of sophistication that those dribbling deviationist morons could never aspire to; under their grotesque and un-Sanchezista mismanagement, I find I can no longer even trust that cities in newly liberated (‘liberated’) Zones to be assigned their proper numbers!

I digress; let us not consider these grim times of backsliding, but look back to my halcyon days. It was a curiosity of our time in continental Zone 4 that we had no knowledge or preconceptions to influence our perceptions. None of us had ever expected to end up here. If, by some miracle, we had escaped after our unfortunately necessary action against Oquendo, I would have pictured us back on the Ea-nasir, or having made our way back to the Liberated Zones. But not to end up here, in the land miscalled Carolina. I say it was; yet here was fertile soil for the right message of Sanchez, and already there were those who knew better.

This was despite the fact that there did not seem to be many Agendes or official cadre members. I later learned that chapters had often formed almost spontaneously, something both gratifying in an abstract sense, yet worrying when one pondered whether one could rely on such unfettered believers. We did not manage to make contact with an official Agende until Navidad, when I met Salonia Rodriga, who lived here under the alias ‘Susannah Ridge’. Despite visibly having some ancestry from farther south, she blended in well; many Firstslain had settled here. Unlike many Agendes, she had been born locally, but become a convert early on and been trained in the Liberated Zones. It was a good combination to ensure she was not found out, but I did fear early on how reliable she was. Fortunately, my fears proved unfounded.

I know it is morally wrong to call attention to another’s appearance in writing like that, of course, but I fear I must scratch another sin under my name. I cannot think of that time in my life without thinking of my relationship with Persephone Weeks, and I cannot think of Persephone without turning into some fourteen-year-old boy with his bad poetry. Her skin was as black as a moonless night, with twice the beauty. Her eyes held all the wonder of that misisng moon, her strong fingers the only thing that could relieve my shoulders of the weight they carried; that, and her silky voice whispered in my ear. I knew, I told myself, that this was merely a convenience, a happy memory to be tossed aside, as I had before with Ayu and Ines in Zone 7. But, I finally forced myself to admit after a little while, I had overstepped. I was in love.

Persephone was the keeper of a tavern, a useful location for us to meet with Agende Rodriga and her own contacts. I told her too much. She claimed to be a believer, a convert. I did things I would have flogged one of my men for if he had done the same. I was wholly open with her. When I think of how close I could have brought us to disaster, I feel ashamed. But, O Dyeus, I was more fortunate than I deserved. She was faithful to us. She did not break my heart. Everything she told me was true.

She was my age. She had never known Firstslain rule. She, and everyone of her generation, had only known a horrible state of limbo, of uncertainty, as long as they had lived. I say this was the land misnamed Carolina, but no man or woman truly knew what it was or how it was governed. Up in the north of the Zone, in the city they dubbed Fredericksburg, the bandit chiefs of the Septen gang had never settled on what to do with it. It had dragged on for a quarter of a century, and still they could not decide. Some wished to rule it directly as part of their gang; others to spin it off as a client, like Oquendo had ruled; and neither of those two factions was united on the details. I remembered my schooldays, of Sanchez’s great insights about the flaws of democracy, of how the Firstslain had argued over whether to integrate some parts of Zone 3 or not into their own gang.[16] Utter foolishness. It was as though, I told her, those boorish young men with the corner table were trying to decide on what meal to order, and as they all wanted something slightly different, they sat there starving rather than compromise. She laughed in delight at this image, though I was unfair to the young men, I admit; not only did they order their meal, but some of them ended up joining our cause.

She showed me around the town. It was strange; I was never there to deliberately collect military data, as that was not my role and I did not want to risk exposure, yet in the end I was able to provide it and play a small part in the eventual struggle. As I said, I went in without preconception. Later, I learned, many Sea Celatores’ plans had been based on how then-Pensacola used to be before the War of Ascension.[17] Even though our Agendes and authorised merchants had passed through this city, few had made the necessary observations to contradict this assumption, much less pass them on. Back then, Persephone told me (her uncle and grandfather had passed on), Pensacola had been a great naval base, a place where ships of the Firstslain navy had been stationed. Ironsharks had sallied out to attack Septen shipping, great lineships had clashed with their Septen counterparts in the sea. The city sat on a bay protected from natural hyperstorms by what was then called Santa Rosa Island, and defended from opponent forces by great coastal batteries guarding this naturally-defensible position. It had made it an ideal site for that naval concentration. In the end, in that war it had surrendered after being attacked by the Septens from the north, all its defences focused on guarding approach by sea. At the time, none had expected that the Septens would manage to fight their way that far south, take the whole of ‘Carolina’.

That is all the preconception I had, and I could see the decay and decline. The old coastal batteries, which took the kind of shells built in the old Firstslain factories, were rusting wrecks. A few of the shipyards were still in use, building merchant vessels, but many had been closed or mothballed. There were only a handful of Septen warships here, mostly older dentist-frigates. It was like a vast auditorium filled with only scattered audience members. Persephone joked that she already knew what it would be like to live in a world without war, as so few Septen ships and troops were ever visible here. I was offended, but knew she had not been raised properly (and I could hardly snap at her loveliness) so I patiently explained that this was the opposite of a true Liberated Zone.

One day no Celatores will be necessary, of course, but in that day, every land will be administered correctly according to the Zones. The biggest thing the people of ‘Carolina’ lacked was certainty. Those living under the gangster control of ‘nations’ at least have some idea of how the world works. They know that if they pay the menaces money called ‘taxes’ that they will be protected against lesser bandits, they know that they will be put in uniforms first if they are sent off to die in pointless gang fights, and so on. They have their rags on a stick, and they know that when it changes to a different rag, they have left the gang jurisdiction and crossed one of their imaginary ‘borders’. The ‘nations’ are the Third Society, more secure than the Second with its city-states, which was more secure than the First with its tribes. Only with the Fourth and Final Society will we eliminate conflict altogether, of course; yet we can see that those in a ‘nation’ too blind to see anything greater may nonetheless dimly perceive reality sufficiently to look down on those stuck in the earlier Societies, like some of those I fought in Zones 7 and 19.

But the people of ‘Carolina’, I told Persephone, have effectively been deprived of all that. She had told me about how the Septen leader Faulkner had sent the tax money to build new coastal batteries, yet they money had either been embezzled or never spent, as no-one could agree by whose authority the batteries should be built. She had told me of the corrupt occupation forces who lived from bribe to bribe, the people under their ‘protection’ never sure if they had paid enough to be safe; of the ‘Neighbourly Communities’ who tried to govern in their stead. It was as though they were trying to rebuild the Second Society, having been deprived of the Third. The Third had failed them, I told her, and I hoped that I would live to see the day they would live under the Fourth. That’s how I phrased it, back then. Even then, looking at those rusting batteries and lack of warships. I didn’t dream of what would happen.

Persephone cried into my shoulder and then I kissed her, passionately. But she stopped, pushing me away. All around us, people stopped and stared. Though I am not a physically imposing human, I was visibly enough of a fighter that they did not challenge me; but the looks of hatred were like nothing I had seen. She saw it too, then urgently pulled me aside into an alleyway, escaping their gazes. “What was all that about?” I asked.

She stared at me in genuine confusion. “We’re under the occupation authority here, but they turn a blind eye if someone like me gets hanged or thrown in the harbour for kissing a white man,” she said.

It still took me a moment to understand that the people here, some of them, would act out of such hatred merely because of a kiss between a man and a woman whose skin happened to be different colours. Then, of course, I was angry. I wanted to kill them all, then, to drown them in death-luft.

But that night, as Agende Rodriga introduced me to new cadre members, I remembered that not all the people here were so vile. Some had seen the light. Sometimes it was for relatively selfish reasons; they desired our Tremuriatix, not only for the plague but to kill the boll weevils that were damaging their cotton crop. They had always hated the Septens (so they told us) but this war had made everything worse. And ultimately, their hatred was not even returned anymore; the Septens regarded them with indifference, a festering sore on a sufficiently distant part of a limb that they could just be ignored.

I had looked at the local newspapers a lot soon after we arrived, looking for news of what was happening in Zon11Ins1 after Oquendo’s tragically necessary death. For a while, I thought the news was censored. Indeed, it was, but (as Persephone told me) the authorities barely cared about many things they would have cracked down on in a Septen newspaper. The ‘Carolinians’ were not even considered important enough to bother managing their consumption of news. News about the civil war in Zon11Ins1 (or ‘Cuba’ as they called it) did eventually make its way into the papers, but it was always overshadowed with self-congratulatory messages about what the Brave Imperial Boys were doing over in Zone 15, fighting Pablus Romanovius’ gang thousands of miles from home. As though anyone cared.

Well, I cared, because it meant Septen killers were so far away from Zon11Ins1. We had failed to draw them in, and at first I was consumed with that failure. It took Persephone’s outside perspective to make me realise that what seemed like a failure could be a different kind of success. If the Septens could not spare troops to send to ‘Cuba’, then...

Some of the locals who came to us had turned to Sanchez out of principle. They had lived in a land which, for longer than anyone could remember, had been divided arbitrarily on the basis of skin colour. Usually the ‘whites’ on top and the ‘blacks’ below, but then things had been complicated by the ‘reds’ and then the Firstslain ‘browns’ arriving at the top of the pyramid. Then after the Septens had conquered the area, they had never settled on how to govern it, and things had devolved into a truly local gang warfare level with every man for himself. These ‘Carolinians’, more than anyone perhaps, understood just how arbitrary nations were, that they were truly bandit gangs writ large which attacked anyone outside their gang. The appeal of the Final Society, in which men could live in peace no matter how they looked – and, as Persephone had so bitterly reminded me, love who they wished – was a heady one to these people.

The papers initially seemed just as blasé about the unrest in the so-called Nicaragua and Costa Rica provinces of ‘Guatemala’ in Zone 11. It was only when the rebels started coming close to the Septens’ upstart canal that the editorials began taking it seriously. The congratulatory articles about the Septen fleet murdering some natives in Zone 14 started to fade into concern.[18] Reading between the lines, some seemed to have concern that so much of the Septen fleet was in the Pacific killing islanders, and the uprising in ‘Nicaragua’ might threaten the security of the canal to bring them back. I do not know if they seriously saw conflict with us as possible at that point; perhaps they were finally beginning to become concerned about ‘Cuba’, where (I know now) our Celatores were now beginning to operate almost openly in the western part.

I could, perhaps, have guessed roughly what was coming, but I was largely cut off from any updates or orders. Agende Rodriga was able to occasionally pass my intelligence on this area back to the Liberated Zones via encrypted messages to ‘Cuba’, but we heard very little in return. I worried we would end up sitting out the conflict altogether.

Then, on the night of the 18th, Persephone awoke me. She had a clockwork crystal Photel set, and had been unable to sleep, so had gotten up to play a little music. She had to pass one of the earpieces to me so I could hear just as well what had interrupted the signal.

I clenched my fists in triumph when I heard the news, no matter how the Septens were trying to reinterpret it. Things had begun; and, I dared hope, I might soon learn of the part I might play.

The part that would ensure that women like Persephone would never have to live in fear again.



[16] Garzius is alluding to the Adamantine and Unionist parties’ debate over whether to annex the Cisplatine and Riograndense Republics in the 1843 election, which strongly influenced Sanchez (see Part #163 in Volume IV).This is an interesting comparison for him to make, as those republics similarly (though not to the same extent) had a degree of legal limbo over their citizens’ rights, due to the assumption they would be annexed soon after the Popular Wars and then this failing to materialise.

[17] A term used by some Societists (especially Celatores) for the Pandoric War. It is not an officially-sanctioned term and is slightly frowned upon, as orthodox Sanchezista views tend to emphasise the idea that the Unliberated Zones are in a continuous state of conflict, and a ‘war’ is merely a temporary and arbitrarily-defined intensification of that conflict.

[18] Alluding to the Operation Covenanter attack on Vostochny Pavlovsk/Tokyo at the end of January 1926.
 
It's starting!

Besides merely engaging in the war the Combine is also extending it. (EDIT: very naughty and un-Sanchezist behaviour!) Having unexpectedly gained a strong ally the Russians may be willing to delay the negotiations. If they do they will soon find themselves in a much better situation. The pressure on the Far East will vanish. France will suddenly face a crisis in its backyard. The Ottoman split will deepen and one of the two factions will be distracted by rebellions.

By attacking immediately before the negotiations began the Combine has allowed the nationalistically blinded powers to bleed themselves out to the greatest possible extent. A perfect Last Throw operation. So perfect that it may be hard for historians to accept the idea that this could have been accidental. An inquiry into the archives of Moscow and Zon1Urb1 would shed some light on any alleged Russo-Combine talks during the war. But we know that government records in both those cities will be... damaged.

China must be tremendously satisfied. It must have made billions of whatever its currency is by selling food and weapons to both sides and by functioning as a safe haven for investments.
 
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It's starting!

Besides merely engaging in the war the Combine is also extending it. Having unexpectedly gained a strong ally the Russians may be willing to delay the negotiations. If they do they will soon find themselves in a much better situation. The pressure on the Far East will vanish. France will suddenly face a crisis in its backyard. The Ottoman split will deepen and one of the two factions will be distracted by rebellions.

By attacking immediately before the negotiations began the Combine has allowed the nationalistically blinded powers to bleed themselves out to the greatest possible extent. A perfect Last Throw operation. So perfect that it may be hard for historians to accept the idea that this could have been accidental. An inquiry into the archives of Moscow and Zon1Urb1 would shed some light on any alleged Russo-Combine talks during the war. But we know that government records in both those cities will be... damaged.

China must be tremendously satisfied. It must have made billions of whatever its currency is by selling food and weapons to both sides and by functioning as a safe haven for investments.
Hmmm, I really doubt that the Combine has any actual deal with the Tsar here. It would be excessively reminiscent of the Pandoric War's supposed 'Diametric Alliance', which Alfarus is likely not to want to recall (although a purely geopolitical approach would certainly argue that Russian-based and Plata-based Great Powers are natural allies by geographical dictates, the problem is that Societism denies geopolitics almost by definition).
 
I was a sailor stationed in Pensacola when I first found and began commenting on this timeline. What a treat to see it play a part in this world.

Too bad that treat is bitter considering it’s where the Combine attacks the ENA first, it seems…
 
Hmmm, I really doubt that the Combine has any actual deal with the Tsar here. It would be excessively reminiscent of the Pandoric War's supposed 'Diametric Alliance', which Alfarus is likely not to want to recall (although a purely geopolitical approach would certainly argue that Russian-based and Plata-based Great Powers are natural allies by geographical dictates, the problem is that Societism denies geopolitics almost by definition).
I could see that being a popular conspiracy theory though. Especially since the rabidly anti-Societist Russians would deny it with a great passion.
 
I'm not sure if it's a perfect plan, but it is hard to argue with "cut off the canal and run roughshod in the Atlantic". At the very least there'll never be such a thing as "perfect timing" in a world full of moving parts.

Now that we're here, I still don't feel like we've made all the preparations. Cuba's somewhat believable, small, rural island where it's difficult to get news out of the island or circulate it within the island, and to get reinforcements in-- just send in the troops in an open conquest, by the time anyone realizes it'll be too late and all there'll be left to deal with is the inevitable rural insurgency (but even that can't be brushed off, especially not when there's likely to be a urban underground funneling out medical or other supplies). I could imagine something similar in the similarly small and rural Central America. Both rely on an "if a tree falls but no one's around..." principle, possibly made literal by mass killings or deportations. But Iberia is big and Carolina bigger still, there's means of getting news out and around up to and including the midnight ride on horseback, etc etc. And yet the Societists are almost totally unknown in both places, setting themselves up for a situation where they will be known only for their atrocities or those of the Meridians.

I mean sure, you could argue the Communist Party of Spain is a workable prototype for a Societist takeover-- previously small and obscure party, built by and for ideological purists and coordinating so closely (in matters of personnel appointments, ideology, and so on) with a foreign government's world revolutionary apparatus as to be almost indistinguishable from it, a mere branch of that apparatus in X country. The Soviets in turn send their agents to Spain, who aggregate increasingly important police and military portfolios either to themselves or ensure they get handed off to PCE members. Then comes turning these military and police institutions against the various allies of convenience, until some of the most important figures of the government are being openly forced to step aside and some of the most important militias are liquidated before the actual "enemy" even arrives. But there's two problems here-- one being that the PCE and the Soviets failed anyways, and very quickly at that (just three years!), but maybe that's explained away by the Combine sending more troops and trying harder, and the opposition not being quite so organized as the Nationalists (who had their own peculiarities steadily whittled away from within). Follow it all up with some ghastly purges if anyone decides to point out that only a minority, growing from opportunism but small all the same, truly wanted these people specifically, out of all the options available on both sides of the civil war, to take over.

The other problem, the bigger problem, is that the Societists don't work with anyone else, and so can't benefit from the "popular front" strategy of riding coattails. Well to be fair, in France the popular front was the Communists' idea; in Spain the PCE followed in the general cultural and political milieu of Azana's electoral coalition and Largo Caballero's failed rebellion. But all the same, the trick here is to associate yourself with bigger and more popular/successful parties, and speak their language so that you might in time argue you speak it better than they do. If you're stuck arguing that all positions save communism lead inexorably to fascism and therefore you won't work with anyone, an observer already biased toward any another party (in other words, most people) can say well, that may be a theoretically sound position-- but still it seems hypocritical to not work with the larger, more acceptable parties who by definition have a greater ability to do something in an electoral or even (para)military arena. But now if you argue instead that fine, you'll work with the liberals for now on anti-fascism and protecting democracy, but all the while you'll wag your finger about who the real antifascists are-- well, now you can become the most glamorous tent of a big camp, one that artists and writers can waltz into from time to time and make speeches about how your courage is what this age really needs ("courage" being considered the thing that sets you apart from less extreme positions, and not the actual differences in thought and method). You might argue the earlier stage of "one against all" was necessary for establishing a sense of group cohesion and unique identity, clearly apparent to observers outside and within-- but the second stage is what really puts these parties on the map, giving them enough mildly sympathetic observers for them to argue they deserve a government portfolio, and then another, and then another...

Right now we've got cadres and Agendes and that's all quite good and necessary, but really at this point we need electoral coalitions, surely there's one other party (preferably several smaller ones, rather than a single big one) in Carolina that cares about all the same issues the Societists, and just needs a little more support to form a government (and what do you know, Carolina's parliamentary! small parties as coalition kingmakers is something people are used to and can accept). I guess if Carolina doesn't really have elections for a "government" as such at the moment, maybe we can go for the Irish playbook of electing deputies for an unrelated matter and then using that popular mandate to go and form an independent government. Or the Chinese situation of a party within a party, Communists getting their first significant experience in governance or mass organization (and their first popular slogans) through KMT peasant bureaux against landlordism (and its cousin warlordism), industrial strikes against foreign capitalists, and party cells/clandestine congresses in hostile territory. One way or another the Societists need their foot in the door of both state institutions and the public consciousness-- and then they can use the Spanish playbook of holding the keys to all significant foreign aid and demanding pounds of flesh in recompense.

EDIT: Just thought of an exculpatory doctrine for the average/not particularly ideological "Societist rebel" fighting to take control of X country. The "all killers get the noose at 80" rule can be applied on the victory of the movement, but not applied retroactively. Anyone who has thus far killed for the Societist cause gets an honorable discharge, and either a pension or a leg up into another profession. Anyone who wants to stay and keep killing falls under the "execution at 80" rule, they will have been given the opportunity to consciously choose that if that's what they want, instead of having to be duped into supporting the Societists from Day 1 and only finding out they get executed later on.
 
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I'm not sure if it's a perfect plan, but it is hard to argue with "cut off the canal and run roughshod in the Atlantic". At the very least there'll never be such a thing as "perfect timing" in a world full of moving parts.

Now that we're here, I still don't feel like we've made all the preparations. Cuba's somewhat believable, small, rural island where it's difficult to get news out of the island or circulate it within the island, and to get reinforcements in-- just send in the troops in an open conquest, by the time anyone realizes it'll be too late and all there'll be left to deal with is the inevitable rural insurgency (but even that can't be brushed off, especially not when there's likely to be a urban underground funneling out medical or other supplies). I could imagine something similar in the similarly small and rural Central America. Both rely on an "if a tree falls but no one's around..." principle, possibly made literal by mass killings or deportations. But Iberia is big and Carolina bigger still, there's means of getting news out and around up to and including the midnight ride on horseback, etc etc. And yet the Societists are almost totally unknown in both places, setting themselves up for a situation where they will be known only for their atrocities or those of the Meridians.

I mean sure, you could argue the Communist Party of Spain is a workable prototype for a Societist takeover-- previously small and obscure party, built by and for ideological purists and coordinating so closely (in matters of personnel appointments, ideology, and so on) with a foreign government's world revolutionary apparatus as to be almost indistinguishable from it, a mere branch of that apparatus in X country. The Soviets in turn send their agents to Spain, who aggregate increasingly important police and military portfolios either to themselves or ensure they get handed off to PCE members. Then comes turning these military and police institutions against the various allies of convenience, until some of the most important figures of the government are being openly forced to step aside and some of the most important militias are liquidated before the actual "enemy" even arrives. But there's two problems here-- one being that the PCE and the Soviets failed anyways, and very quickly at that (just three years!), but maybe that's explained away by the Combine sending more troops and trying harder, and the opposition not being quite so organized as the Nationalists (who had their own peculiarities steadily whittled away from within). Follow it all up with some ghastly purges if anyone decides to point out that only a minority, growing from opportunism but small all the same, truly wanted these people specifically, out of all the options available on both sides of the civil war, to take over.

The other problem, the bigger problem, is that the Societists don't work with anyone else, and so can't benefit from the "popular front" strategy of riding coattails. Well to be fair, in France the popular front was the Communists' idea; in Spain the PCE followed in the general cultural and political milieu of Azana's electoral coalition and Largo Caballero's failed rebellion. But all the same, the trick here is to associate yourself with bigger and more popular/successful parties, and speak their language so that you might in time argue you speak it better than they do. If you're stuck arguing that all positions save communism lead inexorably to fascism and therefore you won't work with anyone, an observer already biased toward any another party (in other words, most people) can say well, that may be a theoretically sound position-- but still it seems hypocritical to not work with the larger, more acceptable parties who by definition have a greater ability to do something in an electoral or even (para)military arena. But now if you argue instead that fine, you'll work with the liberals for now on anti-fascism and protecting democracy, but all the while you'll wag your finger about who the real antifascists are-- well, now you can become the most glamorous tent of a big camp, one that artists and writers can waltz into from time to time and make speeches about how your courage is what this age really needs ("courage" being considered the thing that sets you apart from less extreme positions, and not the actual differences in thought and method). You might argue the earlier stage of "one against all" was necessary for establishing a sense of group cohesion and unique identity, clearly apparent to observers outside and within-- but the second stage is what really puts these parties on the map, giving them enough mildly sympathetic observers for them to argue they deserve a government portfolio, and then another, and then another...

Right now we've got cadres and Agendes and that's all quite good and necessary, but really at this point we need electoral coalitions, surely there's one other party (preferable several smaller ones, rather than a single big one) in Carolina that cares about all the same issues the Societists, and just needs a little more support to form a government (and what do you know, Carolina's parliamentary! small parties as coalition kingmakers is something people are used to and can accept). I guess if Carolina doesn't really have elections for a "government" as such as the moment, maybe we can go for the Irish playbook of electing deputies for an unrelated matter and then using that popular mandate to go and form an independent government. One way or another the Societists need their foot in the door of both state institutions and the public consciousness-- and then they can use the Spanish playbook of holding the keys to all significant foreign aid and demanding pounds of flesh in recompense.
The problem appears to be that Societists of Combine observance do not seem to believe in electoral politics, like, at all (unlike their Danubian fellow Amici, for instance). They appear to believe in deception, infiltration, top-down takeovers, and, increasingly, downright military conquest.
Also, I think that the comparison with OTL's Civil War Era Spain is misleading. For the Soviet Union at the time, establishing Communism in Spain was, at best, low priority. I suppose that, to Stalin personally, a Fascist victory in Spain was vastly preferable to a Spanish Republic that was far-left but NOT of Comintern observance (Anarchist would have bad enough, but there were Trotskist there too). The Party line was "Socialism in One Country" after all.
Societism, however, has to be expansionist. Every bit of land that can be realistically 'liberated', especially if there is a prospect of doing so with little bloodshed, must be liberated. That's the whole point, and in Combine rhetoric, not doing so would be a crime. Of course, I do not believe that Combine decision makers are purely motivated by ideology - they are pragmatic too, and clearly pure power politics drive Alfarus' choices to a significant extent; it has been clearly stated that Hispanophone and former Hermandad areas are regarded as priorities, which makes actually sense in many ways.
 
The problem appears to be that Societists of Combine observance do not seem to believe in electoral politics, like, at all (unlike their Danubian fellow Amici, for instance). They appear to believe in deception, infiltration, top-down takeovers, and, increasingly, downright military conquest.
Yes, and the problem is that this Blanquist approach actually somehow worked for them, when a greater and harder to replicate fluke could hardly be imagined. Meanwhile the Danubia chapter frames the brief period of urgent cooperation between the Catholic Social "Golden" Party and Hordulanus/Kertesz's Societists as an important step on the latter's road to power. I wonder if this attitude of the Combine might be traced in TTL historiography to the Jacobin "holding the heart" doctrine.

Well, electoralism isn't the only way to cooperate, although it so nicely calls to mind ideas of civility and popular will. That's why I brought up the Chinese "party within a party" case-- the KMT wasn't running for elections there either, seeing as how what minimal central government as existed then was run by anti-revolutionary, republican-by-circumstance military cliques. The KMT was a military organization with a political wing, sloganeering as the vanguard of conquest-- but it was enough for the needs of the CCP members who joined it. Work experience is work experience, especially in this line of work.

Also, I think that the comparison with OTL's Civil War Era Spain is misleading. For the Soviet Union at the time, establishing Communism in Spain was, at best, low priority. I suppose that, to Stalin personally, a Fascist victory in Spain was vastly preferable to a Spanish Republic that was far-left but NOT of Comintern observance (Anarchist would have bad enough, but there were Trotskist there too). The Party line was "Socialism in One Country" after all.
It would be a difference in interest level/commitment, but the method would remain very similar. The PCE case featured plenty of infiltration, top-down takeovers, all but the military conquest-- but still, even OTL there was a provocative blurring of the line between the responsibilities of foreign "advisors" and natives. Higher foreign commitment may still mean more success but may exacerbate the fundamental drawbacks and failings. You can't solve every problem by just throwing more foreign troops at it.

--

I've said earlier that Societism could be popular as a unity of religion and modernization (or religion, science, and prosperity), and that it might fill the niche of fascism as a movement of strike breakers invited into even greater power by elements wishing to defend hierarchy and property at all costs. One could even argue the latter method is more or less how they came to power in Danubia (please, save our empire from populist nationalism!), although both the OTL (Nazi, Italian Fascist) and TTL cases of this phenomenon affirm the necessity of public campaigns, paramilitary or electoral, before the Big Day arrives.

But well, even if it's funny to imagine the Societists employing that old Dual Thought to participate, secretly or openly, in "national salvation" fronts with other far right people while trying to saw the "national" part off... that's probably not happening. It's not totally impossible, look at the way Communists were able to harmonize expedient relations with individualist democrats and the ultimate goal of transcending individualism (Marx began his career with a critique of the concept of individualism and its religious origins). But well, that harmonization does rely on the shared Enlightenment heritage, a belief in the popular will and the confidence that it finds expression even in violent and chaotic revolutions, and a sort of vaguely benevolent anti-traditionalism. The Societists at least share with the center right an appreciation for private property and enterprise, and with the far right a disdain for bourgeois individualism and parliamentarism. But as interesting as Societists working within a (ultra)doradist front to ensure racism or "national" feeling or loyalty to a particular commander is replaced by something else (religious feeling, a thirst for true meritocracy, a wish to put all this rabble rousing aside and build a society that "just works") as a bridge to True Societism... unfortunately the Societists already have the "anti-nationalist, self-serving 'pacifist' elitist" stereotype worldwide, which may even gel uncomfortably with ultradoradist paranoia about Jews. And the murky identity and origins of so many leading Combine figures really ought to encourage an "Elders of Zion" interpretation of events in, well, Russia for one.

Plus the Societists might like hierarchy but they probably support strikes on the basis of achieving Equality of Necessity (but they probably wouldn't see any use for unions after that, and would either try to make them into corporatist pillars of the state tamed by graft, or eliminate the more autonomous and Mentian organizations). I guess the cobrists make more natural allies-of-convenience, with the Societists standing on the doradist end of any such coalition but with a healthy dose of skepticism toward the democratic center-left (the most similar to them in policy and therefore the deadliest enemies) and nationalists of all stripes. They take up work they consider hypocritical, but stand ready to inherit those who come to share their exact profile of fears, those disillusioned not only with democracy but eventually with cobrism itself.
 
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Something interesting I found in this book:
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Switch "national" with "world" and Fichte sounds a little Societist. Could Danubia draw on the heritage of German idealism to define... well they wouldn't call it a "German Societism". But they could do something even better-- they could refer to it as an Early Societism, pushing the origins of the ideology behind Sanchez and incorporating much of the discourse on ethics, human rights, and the popular will cut out of "Sanchez's version". Rather than being the unalterable revelation of one man it becomes an idea humanity has played with time and again, developing better and worse forms.
 
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297.1

Thande

Donor
Part #297: Rubikon

“You would be forgiven for thinking you are watching a repeat or a cart recording, dear viewers, but once again, controversy is raging over attendance at the War of 1926 memorial in Fredericksburg for the upcoming anniversary. No sooner was agreement reached over the role of fair Carolina’s own Governor and Speaker that discord has been sparked, once again, over which of the successor states’ leaders should represent those foemen who died heroically, no matter how reprehensible their cause. In a prepared statement, America’s new Pioneer Party leader, Alice Hatton, has condemned the disagreement and pointed to Europe as an example; noting that attendance by a single representative was agreed years before the political reunification of the Russias…”


– Transcription of a C-WNB News Motoscope broadcast,
recorded in Waccamaw Strand, Kingdom of Carolina, 30/06/2020​

*

(Dr Wostyn’s note)

Thank you for your latest update on the work being completed on the vaccines at home. The losses are truly staggering, and we do not know whether to feel relief or guilt that we are not there to see it. Certainly, the consequences of this coronavirus escaping into an unprepared second timeline would clearly be catastrophic, so I understand why Portal travel is still currently off-limits. Don’t worry about us; we are close to exhausting the local resources for reconstructing this timeline (in fact, I’ll be turning back to one of our older books for a bit) but the Captains have a plan concerning what to do next. They will brief you on it before long, but there’s no point until the form is returned after 30 days…anyway.

*

From: “Sharper Sticks: A History of Advancement in Warfare” by William Peter Courtenay, 5th Baron Congleton (1952)—

Ever since the dust settled from the shock of the so-called War of 1926, analysts across the world (but especially in America) have been trying to create a narrative behind the success of Societist arms. Often this consists of painting the Celatores as super-men born of dark science, ideological berserker fanatics, or simply those who had benefited from years of peace and relatively effective plague control while the world went to hell. There may be a grain of truth to the last one, but all of these are fundamentally born of trying to shift the blame; it wasn’t our fault we lost, retired generals say knowingly from their oak-lined studies – the Societists cheated.

Even those analyses which do not come with this bias tend to commence with an unspoken assumption of Celator superiority in arms. It has taken years of study, and the bold, not always accurate pronouncements of revisionist and iconoclastic scholars to shake up the field of ideas, before this has recently been re-examined. A cooler-headed look indicates that, in fact, there were many areas in which the Societists were decidedly inferior in arms to their enemies (or, as they would have it, their opponents). It was simply luck, luck and the nature of the place and time in which they fought, that ensured these disadvantages rarely came into place.

In order to examine the state of the Celatores in 1926, we must first look back to how their arms and tactics had developed from their inception at the turn of the century. As I write these words, we are now as far removed from 1926 as its own warriors were from the Pandoric War, which should be a reminder of how much can change in a quarter-century. Perhaps the most important factor to bear in mind when looking at the Celatores is the philosophy of a ‘clean break’ with the past. Certainly, many of the early Celatores (possibly including Alfarus himself, but not officially admitted) were veterans of the Fuerzas Armadas in the Pandoric War, and these men were crucial to the early battles for the Combine’s survival against the IEF.[1] They also played an important role in training new recruits. However, by the 1920s, most had been either purged (often by means of rigged ‘meritocratic tests’ showing them to be unreliable) or kicked upstairs to staff work or what amounted to colonial administration, not that the Combine would ever use the phrase.

The Celatores of 1926 instead preferred to use those born after the Revolution, or at least those whom had reached adulthood after it. This was largely a decision born of a desire for ideological purity, but it had the unintended consequence of making the Celatores much less wedded to conventions of military doctrine. This is an example of what I meant by ‘luck’. There are many, many circumstances in which having an army that rejects military convention would be a recipe for absolute disaster, and indeed, some early Celator defeats at the hands of ‘opponents’ like General Antonelli or the Sulu Sultanate can be ascribed to this. However, this experience had the almost ‘Paleian’ consequence that conventional doctrine was restored where it was necessary, whilst still being abandoned where it was not.[2] This left a corps that was, compared to the nations, led by younger officers much more open-minded about how improvements in technology could change the world of war, which had important consequences for the War of 1926.

Societist ‘domestic’ propaganda (in South America) tended to portray the Celatores as a small, dedicated, elite group who could defeat far vaster armies of the ‘nationalistically blinded’ via superior technology, tactics and ideologically-inspired fighting spirit. The Greek term ‘hecatomb’ (or ‘ekatumbus’ in Novalatina) was often invoked, relating to a sacrifice of 100 cattle to appease the gods; i.e. that the Celatores were a small number of heroes who had sacrificed their own lives to become ‘licensed murderers’ in defence of the Combine. They could be portrayed positively without ostensibly being presented as a desirable career path for young men.

This impression of a small elite has often been repeated by narratives in the nations as well, so it is important to demolish it here. While the Celatores did include some examples of this, such as elite Spekulador strike marines armed with minicings[3] who could take on much larger but more poorly-equipped armies of Nusantara warriors, it was not the norm. The Societists recruited much larger numbers of Celatores across their whole territory than their propaganda implied, many of whom were not visible in Platinea (“Zone 1”) due to being assigned to the ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Nusantara. These numbers were not immediately apparent at the spearpoint in the War of 1926, but ensured the Combine had plenty of garrison, occupation and support forces to keep their advance moving.

The aforementioned ongoing conflicts ensured that (unlike neutral France in the Pandoric War, say) the Celatores had plenty of active battle experience by the time of the War of 1926. Of course, this experience was not always transferrable, and this again brings up the point of ‘luck’; the Societists were very fortunate that the war rarely tested them on their weaker points. Some revisionist historians argue that one such weakness was that the Celatores were used to fighting an asymmetric war against groups like the Sulu Sultanate or the Kingdom of Lunda, who did not possess modern weapons other than, perhaps, rifles and cingular guns. There is some truth to this, but the Celatores also fought comparably advanced opponents (such as the undeclared border war with Siam for control of Sumatra) and, for that matter, had often been stuck without artillery or aerocraft themselves in their earlier conflicts. Indeed, one can argue that the effectiveness of the Celatores in putting down Kleinkriegers in Java stems from their older officers’ past experience in fighting in that way themselves against the IEF a few years earlier; they knew what tricks they would face.

Let us now look at how this experience shaped the Societists’ equipment and tactics. The Societists themselves did not formally distinguish between branches of the Celatores, though by 1926 it was common to refer to the ‘Sea Celatores’ (the navy) as a subtly distinct group. It is sensible for us to begin with the Sea Celatores and, to a lesser extent, the aerocraft. The Societist aero forces were not even informally considered a distinct group, yet were simultaneously some of the most idolised elite among their forces in the public imagination. Celagii had played a decisive role in the ‘Scientific Attack’ that had, in the public’s eye, saved them from Anglo-American conquest, and the glamour of being a celagus pilot ensured that these roles faced the most heated competition between would be Celatores. Celagus pilots were almost all volunteers, something which the Combine carefully refused to admit, preferring to imply that the vast majority of Celatores were rehabilitated criminals.

This brings up another point we should dispose of before moving on. The Societists had their own set of Novalatina military terminology, which bears little resemblance to that which we know in the free world. Some of these terms have become iconic enough that I will leave them ‘untranslated’. These include celagus for drome (derived from the Pandoric War Meridian term cielago, an abbreviation meaning ‘bat’; originally this only referred to fighters, but later became a generic term) and ansukurrus or kurrus for protgun (from the Hittite word for chariot).[4] However, to avoid confusion, for most weapons and vehicles I will use generally-recognised terms such as lineship and flying artillery [i.e. battleship and dive bomber].

Possibly the most important point to bear in mind when discussing the Sea Celatores is to understand that they did not inherit much from the Meridian Armada of the Pandoric War. The Armada has lost much of its strength in costly sea battles in the first half of the war, such as the Battle of the Windward Passage in and the Battle of the Îles Téméraire, in February and April 1897 respectively, which devastated the Hermandad fleets of both the Pacific and Caribbean.[5] The Armada had never recovered from this, hence why the Americans and their allies could land troops with impunity at the mouth of the Plate at the end of the war. The Armada’s defeats were often attributed to inferior and mutually-incompatible equipment, born of the period of domination by the pseudopuissant corporations and their monopolies over military supply. The companies had been interested in profit and looking good, not making effective weapons for a war which they all expected to never come. This was particularly damaging when the Armada had also been horribly vulnerable to overextended supply chains. The UPSA had lacked much in the way of native coal resources, and her navy was powered by coal-burning boilers, requiring wartime stockpiles that were neglected before the war and soon exhausted during it.

While the Societists had no use for Monterroso, they did agree he had been right about the damage inflicted on the Fuerzas Armadas by the corporations. Rather than the often-inefficient nationalisations Monterroso had begun during the war, the Combine (mostly) allowed the companies to survive and retain their autonomy, but took firm control of procurement. The continuity of the old Meridian companies was not that obvious to the outside observer, as the Combine heavily restricted the use of unique names and logos, but they were generally allowed to keep their old owners and hierarchies with a new Novalatina coat of paint. The companies were forced to standardise on parts (most famously rifle calibres and shell sizes) to avoid the problems of the past.

Every few years, a competition would be held for a new item; sometimes this was a complete celagus or kurrus, but more usually engines would be procured from one company, weapons from another and so forth. The forced standardisation ensured this would not cause issues with integration later on, and would allow individual parts to be upgraded without requiring a new model altogether. The winning corporation would be assigned the contract, but the runners-up would be awarded other, related contracts (such as, for example, an engine for support ships rather than warships). Only the lowest-ranked bidders would be shut out, and these would often receive ‘temporary management’ from the Combine to remove their managers and redirect them to a new project. An important concept in all this, developed by the administrator Antonius Ferrerus (né Antonio Herrera) was Internal Completion.[6] This was intended to remove bottlenecks in the process by bringing management of the whole process under a single overarching body, even if individual parts were taking place in different factories. Internal Completion was also based on the idea that each worker involved in the process should have a vested interest in the result. For example, if a company was assigned to work on a new boiler, that same boiler would be used to heat the homes of its workers in the winter (even if it was actually designed to power a lineship). The logic was that no worker would slack off, or manager accept shoddy work, if he knew it might result in him waking up freezing in the night because something had gone wrong.

This approach generally yielded better results than either the ‘motivational’ threats made against the companies seen in Russia or the inconsistent regulation of procurement with changing governments seen in America. One unintended consequence was that the Societists became very capable in guerre de tonnere tactics, as their supply chain often used vehicles equipped with runner-up engine designs that had narrowly missed out on being fitted to frontline war vehicles.[7] This was particularly noticeable with the Sea Celatores. In the Black Twenties, the Combine was far from the only body to begin outfitting warships with sun-oil engines (either as an alternative to coal to heat boilers, or sometimes as a direct Mitchell drive). However, the nations were still typically using a mix of Pandoric War-era warships and newer ones, forcing their fleets to move at the speed of the slowest ship. This also meant there was no incentive to procure new tenders and oilers that could move at higher speeds, whereas the Societists designed them that way from the start. Of course, the Societists also had a particular incentive to focus on sun-oil engines, as the Combine had much more access to oil resources than it had to coal. The increased focus on sun-oil and spirit Szikra engines for naval and ground vehicles (including civilian ones) also ultimately helped the aerocraft industry, as breakthroughs fed back into it.

The Societist focus on aerocraft, and their corps of iconoclastic young officers open to newer ideas, led to them taking the plunge to abandon lineships as the cornerstone of naval warfare, instead building hiveships. This is often painted as a late decision born of observing incidents such as Julian Worth’s aero attack during the Battle of the Goodman Sea.[8] However, this was merely the nail in the coffin for those Societists still arguing for lineships. Lineships were expensive and soon obsolete, the Combine had not inherited many from the old Fuerzas Armadas, and they had been of little use in the sea fights against the Nusantara peoples. There was a natural tendency to seize on new tactical doctrines that argued lineships were now all but unnecessary, and the Societists – once again – were lucky that they these doctrines turned out to be well grounded. They could easily have been wishful thinking, merely saying that the Combine did not need something it would be difficult and expensive to obtain in the hope it would be true.

So what were the aforementioned disadvantages of the Celatores that we hear so little about? A few internal Societist analyses leaked out during the unrest of the 1930s. Firstly, in part due to the lack of lineships and experience using them, long-range sea gunnery was considered subpar in the Celatores. They were capable of hitting land targets in coastal bombardments, but sea lugalii (admirals) were concerned at their crews’ poor performance in ‘crossing the T’ and hitting moving targets in set-piece fleet engagements. Again, fortunately for the Societists, such engagements were rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Dentists (not called that by the Societists) were also poor at counter-ironshark warfare, largely because the Sea Celatores rarely faced ironsharks (except occasionally from the Siamese in the Sumatra border war). Celatore dentist crews had a tendency to grow complacent in watching for ironsharks and instead focus on steeltooth attacks on enemy capital ships, or close-range gunnery against toothboats and other small craft.

One area in which the Societists almost ended up very vulnerable was those steelteeth. It was only in 1925, when their observers watching Baltic naval clashes reported on the Battle of Cape Domesness, that this was identified as a priority. In the earlier part of the war, English Royal Navy commanders had reported that their steelteeth were unreliable and mostly not detonating against their targets. Just prior to Cape Domesness, a new Mark VI steeltooth (designed by Barrow-based arms manufacturer Dalton Bros) was deployed, and proved decisively devastating against the Vitebsk Pact fleet at the battle. Given the lack of regular use of the Sea Celatores’ own steelteeth, the Societist observers suggested a comprehensive testing programme. (These observers were usually undercover, but in 1925 they were briefly permitted to observe openly by the Protocol, who out of desperation or naïvité hoped the Societists might be sufficiently offended by the Russians’ destruction of history in Anatolia to join their side – or at least drop their embargo). Prokapud Dominikus agreed to the testing programme, and was shocked to discover that the Celatores’ steelteeth were indeed unreliable and ineffective. Fortunately for them, an investigation showed that this was due to an easily-corrected design flaw; a brand-new steeltooth design would not appear until after after the crucial part of the War of 1926.[9] Once again, this was a case of Societist ‘luck’, as it was easily the kind of problem that might have been missed due to their lack of participation in the war thus far. As popular culture suggests, Societist observers did make a difference (favouring the push for hiveships and rocket designs after witnessing their success elsewhere) but there were many things that were missed – it just turned out that these were rarely critical for the war as it was fought.

At the outbreak of the War of 1926 in February of that year, the Societists had amassed two significant naval forces in the Caribbean, usually referred to as Flodus West and Flodus East (a horrible half-hearted translation!) in analyses. Both forces were gradually built up in Zon13Lak1 (formerly the Lago de Maracaibo) which was closed off to civilian shipping for the duration – something which did not excite much attention, as many Societist ports were economically suffering thanks to the embargo on trade with the warring nations. The Societists were also aided in that their approach to procurement had led them to choose a common hull design for the Utnapishtim-class freighter and the Eridu-class hiveship. While not wholly interchangeable and requiring considerable work to convert one into the other (the fuel storage was a particular nightmare), the common design meant it was relatively easy to disguise an Eridu hiveship as an Utnapishtim freighter laid up in port thanks to the trade embargo. It was much more challenging to conceal other warships, but the relatively small number of lineships involved meant that the Imperial Intelligence Corps underestimated the scale of the buildup. Everyone was used to judging the power of a fleet by the number of lineships and then extrapolating from there.

Prokapud Dominikus’ plan relied heavily on a well-coordinated, two-pronged surprise attack. This was bold to the point of foolhardiness given the state of communications in the era, but the Societists did enjoy an advantage in cryptography at this point. The IIC could not break their codes, and doing so was hardly considered a high priority in the middle of the war with Russia. The IIC did suspect that the Combine might try a fait accompli surprise invasion of the former French Guiana once Gilmore had announced the takeover back in October 1925. (This was also one reason why IIC director General Herbert Patmore was less than impressed with Gilmore and why the two worked together poorly, blaming each other for what was to come). However, that was now months ago, there seemed to be no activity from the Societists, and the IIC was growing more concerned with the civil war in Cuba that had broken out a few weeks later. Dominikus knew that a buildup of Celatores on the border with Guiana would be an obvious sign to the Americans of what was coming, and boldly argued that so long as they won the fight in the Caribbean, there was no urgency to take Guiana; that could easily be accomplished later with second-rank reserve troops. Instead, the first shots would be fired at sea, simultaneously at both ends of the Caribbean.

Ships gradually emerged from Zon13Lak1 across the weeks leading up to February 18th 1926. They formed up as though in small patrols, or escorting ‘freighters’ (the disguised Eridu hiveships), and only began to coalesce at pre-planned rendezvous points in the depths of the Caribbean Sea. Flodus West consisted mostly of ironsharks and their support tenders, and headed for the Nicaraguan coast. Flodus East was the main body of the armada, built around three Nimrod-class lineships (Pharaoh, Gilgamesh and Huangdi) and four Eridu-class hiveships (Uruk, Memphis, Elam and Lagash) together with seventeen dentists and a number of support ships.

The operational timetable was determined by the Imperial Navy’s decision to return some of Admiral Crittenden’s Operation Covenanter fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the Nicaragua Canal. This was partly intended as a show of force, as Nicaragua was facing (Societist-sponsored) revolts at the time. This presence of Agendes, together with encrypted Photel transmissions, meant that the Celatores were apprised of the progress of the American ships as they traversed the canal. At 7:34 local time, on the morning of February 18th, 1926, the Societists began what they called, simply, The Police Action. An aerial armada of dromes (or celagii) took off from aero bases across the north-east of Zone 13 (the former New Granada), particularly in Panama (where their presence had ostensibly been to defend the Pablo Sanchez Canal). The celagii consisted of 39 Piranha fighters, 10 Capybara level bombers, 36 Llama flying artillery and 45 Alpaca tooth bombers.[10] The Llama and Alpaca craft were built to a similar design, both being named after those animals’ tendency to be able to spit into the faces of those annoying them with unerring accuracy.

The American force lacked any defensive aerocraft of its own; contrary to Societist intelligence, HIMS Cygnia had remained in the Pacific. The American aero bases in the Nicaragua and Costa Rica provinces of Guatemala did scramble HC-4 Blackhawk fighter-interceptor aerocraft to intercept, but in this era before Photrack, these only inflicted losses on the Societists retreating after the attack was already achieved. The American flotilla, under the command of Crittenden’s subordinate Rear-Admiral Walter Daniels, could reply to the Societists only with their counterdrome guns. This fire proved more effective than the Societists had anticipated (the Americans had gained experience targeting the Russian Burevestniks at the Battle of the Goodman Sea) and the Americans downed 23 of the 130 attackers, mostly Llamas due to their close approach.

The Societists had anticipated that the Capybaras would not be very effective against sea targets from their trials, and this was born out. Most of the damage against the Americans was inflicted by the Llamas. The Alpacas underperformed. Despite the improvement in steelteeth, the battle arena was unsuited for such attacks, being hemmed in a narrow eastern part of the canal. Evidence from later defectors suggest this had been pointed out to Dominikus at the planning stages, arguing for a tooth bomber attack on the flotilla earlier on when it was crossing the Lake of Nicaragua. Dominikus had allegedly rejected this due to an obsession with trying to sink an enemy ship in the canal and block it. In practice, this was much more tricky than he had imagined, and only near the end of the battle was the cruiser-frigate HIMS Potomac successfully sunk. The Americans were able to raise it and reopen the canal after only six weeks, rather than the six months Dominikus had envisaged. However, this focus on blocking the canal did have the unintended effect of (later) convincing Gilmore it was worth focusing his own attention on bombing the Pablo Sanchez Canal, rather than on the situation in the east.

Rear-Admiral Daniels remained calm amid the shock of the attack, and ordered his ships to steam for the Caribbean at full speed, seeking to escape the constraints of the canal so they could manoeuvre. Unfortunately for him, his flagship New York then had its notoriously-unreliable Photel gear knocked out after a minor hit from a Llama’s bomb, meaning he could not issue further orders except by signal flags and heliograph. The Imperial ships followed his orders and indeed steamed for the nearby opening of the canal, only to find a trap laid by the ironsharks of Flodus West. This time, the Societist steelteeth performed very well indeed. All the American capital ships were either sank or scuttled due to excessive damage; only ships of dentist class and below escaped. Total Imperial losses amounted to two modern lineships, six cruiser-frigates and a host of smaller ships. This represented greater losses than Crittenden had suffered at the Battle of the Goodman Sea, and (as one rescued sailor reported the deceased Daniels exclaiming in frustration) “the cowards haven’t even brought their own ships in so we can sink ’em in return!” It was a new era of war.[11]

Simultaneous to the Nicaragua Canal Attack, the more substantial Flodus East under Lugallus Antonius Simonus (né Antonio Gimenez) was coalescing to strike the American fleet stationed at Martinique. The lineships Vanburen and Martin had now been joined by Constellation, Studebaker and New England.[12] Dominikus’ attempts to synchronise the two attacks perfectly had predictably fallen short, and Admiral Marmaduke Wycroft in Martinique received garbled Lectel warnings half an hour before the Societists arrived. Wycroft was capable enough to both act immediately and to recognise the potential of aero power, having followed the Julian Worth controversy over the months. He demanded the Imperial Aeroforce scramble their Blackhawks from the base on Martinique, and 38 fighters were in the air by the time the Societist celagii arrived. The American pilots, inexperienced for the most part, were also hopelessly outnumbered by the 113 Societist celagii launched against them (42 Piranhas, 30 Alpacas and 41 Llamas). Nonetheless, they fought bravely and well, and inflicted significant losses against the Societists, shooting down 32 enemies at the cost of half their own numbers. Wycroft’s fleet lacked the recent experience of Daniels’ men in firing their counterdrome weapons in war conditions, however, and counterdrome fire from the American dentists was of little assistance to the aero fighters.

Unlike the canal attack, this time the steelteeth worked effectively. The Societists took on a force of five lineships with three of their own, as it was reported in many foreign papers, and won. In practice, of course, the lineships did not get to fire their guns at all until quite late into the battle, by which time the Americans had been reduced to parity with the Societists as Alpacas and Llamas had sank the Constellation and Martin. Wycroft, steaming in more ways than one, led the remnant of his fleet into battle with Flodus East and managed to strike a fatal blow to the Huangdi, at the cost of equally mortal damage to the Studebaker. Many writers have since painted Wycroft as a man of the old school who foolishly missed the opportunity to inflict damage on the hiveships instead. Perhaps there is a grain of truth to this, but would such a man have pushed so hard to scramble Martinique’s aerocraft? Regardless, Wycroft took the heavy decision to retreat under cover of darkness, hoping to save his ships for another day.

Unfortunately, this was certainly a miscalculation. Simonus’ Societists were able to recover, rearm, refuel and move far faster than Wycroft had guessed, and Simonus knew his likely destination was Guadeloupe, hoping to combine with the other American forces that had taken possession there. The New England and the Vanburen were both intercepted the next day, the latter sinking while Wycroft managed to beach the former on Dominica before it sank. Regardless, they were out of the fight.

With these two quick victories, the Societists had both demonstrated a new era in naval warfare had come, and more importantly from their point of view, they had defanged the Empire’s complacent defences in the Caribbean…



[1] Once again, note the misplaced assumption that the IEF’s goal was to strangle Societism in the cradle.

[2] We would say Darwinian, i.e. natural selection (or ‘environmental breeding’ in TTL) has eliminated those who have cast aside needed doctrine while preserving those only open-minded about other matters. Comparisons can be made to the early battles of Revolutionary France and the People’s Republic in China in OTL, where idealistic concepts like men electing their officers or ostensibly eliminating officers altogether were abandoned after poor results on the battlefield.

[3] An abbreviation for mini-cingular gun, meaning submachine gun. Note this is an English-speaking term, not a Societist one (as the author will go on to explain).

[4] Transliterated as ‘ansekurra’ or ‘ansukurra’. It may mean ‘soldier(s) using a chariot’ rather than ‘chariot’ but this wasn’t clear to the Celatores when they picked the name. They have gone for a Hittite rather than Sumerian term in this case due to the ancient association of the Hittites with particularly capable chariot-warriors. Again, note the tendency of the Celatores to pick terms in a scattershot manner that would seem anathema to the top-down, ideologically-purified nature of Societism, mostly because they have become so powerful (and backed by Alfarus) that no-one is going to tell them ‘no’.

[5] See Parts #231 and #234 in Volume VI, respectively.

[6] Similar to vertical integration in OTL, but not the same.

[7] Guerre de tonnere, recall, refers to tactics which focus on speed to break through and cut off the opponent but, unlike guerre d’éclair, relies on having a fast supply chain rather than living off the land and alienating the local populace. In this case the term has been stretched to refer to fleets whose support ships can keep up with them.

[8] As portrayed in the film clip in Part #294 for instance.

[9] In OTL, most nations (especially the United States) had notoriously unreliable torpedoes in World War II due to lack of interwar testing, with the exceptions being Britain and Japan. Due to vested interests trying to minimise the problem or shift the blame for the USN’s faulty torpedoes, the USN did not get effective torpedoes until almost two years after Pearl Harbor.

[10] Again, note the Celatores’ quixotic and quite un-Societist choices of names, in this case after domestic South American wildlife. The name Condor, which would seem a more obvious choice for an aeroplane, is avoided as it was a national symbol of the UPSA.

[11] The Americans only lost one lineship, Imperial Sovereign, at the Battle of the Goodman Sea, although Pennsylvania only narrowly escaped joining her.

[12] Confusingly, the Americans have had multiple ‘Confederation classes’ of lineship (named for the Confederations of the Empire) over the years. At the time of the Pandoric War, the Confederation class was a few years past state of the art, and was being replaced by the Constitution class (examples of which include HIMS Constitution, Constellation (named after the stars on the ENA flag), Imperial Sovereign, Rattlesnake and Empire of North America). This replacement was cut short as it was outpaced by tactical developments. Instead, the 1900s saw the introduction of the all-big-gun President class (Vanburen, Studebaker, etc.) before the late 1910s introduced a new Confederation class, the Pandoric-era ones now all having been retired.
 
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Thande

Donor
Indirect thanks go to Nick Sumner as I was reading his third Drake's Drum book (purchasable here) while writing this one, and it helped me get in the right mindset to write the naval warfare sections.
 
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