And the fact that the aforementioned rebellious entities existed in the first place was a testament to the fact that the dynasty had witnesssed seven decades of defeats that had undone the very foundations of traditional Chinese state structure.
I do want to point out that you clearly know this subject very well, and I merely object the cause and effect-part of your otherwise solid argument.
Calling the reform attempts that led to 1911 semi-successfull seems bit odd, if one measures their success and final outcome from the viewpoint of Qing authorities.
The fact that they ultimately saved China from direct colonial rule is irrelevant from this point of view: the dynasty that started them only did so at gunpoint, doomed itself in the process, and wouldn't have enacted these reforms in the first place without repeated defeats and humiliations.
Therefore: There wouldn't have been a modenized European style rebellious army led by foreign-trained officers to begin with, had the traditional Banner armies still been able to fulfill their earlier role. But they weren't, as the Boxer revolt had so painfully demonstrated.
And there wouldn't have been such a clear rejection of all latter attempts to restore imperial rule, either Qing or an entirely new dynasty, without the earlier repeated and utter failures of Qing.