Longer Lasting Pacific War Pods
- Thread starter Wing_Silver
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Fearless Leader
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The only problem is that it's not THAT isolated. Given the proper motivation, I think the Australians, with some American help, could build the requisite infrastructure to get to Darwin overland rather fast once they get reliable air cover.
The real questions for me regarding this situation are
1. How many forces is Japan willing to commit to holding down Darwin?
2. Assuming they invade in February of 1942, how does this affect their other invasions?
3. How will a Japanese presence in Darwin affect Allied deployments in the region?
4. Will MacArthur make it out of the Philippines? An evacuation by Sub is possible...
That seems reasonable.Dan said:
That isn't. Japan was on the brink of massive starvation thanks to mining & attacks on rail transport. The U.S. was capable of making that even worse. That, plus the blockade & bombing, make it damned unlikely Japan could continue much longer, no matter what the government wanted.Dan said:
Air attacks, maybe, but it would have been almost as untenable as Midway as a base, considering it was damn near on the doorstep for subs based in Perth/Fremantle & Brisbane, not to mention Hawaii... Or in Fiji, if a deal could be arranged.Cook said:
Well, no. By the time the Bomb comes into play, Japan is on the edge of a cliff.sharlin said:
The first part of that, I agree with. That this necessarily means a much longer war, I'm not so sure. Why does Nimitz not just bypass & use his carriers to chop up the defenses & subs to cut the SLOCs, starving out the defense? Okay, I'll grant, taking Saipan will be necessary, & that's a pretty obvious spot for Japan to heavily defend. Iwo Jima & Okinawa, too. Elsewhere?Cook said:
No. Not unless Nagumo was prepared to sacrifice all of his DDs & maybe a few cruisers & CVs, too. (BTW, there were no "sub pens"...
)It's perfectly possible. In fact, the cryppies were taken out by sub. So were Quezon & his family, & the P.I. gold reserve.Fearless Leader said:
The bigger question is, what happens if MacArthur stays? The answer is, the war against Japan is shorter... It frees the Luzon/Formosa Straits to subs from Hawaii. It encourages moving all subs to Hawaii (& none to Oz). And it means no P.I. obsession & no 6mo delay to conquer P.I. Just for a start...
Want a longer war? Figure out how to put Ralph Christie in at ComSubPac after English's death (or sooner
). And keep Fife in charge in Oz. Better still, have even more boats in Oz & Britain. (More prewar in P.I., then diverted to Oz, better still.)Something else Japan should've done, before launching MO, was execute the Kokoda Trail op.
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In my opinion, doing better in specific battles isn't the way to go. The huge US production will overwhel the Empire of Japan anyhow. So here are my suggestions:
Much more sealift capacity. Militarist Japan had lots of troops--even at the very end, Japan had millions of troops under arms. But they could never support the troops they sent out, much less even more. So more sealift is a must. In OTL, the government subsidized the production of ocean liners for private firms, on the condition that they could be used as troop ships in case of war. Maybe in this TL, the government subsidizes the production of cargo ships, too. More sealift means more troops on those island garrisons, in far-flung Burma, etc. It also means more supplies, so the troops are in much better fighting shape. It could also even more spare parts for fighters. Of course, more ships eventually just means more targets for US subs, which leads to point two.
Many, many more destroyers. Militarist Japan had very limited slips during the war, and they devoted them to building capital ships, mostly. Virtually no new destroyers were built. This is quite an oversight for an island nation, and it shows just how thoroughly the "short war" faction won the ideological fight in the staff colleges prewar. My humble suggestion for a PoD is to have a German commerce raider out of Tsingtsao get loose in the first World War. It sinks some Japanese ships, enough to make the lack felt. Later, they witness the German sub threat to Britain, and realize they are vulnurable to the same tactic. The IJN realizes they can't hope to win even a short war if their supply lines are cut, and so they devote real resources to ASW. (If subs are seen primarily as a commerce raider, and not as a way to whittle down the USN, then Japan probably won't want them, which will free up some steel and slipways.)
Finally, learn how to build a decent (turbo)supercharger. Imperial Japan had a few OK designs for interceptors, but many of them had trouble reaching the altitudes of the high-flying bombers. Even more than adding power, the Japanese just need their aircraft engines to maintain their rated power up to 30k feet. Even if only a few percentage more bombers are shot down, it could help a lot. Every bomber shot down means bombs aren't dropped on a factory, which means more planes are built, which means more bombers shot down, etc. There is no way for Militarist Japan to stop or prevent the strategic bombing campaign, but even slowing it down a little might add weeks or months to the conflict.
All of these are relatively small changes, but ones who could, I think, extend the war by a noticeable amount.
Much more sealift capacity. Militarist Japan had lots of troops--even at the very end, Japan had millions of troops under arms. But they could never support the troops they sent out, much less even more. So more sealift is a must. In OTL, the government subsidized the production of ocean liners for private firms, on the condition that they could be used as troop ships in case of war. Maybe in this TL, the government subsidizes the production of cargo ships, too. More sealift means more troops on those island garrisons, in far-flung Burma, etc. It also means more supplies, so the troops are in much better fighting shape. It could also even more spare parts for fighters. Of course, more ships eventually just means more targets for US subs, which leads to point two.
Many, many more destroyers. Militarist Japan had very limited slips during the war, and they devoted them to building capital ships, mostly. Virtually no new destroyers were built. This is quite an oversight for an island nation, and it shows just how thoroughly the "short war" faction won the ideological fight in the staff colleges prewar. My humble suggestion for a PoD is to have a German commerce raider out of Tsingtsao get loose in the first World War. It sinks some Japanese ships, enough to make the lack felt. Later, they witness the German sub threat to Britain, and realize they are vulnurable to the same tactic. The IJN realizes they can't hope to win even a short war if their supply lines are cut, and so they devote real resources to ASW. (If subs are seen primarily as a commerce raider, and not as a way to whittle down the USN, then Japan probably won't want them, which will free up some steel and slipways.)
Finally, learn how to build a decent (turbo)supercharger. Imperial Japan had a few OK designs for interceptors, but many of them had trouble reaching the altitudes of the high-flying bombers. Even more than adding power, the Japanese just need their aircraft engines to maintain their rated power up to 30k feet. Even if only a few percentage more bombers are shot down, it could help a lot. Every bomber shot down means bombs aren't dropped on a factory, which means more planes are built, which means more bombers shot down, etc. There is no way for Militarist Japan to stop or prevent the strategic bombing campaign, but even slowing it down a little might add weeks or months to the conflict.
All of these are relatively small changes, but ones who could, I think, extend the war by a noticeable amount.
A Couple of thoughts
One Industrialize Korea in the 20s and 30s
Other some kind of deal ending the China War, Japan gets lots of territory and concessions but China exists and Japanese troops not losing so many in an absolutely unwinnable war
One Industrialize Korea in the 20s and 30s
Other some kind of deal ending the China War, Japan gets lots of territory and concessions but China exists and Japanese troops not losing so many in an absolutely unwinnable war
Without the war in China, Japan has absolutely zero motive to take on US and European powers. Thus invalidating the OPs premise.
In principle if the Manhatten Project was delayed or did not exsit, it would have taken WWII into 1946, or possibly 1947 and cost the lives of nearly an entire nation, and a huge toll on the Allies.
Thus we would have resolved WWII with much more of a Great War feeling, that modern warfare results in far too many casulities to be worth it. With Britian, Germany, America, Russia and Japan having experienced such losses of life, it may have seriously cooled down the cold war.
In principle, any post Pearl Harbour PODs are going to do nothing beyond extending the war a month or two at best...even if stacked in Japans favour again and again.
Pre-Pearl Harbour PODs could do a lot to change the situation. The Japanese army spent vast resources on developing small arms during the interbellium, but for the most part the entire Japanese army still used the 1897 model Arisaka rifle a bolt action, 5-round stripper clip, and hence the Japanese army was by extension about 30 years out of date just on those grounds alone. When compared to the Tommy Gun, or Sten and other infantry submachinguns that came to prominace in WWII.
The strangest part being that Imperial Japan had the technical expertise to construct modern weapons, but didn't. Even though they had ordered foriegn models to look into their use.
The same goes for much of the rest of the Japanese armed forces. In the period 1935-1944 the Japanese armed forces was fighting with WWI era equipment and doctrines, and hence why in every theater apart from Burma and China had their arses handed to them.
If during the early 1930s the Japanese armed forces had opted to modernise and take on board the lessons of WWI they would have been a far more formidable force, and we could see a very different war in the pacific....namely no war in the pacific.
Because the Japanese would have done better in China in '37 and '38 that might have caused Chiangs regime to fall, or at least be pushed back with far less cost.
A second key point is to reign in the generals, since the Advance South policy was conducted almost unilaterally by the imperial navy, and them using the majority of oil and supplies prompted the attack on America. Without them 'getting involved' so to speak, it is far more likely Japan would have never been involved full scale in WWII against America.
In such a case Japan 'wins' because Britian and the Commonwealth alone would never have a hope in hell of taking on the Japanese on their own.
With regards to the pacific campaign we always have to keep in mind that in general the Allies had anywhere between 7 and 15 times more artillery pieces than the Japanese. Which is why when you compare battle casulities statistics it always looks like the Japanese were push overs. The case being far from it when the Allies killed a large majority Japanese from artillery/airstrike
Thus we would have resolved WWII with much more of a Great War feeling, that modern warfare results in far too many casulities to be worth it. With Britian, Germany, America, Russia and Japan having experienced such losses of life, it may have seriously cooled down the cold war.
In principle, any post Pearl Harbour PODs are going to do nothing beyond extending the war a month or two at best...even if stacked in Japans favour again and again.
Pre-Pearl Harbour PODs could do a lot to change the situation. The Japanese army spent vast resources on developing small arms during the interbellium, but for the most part the entire Japanese army still used the 1897 model Arisaka rifle a bolt action, 5-round stripper clip, and hence the Japanese army was by extension about 30 years out of date just on those grounds alone. When compared to the Tommy Gun, or Sten and other infantry submachinguns that came to prominace in WWII.
The strangest part being that Imperial Japan had the technical expertise to construct modern weapons, but didn't. Even though they had ordered foriegn models to look into their use.
The same goes for much of the rest of the Japanese armed forces. In the period 1935-1944 the Japanese armed forces was fighting with WWI era equipment and doctrines, and hence why in every theater apart from Burma and China had their arses handed to them.
If during the early 1930s the Japanese armed forces had opted to modernise and take on board the lessons of WWI they would have been a far more formidable force, and we could see a very different war in the pacific....namely no war in the pacific.
Because the Japanese would have done better in China in '37 and '38 that might have caused Chiangs regime to fall, or at least be pushed back with far less cost.
A second key point is to reign in the generals, since the Advance South policy was conducted almost unilaterally by the imperial navy, and them using the majority of oil and supplies prompted the attack on America. Without them 'getting involved' so to speak, it is far more likely Japan would have never been involved full scale in WWII against America.
In such a case Japan 'wins' because Britian and the Commonwealth alone would never have a hope in hell of taking on the Japanese on their own.
With regards to the pacific campaign we always have to keep in mind that in general the Allies had anywhere between 7 and 15 times more artillery pieces than the Japanese. Which is why when you compare battle casulities statistics it always looks like the Japanese were push overs. The case being far from it when the Allies killed a large majority Japanese from artillery/airstrike
All excellent ideas. Add this; decent ASW doctrine and equipment. In OTL this was a very low priority and losses from US subs was horrendous. More DDE's and convoying ships would help.
And the biggest, getting the IJA and IJN to cooperate!
And then add a German strategic victory on the eastern front. Perhaps the Germans are able to force the Soviets into more free moving tank battles during the Kursk offensive. The Soviets are unable to match German skills and suffer a strategic defeat. Stalin then pushes for a real second front.
Not just the Allies having more artillery on paper.
During the campaign for Guadalcanal the commander of the second Japanese infantry contingent sent had to practically beg the IJN to commit to trying to bring a portion of his unit artillery along.
With attitudes like that it would certainly be fair to ask whose side the IJN was actually on.
During the campaign for Guadalcanal the commander of the second Japanese infantry contingent sent had to practically beg the IJN to commit to trying to bring a portion of his unit artillery along.
With attitudes like that it would certainly be fair to ask whose side the IJN was actually on.
Although a lot of people are looking at what Japan could do, is there anything Germany or Italy could do to cause the USA to think "damn, gonna have to do more to stop them FIRST before turning against the Japanese".
IE, a better performance by the European Axis might help Japan as well.
This requires two things: an understanding of the limits on existing logistic capacity, & an understanding of the threat from submarines.mcdo said:
Japanese leadership had neither.
Forget ideology. This was an IJN doctrine issue, & was symptomatic of the grip Mahan had on all major navies prewar: namely, guerre de course couldn't win a war, only battle between gunlines. IJN bought it.mcdo said:
Unless you change that, you don't change the number of DDs built.
You then have to overcome the incapacity to grasp the need for better sealift & better trade protection... And you need officers who know the difference between tactical & strategic victory. Japan didn't have them.
In short, you need better educated senior officers going back at least 20yr.
So why didn't they OTL?mcdo said:
That requires a doctrine change...mcdo said:
That seems to require more engineering depth than Japan had...mcdo said:
These are all changes that require 747-size butterflies by 1940, or changes going back a generation or more.mcdo said:
They look small to us, 'cause in the West, we did it. Japan didn't, because she couldn't.That would require such an enormous increase in German performance (Italy I just can't take seriously) as to push ASB, IMO. The Allies had a lot more slack than they probably realized. Really quite small changes could have had big benefits. So, if, frex, shipping losses in the Atlantic go way up, you stop shipping loads of crap U.S. troops don't need & never use (all the candy & cigarettes, frex; I've read about 2/3 of what was sent was stockpiled & never even reached the troopsthevaliant said:
). How much shipping did that waste? Or, start basing Stirlings in Newfoundland. Or give ASV radar to Coastal Command first. Or don't invade Italy.Not a chance. Japan couldn't have survived past mid-1946, not with mass famine on the doorstep. And "the lives of nearly an entire nation" is nonsense. It's Truman's justification of the needless use of the Bomb.Genmotty said:
You're joking, right?Genmotty said:
Canada alone had more shipbuilding capacity than Japan. Britain's was at least double. Absent losses from U-boats, Britain could build enough ships to smash IJN. And British aircraft production in a month in 1940 exceeded Japan's for the year.
Not to mention British designs were far & away better. Nor that Japan could scarcely imagine airborne radar, which Canada was building (on Britain's behalf) in numbers Japan couldn't dream of,
even if she could have built them at all.That really is ASB.eltf177 said:
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HeavyWeaponsGuy
Banned
Japan did industrialize Korea and Manchuria, neither place saw the benefit of it because the factories were Japanese-owned and the best any Korean or Manchurian could do by them was to get a job at a slave's wage is one of them. Both places had extensive deposits of coal and other resources that Japan was deficient in. In essence, they got industrialized only in the sense that Japan built industry and the associated infrastructure, the raw materials that went into it and the products that were produced by it were solely for Japanese benefit.
There is not a chance that the Allies (especially FDR and Stalin) will allow the Japanese to remain in China, it really just goes to show how futile it all is for Japan. Japan's Pacific empire in the 30's and 40's isn't a question of if it will be lost, it is a question of when. If the Americans or the Soviets don't throw them out, the locals will.
I was not assuming that the allies would stop fighting if a deal was done with China but it would have given Japan lots of resources
I was especially thinking of more ship building in the case of Korea
Let me stress the word possibly
. Remember that the Emperor himselves had broadcast it was better to die than be captured by the Americans and the Imperial Administration was quite keen to have armed the populace and keep fighting till the end. Without atomic weapons it would have got very bloody, and we don't know exactly how the campaign to subdue the Japanese home islands would have turned out.
Myself said:
You're joking, right?
And British aircraft production in a month in 1940 exceeded Japan's for the year.
Nor that Japan could scarcely imagine airborne radar, which Canada was building (on Britain's behalf) in numbers Japan couldn't dream of,
Full quote required for context of the comment
.Blocaking Japan is a very different state of affairs to invading the Japanese home islands taking perhaps half a million casulities, the Japanese are unlikely to submit to unconditional surrender against only the commonwealth when they know that it won't have the manpower or spirit to invade.
Thus a conditional armistice would be more likely than unconditional surrender.
When you take the full context of my point, it is that America is not involved in fighting in the Pacific theater...or at least was not called into the war at Pearl Harbour. Without the direct threat from the advance south policy on the phillippines the Americans don't really have a casisus belli to justify war against Japan, even because of what the Japanese were doing in China.
In such a case it leaves Imperial Japan as part of 'Britians problems'. America only being involved if they join in the war actively. While arguably this would have been the case sooner or later even without the Japanese attack in 1941, it could be a lot longer coming.
In such a case the Japanese could have well entrenched themselves either as they stood, or in ex-British and french colonial holdings for many more months. Britian may have opted to support a seperate armistice Remember the CBI theater was given the lowest priority by all the Allies during WWII, and even with American air support acheived very very little. Britian and her commonwealth allies would not be able to help the Chinese or summon the manpower for operations in the pacific. Thus each would be stalemated by the other.
In that case Imperial Japan could 'win' the war by seperate armistice.
Note the inverted commas
.BlondieBC
Banned
The Pacific war was really a secondary war. So anything that helps the Nazi, especially at a sea will help. We probably have a 100 threads on this in the last year, but to list some easy POD that are far from ASB.
1) Test the torpedoes better. You get a lot more merchant tonnage and even some capital ships in most scenario. USA like sends more ships from Pacific to Atlantic to make good losses.
2) Better use of airpower for naval warfare. Complicated topic, but most agree German is sub par here.
3) Better Italian naval aviation or surface fleet performance. Lots of room for improvement.
4) Lose more of BEF at Dunkirk.
5) Med Strategy. Things like Malta, Spain joining war, better North Africa performance.
Now you may want more Japan focused POD. There are a good number here.
1) Better codes, codes not broken, etc.
2) It is a huge deal in the Pacific war when either side losses a carrier. Without them, it is hard to attack. Submarines were near the Lexington a couple of times. So either on one of these, or another time the USA could lose a carrier. Halsey was very aggressive, and could have easily lost a ship before Midway. Yorktown dies at Coral Sea. Without carriers, the USA moves slower until mid-1943.
3) Japan could have done a lot better fortifying the Solomon Islands before the USA attacked.
4) Change Japanese doctrine so they do fewer Banzai charge and make the USA did them out more.
5) There is room for better weapons for Japan prewar. It just takes an earlier POD.
BlondieBC
Banned
You are off on a few of these points.
Taking Darwin was possible, I think they may have even a landed a few troops for a raid IOTL. Now Australia is a different issue. If you want to use a Nazi/England analogy, Darwin is the Channel Islands and all of Australia is Sea Lion.
At some battles the Japanese did poorly with even odds. The Coral Sea is actually a minor Japanese win. CVL for CV. The PoW/Repulse is clear win with lesser forces. Some of the surface battles in the Solomon Islands the Japanese won. And bringing more men is what good leaders do. If you are in a fair fight in a war, you have already made one big mistake.
Japan was behind the USA on radars, but this can be overemphasized. The Japanese optics were better and the excelled at night. And to be fair, while the Japanese would have benefited from better radars at Coral Sea or Midway, it had more to do with Code breaking for the loss. Without the codes being broken, the Coral Sea is a successful amphibious operation. And the naval portion of the Midway battle, the Japanese might have won (sunk more carriers than they lost).
While the Japanese had many chance to do better (as so did the USA or UK), the Japanese did very will considering the available resources. They simply could not chose the "fund everything" option that FDR chose.
BlondieBC
Banned
Sure, we were prepared to take losses, but "any amount" overstates it. It is important not just to look at wartime PR and also look at other factors. IOTL, the senior Navy leaders did not want to invade Japan due to casualties. Truman was under pressure to start demobilizing units and war industries used for Europe. Elections are just a little over a year away. If losses had been much higher. If the pace of conquests is substantially slower, the voices saying make peace will increase. The dynamics are depend upon the ATL, but one can get into the range where on has to review if the USA would take a peace offer from Japan.
The real trouble for Japan is they are entering the game of imperialism too late. They've managed to get Korea and Taiwan without drawing too much attention but anything more and it puts them on map and pits them against heavy weights. Unfortunately for them, to have any chance of fair fight they'd need the resources and anything that is in sight is occupied by somebody else.
The POD too early might entirely butterfly away the entire war, and too late might not have any decisive influence. Besides, Japanese have many cultural and religious imperatives that put severe constraints on their options.
For example, offensive spirit of the Japanese might require a POD waaaay back to remove it. Or their Army tendency to have junior officers act on their own (gekokujo), or the cultural imperative that the outcome of ones actions does not matter as long one makes the utmost effort attempting to attain it.
IMHO, I doubt Japanese could industrialize faster or more than they did. I do not think anybody succeeded in that faster than they did. They basically started from scratch and three generations later reached the level they were considered major power. Unless their islands were endowed with way more natural resources than OTL, the pace of industrialization cannot (I think) be much faster or more intensive.
As long as Japan has OTL limitations in industrial capacity, they'll need to prioritize their production in pretty much the same way, confronted with the same geo political situation and challenges. They are bound to emphasize navy over army. Due to lack of industrial capacity and abundance of manpower, their Army will probably come up with similar doctrine. Their Navy, unless their cultural outlook is radically different, will emphasize offensive spirit and dash in their officers. In short plenty of things are given by simple fact Japanese start so late. And plenty of possible early PODs lead either to Japan that is torn by civil war and still backward. Or the Japan that is a stable, peaceful democracy that is not on the warpath and both directions pretty much butterfly away Pacific War from OTL.
There is a slim possibility that different outcomes of Rusdo-Japanese war might lead to different development of Japan but this introduces so many butterflies that it is hard to project the result.
The POD too early might entirely butterfly away the entire war, and too late might not have any decisive influence. Besides, Japanese have many cultural and religious imperatives that put severe constraints on their options.
For example, offensive spirit of the Japanese might require a POD waaaay back to remove it. Or their Army tendency to have junior officers act on their own (gekokujo), or the cultural imperative that the outcome of ones actions does not matter as long one makes the utmost effort attempting to attain it.
IMHO, I doubt Japanese could industrialize faster or more than they did. I do not think anybody succeeded in that faster than they did. They basically started from scratch and three generations later reached the level they were considered major power. Unless their islands were endowed with way more natural resources than OTL, the pace of industrialization cannot (I think) be much faster or more intensive.
As long as Japan has OTL limitations in industrial capacity, they'll need to prioritize their production in pretty much the same way, confronted with the same geo political situation and challenges. They are bound to emphasize navy over army. Due to lack of industrial capacity and abundance of manpower, their Army will probably come up with similar doctrine. Their Navy, unless their cultural outlook is radically different, will emphasize offensive spirit and dash in their officers. In short plenty of things are given by simple fact Japanese start so late. And plenty of possible early PODs lead either to Japan that is torn by civil war and still backward. Or the Japan that is a stable, peaceful democracy that is not on the warpath and both directions pretty much butterfly away Pacific War from OTL.
There is a slim possibility that different outcomes of Rusdo-Japanese war might lead to different development of Japan but this introduces so many butterflies that it is hard to project the result.
That is exactly right. The game had changed even by 1914, but the Japanese didn't get it. Why they didn't is a key question IMO to explaining why they finally went to war against China, & in the Pacific.Shaby said:
Exactly right again IMO. To just affect the Pac War IMO is virtually impossible. Any butterfly on it will also butterfly other things. The only narrow ones I can think of are 1937 & peace in China (& no war), & 1941 & the oil embargo (FDR didn't want a total embargo, but hardliners at State imposed one) (& also no war). How you achieve either of those can't be treated in isolation, so those are bound to have other non-Japan butterflies...Shaby said:
No oil embargo just might mean a "Greer Incident" off the P.I. later on, instead of Pearl Harbor...
Exactly right again IMO.Shaby said:
(Batting 1.000.) Getting at either of those means you have to go back mightily far IMO.Exactly right again IMO.Shaby said:
(Still batting 1.000.) Japan achieved something not far short of miraculous, & done in fiction would probably be called ASB.Here, I'm not so sure. Given the similarity to Germany, I wonder why Japan couldn't develop a doctrine of highly flexible response & excellence: quality over quantity, less than morale over technology.Shaby said:
Yes, perhaps Japan's engineering depth was insufficient. If that's so, the OTL route may be the most likely. However, up til WW1, IJA wasn't the brutal, blindly obedient gang of robots they seemed in the Pacific. So what changed?
I continue to wonder why senior officers, IJA & IJN both, were so shabbily educated & trained. Is that also a cultural thing? IDK.
Agreed. This doesn't mean they have to be suicidal.Shaby said:
Which comes back to poor education. Contrast the Brits: dash & aggressiveness weren't excluded, by any means. Training differed fairly dramatically. (Technical education appears to have been just as dismally bad, tho. {FYI, RCN's was awful, too.})Shaby said:
Lots of TL possibilities there... Got one that makes Japan a U.S. ally?They do get jumbo jet-sized before long.Shaby said:
Just one, Russia hanging on longer, might move Japan to realize the war was more constrained by geography & Russian politics & economics than she did OTL. If this prompts her to be better prepared for a major war... (That said, I find it improbable. How you achieve it, IDK.)One other small one: avoid the Dreibund "taking back" Japan's sucesses after the First Sino-Japanese War.
Noted.Genmotty said:Let me stress the word possibly
I just reject it as beyond what I'd consider possible.I have real doubts it would have been as bloody as that, myself. Japan's defenses were little more than a thin crust. Mobility was near zero, or would be under the likely air umbrella. Bombing would be increasingly severe. Famine would be rife, & it was perfectly possible to isolate Japan into non-communicating zones, so food & fuel can't move between them. How far is the public from revolt? IDK. The Brits could wait awhile.Genmotty said:
I do agree with the proposition of terms being agreed, since IMO that was the optimal solution. I don't believe the invasion, if it even went ahead, would be that costly, nor am I convinced of the need for it.Genmotty said:
I got that. I still think the Commonwealth (or Britain, for simplicity's sake) had the capacity to defeat Japan alone, provided there's U.S. aid against Germany--even if it means no active U.S. entry into the war at all.Genmotty said:
Japan was really over her head with a major power like Britain. And the Brits knew how to threaten SLOCs from bitter experience in two World Wars, so they know how to do to Japan exactly what the Pac Fleet Sub Force did.
Brit bombing was less likely IMO, but not impossible.
Would it be easy? No. Would it be quick? No. And, TBH, I'd love to see a TL dealing with it, because I'd really like to know what it might look like.
I'm very doubtful of that. Don't forget, FDR was looking for an excuse to blockade Japan as a way to provide assistance to China. I maintain there'd be a "Greer Incident" in the Philippine Sea or Luzon Strait or somewhere before much longer.Genmotty said:
Agreed. How much longer is an open question. I really don't feature it being much past the end of '42, but...Genmotty said:
As said, I don't think it'd be quick. Stalemate I don't believe. That's the "barrier" defense Japan foresaw, & the barrier was porous, since Japan's SLOCs were OTL, & would be TTL, vulnerable. So long as that's true, Japan can be beaten.Genmotty said:
And Britain has a very long history of nibbling away at enemies while looking for allies... How long would it be before she got Chiang & Stalin to upgrade their efforts against Japan? How long before she moved FDR in the direction he was already leaning?
Japan was engaged in a war in China she couldn't win. Expanding it was suicide: slow or fast, but still suicide.
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