@Intransigent Southerner sums it up pretty well. While the Japanese had extraordinary success in capturing Joseon strongholds in their initial invasion, the countryside was a very different story, with warrior monks and peasant armies (dubbed the Righteous Armies) harrying Japanese forces and obstructing their already frail and overstretched supply lines.Let's say that Admiral Yi Sun Shin died before the invasion and Japan managed to conquer Korea. Assuming that this butterflies the isolationist period how well do you think they would do?
I'd argue that staying in Korea only weakens the Toyotomi regime and further encourages isolationism (or at least discourages further overseas adventures) going forward. Korea would've been a massive sink of manpower and resources and, without Toyotomi Hideyoshi (who, mind, died of non-combat related causes), the Japanese isles were primed for another bout of civil war (the Battle of Sekigahara and the Siege of Osaka). If anything, it would help the Tokugawa Eastern forces overtake the Toyotomi West, who are now split between Korea and western Japan, and further delegitimatise overseas expansion due to wastefulness of men and money, the loss of trade income with the now hostile mainland, and the vulnerabilities caused by splitting the nation's forces and creating enemies of major mainland forces better able to supply their troops than the Japanese are. It's basically just Japan as it was OTL, just with the Tokugawa winning even more handily due to the Toyotomi being further bled by staying in Korea, which does not discount the possibility of Sakoku policy (doesn't really affect such developments in any negative way).Japan would open up to the World. An active Japan in the 1600s would be a formidable force in the Pacific
@Intransigent Southerner
I'd argue that staying in Korea only weakens the Toyotomi regime and further encourages isolationism (or at least discourages further overseas adventures) going forward. Korea would've been a massive sink of manpower and resources and, without Toyotomi Hideyoshi (who, mind, died of non-combat related causes), the Japanese isles were primed for another bout of civil war (the Battle of Sekigahara and the Siege of Osaka). If anything, it would help the Tokugawa Eastern forces overtake the Toyotomi West, who are now split between Korea and western Japan, and further delegitimatise overseas expansion due to wastefulness of men and money, the loss of trade income with the now hostile mainland, and the vulnerabilities caused by splitting the nation's forces and creating enemies of major mainland forces better able to supply their troops than the Japanese are. It's basically just Japan as it was OTL, just with the Tokugawa winning even more handily due to the Toyotomi being further bled by staying in Korea, which does not discount the possibility of Sakoku policy (doesn't really affect such developments in any negative way).
And it's likely Tokugawa Ieyasu would give up on Korea as well; he didn't send troops to Korea during the war, restored relations with the Joseon in 1609, and a second bout in Korea against the militia, Ming, and possibly Jurchen after another civil war would be suicidal.
Basically, what I'm getting at is that Admiral Yi's impact was more on the Korean peninsula rather than Japan; Japan's invasion was incredibly lucky as it was OTL (the Joseon not telling the Ming about Japan's request for access through the peninsula to invade the Ming, the Joseon refusing to modernise their military equipment, the Joseon refusing to prepare for a seaborn invasion or moving troops into position despite signs of Japanese preparations, the Joseon not having their navy in position and instead scuttling part of it right when the war began, etc.) and their own political situation was unstable to begin with (civil war within 3 years of Hideyoshi dying). A longer war or mainland commitments would just further exacerbate that situation and lead to a relatively similar outcome as OTL for Japan, most things considered.
The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China. It's not like the Japanese were super soldiers, as much as the meme would say they are, seeing as they lost to the Ming-Joseon forces. Seeing as the Ming-Joseon in turn got utterly trounced by Nurhaci's forces on multiple occasions, that doesn't bode well for any defense of a land that is perpetually in active revolt while the home islands are divided (Tokugawa Ieyasu didn't completely eliminate the Toyotomi's power until 1615 with the Siege of Osaka).All true and one would have to imagine major political changes in Japan for her to agree to pay the price to stay but one point to consider is that the Ming could barely afford these costs, the Ming is going downhill. China will soon face several civil wars and a Northern invasion. As it was it was it was only in 1636 that Qing could defeat a much weaker Korea then what this Japanese dominated Korea would be.
Jinju is in the far south of Korea, nowhere near Seoul, which says more about the Japanese failing to capture the western portion of Korea (despite capturing much of the east and central parts of Korea) before the Ming intervened than about their successes. The Second Siege of Jinju was still only within the first year of combat, mind.OTL, after the Chinese captured Pyongyang in February 1593, their pursuit of retreating Japanese was first rebuffed in Battle of Byeokjegwan. It was only in May 1593 that Japanese retreated from Seoul, and even in July 1593 they managed to take Jinju. It was by May 1594 that the Japanese had retreated to Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses.
If Yi Sun-sin is never around or killed in an early battle and Korean navy does as well as the other Korean admirals did OTL - how much difference would it make in 1592-1593 campaign?
How about an outcome where Japanese still lose Pyongyang to Ming, but make better job reducing Korean held forts all around South in 1592-1593, with the result that they hold Seoul?
And the truce, in 1594, leaves enough of South Korea pacified that Japanese internal politics don´t allow just evacuating - there are fiefs in Korea that are assets not liabilities to Japanese daimyo who hold them?
Both in 1627 and 1636, there was as yet no question of "restoring the legitimate ruler", because Ming legitimacy was not in serious question.The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China.
Yi Sun-sin was a lucky strike for Koreans. So just Yi Eok-gi would be something of a middle case.As for other admirals, there was Admiral Yi Eokgi, so it's not like the Joseon fleet immediately loses all its leadership. The Japanese would be better supplied but those supplies would be difficult to move to the north even without the peasantry and monks militant, so Pyongyang is probably lost either way.
One of the most major problems the Japanese faced is that they were running out of food. Unlike in Japan, where the peasantry worked regardless of overlordship, the Korean peasants tended to flee into the mountains or unoccupied zones to the north, which meant no harvests for the soldiers to sustain themselves on. Even with more supplies from a better naval situation, that's still 150,000 soldiers across the peninsula to feed. Hanseong was abandoned OTL because the Japanese defenders were running out of food (the Ming had set much of their food supply aflame), a fact that hinges not on their defensive infrastructure or their fighting but rather because they didn't anticipate the level of opposition they'd face in the countryside.
Jeollado was relatively untouched by war and a major rice producing region in Korea but the Japanese didn't manage to seize it OTL. The further issue is that the Korean peasantry would flee their fields, which means the land just sits there as a liability.
The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China. It's not like the Japanese were super soldiers, as much as the meme would say they are, seeing as they lost to the Ming-Joseon forces. Seeing as the Ming-Joseon in turn got utterly trounced by Nurhaci's forces on multiple occasions, that doesn't bode well for any defense of a land that is perpetually in active revolt while the home islands are divided (Tokugawa Ieyasu didn't completely eliminate the Toyotomi's power until 1615 with the Siege of Osaka).
As for the Ming, they didn't send all too many troops (only 40,000) during the first part of the war, when they pushed the Japanese back to Hanseong and forced them to enter peace talks, with the Ming fighting only something like 2 years total due to entering the war late and having negotiations for 2-3 years. Compared to the Bozhou Rebellion, which required 200,000+ troops, the Korea campaign was expensive but far from breaking the Ming's back. In any case, the whole affair with the Jurchen/Manchu was not something anyone saw coming in the 1590s, so escalating the conflict was certainly in the Ming's capabilities and interests, seeing as the Japanese were planning to invade China next, at that point..
It was in Ieyasu's best interest to keep his enemies occupied and there were a lot of ronin around with nothing to do. If they're all in Korea when he tries to take over it'd be pretty trivial. If they managed to sink the Korean and Ming fleets early in the war they could keep coastal regions supplied. And if they held the coastal regions eventually they'd be able to strangle access to the entire peninsula if they took control over the north. They'd need decent relations with the Jurchen to secure it. Fairly unlikely but not completely impossible.
Say Hideyoshi's son dies in childbirth and he doesn't execute his nephew. With the better supply situation there's no truce in '96 and when Hideyoshi dies his nephew doesn't order a retreat. A few years later Ieyasu takes over in a coup but he doesn't trust the Daimyos in Korea enough to recall them.
It was in 1644, when the Shun seized Beijing, and afterwards, when the Manchu swept over the rest of China.Both in 1627 and 1636, there was as yet no question of "restoring the legitimate ruler", because Ming legitimacy was not in serious question.
Japanese in 1592-1594 could ship in food from home islands when not hampered by Yi. Jurchen in 1627 and 1636 did not have spare food at home.
Which doesn't exactly change the course of the war in much of an extreme. Once Hanseong was lost, the Japanese entered peace talks, which lasted over a year because they knew that the war was not going to end as easily as predicted. Retreat is retreat and, once the Japanese lost their momentum, they were hard-pressed to make any additional gains. Northern Korea was completely lost to the Japanese, who would not be able to occupy it for the next 300 years, as @Intransigent Southerner stated above, while the occupied regions of south were in revolt, the western regions were still fighting, and everyone–Japanese and Korean–was starving.Yi Sun-sin was a lucky strike for Koreans. So just Yi Eok-gi would be something of a middle case.
Setting much of the food supply in Seoul aflame was also a lucky strike for Koreans. A bit better defensive infrastructure for Japanese, Ming fail in trying to set fire on the food supply... the Japanese would probably hold out for several more months. But still problems with sustaining food supply either by sea (even with weaker Korean navy there is still the Ming one) or from countryside. So likely still evacuate, but later in 1593. Right?
If they return in autumn, that doesn't change the fact that there is no harvest to plunder for that year since the fields have gone unsowed, razed, or neglected and winter is coming. It only makes a difference if the Japanese can sustain for an entire year for the next year's harvest with what supplies they already have. Otherwise, all that does is cause more peasants to starve to death and increase resentment in a population that already is rising up against foreign occupation.OTL, by spring 1594, Japanese held just Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses. For all Korean peasants, unoccupied territories were nearby. And the matters were obviously going this way by late summer 1593, when Japanese took Jinju - and promptly evacuated it.
If Korean navy is weaker and Japanese have better supply situation in 1593, enabling them to feed a bigger occupation force and hold more forts, that might be somewhat amplifying. Peasants fled to unoccupied zones would stay there, but as for those in the mountains, if in autumn 1593 it looks like the Japanese are staying, many might be unwilling to hold out indefinitely. Improving Japanese situation, at least in longer term.
40 years later isn't quite 'soon' enough to affect the Imjin War.ti
Those Chinese troops were pulled at of the North where they were really needed and the Ming did break soon. I also agree from China view the war was a necessity.
It leads me to the view that the Ming problem was not the North or the South but her economics. The Ming should have increased their taxes to build up their military. In modern terms, we call this Imperial overstretch.
Having said that I think my argument still stands if the Japanese can hold in Korea, it will be quite a while before the Chinese are in a position to drive them out.
Seeing as they attacked the Jurchen and Nurhaci is still in in the 'sucking up to the Ming while trying to get powerful' stage, it's kinda hard for the Japanese to stay cordial with the Jurchen. Unless the Japanese defeat the Ming forces handily, Nurhaci, like pretty much everyone outside of Japan, would still see the Ming as the dominant force in NE Asia (hence offering to support the Ming, Nurhaci wasn't the type to bet on a losing horse) and that still doesn't change the fact that most everyone south of the Jurchens saw the Jurchens as uncivilised barbarians.They'd need decent relations with the Jurchen to secure it. Fairly unlikely but not completely impossible.
Say Hideyoshi's son dies in childbirth and he doesn't execute his nephew. With the better supply situation there's no truce in '96 and when Hideyoshi dies his nephew doesn't order a retreat. A few years later Ieyasu takes over in a coup but he doesn't trust the Daimyos in Korea enough to recall them.