Long term prospects of a Japanese colonial empire starting from the 1590s innvasions of Korea.

Let's say that Admiral Yi Sun Shin died before the invasion and Japan managed to conquer Korea. Assuming that this butterflies the isolationist period how well do you think they would do?
 
Ming China would kick out Japan in the 1590s from northern Korea at the very least, and then guerrilla rebels would make controlling the south untenable as well. The Hideyoshi regime collapses much as OTL and when Ieyasu takes over, he abandons Korea.
 
Japan would open up to the World. An active Japan in the 1600s would be a formidable force in the Pacific
 
Let's say that Admiral Yi Sun Shin died before the invasion and Japan managed to conquer Korea. Assuming that this butterflies the isolationist period how well do you think they would do?
@Intransigent Southerner sums it up pretty well. While the Japanese had extraordinary success in capturing Joseon strongholds in their initial invasion, the countryside was a very different story, with warrior monks and peasant armies (dubbed the Righteous Armies) harrying Japanese forces and obstructing their already frail and overstretched supply lines.

While Admiral Yi had a marked impact on the war, his overwhelming successes have the unfortunate effect of obscuring the efforts of the many others whose efforts hindered the Japanese invasion and render the war as a 'Yi versus the Japanese and the Joseon court' rather than the more chaotic affair it was, with the Japanese bickering amongst themselves as they advanced far faster than their supply lines could realistically manage, militiamen and monks across the peninsula's countryside and mountains rising up against the invaders, and the other generals and admirals making the best of the situation that they could while the Ming were contemplating intervention or treason (the speed of the Japanese advance caused confusion in the Ming court, leading to the notion that their tributary was about to betray them with Japanese help) and King Seonjo was in tears defending his conduct against the Ming envoys' accusations.

So say Admiral Yi dies during his time up on the northern border. The Japanese see better results in shipping supplies, though their advance is probably not going to be all that faster (they went from Busan to Pyongyang (520 km across mountainous terrain) in around 3 months time in a military campaign). They blasted through the Joseon forces with nary the slightest opposition and seized food along the way OTL, the slaughtering of resisting cities probably doesn't change either. The main impact of Yi's absence would probably be how long the Japanese can keep up the assault rather than speed (the daimyo were racing each other OTL anyways).

It's worth noting that the Japanese forces' success was one of the contributing factors in their ultimate defeat. By advancing so quickly, they created overstretched supply lines (the north not being able to get the extra supplies they'd get in ATL in any case due to terrain constraints, distance, and fighting elsewhere) vulnerable to the harassment the Righteous Armies and the monks inflicted and situations where armies were not in position to support each other, which is what happened when the Ming intervened in the war and Konishi Yukinaga had to defend Pyongyang alone, which ended in one of the worst Japanese defeats in the war. Not only that, this opened up rivalries that would haunt the Toyotomi at Sekigahara, with daimyo like Kato Kiyomasa siding with the Tokugawa due to Ishida Mitsunari's actions (or what would be painted as his actions) and his own rivalry with Konishi Yukinaga, whom he saw as stealing his own glory, during the war. These factors would allow the Ming's army of 40,000 men to push the Japanese 200 km from Pyongyang to Hanseong at almost the same rate the Japanese had advanced at.

Additionally, no Yi doesn't butterfly away the Japanese attack on the Jianzhou Jurchens (the future nucleus of the Jin/Qing dynasty) in 1592 and worsened conditions for the Joseon might even see them accept Nurhaci's offer for help in the war (they had refused OTL due to fears that the Jurchen would turn on them like the Uighur did to the Tang after liberating Chang'An).

That said, the Japanese would have some better luck with subduing the countryside with the extra supplies and men that were OTL sunk by Admiral Yi, so their position there might be a bit more entrenched. But the war was quickly becoming a quagmire within the first year of conflict and extra supplies won't fix that. Men might help, but it's just as possible that the Ming or Jurchen contribute additional men in the process and more troops just exacerbates the need for supplies, which will be hard to acquire once the numerically superior Ming fleet joins with the Joseon fleet (the fleet only got sunk in the 2nd phase of the war).

So even if Admiral Yi wasn't there, the Japanese situation in northern Korea was untenable and risked bringing in another combatant when they were already in a precarious situation. I'd agree with the notion that the Ming would at least liberate northern Korea, with the south sucking up far too many Toyotomi resources to be maintained, especially with Tokugawa Ieyasu becoming increasingly powerful and the daimyo more restless against the Toyotomi leadership and butting heads with each other.
Japan would open up to the World. An active Japan in the 1600s would be a formidable force in the Pacific
I'd argue that staying in Korea only weakens the Toyotomi regime and further encourages isolationism (or at least discourages further overseas adventures) going forward. Korea would've been a massive sink of manpower and resources and, without Toyotomi Hideyoshi (who, mind, died of non-combat related causes), the Japanese isles were primed for another bout of civil war (the Battle of Sekigahara and the Siege of Osaka). If anything, it would help the Tokugawa Eastern forces overtake the Toyotomi West, who are now split between Korea and western Japan, and further delegitimatise overseas expansion due to wastefulness of men and money, the loss of trade income with the now hostile mainland, and the vulnerabilities caused by splitting the nation's forces and creating enemies of major mainland forces better able to supply their troops than the Japanese are. It's basically just Japan as it was OTL, just with the Tokugawa winning even more handily due to the Toyotomi being further bled by staying in Korea, which does not discount the possibility of Sakoku policy (doesn't really affect such developments in any negative way).

And it's likely Tokugawa Ieyasu would give up on Korea as well; he didn't send troops to Korea during the war, restored relations with the Joseon in 1609, and a second bout in Korea against the militia, Ming, and possibly Jurchen after another civil war would be suicidal.

Basically, what I'm getting at is that Admiral Yi's impact was more on the Korean peninsula rather than Japan; Japan's invasion was incredibly lucky as it was OTL (the Joseon not telling the Ming about Japan's request for access through the peninsula to invade the Ming, the Joseon refusing to modernise their military equipment, the Joseon refusing to prepare for a seaborn invasion or moving troops into position despite signs of Japanese preparations, the Joseon not having their navy in position and instead scuttling part of it right when the war began, etc.) and their own political situation was unstable to begin with (civil war within 3 years of Hideyoshi dying). A longer war or mainland commitments would just further exacerbate that situation and lead to a relatively similar outcome as OTL for Japan, most things considered.
 
@Intransigent Southerner
I'd argue that staying in Korea only weakens the Toyotomi regime and further encourages isolationism (or at least discourages further overseas adventures) going forward. Korea would've been a massive sink of manpower and resources and, without Toyotomi Hideyoshi (who, mind, died of non-combat related causes), the Japanese isles were primed for another bout of civil war (the Battle of Sekigahara and the Siege of Osaka). If anything, it would help the Tokugawa Eastern forces overtake the Toyotomi West, who are now split between Korea and western Japan, and further delegitimatise overseas expansion due to wastefulness of men and money, the loss of trade income with the now hostile mainland, and the vulnerabilities caused by splitting the nation's forces and creating enemies of major mainland forces better able to supply their troops than the Japanese are. It's basically just Japan as it was OTL, just with the Tokugawa winning even more handily due to the Toyotomi being further bled by staying in Korea, which does not discount the possibility of Sakoku policy (doesn't really affect such developments in any negative way).

And it's likely Tokugawa Ieyasu would give up on Korea as well; he didn't send troops to Korea during the war, restored relations with the Joseon in 1609, and a second bout in Korea against the militia, Ming, and possibly Jurchen after another civil war would be suicidal.

Basically, what I'm getting at is that Admiral Yi's impact was more on the Korean peninsula rather than Japan; Japan's invasion was incredibly lucky as it was OTL (the Joseon not telling the Ming about Japan's request for access through the peninsula to invade the Ming, the Joseon refusing to modernise their military equipment, the Joseon refusing to prepare for a seaborn invasion or moving troops into position despite signs of Japanese preparations, the Joseon not having their navy in position and instead scuttling part of it right when the war began, etc.) and their own political situation was unstable to begin with (civil war within 3 years of Hideyoshi dying). A longer war or mainland commitments would just further exacerbate that situation and lead to a relatively similar outcome as OTL for Japan, most things considered.

All true and one would have to imagine major political changes in Japan for her to agree to pay the price to stay but one point to consider is that the Ming could barely afford these costs, the Ming is going downhill. China will soon face several civil wars and a Northern invasion. As it was it was it was only in 1636 that Qing could defeat a much weaker Korea then what this Japanese dominated Korea would be.
 
OTL, after the Chinese captured Pyongyang in February 1593, their pursuit of retreating Japanese was first rebuffed in Battle of Byeokjegwan. It was only in May 1593 that Japanese retreated from Seoul, and even in July 1593 they managed to take Jinju. It was by May 1594 that the Japanese had retreated to Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses.

If Yi Sun-sin is never around or killed in an early battle and Korean navy does as well as the other Korean admirals did OTL - how much difference would it make in 1592-1593 campaign?
How about an outcome where Japanese still lose Pyongyang to Ming, but make better job reducing Korean held forts all around South in 1592-1593, with the result that they hold Seoul?
And the truce, in 1594, leaves enough of South Korea pacified that Japanese internal politics don´t allow just evacuating - there are fiefs in Korea that are assets not liabilities to Japanese daimyo who hold them?
 
All true and one would have to imagine major political changes in Japan for her to agree to pay the price to stay but one point to consider is that the Ming could barely afford these costs, the Ming is going downhill. China will soon face several civil wars and a Northern invasion. As it was it was it was only in 1636 that Qing could defeat a much weaker Korea then what this Japanese dominated Korea would be.
The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China. It's not like the Japanese were super soldiers, as much as the meme would say they are, seeing as they lost to the Ming-Joseon forces. Seeing as the Ming-Joseon in turn got utterly trounced by Nurhaci's forces on multiple occasions, that doesn't bode well for any defense of a land that is perpetually in active revolt while the home islands are divided (Tokugawa Ieyasu didn't completely eliminate the Toyotomi's power until 1615 with the Siege of Osaka).

As for the Ming, they didn't send all too many troops (only 40,000) during the first part of the war, when they pushed the Japanese back to Hanseong and forced them to enter peace talks, with the Ming fighting only something like 2 years total due to entering the war late and having negotiations for 2-3 years. Compared to the Bozhou Rebellion, which required 200,000+ troops, the Korea campaign was expensive but far from breaking the Ming's back. In any case, the whole affair with the Jurchen/Manchu was not something anyone saw coming in the 1590s, so escalating the conflict was certainly in the Ming's capabilities and interests, seeing as the Japanese were planning to invade China next, at that point.

But yeah, the Japanese were the ones on the backfoot once the Ming intervened, not the Ming, and the Jurchen/Manchu were far stronger than you're giving them credit for (they trounced the Ming multiple times before they invaded the Joseon, mind, which the Japanese weren't able to do despite massive numerical superiority due to their armies not cooperating and the Korean peasantry not giving them supplies the way the Japanese expected from their feudal warfare in the Sengoku Jidai).

OTL, after the Chinese captured Pyongyang in February 1593, their pursuit of retreating Japanese was first rebuffed in Battle of Byeokjegwan. It was only in May 1593 that Japanese retreated from Seoul, and even in July 1593 they managed to take Jinju. It was by May 1594 that the Japanese had retreated to Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses.

If Yi Sun-sin is never around or killed in an early battle and Korean navy does as well as the other Korean admirals did OTL - how much difference would it make in 1592-1593 campaign?
How about an outcome where Japanese still lose Pyongyang to Ming, but make better job reducing Korean held forts all around South in 1592-1593, with the result that they hold Seoul?
And the truce, in 1594, leaves enough of South Korea pacified that Japanese internal politics don´t allow just evacuating - there are fiefs in Korea that are assets not liabilities to Japanese daimyo who hold them?
Jinju is in the far south of Korea, nowhere near Seoul, which says more about the Japanese failing to capture the western portion of Korea (despite capturing much of the east and central parts of Korea) before the Ming intervened than about their successes. The Second Siege of Jinju was still only within the first year of combat, mind.

As for other admirals, there was Admiral Yi Eokgi, so it's not like the Joseon fleet immediately loses all its leadership. The Japanese would be better supplied but those supplies would be difficult to move to the north even without the peasantry and monks militant, so Pyongyang is probably lost either way.

One of the most major problems the Japanese faced is that they were running out of food. Unlike in Japan, where the peasantry worked regardless of overlordship, the Korean peasants tended to flee into the mountains or unoccupied zones to the north, which meant no harvests for the soldiers to sustain themselves on. Even with more supplies from a better naval situation, that's still 150,000 soldiers across the peninsula to feed. Hanseong was abandoned OTL because the Japanese defenders were running out of food (the Ming had set much of their food supply aflame), a fact that hinges not on their defensive infrastructure or their fighting but rather because they didn't anticipate the level of opposition they'd face in the countryside.

Jeollado was relatively untouched by war and a major rice producing region in Korea but the Japanese didn't manage to seize it OTL. The further issue is that the Korean peasantry would flee their fields, which means the land just sits there as a liability.

There's just not a lot of situations where southern Korea could be pacified in such a manner that the Japanese can sustain a presence there in opposition to the Ming and their own internal instability.
 
The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China.
Both in 1627 and 1636, there was as yet no question of "restoring the legitimate ruler", because Ming legitimacy was not in serious question.
Japanese in 1592-1594 could ship in food from home islands when not hampered by Yi. Jurchen in 1627 and 1636 did not have spare food at home.
As for other admirals, there was Admiral Yi Eokgi, so it's not like the Joseon fleet immediately loses all its leadership. The Japanese would be better supplied but those supplies would be difficult to move to the north even without the peasantry and monks militant, so Pyongyang is probably lost either way.

One of the most major problems the Japanese faced is that they were running out of food. Unlike in Japan, where the peasantry worked regardless of overlordship, the Korean peasants tended to flee into the mountains or unoccupied zones to the north, which meant no harvests for the soldiers to sustain themselves on. Even with more supplies from a better naval situation, that's still 150,000 soldiers across the peninsula to feed. Hanseong was abandoned OTL because the Japanese defenders were running out of food (the Ming had set much of their food supply aflame), a fact that hinges not on their defensive infrastructure or their fighting but rather because they didn't anticipate the level of opposition they'd face in the countryside.
Yi Sun-sin was a lucky strike for Koreans. So just Yi Eok-gi would be something of a middle case.
Setting much of the food supply in Seoul aflame was also a lucky strike for Koreans. A bit better defensive infrastructure for Japanese, Ming fail in trying to set fire on the food supply... the Japanese would probably hold out for several more months. But still problems with sustaining food supply either by sea (even with weaker Korean navy there is still the Ming one) or from countryside. So likely still evacuate, but later in 1593. Right?
Jeollado was relatively untouched by war and a major rice producing region in Korea but the Japanese didn't manage to seize it OTL. The further issue is that the Korean peasantry would flee their fields, which means the land just sits there as a liability.

OTL, by spring 1594, Japanese held just Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses. For all Korean peasants, unoccupied territories were nearby. And the matters were obviously going this way by late summer 1593, when Japanese took Jinju - and promptly evacuated it.

If Korean navy is weaker and Japanese have better supply situation in 1593, enabling them to feed a bigger occupation force and hold more forts, that might be somewhat amplifying. Peasants fled to unoccupied zones would stay there, but as for those in the mountains, if in autumn 1593 it looks like the Japanese are staying, many might be unwilling to hold out indefinitely. Improving Japanese situation, at least in longer term.
 
ti
The Manchu/Jurchen actually defeated the Joseon in 1627 in the span of 2 months, captured Pyongyang with nary a fight, and forced them to become a Jin tributary (which was later enforced more effectively when the Manchu rebranded themselves as the Qing and invaded again). Both invasions were sweeping successes for the Manchu despite the Joseon having had ample time to recover from the Japanese invasion (almost 30 years) against the starving Manchu (loss of trade with the Ming due to conflicts affected the expanding Manchu population rather severely). For a Japan divided amongst itself and suffering unrest throughout the peninsula, their chances are probably worse, since the Manchu can pull a 'restore the legitimate ruler' card and get local support like how it went in their conquest of China. It's not like the Japanese were super soldiers, as much as the meme would say they are, seeing as they lost to the Ming-Joseon forces. Seeing as the Ming-Joseon in turn got utterly trounced by Nurhaci's forces on multiple occasions, that doesn't bode well for any defense of a land that is perpetually in active revolt while the home islands are divided (Tokugawa Ieyasu didn't completely eliminate the Toyotomi's power until 1615 with the Siege of Osaka).

As for the Ming, they didn't send all too many troops (only 40,000) during the first part of the war, when they pushed the Japanese back to Hanseong and forced them to enter peace talks, with the Ming fighting only something like 2 years total due to entering the war late and having negotiations for 2-3 years. Compared to the Bozhou Rebellion, which required 200,000+ troops, the Korea campaign was expensive but far from breaking the Ming's back. In any case, the whole affair with the Jurchen/Manchu was not something anyone saw coming in the 1590s, so escalating the conflict was certainly in the Ming's capabilities and interests, seeing as the Japanese were planning to invade China next, at that point..

Those Chinese troops were pulled at of the North where they were really needed and the Ming did break soon. I also agree from China view the war was a necessity.

It leads me to the view that the Ming problem was not the North or the South but her economics. The Ming should have increased their taxes to build up their military. In modern terms, we call this Imperial overstretch.

Having said that I think my argument still stands if the Japanese can hold in Korea, it will be quite a while before the Chinese are in a position to drive them out.
 
It was in Ieyasu's best interest to keep his enemies occupied and there were a lot of ronin around with nothing to do. If they're all in Korea when he tries to take over it'd be pretty trivial. If they managed to sink the Korean and Ming fleets early in the war they could keep coastal regions supplied. And if they held the coastal regions eventually they'd be able to strangle access to the entire peninsula if they took control over the north. They'd need decent relations with the Jurchen to secure it. Fairly unlikely but not completely impossible.

Say Hideyoshi's son dies in childbirth and he doesn't execute his nephew. With the better supply situation there's no truce in '96 and when Hideyoshi dies his nephew doesn't order a retreat. A few years later Ieyasu takes over in a coup but he doesn't trust the Daimyos in Korea enough to recall them.
 
The problem with a Japanese colonial empire even with a victory in the Imjin War POD is that Feudal Japan is inherently unstable. Every daimyo can be an enemy to Kampaku or Shogun as Japan expands any conquests or are going to colonies have to manage their own military forces and become any threat to possibly manage. Until the feudal system is kept in check and replaced any Japanese colonial empire would be hard pressed to expand as the military would be controlled by local lords, both at home and in foreign lands.

It was in Ieyasu's best interest to keep his enemies occupied and there were a lot of ronin around with nothing to do. If they're all in Korea when he tries to take over it'd be pretty trivial. If they managed to sink the Korean and Ming fleets early in the war they could keep coastal regions supplied. And if they held the coastal regions eventually they'd be able to strangle access to the entire peninsula if they took control over the north. They'd need decent relations with the Jurchen to secure it. Fairly unlikely but not completely impossible.

Say Hideyoshi's son dies in childbirth and he doesn't execute his nephew. With the better supply situation there's no truce in '96 and when Hideyoshi dies his nephew doesn't order a retreat. A few years later Ieyasu takes over in a coup but he doesn't trust the Daimyos in Korea enough to recall them.

Ieyasu's powerplay is not a sure thing. Sinking the Ming and Korean fleets would be difficult because the Japanese navy was only suited for local combat in the Seto Inland Sea.
 
Both in 1627 and 1636, there was as yet no question of "restoring the legitimate ruler", because Ming legitimacy was not in serious question.
Japanese in 1592-1594 could ship in food from home islands when not hampered by Yi. Jurchen in 1627 and 1636 did not have spare food at home.
It was in 1644, when the Shun seized Beijing, and afterwards, when the Manchu swept over the rest of China.

Plus, the 'restore legitimate ruler' thing was a card the Manchu pulled during their first invasion of Korea in 1627, after King Gwanghaegun, who opposed war with the Manchu, was overthrown and replaced by King Injo, who was notoriously anti-Manchu.

As for shipping food from the home islands, food wasn't the issue during the Manchu invasions. They didn't intend on conquest, only raiding and subjugation, and the Japanese will have to deal with constant raids against a foe they have little experience fighting.
Yi Sun-sin was a lucky strike for Koreans. So just Yi Eok-gi would be something of a middle case.
Setting much of the food supply in Seoul aflame was also a lucky strike for Koreans. A bit better defensive infrastructure for Japanese, Ming fail in trying to set fire on the food supply... the Japanese would probably hold out for several more months. But still problems with sustaining food supply either by sea (even with weaker Korean navy there is still the Ming one) or from countryside. So likely still evacuate, but later in 1593. Right?
Which doesn't exactly change the course of the war in much of an extreme. Once Hanseong was lost, the Japanese entered peace talks, which lasted over a year because they knew that the war was not going to end as easily as predicted. Retreat is retreat and, once the Japanese lost their momentum, they were hard-pressed to make any additional gains. Northern Korea was completely lost to the Japanese, who would not be able to occupy it for the next 300 years, as @Intransigent Southerner stated above, while the occupied regions of south were in revolt, the western regions were still fighting, and everyone–Japanese and Korean–was starving.

It's also worth mentioning that Japanese warships were more suited to boarding than long-ranged combat, which the Korean and Chinese vessels focused more on. Even absent Admiral Yi, the entrance of the Ming fleet would've seen Japan lose control of the seas.

OTL, by spring 1594, Japanese held just Pusan and a few other coastal fortresses. For all Korean peasants, unoccupied territories were nearby. And the matters were obviously going this way by late summer 1593, when Japanese took Jinju - and promptly evacuated it.

If Korean navy is weaker and Japanese have better supply situation in 1593, enabling them to feed a bigger occupation force and hold more forts, that might be somewhat amplifying. Peasants fled to unoccupied zones would stay there, but as for those in the mountains, if in autumn 1593 it looks like the Japanese are staying, many might be unwilling to hold out indefinitely. Improving Japanese situation, at least in longer term.
If they return in autumn, that doesn't change the fact that there is no harvest to plunder for that year since the fields have gone unsowed, razed, or neglected and winter is coming. It only makes a difference if the Japanese can sustain for an entire year for the next year's harvest with what supplies they already have. Otherwise, all that does is cause more peasants to starve to death and increase resentment in a population that already is rising up against foreign occupation.
There's also the fact that the Ming would bring in an additional 30,000 troops in the second phase of the war.

The issue wasn't with the size of the Japanese occupation force so much as them not expecting nearly as much opposition to their occupation as was manifest in 1592 onwards. Feudal warfare was incompatible with war with a peasantry and gentry with relatively strong national leanings. War in Japan during the Sengoku Jidai could feed itself, the war in Korea could not.

In any case, longer term just means until Toyotomi Hideyoshi kicks the bucket. Without him pushing for war and seeing how they had been pushed back without much chance of victory, the Council of Five Elders promptly made peace with the mainland. Not only would the Japanese have to hold out longer, they'd have to either win before Hideyoshi dies or keep winning in a sustainable fashion that the Five Elders can see as anything but a complete waste of men and money for Japan to stay in the war, so simply hanging on a bit longer isn't sufficient for Japan conquest of Korea.

ti

Those Chinese troops were pulled at of the North where they were really needed and the Ming did break soon. I also agree from China view the war was a necessity.

It leads me to the view that the Ming problem was not the North or the South but her economics. The Ming should have increased their taxes to build up their military. In modern terms, we call this Imperial overstretch.

Having said that I think my argument still stands if the Japanese can hold in Korea, it will be quite a while before the Chinese are in a position to drive them out.
40 years later isn't quite 'soon' enough to affect the Imjin War.

And seeing as the Chinese did drive the Japanese out of the entire north of Korea within 3 months with 40,000 men, it doesn't exactly seem like Japan can resist Jurchen raids and Chinese invasion without a long period of peaceful preparation without having to deal with rebellions.

They'd need decent relations with the Jurchen to secure it. Fairly unlikely but not completely impossible.

Say Hideyoshi's son dies in childbirth and he doesn't execute his nephew. With the better supply situation there's no truce in '96 and when Hideyoshi dies his nephew doesn't order a retreat. A few years later Ieyasu takes over in a coup but he doesn't trust the Daimyos in Korea enough to recall them.
Seeing as they attacked the Jurchen and Nurhaci is still in in the 'sucking up to the Ming while trying to get powerful' stage, it's kinda hard for the Japanese to stay cordial with the Jurchen. Unless the Japanese defeat the Ming forces handily, Nurhaci, like pretty much everyone outside of Japan, would still see the Ming as the dominant force in NE Asia (hence offering to support the Ming, Nurhaci wasn't the type to bet on a losing horse) and that still doesn't change the fact that most everyone south of the Jurchens saw the Jurchens as uncivilised barbarians.

Then, of course, if the Tokugawa take over, they want to wipe out all Toyotomi remnants and strip the tozama daimyo of all power to cement their takeover.
 
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