London Firestorm

[BlondieBC]

I'm curious what would happen if the British had trouble exporting equipment to the Middle East and North Africa to support the offensive against the Italians. AFAIK British factories in the Home Isles were a big source of supplies to the British forces in Africa.

The information I looked at is for WW1, so if something changes that is major, I will give you the wrong information. I figured that 25% of the supplies came from outside of Europe (Aussies, USA, Canada), so if the forces are below that level, they function ok. But I was doing WW1 infantry divisions, not armor formations or large air groups. I think we can safely say that any dismounted infantry will be fine as far a supplies. Fuel should not be an issue, since a lot comes from the USA or Persian Gulf. And with the UK unable to unload oil, they may actually improve the fuel situation. I see issue potentially with new equipment (tanks, air planes), spare parts, and larger caliber ammo. So the Mechanized infantry, airplanes and tanks will have plenty of fuel, but sustained operations will cause ammo shortages and equipment unavailable for operations.

And as far as I can see, there is only one solution and it is easy. Go on the defensive. Maintenance cycles are trigger by miles driven/hours of operation. Offensive operations consume vast quantities of ammo. Within a few days to weeks of things getting bad, the Middle east will be order on the defensive. Think in terms of Kaserine Pass where the Germans whipped the USA, but the went back on the defensive due to poor supplies. I would expect the UK to be whipping the Italians, then to fall back to a good defensive location such as El Alaman. The supply lines into Libya will be too long to sustain. Likely the Germans don't send troops to Africa, you have to look at the date. The Italians have a better supply situation, but are too weak to attack again. Things stalemate until the USA enters the war. The UK will have fewer sorties for its airplanes, so the Italians lose fewer ships and planes.

I see a few butterflies you have to deal with.

1) What happens with the German North Africa forces? Do they show up in attack on the the USSR or somewhere else?

2) Malta - Is it invaded? Or is the interdiction heavier?

3) Does the UK still get involved in Greece? Crete?

4) Does the UK do something more aggressive with its navy to try to stop the Italian supplies? Or do they cancel operations in the Med due to issues in the UK?

There are not correct answers on these, you just will make choices.

The Allied bombing of Germany is quite different than the German bombing of Britain. Britain is uniquely vulnerable to a sustained bombing campaign because of her reliance on imports of food and fuel. Britain could at most supply about 2/3rds of her requirements and though Ireland could provide surpluses for about 13-18 weeks, it still needs to be shipped in and distributed. Fuel was even worse. Britain required about 300k tons of fuel a week and had 3 million tons in stock in July-August 1940. It had to totally reorient its imports to the West Coast and those areas I mentioned above, which dropped imports significantly, as these docks had to adjust to the increased volume. There were points in late 1940 that tankers were lined up with a 10 day wait to unload their fuel shipments. Yet the Germans didn't really try and bomb these areas in heavy raids (by LW standards more than 400 bombers) until 1941 or just sporadically in 1940. OTL there were only 11 raids of more than 400 bombers in 1940. Concentration of weight of bombs on a single traget night after night was never attempted, as targets constantly shifted under Goering's plans.
Repeatedly I've read quotes by British officials wondering why the Germans didn't focus on one spot with the bombers and render it useless by sustained bombing several times a week to deny its use to the British war effort.

Had even Liverpool and the docks around the Mersey been bombed night after night for a month, the British would have lost over half of the importing capacity (at one 3 month period it handled 87% of British imports in 1940), especially as the Southern and Western ports were shut down to international shipping until 1941. From July to October the Western Ports were operating below import requirements IOTL before they were really bombed and sustained bombing would have been crippling to the British war effort. Also the British rail system was badly mismanaged until 1941, so there would have been added pressure on the rail infrastructure of any port that had to compensate for the reduced capacity of Liverpool. There were several periods where it was feared that the rail transport system would collapse when coastal shipping was dramatically reduced by German naval bombing.

The point is that even a small number of heavy bombers could have a major effect in carry heavy ordnance and larger loads to targets, which would maximize sortee effectiveness. Plus the heavier bomb loads help increase chances of large fires and small firestorms.

When you say fuel, is this coal or oil?

In WW1, we are talking 3.5 million tons per month, so a 50% reduction will mean losing 1.8 million tons per month. The UK will not starve at these levels, but it will be a hungry winter, and productive of hungry men plummets. Say you go from 3400 calories per day to 1700. It is not starvation, but you can't do a hard 12 hour day. It will have interesting impact on morale and politics, but the UK will stay in the war.

Losing the other 50% of raw materials will collapse the UK economy. While the will do heroic things to try to keep the factories running, I don't see how you have less than 25% reduction in war materials produced each month. The UK will have to start cancelling/delaying major war projects. Some candidates.

1) Any non escort ships not within 6 months of being finished.

2) Merchant ships. If you have too few ports ,the UK now has a surplus of ships.

3) Major weapons systems not expect to be available for 2 years or more.

4) Tube Alloy. This might be huge, not sure how much it delays the bomb.

5) Also, they might be looking at shipping machine tools to Canada. Literally moving entire factories. Or as in point 3, move the project to Canada.

6) Exporting non-essential civilians, more than OTL.

This will not kill the UK. It may not even delay D-Day, but something major is derailed for the Western Allies.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

comrade wiking,

for your research requests:
the HE-111 had a soft undercarriage prone to taxiway accidents along with take off and landing; especially with full war load.... a brilliant description of the hazards of operations from semi prepared airfields in france and supporting the stalingrad relief effort is found in franz kurkowski's "luftwaffe aces" bio on ludwig havighorst who had the most total observer missions in the plane in the service here is the amazon link http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Ace...4488&sr=8-1&keywords=franz+kurowski+luftwaffe

john mosier's otherwise extremely abrasive "blitzkrieg myth" has a thoroughly researched and excellently translated segment on the LW's sortie tempo and it's advantages (and disadvantages from sickled cut to the BOB) here is the amazon link
http://www.amazon.com/The-Blitzkrie...F8&qid=1340404986&sr=1-6&keywords=john+mosier

I'll check these out; I have Mosier's book and read it years ago. I may be worth checking out for further sources. I might need to ask my library to order the MGFA official history again; it a pretty good resource for most things about the German war effort.

Edit: checked Mosier, did not find anything about numbers of sortees. Do you have a page number? I found information about them being able to launch more sortees during the BoF and its wear and tear on pilots. Logically the same for the BoB, but that suggests the problems of multiple daylight sortees and doesn't get into what the actual status of the flyers were in July-August.

(I recommend taking everything else in that book with a HUGE grain of salt, mosier is a douchebag who draws a lot of false conclusions; however his research on the sortie tempos is reasoned, researched and extremely well thought out and explained)

I was not impressed with Mosier, but he does do research into interesting areas.

on wever being abrasive and having no patience for anyone, that comes from Below whom I've recommended to you previously; i think the term patronizing was used at least twice

What was the title of his book again? Can't seem to find it.
That doesn't surprise me that Below thought that, as he was demanding of his subordinates and saved his 'personality managing' for his superiors and equals. There was a quote from him in the USAAF monographs that Milch "like to be coddled", so he gave him what he craved, respect and deferment, and in return Milch was much more helpful and pleasant to deal with.

I am happy to contribute to the project in any way i can

Much obliged. You're definitely a good foil for my ideas; that's why I'm posting here, to get push back on my brainstorms and get new information/sources.

Osterkamp's memoirs say otherwise about the calais area being in good shape at the start of the BOB... his JG51 was the first single engine fighter group to open up sustained ops against the uk, he complains openly about servicability, unreplaced losses, lack of suitable fields, repairs having to be done in the open, lack of proper quarters/field kitchens, lack of parts fuel ammo at site, pilot fatigue etc etc; Moelders said quite the same thing later and made himself a swatch of enemies in the upper circles of the LW

Osterkamp and Molders were only focused on fighters, which were expected to operate in worse conditions than bombers. All of that stuff makes sense give how Jeschonnek felt about the fighter force. That totally jibes with what I read about the fighter situation, which is irrelevant to night campaign.

if you read the section i suggested above on the he-111 operations they talk extensively about the force being strung out, needing more time to integrate replacements and not being able to take off with full bomb loads due to the lack of permanent bases... this is my objection to the august attacks, since they are attacking at night; it would be better to take the whole month and massage the force back to fullish strength, give them proper runways and build up a reserve of parts/bombs etc so that once the pressure starts to be applied it can be applied every single night as opposed to punching whilst exhausted

I'll check it out. Stephen Bungay in his book about the Battle of Britain "Most Dangerous Enemy" suggests that by August the German bomber forces were reasonably prepared.

I have no objection to pushing back the start date of operations to maximize preparedness and bring in new equipment/perform necessary maintenance/rest/train.

i don't quite follow your objection on the DO-19... the bmw 132 j produced 950hp and was in serial production for the JU-52 and the condors. i realize the plane was ugly as all hell and it's tail would have to be redesigned once it got some operational experiance but the 132's would have greatly improved the power to weight ratio letting her carry the standard two tonne bomb load at an economical cruising speed (albeit at low altitude due to german defects in radial engine manufacture) her being narrow isn't a big deal till the germans develop really big bombs, as she was she could carry the standard 8 sc-250's

Its more than just ugly, it was badly designed. Yes, it was designed around the weak engines and old aviation knowledge, even the Ju89 got better engines, and had lots of upgrade potential, but that would take time, time that would push its development back to compete with the Heinkel.
Two tons of bombs for a 4 engine bomber is pretty bad, especially as it was for under 1000 miles. Again its a major investment in scarce resources to develop an underwhelming design that requires major changes to reach viable production. Perhaps it could be ready in 1939, but the TL I envision for its development is this:
-28th October 1936 V1 prototype flies with 4 322H Bramos (OTL)
-(ITTL) V2 with 4 BMW 132F radials flies in May 1937
-V3 with 4 Bramo 323 Fafnirs flies in June-July 1937
-redesigns in August 1937 started when Wever grants request for a V4 with Jumo 211As
-redesigns take 6-12 months
-v4 prototype take 9-12 months to build
-v4 ready in August 1939 at the latest, February 1939 at the earliest
-testing takes 12-18 months, which pushes us into 1940-1.

Let me know if you think this is unreasonable and why so I can adjust accordingly.

the cockpit, wings, and tail could be redesigned in subsequent versions or the design could simply be phased out as the heinkel comes online; however, it would still have been extremely worthwhile to put the dornier on the line and get her going even with her flaws as she would force the lw to build up a reserve of pilots, long runways and figure out tactics

That's a heavy investment of resources that were relatively scarce considering and would probably delay the Heinkel coming online by a year.

i am not a huge fan of heinkel; their designs didn't win a lot of competions for good reason (certainly not for a lack of political love either) they were the lockheed over promise under deliverer of their day... they would have had delivery problems if they stayed with the evaporation cooling system; once going to conventional radiators the weight and drag would have given much lower speed than the original production brochures; it's wings were also just as crappy (for different reasons) than the DO's wings; fwiw the heinkel got fucking db engines which is a hugely unfair comparison; aviation technology moved rapidly forward in the intervening 18 months; it's like comparing a b-17 and a b-24 and then trashing the b-17 for having inferior performance without looking at the design dates;

The evaporation cooling system was also a problem with the FWs too and the Ju88 tried to use it at one point. That was not just Heinkel. Yes, I know what you mean about the over promising. The He177 wouldn't live up to its full promises either even in the scenario I'm proposing, but the major redesigns of the Do19 would push its development to leave it out of production until 1940.

I do agree that the Do19 got raw deal over the engine issue. Still, it was not that aerodynamic. I'll look at it again and what historical redesign times were, but its is hard to find data about the Do19 that is reliable and its hard to compare it to other designs ITTL because they are all so different than OTL. I keep vacillating about whether something viable could be ready to produce in 1939.

I'll have to get back to you about this.

wever did see and experience the rapidity of hitler's orders and hitler's already open forays into international intrigue war was going to come soon; 5 year development curves were a non starter when germany's rapid rearming advantage would expire by 1941 at the lastest (which the old quartermaster in wever would have known objectively in understanding weapon cycles)

Hitler also promised to avoid war until 1942, which would mean that hundreds of He177s would be ready. Plus Wever lived long enough to see the Allies back down over the Rhein remilitarization thanks to the bluff over airpower, so I'm not entirely convinced that Wever would be aware of the danger of the 5 year development cycle.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

When you say fuel, is this coal or oil?

Oil and derivative fuels.

Coal was another issue. The UK needed 2 million tons yearly to be imported, but with the rail difficulties and the reduction in coastal shipping, it was harder to get domestically produced coal to where it needed to be. London was a big problem if the Thames was shut down. Its tram system was powered by coal, which, if it couldn't be brought in via coastal convoy, then would need to be brought in by rail. There was too much needed in London besides coal for electricity for trams, so it becomes that much harder to get workers to work. Not only that, but the population will require more evacuations and perhaps workers being relocated within London to account for the lack of tram service.

And if those 2 million tons of coal don't get imported...winter is going to be very hard for poor families.

In WW1, we are talking 3.5 million tons per month, so a 50% reduction will mean losing 1.8 million tons per month. The UK will not starve at these levels, but it will be a hungry winter, and productive of hungry men plummets. Say you go from 3400 calories per day to 1700. It is not starvation, but you can't do a hard 12 hour day. It will have interesting impact on morale and politics, but the UK will stay in the war.

Losing the other 50% of raw materials will collapse the UK economy. While the will do heroic things to try to keep the factories running, I don't see how you have less than 25% reduction in war materials produced each month. The UK will have to start cancelling/delaying major war projects. Some candidates.

1) Any non escort ships not within 6 months of being finished.

2) Merchant ships. If you have too few ports ,the UK now has a surplus of ships.

3) Major weapons systems not expect to be available for 2 years or more.

4) Tube Alloy. This might be huge, not sure how much it delays the bomb.

5) Also, they might be looking at shipping machine tools to Canada. Literally moving entire factories. Or as in point 3, move the project to Canada.

6) Exporting non-essential civilians, more than OTL.

This will not kill the UK. It may not even delay D-Day, but something major is derailed for the Western Allies.

Fuel shortages are bad for Britain. It means the navy doesn't have enough for its oil fueled warships (merchant ships used coal) and the air force doesn't have enough for training or patrols. Daylight raids over the UK from a grounded RAF is bad news. Coastal Command lacking fuel for patrols is bad news. Britain could end up being bombed into submission, especially if food isn't getting in. Submission being in this case forcing them to negotiate and accept an unfavorable peace deal.

 

[BlairWitch749]

Comrade Wiking,

The Kurkowski books is a real page turner with tremendously detailed descriptions of he-111 operation, ju-88, fw-190, me-109 and me-110 night fighter ops; all first hand and operational stuff from some of the best pilots who ever flew

this is the amazon to below's book http://www.amazon.com/At-Hitlers-Side-Luftwaffe-Adjutant/dp/1853674680 you have to hold your nose because Below is a liar and an unapologetic nazi but he was a bit more introspective on wever than kesselring, and belows book translated well into english

regarding the calais field... the havighorst bio talks about his HE-111 being based at brest; and his takeoffs from there are real nailbiters (having to use manual take off assist rockets due to the french runways being too short for them to take off with full war load) and his having squadron mates have accidents at take off or having to turn back due to botched take offs; i get the feeling from different sources that the fields all sucked until 1941 when they got less congested; havighorst gives testimony about his crew training being radically cut short due to crew losses during sickle cut and case red which you can extrapolate throughout the force as his story was the rule as opposed to the exception

your development curve is logical provided the project doesn't get sidelined by the start of the war... the comparison to the b-17 is a bit off... if you look at the DO-19 and say the Short Stirling, they look like distant cousins.

i actually think even if the DO-19 postpones the heinkel a year it would be worth it if you could get 100-150 of them by bob; 50 for naval recon/uboat co-op 100 for bombing; upengined and armored they would still be able to hold their own against 1940 british fighters and the somewhat earlier development (sucking up the wings and cock pit being terrible with only minor modifcation to the tail in the production models; and single machine gun turrets/mounts instead of the heavy useless double cannon mounts)

this lets germany work out the kinks of training people on the thing, and building runways for it in peacetime which is so invaluable as to be worth flying an inferior machine to start; and when the HE comes online, the crews can just swap over and already be certified on 4 engines with some experience and be able to get the most out of their experience

i realize the bombload isn't as good but you have to keep in mind that the DO and the ural bomber spec as a whole called for extremely lengthy penetrations of hostile enemy territory having to fight all the way in and out of the target, as opposed to the expected long over water flights followed by short quick bomb runs expected for the American and British bombers of the period; and that bombload can be increased in follow up models with more powerful engines

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Ju89

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

Junkers completed the second Ju 89 prototype D-ALAT July 1937. Junkers used both prototypes for extensive flight tests to get experiences about the stability and flight controls of large aircraft. But the third prototype V3 was stopped after the program was cancelled.
On 4 June 1938, Junkers achieved a new Payload/Altitude World Record with the second prototype D-ALAT with 5,000 kg (11,000 lb) payload at an altitude of 9,312 m (30,500 ft). (4,000 m/13,120 ft more than a Short Stirling with the same payload) On 8 June 1938, D-ALAT reached an altitude of 7,242 m (23,750 ft) with 10,000 kg (22,000 lb). In late 1938, both aircraft were transferred to Luftwaffe, where they were used as heavy transport aircraft.

Performance
Maximum speed: 386 km/h (241 mph)
Range: 2,980 km (1,862 mi)
Service ceiling: 7,000 m (22,960 ft)
Wing loading: 11.2 kg/m² (25.4 lb/ft²)
Power/mass: 0.06 hp/lb ()

Specifications (Ju 89 V2)
Powerplant: 4 × Daimler-Benz DB 600A, 560 kW (750 hp) each

I think that HP is too low for the DB600A. IIRC it was 1000hp, but correct me if I'm wrong.

http://www.simviation.com/fsdcbaindo19.htm

Dornier 19
Technical Data
Powerplant: Four 533-kW (715hp) Brano 332H-2 radial piston engines
Performance:
Maximum Speed (at Sea Level): 196 mph (315 kph)
Cruising Speed: 155 mph (250 kph)
Range: 1600km (994 miles)
Initial Climb: N/A
Endurance: N/A
Service Ceiling: 18,370 ft. (5600 km)

Also the 715 HP here is only for take off and after that it was about 600HP. Agains correct me if I'm wrong.

Still that makes the Ju89 seem much more viable despite its lower power to weight ratio. Its payload capacity in the 1938 test is also enormous for its design.

 

[von hitchofen]

despite the tons of ordnance dropped on Berlin, AFAIK a large firestorm never took hold there as the cityscape is/was too dispersed

London is in a very similar, which why firestorm effects were experienced in the ancient parts of London [the City - small streets, buildings close together]

even if the whole of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 were put over London to Blitz it, the damage would more widespread but less concentrated

also nearly all the Bf109s in use at the time were unable carry bombs and would not be able til mid-1941 at least

not enough E-7s to go around

neither Hitler nor Goring would happy risking their entire bomber force just to wreck London, not while looking over their shoulder at the USSR...

 

[von hitchofen]

So assuming a Wever lives TL, preferably with a Goering dies component like I'm planning in my eventual TL on this subject, the LW will get a small number of HE177s operational over Britain at night by October. That's with its 6 ton internal bomb load and as much as 7 tons if external bombs are added. In 1940!.

Nice idea, but like the concrete airliner, it won't fly...it took 4 years to get the He177 to be a working weapon system and not a flying death trap

gallons of liquid handwavium required to get the DB606s to work

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Engine_difficulties

or make enough engines for the Heinkel He274/277

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_277

or the Junkers Ju488
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_488

and there is no reason to suggest that the Wever Do19 would any better than the FW200 or the Ju90 as a strategic bomber - i.e. not at all

you can prove anything with statistics, but in the time it took the Nazis to build 1,169 He177s and 1 Me264 "Amerika-Bomber"...

the US built 18,188 Liberators, 11,000+ Fortresses & 3,970 Superforts

the Brits and Canadians built 7,366 Lancasters, 6,176 Halifaxes and 2,371 Stirlings

the industrial base just wasn't available in Germany for a four-engined Blitz

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Nice idea, but like the concrete airliner, it won't fly...it took 4 years to get the He177 to be a working weapon system and not a flying death trap

gallons of liquid handwavium required to get the DB606s to work

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Engine_difficulties

or make enough engines for the Heinkel He274/277

Except I didn't say that it would use the DB606s. In fact I explicitly stated it wouldn't; instead it would use 4 propellors with either Jumo 211s or DB601s.

Without the dive bombing requirement for the bomber, it wouldn't have the 2 propellors and welded engines. So no death trap.

and there is no reason to suggest that the Wever Do19 would any better than the FW200 or the Ju90 as a strategic bomber - i.e. not at all

Neither were used as strategic bombers, nor were either designed as such.
The FW200 was an airliner turned into a reconnaissance aircraft. The Ju90 was a transport aircraft.

A Do19 would be designed from the beginning as a strategic bomber, unlike the other two types that were never even used in that role.

you can prove anything with statistics, but in the time it took the Nazis to build 1,169 He177s and 1 Me264 "Amerika-Bomber"...

the US built 18,188 Liberators, 11,000+ Fortresses & 3,970 Superforts

the Brits and Canadians built 7,366 Lancasters, 6,176 Halifaxes and 2,371 Stirlings

the industrial base just wasn't available in Germany for a four-engined Blitz

Of course you haven't read anything about the massive mismanagement of the German aviation industry. It could not have built as many as the US, but then literally no one could, even the USSR with a larger population than the US and a larger resource base.

Of course in your statistics you leave out the other bombers that were built by Germany: 15,000 Ju88's, 6,500 He111s, 2,100 Do17s, 2,000 Do217s, 6,500 Ju87s, 1,600 Me110s, 1,200 Me410s, 1,234 Ju188s, 865 Hs129s etc.
Plus there were the massive problems with the ME210 which cost Germany at least, but probably more than 2,000 aircraft from 1939-1942.

One of Germany's problems lay with the multitude of various types of aircraft that she did build. Of course the dispersal of production starting from pre-war policies to avoid bombing that only increased during the war seriously affected production.

http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwaffe-German-Aviation-Industry/dp/0786465212

http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa...1340465707&sr=1-2&keywords=luftwaffe+industry

R. J. Overy, 'German Aircraft Production 1939–1942: A Study in German War Economy' (Cambridge, Ph.D. 1978)

All of these books focus on different periods, from before the war to the finals years of it.

The short answer is that Germany very much did have the resources and industrial base, but managerial incompetence by Goering really resulted in far too low of production than what should have been.

For instance Germany had roughly double the manpower and resources (raw and industrial) dedicated to aircraft production in 1940, yet the British outproduced them in aircraft. Part of the reason was that the British were focused on producing mostly single engine fighters, while Germany was focused on multi-engine bombers, but still, given double the resources committed Germany should have produced nearly 20,000 or more aircraft in 1940 instead of the 11000 they did OTL.

 

[von hitchofen]

Except I didn't say that it would use the DB606s. In fact I explicitly stated it wouldn't; instead it would use 4 propellors with either Jumo 211s or DB601s. Neither were used as strategic bombers, nor were either designed as such.

sounds good, if only for the other Luftwaffe a/c left without motive power - German aero engines was badly mismanaged, with demand always outstripping supply

A Do19 would be designed from the beginning as a strategic bomber, unlike the other two types that were never even used in that role.

yes, a flimsy and underpowered one, with a bombload not much bigger than a Ju 88s

its possible success would rely on a more organised Nazi aero industry

the Do19 would not amount to much, and even counterfactual authors like Mike Sprick

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Luftwaffe-V...611X/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1340490766&sr=8-2

choose to pin their hopes on a undesigned, imaginary "Do219"

Of course you haven't read anything about the massive mismanagement of the German aviation industry. It could not have built as many as the US, but then literally no one could, even the USSR with a larger population than the US and a larger resource base..

Haven't I?

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Luftwaffe-V...611X/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1340490766&sr=8-2

good book

there's also this if you want something to get your teeth into

http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Wages-D...3480/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1340491020&sr=8-1

and this of course

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Luftwaffe-1...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491100&sr=1-1

too much has to go right, and only little to wrong to make a four-engined blitz work, especially in 1940

you only need to look at the development history of the Me210 and He177 to find that out...

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Heinkel-He1...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491361&sr=1-1

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Messerschmi...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491529&sr=1-1

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Messerschmi...=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491529&sr=1-2

 

[Just Leo]

I think that HP is too low for the DB600A. IIRC it was 1000hp, but correct me if I'm wrong.


Also the 715 HP here is only for take off and after that it was about 600HP. Agains correct me if I'm wrong.

.[/QUOTE]

The DB-600A production engine was cited as 1,000 hp, or so, but pre-production engines would probably produce less.

The BMW/Bramo Fafnir 323 engine produced more horsepower at 10,000 ft (1,000 hp).

Quoting engine performance can be as tricky and deceptive as quoting aircraft performance.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

sounds good, if only for the other Luftwaffe a/c left without motive power - German aero engines was badly mismanaged, with demand always outstripping supply

One of the benefits of the death of Goering would be to allow Milch to sink his teeth into the aero-engine industry.
Historically he wasn't allowed to before he as sidelined and Udet mismanaged everything.

I agree that in a TL having Goering alive and in charge of the economy, even with Wever living, the engine problem would be a serious problem.

yes, a flimsy and underpowered one, with a bombload not much bigger than a Ju 88s

its possible success would rely on a more organised Nazi aero industry

the Do19 would not amount to much, and even counterfactual authors like Mike Sprick

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Luftwaffe-V...611X/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1340490766&sr=8-2

choose to pin their hopes on a undesigned, imaginary "Do219"

Spick's work is...terrible. Again the scenario I described involving a Do19 would involve Goering dying instead of Wever, which would result in a much better managed aero- and aero-engine industry, plus the economy as a whole would get a more competent administrator in Fritz Todt, who was actually Hitler's second choice after Goering to manage the 4 year program and pretty much the entire economy.

As to the Do19...the original design was not good and required modification. Part of the problem though was also the engines, which were capable of only 600hp. Total the Do19 prototype had as much power as the Ju88 in 1940 despite being 2.5x as heavy. Adding better engines improved its performance dramatically. Still, being first flown in 1936 it had time to be modified and enter production in 1939-1940 with major modifications that would improve its performance dramatically.

good book

there's also this if you want something to get your teeth into

http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Wages-D...3480/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1340491020&sr=8-1

I have it and read it throughly, plus his economic articles on WW2. I've read the criticisms of that work too and find it somewhat flawed.
I've also read Overy's work on the same subject and found it to be more informative, as was the Bundeswehr's historical research department's 13 volume series about the German war effort. Lutz Budrass also has an excellent article about the armaments miracle from 1942 and its roots in pre- and early-war investments.
Budrass also has an outstanding, massive book on the German aero-industry in German and also answers emails.

Long story short "Wages" is far from the end all of the German war economy, especially in reference to the aviation industry.

and this of course

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Luftwaffe-1...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491100&sr=1-1

An interesting work that is a start, but still a dated book that has been superseded by more modern research.

too much has to go right, and only little to wrong to make a four-engined blitz work, especially in 1940

you only need to look at the development history of the Me210 and He177 to find that out...

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Heinkel-He1...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491361&sr=1-1

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Messerschmi...=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491529&sr=1-1

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Messerschmi...=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1340491529&sr=1-2

I agree that some things have to go right, but in both cases the problem with those aircraft stemmed from adding a dive bombing requirement to designs that were originally not meant to handle them. The modifications were crap and compromised the designs.

With Wever surviving Goering is not able to replace Wimmer in the technical department, Richthofen doesn't leave the development section to escape Udet, Loeb isn't transferred to the 4 year program, and Udet doesn't come in and reorganize the technical department, leaving it in chaos and doesn't get control over production from Milch. Udet also doesn't therefore get to order all the new designs add a dive bomb requirement and compromise the designs, causing all sorts of problems that his disorganized technical department cannot solve due to fragmented responsibilities and an ignorant, absent chief. Even with Goering living, so long as Wever is alive the ME210 and HE177 programs wouldn't be the messes they were IOTL.

So yeah, I'd say you should check out the specifics of what was going on organizationally in the books I recommended before you start dropping in examples of things I've dealt with and resolved in earlier posts in this thread.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The DB-600A production engine was cited as 1,000 hp, or so, but pre-production engines would probably produce less.

The DB600A was already in series production by 1937, so it would not have been a pre-production model.

The BMW/Bramo Fafnir 323 engine produced more horsepower at 10,000 ft (1,000 hp).

Quoting engine performance can be as tricky and deceptive as quoting aircraft performance.

Quoting Wikipedia can be tricky some times!

 

[BlairWitch749]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

I think that HP is too low for the DB600A. IIRC it was 1000hp, but correct me if I'm wrong.

http://www.simviation.com/fsdcbaindo19.htm

Also the 715 HP here is only for take off and after that it was about 600HP. Agains correct me if I'm wrong.

Still that makes the Ju89 seem much more viable despite its lower power to weight ratio. Its payload capacity in the 1938 test is also enormous for its design.

The JU-89 was better; however it's weight was MUCH MUCH MUCH higher and it cost a shitload more; this is one of the proper parts of Spick's analysis in selecting the DO-19; the inferior performance of the DO-19 in terms of speed, altitude and service ceiling would be made up for with better engines (payload of course not due to layout although the bomb bay in a redesign could be made bulged)

And having the aircraft cost less and weigh less is a good hedge against possible cancelation or postponement

 

[von hitchofen]

Spick's work is...terrible.

Yeah, it is

As to the Do19...the original design was not good and required modification. Part of the problem though was also the engines, which were capable of only 600hp. Total the Do19 prototype had as much power as the Ju88 in 1940 despite being 2.5x as heavy. Adding better engines improved its performance dramatically. Still, being first flown in 1936 it had time to be modified and enter production in 1939-1940 with major modifications that would improve its performance dramatically.

sounds plausible, but highly improbable

Bundeswehr's historical research department's 13 volume series about the German war effort. Lutz Budrass also has an excellent article about the armaments miracle from 1942 and its roots in pre- and early-war investments..

13 volumes eh, I think I'll wait History Channel documentary

Do19 would involve Goering dying instead of Wever, which would result in a much better managed aero- and aero-engine industry, plus the economy as a whole would get a more competent administrator in Fritz Todt, who was actually Hitler's second choice after Goering to manage the 4 year program and pretty much the entire economy. With Wever surviving Goering is not able to replace Wimmer in the technical department, Richthofen doesn't leave the development section to escape Udet, Loeb isn't transferred to the 4 year program, and Udet doesn't come in and reorganize the technical department, leaving it in chaos and doesn't get control over production from Milch. Udet also doesn't therefore get to order all the new designs add a dive bomb requirement and compromise the designs, causing all sorts of problems that his disorganized technical department cannot solve due to fragmented responsibilities and an ignorant, absent chief. Even with Goering living, so long as Wever is alive the ME210 and HE177 programs wouldn't be the messes they were IOTL.

fascinating spider-web of "what ifs" there... very ornate

Bring on the Nazi viermots then - nice, big fat juicy targets for Beaufighters, Defiants, Havocs, et al....and a good way of burning up the Luftwaffe's aircrew [literally]

the RAF can have a Wolfgang Schnaufer-, or "Tino" Becker- equivalent in its ranks

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Bring on the Nazi viermots then - nice, big fat juicy targets for Beaufighters, Defiants, Havocs, et al....and a good way of burning up the Luftwaffe's aircrew [literally]

Historically at night the British fighters did a terrible job of shooting down German bombers. Even in May 1941 when the Blitz was called off the loss rate was still around 1% per mission, lower than when Bomber Command was over Germany in 1941.

Note too that I'm only suggesting they are used as a component of the night bombing campaign over Britain, not during the day. If you will go back to my first post where I mentioned the Do19 you'll see that I've only ever suggested that said bomber is used at night. During the day it would get slaughtered when the Hispano cannon appears, but not before when British fighters still were using rifle caliber machine guns. The British two engine fighters would be targets for the Luftwaffe every bit as much as the Bf110 was to the RAF.