Oh so true, but i do think that esp biological/chem warfare at this point would trigger the self-preservation responses, its just too suicidal.
Oh so true, but i do think that esp biological/chem warfare at this point would trigger the self-preservation responses, its just too suicidal.
Snake Featherston
Banned
Well, there's the gassing of Allied troops in Bari by mustard gas prepared for possible use in Sicily, covered up for decades by Allied governments.....and which led to no German counterattack even though they evidently knew it was mustard gas.
BlondieBC
Banned
Well, since he is working on an ATL, I thought I would throw some dumb decisions to consider. In many wars, at least 5% of the decisions are real "head-scratchers", or "what they hell were they thinking" type decisions. I thought about in my TL using a D20 on any decisions, and if I got a 20, just do something bizarre, and if I got an 18 or 19, do something dumb. It would make a much more realistic TL, but I would have had to deal with too many compliants for a first TL.
I put in some forced dumb decisions, but overall, there should be 2 or 3 times more mistakes. Just imagine you went to an ATL where Hitler died in WW1 to a bullet, and tried to pitch OTL as a book. Or go back to 1910 IOTL, and pitch WW1 as a book. No one would believe it.
Deleted member 1487
I like the idea of using a die to check things for stupidity, but frankly there are so many things in WW2 that seem like stupid decisions, but when you did deeper into the whys of things, there is a twisted logic. Take for example what you mentioned in a previous post about Hitler invading the Soviet Union while at war with Britain.
Hitler did have a logic to invading the Soviets:
-he didn't think his forces had enough resources to fight the Brits in a long war, which he felt that any war with Britain would end up being, and leave the Soviets at his back in the long term, because they were becoming increasingly aggressive
-he thought the Soviets were getting ready to attack him, might as well be first
-he thought the Soviets wouldn't last beyond the initial onslaught for ideological reasons, i.e. Slavs were 'inferior' and communism was so unpopular that the regime would collapse with the early German victories.
Note that more countries than just Germany thought this.
The point is that there is a (messed up) logic to many/most things that appear shear stupidity in history.
BlondieBC
Banned
True, there is often are mistaken assumptions, twisted logic, and delusional rationalization behind the decisions, but it is very hard to get the write flow without some kind of help. A lot of TLs end up being only ok to good decisions. For example, I enjoyed your Conrad turns east TL, but Conrad made an epic blunder every other year, so it you extend the TL, it is about time for Conrad to make the mistake that cost 500K + needless prisoner of war.
Hitler is even worse, being a classic risk seeking personality type. As soon as you get far enough into the TL so that you are not modifying battles, but writing campaigns from scratch, you run the risk of having Germany win battles more from Hitler not making bizarre decisions compared to the original POD.
Take OTL. If one was writing the OTL, but only had the information through the end of 1941, one would tend to miss Hitler mistakes - How the Panzer Army used in 1942, not retreating from Stalingrad, not canceling Kursk, Battle of bulge, etc. You need some mechanism to insure that Hitler still makes the mistakes at a reasonable rate.
Deleted member 1487
Not necessarily. Once a certain critical mass is reached, it becomes very hard for Conrad to screw up. I'm at that point in that TL. At some point the AH army just becomes too experiences both with its commanders and ranks and file to really fall victim to the mistakes of Conrad.
OTL the AH army was just so worn down that it become 'error' prone even in situations it should not have, had the pre-war army still been around. Now that doesn't mean the AH army won't take massive casualties, actually I'm at that point in TTL, but the huge cock ups are behind the capabilities of the AH army.
The more I read about how decisions were made by Hitler, the more I realize that he was really misled/outright deceived by Goering and his yes-men. That is certainly Hitler's fault for surrounding himself by those types of people, mainly to solidify his political power, plus dismissing intelligence that even the yes-men brought him when inconvenient, but its not entirely his fault for making bad decisions based on bad information.
Prime examples are going to war in 1939 based on Goering's claims about the Luftwaffe's readiness and the advanced state of the German economy's preparations. Neither was true and Hitler went to war on this advice. Yes, he made a bad decision about the seriousness of the Allies to declare war, but he wouldn't have risked it with knowledge of the state of German military preparations.
Stalingrad is another example of Hitler making a decision based on Goering's unsubstantiated boasts. There is some truth to Hitler's complaints about being lied to by his advisors.
So when writing a TL about different situations from scratch, you need to take into account who is actually surrounding Hitler and what information he is being fed.
Say with better people managing the German economy/military, but with a guy like Bormann regulating access to Hitler and what information he received, its still conceivable that Hitler will take gambles based on that limited/bad information.
I'm of the view that Hitler would not have taken as many risks (still he will take many) with better information about the reality of the German preparations/capabilities. Much of the 'blame Hitler' paradigm was set by generals trying to save their reputation for posterity. They aren't totally or probably even mostly wrong to blame Hitler for most things, but I think they also are able to hide their mistakes, because they write the history of what was said by whom when.
It depends on whether one factors in all of the disfunction going on in the inner circle of the Nazi state and Hitler's increasing drug use through his doctor. If one really had all the information about the dynamics and deteriorating relationships with Hitler and the general staff, plus the bad decisions leading to the rout at the end of the years, plus the death of Fritz Todt, perhaps via assassination, and I think the ugly end was increasingly obvious, especially with the US entering the war. Now the exact progression could not be projected, but something along the lines leading up to the end would be somewhat predictable by a well researched AH writer.
BlondieBC
Banned
I see where you are coming from, and we just see a different progression of the man. I also see a man who reputation was harmed by post war writers trying to save their reputation. I believe a lot of Hitler early success was due to charisma, high intelligence, and a gamblers instinct. The horribly dangerous game he played to rise to the top of the Nazi party and not be assassinated or side line is a testament to his skills. But he was also a speed user though his doctor and after having seen some of the footage of his uncontrollable shakes in 1944, he was clearly a very ill man. While it i cannot be proved, I believe if you did an autopsy of his body in 1945 using today's techniques you would find a man with brain damage and some neurological illness - Parkinson disease, syphillus, strokes, etc.
To me, Hitler exceptionally talented performance between 1930 and 1940 despite the chaos that was the Nazi movement indicates combined with his extremely poor decision making after 1941 is strong illness of a disease being responsible.
And each author has to write his TL based on his analysis of history.
Good luck on it.
Deleted member 1487
Thanks!
I do have to disagree about the illness part. I honestly think it is just hearsay and based on people trying to get name recognition. Ultimately his shakes and 'unwellness' could easily and completely be explained by his drug use. Its no secret that he thought amphetamines were a miracle drug and it was liberally used throughout just about all militaries of the time, without the knowledge of its very negative health effects, just as many medications are legalized without full knowledge of their side effects even today.
Thats said Hitler had some natural intellectual aptitude, but was very lazy. He also trusted too much in his own intellect because of his success/survival; he was a victim of his own myth. So very much of his rise and survival were based totally on luck and very very little on his skill, at least his own skill, as Goering played a vital part in Hitler's rise and survival. Also the disorganization of the Nazi was part of Hitler's poor leadership skills (he hated making decisions, putting them off until it was too late), ideology (survival of the fittest even in bureaucracy and of course the führerprinzip), and design to ensure his political survival. It was not just him though, as Goering was a huge part of the malign influence on just about everything, but even this was a fault of Hitler's poor ability to judge the character of his subordinates and a function of his laziness that he passed off critical parts of his agenda to subordinates with no oversight whatsoever.
Much of this really comes through in Richard Overy's "Goering: Hitler's Iron Knight", which totally changed my perception of what was going on in the Nazi leadership throughout the 1930's and 40's.
The "Germany and the Second World War" series by the Bundeswehr's historical research office really then adds a whole new layer to the issues of Nazi leadership and rise to power, which really make it clear how little respect Hitler deserves, but also how much he let himself be deceived by Goering.
Its almost as if Hitler's totally ASB rise to power were preordained, given the ridiculous series of events that led to his rise to power, survival in power, let him launch WW2, and then the massive string of successes in the early years of the war.
Hang on, the US and Mexico went to war over a 21 gun salute? What the hell was that all about?
It arose out of an incident during the Mexican Revolution in 1914, the Tampico Affair, where due to a misunderstanding, 9 US sailors from a gunboat anchored in the harbor to look after US interests making a supply run ashore were arrested by forces loyal to Huerta after they got too close to the front lines in their engagement with the forces of Carranza. The US commander in the area sent several warships to demand the release of the sailors & a formal apology, & the local commander of Huerta's forces released the sailors & made a written apology but didn't raise a US flag over Vera Cruz & fire a 21-gun salute to the US flag. Incensed by this 'incomplete apology', the US Naval commander asked & got permission from President Wilson to use the 'insult' to the American flag as a pretext to occupy Vera Cruz (the underlying policy goal of Wilson's being to seize an opportunity to take control of the port so that it would be possible to enforce an arms embargo the US had placed on Huerta & interdict several arms shipments from Germany.)
To accomplish this, substantial elements of the Atlantic Fleet (including 2 dreadnoughts) as well as a significant part of the available Marine expeditionary forces available (reinforced by sailors & the ships' Marine detachments) deployed to & occupied Vera Cruz for several months, & though both Huerta & Carranza were opposed to the occupation, neither had the military means to resist it because of the ongoing civil war, & eventually, the incident was submitted to mediation by Argentina, Brazil, & Chile, where an agreement that Huerta would give up power favor of Carranza (who would only hold power briefly before stepping aside for a moment due to factional infighting) & the US would withdraw.
Last edited:
Deleted member 1487
Hang on, the US and Mexico went to war over a 21 gun salute? What the hell was that all about?
The US and Britain went to war over a pig:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig_War
BlairWitch749
Banned
I get the feeling that Germany couldn't generate the sorties to do this in 1940 and such activity would have to take place in 1941 (with that big war with russia looming)
The Germans launched some 80K plus sorties during sickle cut and case red which cost them over 3000 aircrew of whom they only got back 400 from France as POW's. Servicability even into mid july after 4 weeks to get on their feet (albeit they had to move their forces to the channel and build/rebuild air bases there) was still hovering below 50 percent and the pilots were exhausted as were their ground sections
IMO the LW as it was consitituted with it's poor equipment and pilot replacement streams was too worn out from France to launch another decisive campaign in the same year; plus they desperately needed to reform after France and modify their kit a bit
Postponing the decisive assault till 41 has some advantages (evening port attacks could still be done in 40) without such mega attrition and stress of the BOB, the HE-111 could be completely phased out and replaced with JU-88s (with the 111's reverted to training) and the FW-190 could start entering squadron service), the airfields in northern france could be developed beyond flat grass, and larger bombs could be tested and deployed to make the sorties more worth while
So say starting in the spring, they could launch massive, almost exclusively dusk (escorted by 190's) and evening attacks to create fire storms and be prepared to maintain a high sortie tempo and press the bombing home
Night fighting was still largely a joke in 41; and the LW wouldn't have the drain on lost pilots they experienced in the BOB
however, given the LW's unbroken string of success up until the BOB this would require asb amounts of foresite
The Germans launched some 80K plus sorties during sickle cut and case red which cost them over 3000 aircrew of whom they only got back 400 from France as POW's. Servicability even into mid july after 4 weeks to get on their feet (albeit they had to move their forces to the channel and build/rebuild air bases there) was still hovering below 50 percent and the pilots were exhausted as were their ground sections
IMO the LW as it was consitituted with it's poor equipment and pilot replacement streams was too worn out from France to launch another decisive campaign in the same year; plus they desperately needed to reform after France and modify their kit a bit
Postponing the decisive assault till 41 has some advantages (evening port attacks could still be done in 40) without such mega attrition and stress of the BOB, the HE-111 could be completely phased out and replaced with JU-88s (with the 111's reverted to training) and the FW-190 could start entering squadron service), the airfields in northern france could be developed beyond flat grass, and larger bombs could be tested and deployed to make the sorties more worth while
So say starting in the spring, they could launch massive, almost exclusively dusk (escorted by 190's) and evening attacks to create fire storms and be prepared to maintain a high sortie tempo and press the bombing home
Night fighting was still largely a joke in 41; and the LW wouldn't have the drain on lost pilots they experienced in the BOB
however, given the LW's unbroken string of success up until the BOB this would require asb amounts of foresite
Deleted member 1487
A night campaign against Britain from August 1940 on, skipping the BoB entirely, would save tremendous numbers of aircrews and still allow the Luftwaffe massive numbers of sortees with comparable destruction to OTL.
Note that your numbers reflected less than two weeks of recovery, for in mid-July the Luftwaffe had only stopped bombing France in late June early July. They never stopped bombing Britain though; the campaigns somewhat seamlessly blending into one another. Bombing of Britain started in earnest in June 1940 before France surrendered.
Nevertheless by August 1940 serviceability had risen to 60% and increased to a high of over 65%, hovering around there for most of the rest of 1940.
Still, there is little reason to wait beyond August to start the night assault. Its obvious that Sealion was never serious, though Hitler's sycophants tried to push it to curry favor, even as Hitler himself was only luke warm on the subject.
I think you are wrong to assume that ASB foresight is necessary to generate a serious plan to bomb Britain by night. Just a quick analysis of the losses over France and the attrition suffered by the LW up to July is enough to determine that the LW was incapable of beating the RAF in daylight. Dunkirk demonstrated the ability of the RAF to contest airspace. Not only that but the logistic issues associated with displacing the LW forward into France quickly and the serious need to rest for the LW pretty much demonstrates to any competent leader the need to take an alternate approach, which the LW had developed prior to the war with their radio navigation systems and their specialist nightbomber gruppen (KG100), which were terribly misused as naval bombers in Norway from April to about September!
The problem was the leadership; Felmy, who actually was tasked with developing a strategy against Britain in 1938 was dismissed in 1940 over the Mechelen incident that he was not associated with, just so Goering could say he 'did something'. Also he report was dismissed as 'too pessimistic'. LW intelligence, with Goering's personal sycophant Josef Schmid at the helm, produced a similar strategy only to see it dismissed by Goering.
Goering went along with whatever the vacillating Hitler suggested, while Jeschonnek was in awe of both men and did whatever they wanted. It was a metaphorical perfect storm of the lack of foresight and planning with only ideology and terrible gambling ruling the thought processes of the leadership.
Had a better commander been around, say Wever, there is little reason to see why he wouldn't have adopted, proposed, and pushed such a strategy as Felmy and the Intelligence section produced. Especially as he was a proponent of strategic warfare as a component of LW doctrine.
Wever
And if we are going as far to suggest Wever remains around, we can also propose that guys like Schmid aren't in the Intelligence section, which raises the quality of the work produced by a wide margin, but also the the HE177 is ready on schedule in late 1940, produced as a 4 propellor strategic bomber as originally conceived thanks to Udet not being in the technical department to push for dive bombing with all bombers. This would also mean the Ju88 is ready 6 months earlier and is faster than the OTL version, but cannot dive bomb. That means more Ju88s in 1939 and 1940, especially as the production difficulties that plagued the diving Ju88 wouldn't result in TTL's model. We also avoid the ME210 problem without Udet too, so starting from 1939 when IOTL the tooling up for that model began, the LW doesn't spend the resources on it and lose so much time, resources, and lost bombers. By 1942, when it was finally cancelled, that equals, in conservative estimates, about 2000 more bombers for the LW from 1939-1941.
So assuming a Wever lives TL, preferably with a Goering dies component like I'm planning in my eventual TL on this subject, the LW will get a small number of HE177s operational over Britain at night by October. That's with its 6 ton internal bomb load and as much as 7 tons if external bombs are added. In 1940!
Plus it gets faster, cheaper, heavier bomb load Ju88s earlier and in greater numbers thanks to entering mass production before the war without the divebombing problems.
And it avoids the ME210 problems, meaning 2000+ more bombers from 1939-1941.
Plus with Wever there is very likely an expansion of the pilot training program and a rotation of experienced pilots to training facilities, unlike the 'pillage everything for a quick victory gamble' Jeschonnek.
Add all of that together and the LW gets a pretty good shot at a successful night bombing campaign from August on.
Added info about what could have been achieved in OTL without the BoB
Edit:
Even without the benefits of Wever surviving and just the OTL strength post Fall of France, if the Luftwaffe avoids the Battle of Britain and turns straight to a night bombing campaign starting in early-mid August after a rest, its strength would actually increase over the rest of 1940. With a loss rate of ~1% from their night campaign IOTL, the LW was expanding at a faster rate and could actually have more bombers in the air in December than in August. British night defenses were terrible even in May 1941 as the campaign was broken off to fight Russia, though even in early 1941 an entire air fleet, the 2nd air fleet, was removed from the bombing campaign, decreasing LW bomber strength and increasing the ratio of British nightfighters to German nightbombers, yet still lose rates never broke even 2%, which still let the LW expand their numbers.
The problem was the Battle of Britain IOTL (daylight campaign from July-October), as it resulted in ~1800 aircraft (fighters AND bombers) being destroyed with several hundred more being damaged. This was after ~1300 losses in France (~450 damaged). The lack of the 1800 aircraft lost and 2700 aircrew killed (though some daylight fighting over the English Channel would still result in some losses), the Luftwaffe would have had about 900 more bombers, not including Stukas and Me110.
Another Edit: Luftwaffe bombers strength, not Stukas or Me110s, was 1380 aircraft for bombing Britain in July 1940. Without the losses of the Battle of Britain, which chewed through replacement aircraft horribly, the LW could have increased their bomber strength by at least 600 aircraft during July-October assuming the night bombing had a 1% loss rate like in OTL. So that means about 2000 bombers would be available IOTL without the Battle of Britain! Even with a 60% serviceability rate that is still 1200 bombers operating, which is nearly 1.7x what were actually operating at any one time IOTL over Britain in October 1940 to March 1941. It could be even more than that depending on how many sortees are run.
That's just with OTL.
Assuming the changes with Wever are made then the number of bombers and aircrews goes up even more, approaching 3000+ by October, plus HE177s to drop the really heavy ordnance and carry greater tonnage even farther than what was possible with the OTL aircraft.
Last edited by a moderator:
I think you missed the "almost" part of that. it didn't quite get to actually shooting. Other than the pig of course.
BlairWitch749
Banned
Comrade Wiking,
I know you have a back burner TL developing for this, and I am very interested in the subject; my nitpicking is in part a desire to see something really great be produced
My july numbers reflect almost no recovery, that's the point; even forgetting the displacement problems; the pilots had flown 8 to 10 sorties a day for 8 weeks and were completely exhausted. Exhausted pilots make mistakes
When the LW launched the campaign in earnest in August they hadn't made good their losses, and the bits of infrastructure they had erected in France were not good enough for really high tempo operations (and the lack of proper landing fields increased accident rates which were already high in some of the types flown; they experienced rediculous delays like lack of bombs and ammo due to the airbases not being connected to anything for weeks and months
some port bombing is fine at night starting in september if one is going to reconcile that sealion won't happen. Earlier involves using the crappy infrastructure with tired/depleted flight crews and largely isn't worth it
beepo schmidt was an idiot who failed even basic math and lost academic arguements to even the least thought of toadies in hitler's circle like Ribbentrop eliminating him would be an immense boon to the LW; also having the strategic capacity would indeed help; although IMO if you wait till the 177 uralbomber 2 specs you won't have the thing in squadron service in 1940 the development curve would still be being conquered; upengined DO-19 selected in 36 is the only real answer if you want that force in squadron service in 1940
I don't know that Wever living creates a strategic bombing force. Spick argued it would but his thesis flew in the face of Wever's actual shit canning and stone walling with the DO-19 in the first place. Wever in that regard was dead wrong; the fact that aviation technology had moved forward since the Bomber A spec was submitted didn't make the DO-19 an obsolete design; B-17's flew through 45 and it was conceived many months earlier than the DO-19. Him shitcanning that and starting over with the Heinkel (a bird with plenty of flaws beyond the dive bombing specs) pushed any realistic chance of a 250 bomber force back to late 41 at the earliest which the war situation could have seen cancelled or delayed into oblivion
Pilot training is probably a lot better and more organized
But Wever still holding out and even being in a position of power by 1940 is somewhat dubious. I know Hitler kind of liked him and fatboy HG respected him in the sense that he respected anyone; but the man was abrasive and had limited patience for Milch and a lot of the rest of the inner circle which would see him relieved for defeatism at the moment of the first setback The LW changed chiefs of staff almost constantly and Wever was not untouchable (despite being a devout nazi and having actually read mein kempf which even fatboy HG didn't make time for) even Guderian found himself relieved when the music stopped (twice actually)
I am not disagreeing with the overall track that Wever's continued influence would produce a more balanced for with better regenerative and upgrade capabilities but Wever wasn't anymore infallible than Manstein or Guderian... he was wrong about his approach to the strategic bombers; in hanging out with Hitler as much as he did, he had to know war was coming soon and that continuing to push serial production back would delay the necessary force development (ie training 4 engine crews, developing proper infrastructure, tactics, weapons etc etc etc) which was more important than the actual machines themselves.... the 177 would have been able to deploy faster if the DO-19 was built first and crews were certified on the type in advance; I also am not sure he would have loved the ultimately very useful divergence into the FW-190
I know you have a back burner TL developing for this, and I am very interested in the subject; my nitpicking is in part a desire to see something really great be produced
My july numbers reflect almost no recovery, that's the point; even forgetting the displacement problems; the pilots had flown 8 to 10 sorties a day for 8 weeks and were completely exhausted. Exhausted pilots make mistakes
When the LW launched the campaign in earnest in August they hadn't made good their losses, and the bits of infrastructure they had erected in France were not good enough for really high tempo operations (and the lack of proper landing fields increased accident rates which were already high in some of the types flown; they experienced rediculous delays like lack of bombs and ammo due to the airbases not being connected to anything for weeks and months
some port bombing is fine at night starting in september if one is going to reconcile that sealion won't happen. Earlier involves using the crappy infrastructure with tired/depleted flight crews and largely isn't worth it
beepo schmidt was an idiot who failed even basic math and lost academic arguements to even the least thought of toadies in hitler's circle like Ribbentrop eliminating him would be an immense boon to the LW; also having the strategic capacity would indeed help; although IMO if you wait till the 177 uralbomber 2 specs you won't have the thing in squadron service in 1940 the development curve would still be being conquered; upengined DO-19 selected in 36 is the only real answer if you want that force in squadron service in 1940
I don't know that Wever living creates a strategic bombing force. Spick argued it would but his thesis flew in the face of Wever's actual shit canning and stone walling with the DO-19 in the first place. Wever in that regard was dead wrong; the fact that aviation technology had moved forward since the Bomber A spec was submitted didn't make the DO-19 an obsolete design; B-17's flew through 45 and it was conceived many months earlier than the DO-19. Him shitcanning that and starting over with the Heinkel (a bird with plenty of flaws beyond the dive bombing specs) pushed any realistic chance of a 250 bomber force back to late 41 at the earliest which the war situation could have seen cancelled or delayed into oblivion
Pilot training is probably a lot better and more organized
But Wever still holding out and even being in a position of power by 1940 is somewhat dubious. I know Hitler kind of liked him and fatboy HG respected him in the sense that he respected anyone; but the man was abrasive and had limited patience for Milch and a lot of the rest of the inner circle which would see him relieved for defeatism at the moment of the first setback The LW changed chiefs of staff almost constantly and Wever was not untouchable (despite being a devout nazi and having actually read mein kempf which even fatboy HG didn't make time for) even Guderian found himself relieved when the music stopped (twice actually)
I am not disagreeing with the overall track that Wever's continued influence would produce a more balanced for with better regenerative and upgrade capabilities but Wever wasn't anymore infallible than Manstein or Guderian... he was wrong about his approach to the strategic bombers; in hanging out with Hitler as much as he did, he had to know war was coming soon and that continuing to push serial production back would delay the necessary force development (ie training 4 engine crews, developing proper infrastructure, tactics, weapons etc etc etc) which was more important than the actual machines themselves.... the 177 would have been able to deploy faster if the DO-19 was built first and crews were certified on the type in advance; I also am not sure he would have loved the ultimately very useful divergence into the FW-190
The best part of this was that:
1. No human blood was shed
2. The initial American commander on the Island was none other than Captain George Pickett (yep, of Gettysburg fame)
3 The initial British naval commander, also a captain at the time, wound up Admiral of the Fleet, top commander in the RN.
Deleted member 1487
Much appreciated!
What are your sources for that? I'm always trying to expand my reading list to get to the best and most comprehensive set of data to ensure accuracy.
Yes they were still numerically reduced, but with nearly 1400 bombers the LW still have a major combat element for a serious bombing campaign by night, especially given the lack of British defenses. I'm not arguing for high tempo operations; even 400 bombers every other night over just Liverpool is a huge blow to the British war effort.
What types beside the ME109 had a high accident rate? Again I'd like to get your sources so that I can improve my knowledge. My sources indicate that the LW wasn't as poorly off in the area around Pas-de-Calais in August.
Considering that the LW OTL was launching these attacks against British ports at night in June 1940 suggests that they had the ability to conduct a night air war before September without much problem. In fact looking at the number of day and night sortees IOTL August suggests they could sustain a high tempo of air operations as of August. Factoring out fighter accidents, as the ME109 was very prone to problems with landing and ground looping on take off, especially with inexperienced pilots, the LW bombers weren't having that much of an issue with non-combat accidents. Of course fighters were getting the greatest pressure from July-October in terms of sortees per pilot (heavy need for escorts), but this is irrelevant ITTL if the bomber force is operating at night in planned shifts so that the bomber crews are rested and able to sustain an extended campaign by night.
As of August IOTL most bomber crews had gotten several weeks rest, as the fighters were the ones with most of the action. Many were actually still running missions at night, but during the day in July it was mostly the Stukas and fighters flying. In August it was fighters, Me110's, Stukas, and some bombers, but not nearly as many as the other types, because they required major escorts from the fighters. Quickly the number of bombers in operation at one time, which BTW outnumbered the fighters, became dependent on the number of fighters operational.
I think the problems you are citing mainly affected the fighter, fighter-bomber, and stuka force in August 1939. The bomber force got lots of rest and preparation before the BoB started and were less fatigued overall because few could actually conduct missions at any one time because of the critical need for fighter escort to operate during the day. That is the limited numbers of fighters limited the number of bomber missions. This allowed for much better rotation, as more escorts than bombers were used every mission and there were more bombers and bomber pilots available for operations in July-August 1940. Plus, with this limited force of fighters and pilots, the fighters took more losses in terms of machines than the bombers did. And bomber replacement was better than fighter replacement, because the bomber was an offensive weapon and the LW was an offensive force which sent the most and best pilots to its bomber force. Even looking at production its clear that the bomber force had to majority of production.
People like to cite that the British outbuilt the Germans in terms of aircraft in 1940, but that was because the Germans were building bombers, not masses of fighters like the British at the time. Later the Germans outbuilt the British after the British had turned to build bombers and the Germans fighters.
Yeah, I'm not a big fan of Schmid.
As to the Do 19, it was just a 4 engine Do17 and a bad upgrade at that.
I'm really not convinced at a worthwhile version would have been ready before 1941-2 considering the massive upgrades required to make it serviceable. It would pretty much have to be rebuilt from scratch to make it useful.
The HE177 is pretty much the best you could expect in the time frame.
Assuming it had a bit more oversight when being designed, which it would be if Wimmer wasn't replaced by Udet, the 4 props kept, and no dive bombing added, the HE177 would have entered production in 1940.
The original TL of production would be that the V1 prototype would be delivered in August-September 1938.
It had no basic problems with the design without the dive bombing requirement, which made it require structural strengthening and the wings and tail to be strengthened and expanded during testing.
Without diving it wouldn't need those improvements.
That's why I'm suggesting that by May 1940 the aircraft can enter mass production, even short of the suggested two years of testing usually required to put an aircraft into production. I was not able to find a single issue with the airframe that didn't stem from the changes made by adding the dive requirement. Sure, some things might come up, but really there was nothing major that couldn't be worked out in the abbreviated testing time.
As to time getting a Gruppe or Geschwader ready, considering that the 30 pre-production aircraft ordered would be delivered before the airplane entered into mass production would mean that an Erprobungsgruppe would have time to work out training and tactics, not to mention train ground crews on the aircraft so that the first unit can start training before their aircraft even arrives from the Heinkel Schwechat factory.
Not only that, but the if the prototypes of the Do19 and Ju89 and built and used as demonstrators like Wever intended, tactics and doctrine can already be worked out and the Luftwaffe can gain experience with 4 engine bombers as far as maintenance issues, how they handle in the air, etc. which geschwader or specialist gruppe can form around to try this all out before the He177s become available so that the type isn't unfamiliar and the time to get the unit operational is reduced. About 30-50 aircraft could be ready by October-December 1940 if all preparations are made as early as possible.
No, it doesn't create a strategic force before the war in terms of equipment, but it does help create doctrine and develop critical technologies that allow for its, like increased focus on radio navigation and guidance.
The Do19 was a dead end; the more research I do on it, the less likely it would be a viable machine at all and would require a total redesign, literally every part from the wings, tail, cockpit, and fuselage, which puts Dornier at square one by 1937, which was when the He177 was already designed and starting construction of its prototype if the 4 props are used ITTL.
250 bombers are probably not likely to be operational until mid to late-1941 at the earliest. But even 30-50 ready by November-December adds a critical punch to the bombers operating at night over Britain.
What flaws in the design were there that didn't stem from the dive bombing requirement? The engines, wings, tail, and undercarriage all stemmed from a 2 prop dive bomber being required for the dive bombing addition in 1937. It was the original sin from which all the major problems of the design stemmed.
Undoubtedly. Tactics are probably better for fighters too, as without Goering directly interfering in command issues with Wever living the 'knights of the sky' mentality doesn't take hold and team tactics are the focus over 'experten' that sacrifice their wingmen for a kill.
Where are you reading that Wever was abrasive? I've read everything available about him in English and nothing indicated he was abrasive; rather the total opposite. He was a smooth operator that could work with the most demanding of personalities (he got Milch and Goering to work together!) and had an excellent relationship with Milch, as far as anyone did.
What part of the inner circle did he have limited patience for and what is your source on that?
The LW changed chiefs for the following reasons:
-Stumpf was always meant as an interim appointment
-Kesselring was unable to work with Milch or Udet, which caused him to leave by free will. Wever did not have that problem, as he had Wimmer and had a working relationship with Milch.
-Jeschonnek was the next guy and he committed suicide because of his failures leading up to the Hamburg firestorm
-Korten died in the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944
-Kriepe took over as an interim and was replaced when a better man was found
-Koller was then chief until the end of the war, even after Goering was replaced by Greim.
Yeah, there was a lot of changing, but all for explicable reasons that had little to do with politics (except a bit of internal ones between Milch, Udet, and Kesselring, but Kesselring wasn't suited to the job and knew it).
Jeschonnek kept his job despite his failures and only left it when he killed himself. There really was no reason to think that Wever would get replaced until and unless things went badly.
No, you are right. Wever wasn't infallible, but there was very little I can think of that he got wrong leading up to his death, other than not checking his aerilon locks.
I still don't think the Do19 decision was the wrong one because of the massive flaws of the Do19, which would have required a totally redesigned aircraft that pretty much meant a new development cycle; the HE177 would have been available sooner than the redesigned Do19.
By 1936 there was no indication that war was coming yet. It was only in 1937 with the Hossbach conference more than a year after he died that that would have been revealed. I figure you have the rest right, but the Do19 would cost too many resources and would not have been available as a serious aircraft until 1941. Even with a set of Jumo 211s it would have had less bomb load in its internal bomb bays than the He111! It needed totally new wings, cockpit, fuselage, an improve tail and an enlarged bomb bay. It was just a big version of the Do17. At that point it could have been redesigned after testing in 1937 when it would have gotten 1000hp engines (Bramo 323 Fafnir) in the 3rd prototype, which would take a year and result in another 9-12 months to build another prototype and then 15-24 months of testing, as it would be a totally different aircraft. That pushes its development time back to beyond the He177!
As Milch said, by 1942 it would have been better than the B17; he was right, but it would take until 1942 to reach that point. The HE177 was already as good if not better than the B17 in 1940 and would have been ready to enter production in that same year.
As to the Fw190, who knows.
BlondieBC
Banned
So what do you plan on German fighter command doing? And the Stuka's. If it is only a naval interdiction war and the UK stop using the English Channel, don't you lose most of the naval targets for the Stuka's? One idea would be to transfer several squadrons to Southern Italian bases and try to shut down the merchant traffic in the Med, or even try very heavy air interdiction of Malta.
The more I think about what you are trying to do, you will end up with very heavy butterflies from the deployment changes alone. The UK is much harder pressed for sea borne supplies. The UK will react to this and move units around, cancel operations, etc. The Germans have many idle day planes. They either get heavy training cycles or they are used elsewhere. Even if you plan to do the invasion of the Soviet Union on OTL schedule, there should be very heavy butterflies in the Med Sea Basin and the Far East. And then there is enough time for each side to react to the other butterflies, and maybe one more reaction cycle.
I cannot emphasis enough that losing 10% of your shipping capacity with have massive butterflies, both to troop usage and the economy. In WW1, the Emden shut down shipping in Eastern India for a few weeks, and because of this event, an item needed for the wool harvest did not arrive in Australia on time, so the wool harvest was delayed, which cause a clothing shortage. You will have similar issues here, but the details will vary a lot based on what the bottleneck is. A limit on docks to unload will give a different result from lack of colliers.
Also, if the ports of England are crammed, there will be real temptation to send any ANZAC units to Egypt and to find alternative uses for any Canadian units excluding night fighters. When the logistics get bad in England, the easy solution is to train the Canadian units in Canada over the winter months.
You seem to need the bigger payload for some larger weapons not used IOTL in large numbers. Is this correct, and which weapons? Or are you just trying to boost the total tonnage deliver to the UK each week? I can see night versus day bombing helping, but I have more trouble with 40 extra heavy bombers making any noticeable difference. After all, the USA accomplished squat when it had 40 heavy bombers or even 160 heavy bombers in England.
Deleted member 1487
The British would stop using the Channel during the day, which is what they did OTL during the Kanalkampf of July. So shift to land targets like Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Dover to draw in fighter command and pin RAF resources to defending during the day, so they cannot easily transition to night fighter production. Also it would help prevent day fighters from getting used at night, like the British and Germans did OTL (wild boar tactics) after the daylight fighting ended, to bridge the gap until night fighters are ready. Interestingly enough IOTL in 1941 the daylight fighters were actually bringing down more LW bombers than the specialist British nightfighters!
Yep, heavy butterflies. I think the day planes won't be idle, as OTL during the night Blitz there was still fighting going on with fighters over the Channel.
I'm curious what would happen if the British had trouble exporting equipment to the Middle East and North Africa to support the offensive against the Italians. AFAIK British factories in the Home Isles were a big source of supplies to the British forces in Africa.
The goal is to limit the ability to actually unload supplies, as the docks would be destroyed and only three areas in Britain were used in 1940-1941 to import from the outside:
In descending importance-
Merseyside (Liverpool and surroundings/Manchester)
River Clyde (Clydeside and Glasgow)
Bristol Canal (Avonmouth/Bristol, Gloucester)
Makes sense.
You seem to need the bigger payload for some larger weapons not used IOTL in large numbers. Is this correct, and which weapons? Or are you just trying to boost the total tonnage deliver to the UK each week? I can see night versus day bombing helping, but I have more trouble with 40 extra heavy bombers making any noticeable difference. After all, the USA accomplished squat when it had 40 heavy bombers or even 160 heavy bombers in England.[/QUOTE]
There were He111s using 2500kg bombs, the heaviest available in 1940. Those could only reach London and the Bristol Channel area/Wales.
The Ju88's could use the 2000kg against Liverpool IIRC.
The Ju88's could only hit Glasgow and the Clyde area with 1000kgs IIRC.
The big bombs help with starting fires. Carrying them to even Scotland would help with shutting down ports there thanks to more and larger fires. Also the British determined that incendiaries were 10x more effective than HE in destroying critical things like steel. So more fire is better for destruction.
The Allied bombing of Germany is quite different than the German bombing of Britain. Britain is uniquely vulnerable to a sustained bombing campaign because of her reliance on imports of food and fuel. Britain could at most supply about 2/3rds of her requirements and though Ireland could provide surpluses for about 13-18 weeks, it still needs to be shipped in and distributed. Fuel was even worse. Britain required about 300k tons of fuel a week and had 3 million tons in stock in July-August 1940. It had to totally reorient its imports to the West Coast and those areas I mentioned above, which dropped imports significantly, as these docks had to adjust to the increased volume. There were points in late 1940 that tankers were lined up with a 10 day wait to unload their fuel shipments. Yet the Germans didn't really try and bomb these areas in heavy raids (by LW standards more than 400 bombers) until 1941 or just sporadically in 1940. OTL there were only 11 raids of more than 400 bombers in 1940. Concentration of weight of bombs on a single traget night after night was never attempted, as targets constantly shifted under Goering's plans.
Repeatedly I've read quotes by British officials wondering why the Germans didn't focus on one spot with the bombers and render it useless by sustained bombing several times a week to deny its use to the British war effort.
Had even Liverpool and the docks around the Mersey been bombed night after night for a month, the British would have lost over half of the importing capacity (at one 3 month period it handled 87% of British imports in 1940), especially as the Southern and Western ports were shut down to international shipping until 1941. From July to October the Western Ports were operating below import requirements IOTL before they were really bombed and sustained bombing would have been crippling to the British war effort. Also the British rail system was badly mismanaged until 1941, so there would have been added pressure on the rail infrastructure of any port that had to compensate for the reduced capacity of Liverpool. There were several periods where it was feared that the rail transport system would collapse when coastal shipping was dramatically reduced by German naval bombing.
The point is that even a small number of heavy bombers could have a major effect in carry heavy ordnance and larger loads to targets, which would maximize sortee effectiveness. Plus the heavier bomb loads help increase chances of large fires and small firestorms.
Last edited by a moderator:
BlairWitch749
Banned
comrade wiking,
for your research requests:
the HE-111 had a soft undercarriage prone to taxiway accidents along with take off and landing; especially with full war load.... a brilliant description of the hazards of operations from semi prepared airfields in france and supporting the stalingrad relief effort is found in franz kurkowski's "luftwaffe aces" bio on ludwig havighorst who had the most total observer missions in the plane in the service here is the amazon link http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Ace...4488&sr=8-1&keywords=franz+kurowski+luftwaffe
john mosier's otherwise extremely abrasive "blitzkrieg myth" has a thoroughly researched and excellently translated segment on the LW's sortie tempo and it's advantages (and disadvantages from sickled cut to the BOB) here is the amazon link
http://www.amazon.com/The-Blitzkrie...F8&qid=1340404986&sr=1-6&keywords=john+mosier
(I recommend taking everything else in that book with a HUGE grain of salt, mosier is a douchebag who draws a lot of false conclusions; however his research on the sortie tempos is reasoned, researched and extremely well thought out and explained)
on wever being abrasive and having no patience for anyone, that comes from Below whom I've recommended to you previously; i think the term patronizing was used at least twice
I am happy to contribute to the project in any way i can
Osterkamp's memoirs say otherwise about the calais area being in good shape at the start of the BOB... his JG51 was the first single engine fighter group to open up sustained ops against the uk, he complains openly about servicability, unreplaced losses, lack of suitable fields, repairs having to be done in the open, lack of proper quarters/field kitchens, lack of parts fuel ammo at site, pilot fatigue etc etc; Moelders said quite the same thing later and made himself a swatch of enemies in the upper circles of the LW
if you read the section i suggested above on the he-111 operations they talk extensively about the force being strung out, needing more time to integrate replacements and not being able to take off with full bomb loads due to the lack of permanent bases... this is my objection to the august attacks, since they are attacking at night; it would be better to take the whole month and massage the force back to fullish strength, give them proper runways and build up a reserve of parts/bombs etc so that once the pressure starts to be applied it can be applied every single night as opposed to punching whilst exhausted
i don't quite follow your objection on the DO-19... the bmw 132 j produced 950hp and was in serial production for the JU-52 and the condors. i realize the plane was ugly as all hell and it's tail would have to be redesigned once it got some operational experiance but the 132's would have greatly improved the power to weight ratio letting her carry the standard two tonne bomb load at an economical cruising speed (albeit at low altitude due to german defects in radial engine manufacture) her being narrow isn't a big deal till the germans develop really big bombs, as she was she could carry the standard 8 sc-250's
the cockpit, wings, and tail could be redesigned in subsequent versions or the design could simply be phased out as the heinkel comes online; however, it would still have been extremely worthwhile to put the dornier on the line and get her going even with her flaws as she would force the lw to build up a reserve of pilots, long runways and figure out tactics
i am not a huge fan of heinkel; their designs didn't win a lot of competions for good reason (certainly not for a lack of political love either) they were the lockheed over promise under deliverer of their day... they would have had delivery problems if they stayed with the evaporation cooling system; once going to conventional radiators the weight and drag would have given much lower speed than the original production brochures; it's wings were also just as crappy (for different reasons) than the DO's wings; fwiw the heinkel got fucking db engines which is a hugely unfair comparison; aviation technology moved rapidly forward in the intervening 18 months; it's like comparing a b-17 and a b-24 and then trashing the b-17 for having inferior performance without looking at the design dates;
wever did see and experience the rapidity of hitler's orders and hitler's already open forays into international intrigue war was going to come soon; 5 year development curves were a non starter when germany's rapid rearming advantage would expire by 1941 at the lastest (which the old quartermaster in wever would have known objectively in understanding weapon cycles)
for your research requests:
the HE-111 had a soft undercarriage prone to taxiway accidents along with take off and landing; especially with full war load.... a brilliant description of the hazards of operations from semi prepared airfields in france and supporting the stalingrad relief effort is found in franz kurkowski's "luftwaffe aces" bio on ludwig havighorst who had the most total observer missions in the plane in the service here is the amazon link http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Ace...4488&sr=8-1&keywords=franz+kurowski+luftwaffe
john mosier's otherwise extremely abrasive "blitzkrieg myth" has a thoroughly researched and excellently translated segment on the LW's sortie tempo and it's advantages (and disadvantages from sickled cut to the BOB) here is the amazon link
http://www.amazon.com/The-Blitzkrie...F8&qid=1340404986&sr=1-6&keywords=john+mosier
(I recommend taking everything else in that book with a HUGE grain of salt, mosier is a douchebag who draws a lot of false conclusions; however his research on the sortie tempos is reasoned, researched and extremely well thought out and explained)
on wever being abrasive and having no patience for anyone, that comes from Below whom I've recommended to you previously; i think the term patronizing was used at least twice
I am happy to contribute to the project in any way i can
Osterkamp's memoirs say otherwise about the calais area being in good shape at the start of the BOB... his JG51 was the first single engine fighter group to open up sustained ops against the uk, he complains openly about servicability, unreplaced losses, lack of suitable fields, repairs having to be done in the open, lack of proper quarters/field kitchens, lack of parts fuel ammo at site, pilot fatigue etc etc; Moelders said quite the same thing later and made himself a swatch of enemies in the upper circles of the LW
if you read the section i suggested above on the he-111 operations they talk extensively about the force being strung out, needing more time to integrate replacements and not being able to take off with full bomb loads due to the lack of permanent bases... this is my objection to the august attacks, since they are attacking at night; it would be better to take the whole month and massage the force back to fullish strength, give them proper runways and build up a reserve of parts/bombs etc so that once the pressure starts to be applied it can be applied every single night as opposed to punching whilst exhausted
i don't quite follow your objection on the DO-19... the bmw 132 j produced 950hp and was in serial production for the JU-52 and the condors. i realize the plane was ugly as all hell and it's tail would have to be redesigned once it got some operational experiance but the 132's would have greatly improved the power to weight ratio letting her carry the standard two tonne bomb load at an economical cruising speed (albeit at low altitude due to german defects in radial engine manufacture) her being narrow isn't a big deal till the germans develop really big bombs, as she was she could carry the standard 8 sc-250's
the cockpit, wings, and tail could be redesigned in subsequent versions or the design could simply be phased out as the heinkel comes online; however, it would still have been extremely worthwhile to put the dornier on the line and get her going even with her flaws as she would force the lw to build up a reserve of pilots, long runways and figure out tactics
i am not a huge fan of heinkel; their designs didn't win a lot of competions for good reason (certainly not for a lack of political love either) they were the lockheed over promise under deliverer of their day... they would have had delivery problems if they stayed with the evaporation cooling system; once going to conventional radiators the weight and drag would have given much lower speed than the original production brochures; it's wings were also just as crappy (for different reasons) than the DO's wings; fwiw the heinkel got fucking db engines which is a hugely unfair comparison; aviation technology moved rapidly forward in the intervening 18 months; it's like comparing a b-17 and a b-24 and then trashing the b-17 for having inferior performance without looking at the design dates;
wever did see and experience the rapidity of hitler's orders and hitler's already open forays into international intrigue war was going to come soon; 5 year development curves were a non starter when germany's rapid rearming advantage would expire by 1941 at the lastest (which the old quartermaster in wever would have known objectively in understanding weapon cycles)