Little Mac had some real courage

What if Little Mac actually had some guts? He actually had some military talent as the Peninsula Campaign showed. His main fault is that he had the tendency to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory such as in the Seven Days. If he would have pushed against Lee in Antietam he would have crushed Lee instead of being stalemated by him.
 
If he had done that at Antietam he wouldn't BE Little Mac.

He got that nickname before Antietam. What I am talking about is what if he had his real talent at training men and a decent gift with strategy along with some actual guts to follow his plans through to victory? Personally I think guts is the only thing he lacked in making a good general. His lack of guts however was a grave defect that put him a very mediocre one.
 
He got that nickname before Antietam. What I am talking about is what if he had his real talent at training men and a decent gift with strategy along with some actual guts to follow his plans through to victory? Personally I think guts is the only thing he lacked in making a good general. His lack of guts however was a grave defect that put him a very mediocre one.

What would you say of the perfect private soldier who breaks under fire in every battle?
 
So who's going to write this ''Badass Mac'' TL?:D

He'll whip Johnny Reb & Abe Lincoln!

Badass Mac TL (brief)
I got it for you right here. He shoots Allen Pinkerton as the Confederate spy he was, fights his way through to Antietam 12-24 hours earlier, drives on every point on Lee's lines, commits his reserves immediately, breaks through to Boteler's Ford in one massive blow, and catches Jackson's troops on the march. McClellan takes Lee's surrender, Richmond falls by Thanksgiving, the war is over by Christmas, and McClellan becomes the next President.:cool:
 
What would you say of the perfect private soldier who breaks under fire in every battle?


Ever read Wouk's The Caine Mutiny? If so, you already know the answer to your question.

Enlisted men can be cowards and officers cannot be cowards. If an officer displays behavior which seems cowardly, there must be another reason because an officer cannot be a coward. :rolleyes:

I'm sure more of us have seen the movie with Bogie rolling his ball bearings on the witness stand than have read the book. There's much much more to the book than Queeg's breakdown and the subsequent court martial, but the cultural blind spot I'm referring takes place at the trial.

Queeg is a marginal fellow who has become a marginal officer. In peacetime he would have eventually failed to go "up" and thus would have been sent "out". But it's not peacetime and he's an Annapolis grad, so he's given a command where he shouldn't be able to do much harm. He shouldn't be in command though, it's definitely beyond his abilities.

Queeg's also a coward. That, plus the pressures of command, wear on him so much that his psychiatric health becomes marginal too. He's not foaming at the mouth or talking to Jesus, it comes and goes. One shrink could look at him one day and commit him immediately while another shrink could look at him another day and see nothing worth an intervention, but there's definitely something going on and it's getting worse.

Of course Queeg's officers aren't helping matters either.

Anyway, the mutiny occurs and the fellow who gets fingered for it, the XO, is relatively blameless. He was sort of talked into it over a long period of time by another officer. The navy lawyer defending the XO, a pilot on medical leave after a crash who was a hotshot lawyer in civilian life, sizes all this up pretty quickly and, deciding that the wrong man is on trial, comes up with a strategy to get the XO off.

That strategy is what I wrote above: An officer CANNOT be a coward. The defense lawyer hammers that home time and time again, pointing to Queeg's undeniably cowardly behavior and his other quirks to lead the court martial panel to conclude that the XO is innocent because Queeg is insane. Because an officer simply cannot be a coward, Queeg acted cowardly because he was insane and, because Queeg was insane, the XO was correct in relieving Queeg of his duties.

The defense lawyer plays to the court martial officers' innate prejudices and fears. The officers not only cannot believe that an officer, especially an Annapolis grad, can be a coward but they don't want to believe that an officer, especially an Annapolis grad, can be a coward.

It's simple logic really.
An officer cannot be a coward.
Little Mac is an officer.
Little Mac cannot be a coward.

But an enlisted man can be shot. ;)
 
McClellan's "cowardice" was not fear for himself, but for his soldiers. He was very cautious and didn't want to go carelessly expending his troops.

(The Confederates could take advantage of this, including setting up fake artillery and thus convincing him the enemy had "great cannons" and thus the men needed more training.)

Over-cautious, yes, especially considering there was a war on and at some point, battles had to be fought, but "coward" is not the right word.

Look at Antietam. Once he had the big advantage (knowing what Lee would do), he pounced.
 
McClellan's "cowardice" was not fear for himself, but for his soldiers. He was very cautious and didn't want to go carelessly expending his troops.

(The Confederates could take advantage of this, including setting up fake artillery and thus convincing him the enemy had "great cannons" and thus the men needed more training.)

Over-cautious, yes, especially considering there was a war on and at some point, battles had to be fought, but "coward" is not the right word.

Look at Antietam. Once he had the big advantage (knowing what Lee would do), he pounced.

"Pounced" by Little Mac standards. The earlier "Badass Mac" post was an example of what an agressive officer could do. And he was a coward. Not physically. Only one Army commander on either side was KIA in the ACW. He feared losing badly. As long as he took the most conservative approach, he would never be crushed. There were no Fredericksburgs or Chancellorsvilles in his record. Only a lot of hesitant advances, battling retreats, and one single strategic victory handed to him on a solid gold plate that he managed to turn into a bloody standoff.
 
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Ever read Wouk's The Caine Mutiny? If so, you already know the answer to your question.

Enlisted men can be cowards and officers cannot be cowards. If an officer displays behavior which seems cowardly, there must be another reason because an officer cannot be a coward. :rolleyes:

I'm sure more of us have seen the movie with Bogie rolling his ball bearings on the witness stand than have read the book. There's much much more to the book than Queeg's breakdown and the subsequent court martial, but the cultural blind spot I'm referring takes place at the trial.

Queeg is a marginal fellow who has become a marginal officer. In peacetime he would have eventually failed to go "up" and thus would have been sent "out". But it's not peacetime and he's an Annapolis grad, so he's given a command where he shouldn't be able to do much harm. He shouldn't be in command though, it's definitely beyond his abilities.

Queeg's also a coward. That, plus the pressures of command, wear on him so much that his psychiatric health becomes marginal too. He's not foaming at the mouth or talking to Jesus, it comes and goes. One shrink could look at him one day and commit him immediately while another shrink could look at him another day and see nothing worth an intervention, but there's definitely something going on and it's getting worse.

Of course Queeg's officers aren't helping matters either.

Anyway, the mutiny occurs and the fellow who gets fingered for it, the XO, is relatively blameless. He was sort of talked into it over a long period of time by another officer. The navy lawyer defending the XO, a pilot on medical leave after a crash who was a hotshot lawyer in civilian life, sizes all this up pretty quickly and, deciding that the wrong man is on trial, comes up with a strategy to get the XO off.

That strategy is what I wrote above: An officer CANNOT be a coward. The defense lawyer hammers that home time and time again, pointing to Queeg's undeniably cowardly behavior and his other quirks to lead the court martial panel to conclude that the XO is innocent because Queeg is insane. Because an officer simply cannot be a coward, Queeg acted cowardly because he was insane and, because Queeg was insane, the XO was correct in relieving Queeg of his duties.

The defense lawyer plays to the court martial officers' innate prejudices and fears. The officers not only cannot believe that an officer, especially an Annapolis grad, can be a coward but they don't want to believe that an officer, especially an Annapolis grad, can be a coward.

It's simple logic really.
An officer cannot be a coward.
Little Mac is an officer.
Little Mac cannot be a coward.

But an enlisted man can be shot. ;)

Who's the highest ranking officer in US history to be court-martialed? Imprisoned for a lengthy term? Executed? I honestly think if a three star or above was found to have committed a grave crime, whether it be high treason or being a serial killer, the whole military judicial establishment would probably just go 'TILT'. They might find it easier to toss him out of the military and hand him over to civilian authorities for trial.:rolleyes::p
 

67th Tigers

Banned
What if Little Mac actually had some guts? He actually had some military talent as the Peninsula Campaign showed. His main fault is that he had the tendency to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory such as in the Seven Days. If he would have pushed against Lee in Antietam he would have crushed Lee instead of being stalemated by him.

Guts? Three times breveted for bravery in Mexico, leading what today we'd call a special forces team. He had plenty of physical courage.

The situation in the Seven Days was such that the Confederate advantage in numbers and position meant it was a case of saving the army, which he did.

At Antietam he certainly could have put in his last 2 brigades, but Lee had a larger reserve than him to use.

Lets transpose someone with "guts" into McClellan's position. A sort of "super-Grant" (because the real Grant also faced a similar but much less serious version of McClellan's situation before Vicksburg and responded by retreating as well).

At Yorktown our gutsy general may well have thrown his men into the Confederate killing ground. Charging 30,000 men across an open killing field swept by over 100 pieces of artillery, through their obstructions (and minefields, the first recorded use thereof) under fire from some 10,000-20,000 infantry and into their works is not a recipe for success.

In the Seven Days, leaving nearly half his army on one side of a swollen river whilst charging his other half into fortifications swept by 250 guns (some 200 in the forts plus the field guns) manned by 45,000 infantry in the absence of a supply line is the "gutsy" thing to do. This would not likely to go well.

At Antietam he orders the attack at ca. midday on the 16th, Hooker on the right, Burnside on the left, Sumner (w/ 2nd and 12th Corps) ready to reinforce success. Burnside is slow, and Hooker hits Hood and refuses to advance further without reinforcement (he gets 12th Corps, which arrives after dark). Every attack he launches is parried, and his reserves are largely used up. At the end of the battle he has a reserve of a single brigade.

However, if "gutsy" on the 17th and he doesn't call off Franklin's little 2 brigade assault then his army may well have been swept from the field. Lee has collected a reasonably large reserve and intends to attack McClellan's exhausted army, which falters because McClellan commits reserves to shore up his lines at the critical point. If McClellan spent more of his force then Lee's counterattack may have been pulled off.

Yes, McClellan is cautious about mounting frontal assaults. However, he has good cause to be. Assaulting entrenchments is rarely successful and always costly, as Grant found out a few years later. A lesson McClellan, Meade and Sherman didn't need to be taught because they already knew it.

usertron2020 said:
He shoots Allen Pinkerton as the Confederate spy he was, fights his way through to Antietam 12-24 hours earlier, drives on every point on Lee's lines, commits his reserves immediately, breaks through to Boteler's Ford in one massive blow, and catches Jackson's troops on the march.

Pinkerton has left by this point.

Ever looked at the march to Antietam?

After South Mountain (14th) there is the Battle of Boonsboro on the 15th (McClellan smashes Lee's rearguard) reaching Antietam Creek late on the 15th. He commits to an attack on the 16th which falters, and is continued on the 17th.

MerryPrankster said:
(The Confederates could take advantage of this, including setting up fake artillery and thus convincing him the enemy had "great cannons" and thus the men needed more training.)


McClellan knew the quaker guns at Manassas were just that.

Look at Antietam. Once he had the big advantage (knowing what Lee would do), he pounced.

Antietam was fought because of a failure of McClellan's plans. He intended driving down the Loudon Valley, Franklin leading. After Franklin broke through at Crampton's Gap with 8,000 men he was faced with the whole of Anderson's division blocking such a move and decided not to attack.
 
Guts? Three times breveted for bravery in Mexico, leading what today we'd call a special forces team. He had plenty of physical courage.

The situation in the Seven Days was such that the Confederate advantage in numbers and position meant it was a case of saving the army, which he did.

At Antietam he certainly could have put in his last 2 brigades, but Lee had a larger reserve than him to use.

Lets transpose someone with "guts" into McClellan's position. A sort of "super-Grant" (because the real Grant also faced a similar but much less serious version of McClellan's situation before Vicksburg and responded by retreating as well).

At Yorktown our gutsy general may well have thrown his men into the Confederate killing ground. Charging 30,000 men across an open killing field swept by over 100 pieces of artillery, through their obstructions (and minefields, the first recorded use thereof) under fire from some 10,000-20,000 infantry and into their works is not a recipe for success.

In the Seven Days, leaving nearly half his army on one side of a swollen river whilst charging his other half into fortifications swept by 250 guns (some 200 in the forts plus the field guns) manned by 45,000 infantry in the absence of a supply line is the "gutsy" thing to do. This would not likely to go well.

At Antietam he orders the attack at ca. midday on the 16th, Hooker on the right, Burnside on the left, Sumner (w/ 2nd and 12th Corps) ready to reinforce success. Burnside is slow, and Hooker hits Hood and refuses to advance further without reinforcement (he gets 12th Corps, which arrives after dark). Every attack he launches is parried, and his reserves are largely used up. At the end of the battle he has a reserve of a single brigade.

However, if "gutsy" on the 17th and he doesn't call off Franklin's little 2 brigade assault then his army may well have been swept from the field. Lee has collected a reasonably large reserve and intends to attack McClellan's exhausted army, which falters because McClellan commits reserves to shore up his lines at the critical point. If McClellan spent more of his force then Lee's counterattack may have been pulled off.

Yes, McClellan is cautious about mounting frontal assaults. However, he has good cause to be. Assaulting entrenchments is rarely successful and always costly, as Grant found out a few years later. A lesson McClellan, Meade and Sherman didn't need to be taught because they already knew it.



Pinkerton has left by this point.

Ever looked at the march to Antietam?

After South Mountain (14th) there is the Battle of Boonsboro on the 15th (McClellan smashes Lee's rearguard) reaching Antietam Creek late on the 15th. He commits to an attack on the 16th which falters, and is continued on the 17th.




McClellan knew the quaker guns at Manassas were just that.



Antietam was fought because of a failure of McClellan's plans. He intended driving down the Loudon Valley, Franklin leading. After Franklin broke through at Crampton's Gap with 8,000 men he was faced with the whole of Anderson's division blocking such a move and decided not to attack.


There are different types of courage. He didn't lack physical courage but he did lack courage in the willingness to look bad. He won 6 of the 7 days battles but retreated every time. If he would have advanced he would have whipped Lee. Hell, he suprised the Confederacy so badly he had Macgruder outnumbered at least 10:1 and should have stompped him on the way to Richmond. He greatly outnumbered Lee at Antietham and had plentiful reserves. If he would have commited them Lee would have been stompped. He might not necessarily have to surrender his army but it would have been devestated.
 
If he commits his entire army at Antietam the war is over by mid-1863 at the latest, with butterflies in that Lincoln may or may not be re-elected depending on how that shapes up and certainly there's no abolition of slavery. The consequences of that could be......unpleasant.....:eek:
 
Antietam was fought because of a failure of McClellan's plans. He intended driving down the Loudon Valley, Franklin leading. After Franklin broke through at Crampton's Gap with 8,000 men he was faced with the whole of Anderson's division blocking such a move and decided not to attack.

He had more than sufficient troops to completely crush the Army of Northern Virginia. The bridge Burnside was told to attack headlong also was able to be forded around, and had he been told to look for a ford the ANV would have been crushed between a hammer and an anvil. McClellan's incompetence is rather telling here because he not only came the closest in any of his battles to actually defeating a Confederate army, he also followed his time-honored practice of leaving entire corps entirely out of the Battle (contrasted with Earl Van Dorn in Mississippi in this same timeframe).

If McClellan had Grant's aggressiveness as a battlefield commander the Civil War would also have ended in April 1862 following the Union victories at Donelson, New Orleans, and Richmond and the Confederate military would be treated as a joke ITATL.
 
If McClellan had Grant's aggressiveness as a battlefield commander the Civil War would also have ended in April 1862 following the Union victories at Donelson, New Orleans, and Richmond and the Confederate military would be treated as a joke ITATL.

Wouldn't the Confederate government just have retreated to Montgomery?



And 67th Tigers, let's say McClellan had more of a free reign in the army (since you've said Lincoln hampered him in other threads); what is the soonest he could have won the war?
 
Wouldn't the Confederate government just have retreated to Montgomery?



And 67th Tigers, let's say McClellan had more of a free reign in the army (since you've said Lincoln hampered him in other threads); what is the soonest he could have won the war?

Hence why I said it would end in mid-1863. ;)
 
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