It may be quite surprising, knowing that Lithuania was one of the strongholds of anti-Soviet separatism during the 1980s and 1990s and remains heavily anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, but its lustration and de-sovietization laws were among the most lenient in the entire Eastern Bloc.
Unlike, for example, Latvia and Estonia, both of whom passed laws preventing high Soviet era officials and bureaucrats from running for public office, Lithuania never passed anything resembling this, and, in fact, the first ever democratic election in post-communist Lithuania was won by a party led by the same Soviet-era nomenklatura, complete with the former leader of the Lithuanian Communist Party in charge. In addition, Lithuania's policy towards former former KGB agents can be best summed up as "if you swear loyalty to Lithuania, we won't touch you". A lustration process was only established in 1999 (still fairly lenient), and even then, only a small portion of suspected former KGB agents went through the process, with little repercussions.
There are reasons for why this happened, however. Lithuania is unique among the post-Soviet states in that its drive towards independence was championed not just by a homegrown dissident movement (Sąjūdis), but also the local Lithuanian communist party. As such, harsh lustration laws like in Latvia and Estonia were less likely to fly here, even though it's almost universally agreed that it would have been a good thing - politicians from the old Soviet nomenklatura inherited its complacency towards corruption, bribery and undemocratic actions, and many of their loyalty to Lithuania is also a big question mark.
It could have happened otherwise, however.
A lustration law was debated in the Supreme Council of Lithuania (later replaced by the Seimas) from 1991 to 1992. It would have, much like in Latvia and Estonia, barred high-level Soviet era politicians (secretaries and up) from running for public office. Sąjūdis was obviously in favor, LDDP (formerly the Communist party) was obviously against. What ruined this law from passing was the National Progress (Tautos pažanga) faction, later renamed to a party of the same name. An opportunistic bunch, an offshoot of the Sąjūdis led by Rolandas Paulauskas (who is now, interestingly enough, a pro-Russian public spokesperson echoing alt-right talking points about refugees and multiculturalism), it was small, but lucky in that it had juuust enough seats in the parliament for their backing to be necessary for either party to pass any laws.
So Sąjūdis proposes a lustration law. Tautos pažanga, either out of spite, idiocy or being pressured by the LDDP (nobody knows), suddenly demands an even harsher an outright ridiculous alternative, banning anyone who was ever a member of the CPSU or its Lithuanian offshoot from running for public office. The result was chaos, months of debating in the parliament until the entire motion was finally killed and never brought back up.
Let's say that Tautos pažanga either gets a few less deputies during the Sąjūdis split or its leadership gets a change of heart and agrees to back Sąjūdis's lustration law.
What are the immediate effects?
Unlike, for example, Latvia and Estonia, both of whom passed laws preventing high Soviet era officials and bureaucrats from running for public office, Lithuania never passed anything resembling this, and, in fact, the first ever democratic election in post-communist Lithuania was won by a party led by the same Soviet-era nomenklatura, complete with the former leader of the Lithuanian Communist Party in charge. In addition, Lithuania's policy towards former former KGB agents can be best summed up as "if you swear loyalty to Lithuania, we won't touch you". A lustration process was only established in 1999 (still fairly lenient), and even then, only a small portion of suspected former KGB agents went through the process, with little repercussions.
There are reasons for why this happened, however. Lithuania is unique among the post-Soviet states in that its drive towards independence was championed not just by a homegrown dissident movement (Sąjūdis), but also the local Lithuanian communist party. As such, harsh lustration laws like in Latvia and Estonia were less likely to fly here, even though it's almost universally agreed that it would have been a good thing - politicians from the old Soviet nomenklatura inherited its complacency towards corruption, bribery and undemocratic actions, and many of their loyalty to Lithuania is also a big question mark.
It could have happened otherwise, however.
A lustration law was debated in the Supreme Council of Lithuania (later replaced by the Seimas) from 1991 to 1992. It would have, much like in Latvia and Estonia, barred high-level Soviet era politicians (secretaries and up) from running for public office. Sąjūdis was obviously in favor, LDDP (formerly the Communist party) was obviously against. What ruined this law from passing was the National Progress (Tautos pažanga) faction, later renamed to a party of the same name. An opportunistic bunch, an offshoot of the Sąjūdis led by Rolandas Paulauskas (who is now, interestingly enough, a pro-Russian public spokesperson echoing alt-right talking points about refugees and multiculturalism), it was small, but lucky in that it had juuust enough seats in the parliament for their backing to be necessary for either party to pass any laws.
So Sąjūdis proposes a lustration law. Tautos pažanga, either out of spite, idiocy or being pressured by the LDDP (nobody knows), suddenly demands an even harsher an outright ridiculous alternative, banning anyone who was ever a member of the CPSU or its Lithuanian offshoot from running for public office. The result was chaos, months of debating in the parliament until the entire motion was finally killed and never brought back up.
Let's say that Tautos pažanga either gets a few less deputies during the Sąjūdis split or its leadership gets a change of heart and agrees to back Sąjūdis's lustration law.
What are the immediate effects?
- The LDDP is neutered almost immediately. Much of its higher leadership, especially Algirdas Brazauskas, are no longer able to run for public office, either forever or for some specific amount of time. Though this might not completely butterfly away a Sąjūdis loss in the 1992 Lithuanian election, as the economic troubles which led to public opinion shifting away from Landsbergis will remain, the result may not be as one-sided, and the subsequent government much different. For example, perhaps the LSDP manages to steal far more LDDP support and Aloyzas Sakalas could become the first democratically elected Prime Minister, which would probably steer Lithuania considerably closer to real social democracy.
- No Brazauskas means that the LDDP, or whoever succeeds them, won't be able to field anything strong against Stasys Lozoraitis in the 1993 Lithuanian presidential election, which would have considerate effect as well. Lithuania would likely be even more Western-aligned than OTL, more aggressively seeking to join EU and NATO. (I don't think it would actually make accession any faster, though) This is assuming that Lozoraitis doesn't die in 1994 under suspicious circumstances like in OTL, however.
- If Lozoraitis is the President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus may consider sitting the 1998 presidential election out. However, his OTL opponent, Artūras Paulauskas, was a fairly high ranking member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, so he is out of the election as well. As such, the 1998 presidential election is open to pretty much anyone. Really depends on how Lozoraitis's term goes, what is the economic situation and who won the 1996 parliamentary election.
- In the long term, I expect the left-wing of Lithuanian politics to steer towards social liberalism and Scandinavian-style social democracy instead of the "center-right with a red coat of paint" that the LDDP/LSDP had been until very recently. Perhaps the social-liberal New Union (if it is still founded, which might not happen because Paulauskas is ineligible) survives, absorbs the LSDP, steers a little to the left and becomes the leading force of left Lithuanian politics? That would be weird and I doubt it would last for very long (definitely not past the economic crisis), but an interesting scenario nonetheless. I would also imagine that Lustration Law becomes a large point of contention. After all, it would make many politicians which supported Lithuanian autonomy and later independence, even a number of those who voted for the March 11 Act, unable to shape the fate of the country. This would be Paksasgate on steroids. It's very possible that it might be overturned sometime in the future, or even declared unconstitutional sometime down the line much like what happened in Poland.