List of things needed for a German WW2 victory.

Casualties would probably be in the same region as the losses taken in OTL being hammered outside Moscow with no defense from the elements. The Soviets wouldn't surrender but their official forces were nearly gone and barely trained militia can only do so much. This isn't the same as Stalingrad.

Right. But how did Leningrad hold out, then? I imagine the troops there weren't better than those in Moscow by orders of magnitude, especially as resupplying them was difficult as hell (that they could do so at all was because the Finns wouldn't do their part of the job and seal off access across the frozen lake). Even militia can fuck things up in house-to-house warfare. And I imagine more reinforcements from the Far East would be pouring in if Moscow was directly threatened.

I don't know exactly how much Germany got out of Ukraine in the winter of 1941-2 but I doubt it was so valuable that they could not get on without it if they had secured Moscow. They can close the Kiev pocket later on once the situation in Moscow is beyond doubt, assuming Army Group South has not managed to defeat them alone.

Arguably. But at the very least, it gives the Russians more time to wreck shit and organise partisans. And they might need to prop up the Romanians if they don't want backlashes.

How valueable another half a million Soviet Soldiers with largely out-dated equipment would prove is somewhat debatable. They cannot all easilly be withdrawn without abandoning Ukraine to Army Group South. As it is that force would be in position to harry any withdrawl.

But they might not be concentrated in Kiev either and give the Germans the kind of knock-out that pocket was IOTL (600,000 prisoners do make a difference, even if their weapons are shit). Saner deployment of them will delay their advance. And time is what the Germans are short of in virtually every scenario.

Heart attack? Stroke? Bad fall down a flight of stairs? Anyway works, its your POD. Its a bit contrived perhaps, but its hardly impossible. Stress can do that to a person.

All right, it's fiat. Well, I guess it's not impossible, but that's a very favourable scenario (Stalin became quite old, and I think it's still debated whether he was poisoned).

No you don't. Because in 1941 Stavka was not nearly as confident and adept as it would be later on in the war. They were in abject disarray suffering defeat after defeat. The Purges had ensured that it was not a well oiled machine that could run without Stalin. The complete failure to act in the first week of Barbarossa demonstrates this quite clearly. The Red Army had essentially been stripped of any initiative because to act on your own authority was to sign your own death warrant. Everyone needed authority from someone. That someone was nominally the Party by by this time it was only Stalin and his political commissars. If you remove him at the very least the Party will have to get together and either have a new leader establish his authority or form a council. That will take time. A new leader will involve alot of backstabbing and councils are rarely effective in times of war.

Read again. Stavka had authority second only to Stalin; would people start rebelling all over the place against their legitimate orders? Prominent Old Bolsheviks like Zhukov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, Molotov? With inherent Russian xenophobia, Bolshevik hatred of "Fascist Gitlerism" and the Nazis making asses of themselves in the occupied lands, mobilising the people and army against them shouldn't be terribly difficult.

The relations between Commissars and military commanders weren't overall as bad as the popular view has it; sure, there were archetypical "No retreat, and I'll hang everyone who dies on his watch" bastards, but they were fairly rare. Remember, the Commissars had been part of the forces since the Civil War; they often knew a little about how things worked in the military, and most were willing to simply countersign orders as a matter of fact. And the Purges weren't as devastating as is commonly put forth, either; the Army was hurt far worse by the assimilation of the Territorial Forces in the mid-to-late '30s, which together with the general massive expansion as the war approached created an unsuppliable need of officers. Only 20,000-30,000 officers were purged, and most of those were merely fired, not shot; they were reactivated when the Motherland was threatened. (In fact, the larger part of those purged in the Army were Commissars, not true military men).

The civilian administration was only slighter better than under Hitler because while Hitler let people build their own private fiefdoms Stalin suffered nothing of the kind. Beria comes close but he has nothing on Himmler. The result of this was that the inter-deparmental competition was lessened although still not removed entirely. As it is you still had alot of personalities who did not get on and were unlikely to put aside those differences so someone could become the big cheese.

The Soviet civil service is admittedly not my area of expertise. I cannot comment on it. I do think Stavka would be able to maintain overall control, though, with the rest of the mechanisms still in place. Wasn't most of the bureaucracy evacuated from Moscow IOTL?

All in all the chaos may only last for a couple of weeks or months. This is time however which the Soviet Union and the Red Army does not have.

The Germans won't be able to achieve unsurmountable advantages in such a span of time; even positing disorganised resistance, shit'd be breaking down by itself, and land does take troops and equipment to pacify and supervise. In addition, Stalin's death would supposedly happen in the winter or late autumn, which would make it very difficult for the Germans to advance and capitalise on this massive gain. By springtime, Stavka would've sorted things out; they are not fools.
 
Right. But how did Leningrad hold out, then? I imagine the troops there weren't better than those in Moscow by orders of magnitude, especially as resupplying them was difficult as hell (that they could do so at all was because the Finns wouldn't do their part of the job and seal off access across the frozen lake). Even militia can fuck things up in house-to-house warfare. And I imagine more reinforcements from the Far East would be pouring in if Moscow was directly threatened.

Well, I might be mistaken, but didn't Hitler essentially determine that Leningrad was of secondary importance? He had the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized moved over to the Moscow front and would have moved more. I also read somewhere that the defence of Leningrad benefited from the naval guns of the Soviet's Baltic navy, something which wouldn't be the case in Moscow.

Leningrad was argueably a classic example of where the generals on the ground disagreed with OKH (and thus Hitler). The commander on the ground (Leeb?) attacked the city with the 41st Panzer Corps despite orders only to surround it with the result that a significant volume of armour was badly damaged. OKH then withdrew these battered forces, argueably at the moment when they were making headway against the Russian defenses, to send them to attack Moscow when they need time to refit, rest and repair.

Arguably. But at the very least, it gives the Russians more time to wreck shit and organise partisans. And they might need to prop up the Romanians if they don't want backlashes.

But they might not be concentrated in Kiev either and give the Germans the kind of knock-out that pocket was IOTL (600,000 prisoners do make a difference, even if their weapons are shit). Saner deployment of them will delay their advance. And time is what the Germans are short of in virtually every scenario.

While the Soviets can organise Partisans, unsupported Partisans do not win wars. Given the state of Soviet forces this great host of men is likely to only fall back before Army Group South otherwise they risk encirclement from the north once Moscow is in German hands.

Read again. Stavka had authority second only to Stalin; would people start rebelling all over the place against their legitimate orders? Prominent Old Bolsheviks like Zhukov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, Molotov? With inherent Russian xenophobia, Bolshevik hatred of "Fascist Gitlerism" and the Nazis making asses of themselves in the occupied lands, mobilising the people and army against them shouldn't be terribly difficult.

The relations between Commissars and military commanders weren't overall as bad as the popular view has it; sure, there were archetypical "No retreat, and I'll hang everyone who dies on his watch" bastards, but they were fairly rare. Remember, the Commissars had been part of the forces since the Civil War; they often knew a little about how things worked in the military, and most were willing to simply countersign orders as a matter of fact. And the Purges weren't as devastating as is commonly put forth, either; the Army was hurt far worse by the assimilation of the Territorial Forces in the mid-to-late '30s, which together with the general massive expansion as the war approached created an unsuppliable need of officers. Only 20,000-30,000 officers were purged, and most of those were merely fired, not shot; they were reactivated when the Motherland was threatened. (In fact, the larger part of those purged in the Army were Commissars, not true military men).

The Soviet civil service is admittedly not my area of expertise. I cannot comment on it. I do think Stavka would be able to maintain overall control, though, with the rest of the mechanisms still in place. Wasn't most of the bureaucracy evacuated from Moscow IOTL?

Its not a case of rebelling against orders. I don't mean to imply that if Stalin died the Red Army would desert in droves and people would all just go home. Its the case of sending them in the first place. Modern logistics depends far more on civilian bureaurocracy than whether people obey Zhukov. Soldiers can and will obey, such as they are able, but soldiers cannot demand factories produce X instead of Y, that supplies are sent to Moscow instead of elsewhere and so on and so forth.

Well they can in a country where the Army dominates the State but that was not true of the Red Army and Soviet Russia. Zhukov and the rest never came close to the "Silent Dictatorship" of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. So in short no, I don't see Stavka simply over-ruling the Party in the case of Stalin being killed. Command will fall to a politician of some sort and the kind to reach the top of the Soviet politics is not the kind to hand over control to the Army.

The Germans won't be able to achieve unsurmountable advantages in such a span of time; even positing disorganised resistance, shit'd be breaking down by itself, and land does take troops and equipment to pacify and supervise. In addition, Stalin's death would supposedly happen in the winter or late autumn, which would make it very difficult for the Germans to advance and capitalise on this massive gain. By springtime, Stavka would've sorted things out; they are not fools.

My argument is as follows.
If Moscow falls in 1941, and isn't immediately re-taken by some counter-attack, the rest of the Soviet Union will fall.
If Stalin dies in October/November 1941, the defense of Moscow shall be more disorganised than OTL and as such shall fail.
Thus if Stalin dies in October/November 1941, the Soviet Union shall be defeated.

The Germans don't need to make massive gains. Once they have Moscow they have gained a significant logistical boost meanwhile the Soviets have suffered a terrible blow. With Moscow in German hands they can move against Leningrad at their leisure and against Stalingrad in the following year. Once both of those cities fall there is nothing much to stand against the German armies before the Ural mountains.
 
What if Nazi Germany, after invading France, just swept through the Middle East and took Arabia, making Turkey a Nazi Puppet State. Then, just swept through Sub-Saharan Africa.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Moscow was the main hub of roads and RR. taking it or surrounding it really screws up transportation for all of Central Russia. That would have a big effect.

The Mediterranean Strategy is keyed by logistics. That was always Rommels problem and the big edge to the British since the closer to Egypt they were the better their supply situation. IF Hitler had supported Mussolini who wanted to take Malta (one of the few times he was right) then without Malta Rommels supply situation is much better. There is still only one road but now it can be filled full time. Also the Luftwaffe needed more support and if it had been stronger that also would have made a difference.
 
Barbarossa is keyed to logisitics as much of not more than the Africa/ME campaign. What's more the logistoic problems in Russia are far more difficult to solve than those in Africa. In Africa some railway building in Libya, more trucks and more agressive use of forward ports would have gone a long way to solving Axis logistic problems. In Russia it's much more difficult things like increased truck production, better railway conversion, increased petroleum production and the like, and there's no easy answers in that list for a bunch of dickheads like the Nazi leadership.
 
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