I'd think Egypt would be a tad annoyed at the fact that the Suez has been essentially blockaded (for destinations beyond the Red Sea, ie. South and East Asia and Australia).
Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
- Thread starter NeoDesperado
- Start date
Egypt's army fought in Yemen before and they might still have friends there.
OTL I think they fought Iraqis. In TTL, they might fight in Yemen.
Saddam's playing it smarter here, but at the end of the day it's still Saddam: very blunt and violent, very full of himself and quite willing to tell people whatever they want to hear so long as it suits his goals. Right now his goal is grabbing anything that isn't chained down in the territories he's occupying, and shooting/disappearing anyone who would pose a threat to his continued presence there, and all while keeping the West off his back.
Right now the USSR is trying to deal with its own internal issues while convincing the rest of the world that despite the end of the Cold War they're still a power to be reckoned with. They'll be siding with the West, but will want to serve as mediators to resolve the situation diplomatically to try and prove their power and influence. More on this in the next update.
Aside from King Hussein and the Hashemites, while there may be tribal leaders with visions of power, realistically there's not many who would have the ability to move against the House of Saud even now, not without some outside influence. One potential candidate would be the House of Rashid, major rivals to the Sauds during the early 20th century before getting deposed in the unification wars. They don't have any major figures in the public eye right now, but with a little meddling they could try to reclaim the region as their own.
True, Egypt is quite miffed at Yemen and the shutdown, but Yemen is hoping that the situation will resolve itself quickly enough before irreparable damage is done on the relations front. In regard to troops deployed, Mubarak will need to figure out where things are the most dire and move accordingly. More on this in future installments.
Iran is still hurting too much from the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War to make any overt moves, but they'll still be on alert and watching the border to make sure they don't get dragged in before they're ready.
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If I remember correctly, Jordan during this period was friendly with Saddam.
Maybe they'll jump on at some point? Not sure if borders work for this, but the Arab Legion marching down the Hejaz would rock.
Maybe they'll jump on at some point? Not sure if borders work for this, but the Arab Legion marching down the Hejaz would rock.
Given the photo, I assume a war like OTL is going to happen?
Maybe Iraq's allies see the writing on the wall and cut advantageous deals (Hejaz, Asir) while they still can and Saddam ends up facing the storm alone?
With the friendly Arab states bloodied and Saddam controlling more territory it will be harder than OTL, but still a Coalition victory.
Maybe Iraq's allies see the writing on the wall and cut advantageous deals (Hejaz, Asir) while they still can and Saddam ends up facing the storm alone?
With the friendly Arab states bloodied and Saddam controlling more territory it will be harder than OTL, but still a Coalition victory.
One more thing:
OTL there was the extended Desert Shield buildup in Saudi Arabia. Unless that happens in Oman or Qatar* (do they have the resources or space?), that will cause problems for the Coalition. Sending the armies in piecemeal with fewer local bases means a less overwhelming advantage.
*Qatar was definitely part of the Coalition OTL. Don't know about Oman.
OTL there was the extended Desert Shield buildup in Saudi Arabia. Unless that happens in Oman or Qatar* (do they have the resources or space?), that will cause problems for the Coalition. Sending the armies in piecemeal with fewer local bases means a less overwhelming advantage.
*Qatar was definitely part of the Coalition OTL. Don't know about Oman.
Just reread the earlier updates and it looks like U.S. troops *will* be arriving and may be engaging Iraqi and Yemeni troops straight away.
Things are going to get interesting a lot sooner than I thought. That may deter Jordanian intervention though.
Things are going to get interesting a lot sooner than I thought. That may deter Jordanian intervention though.
Guys
I'm doubtful about the idea of Jordan allying with Iraq. Hussain was pretty knowledgeable about the west and the power of the US and also a moderate leader with good skills as a survivor. He might stay neutral rather than join the allies but I can't see him joining Saddam.
Western forces are likely to clash with the Iraqis markedly earlier than OTL, especially as the US will want to show support for the Saudis and the Gulf States and keep as much of the oilfields out of Saddam's hands. This is also not totally to the advantage of the Iraqis either. The western forces will be a lot weaker and disorganised as well as lacking the powerful air support. However the Iraqis will have to be doing most of the attacking. Furthermore, if their seriously going for the main Saudi oilfields they have to push a lot further than Kuwait, meaning much longer supply lines and that they won't have a powerful air defence network on top of their forces. US and British a/c operating from CVs and Oman along with possibly some of the Gulf states could do a lot of damage here, although unlikely to stop the Iraqis in the short term.
The other unknown is how the Saudi forces will respond to the invasion and possibly also the population of the area being attacked. The local population is mainly Shia, who have no reason to be friendly to either government along with a lot of migrant workers from many different countries.
Steve
I'm doubtful about the idea of Jordan allying with Iraq. Hussain was pretty knowledgeable about the west and the power of the US and also a moderate leader with good skills as a survivor. He might stay neutral rather than join the allies but I can't see him joining Saddam.
Western forces are likely to clash with the Iraqis markedly earlier than OTL, especially as the US will want to show support for the Saudis and the Gulf States and keep as much of the oilfields out of Saddam's hands. This is also not totally to the advantage of the Iraqis either. The western forces will be a lot weaker and disorganised as well as lacking the powerful air support. However the Iraqis will have to be doing most of the attacking. Furthermore, if their seriously going for the main Saudi oilfields they have to push a lot further than Kuwait, meaning much longer supply lines and that they won't have a powerful air defence network on top of their forces. US and British a/c operating from CVs and Oman along with possibly some of the Gulf states could do a lot of damage here, although unlikely to stop the Iraqis in the short term.
The other unknown is how the Saudi forces will respond to the invasion and possibly also the population of the area being attacked. The local population is mainly Shia, who have no reason to be friendly to either government along with a lot of migrant workers from many different countries.
Steve
Jordan is biding its time and hoping for a clearer picture of the situation before they commit to anything. King Hussein will of course be hoping for an opening that will put his family back in control of the Hejaz region, but overall he's playing it safe and seeing what happens first. Should things continue to stay in Iraq and Yemen's favor, it's all too likely that Jordan will be headed south to join in.
The interesting thing here is that while Saddam believes he's playing it smart and giving the U.S. no chance to intervene before he gets what he wants, the move into Saudi Arabia has firmly set the United States on a path to do exactly that. OTL he didn't release a (obviously false) statement about being requested by the Kuwaitis to step in and help sort things out until a few days after the invasion. Here he's still trying to solve his problems by using a bigger gun, and then belatedly remembering that there might have been additional options after the fact.
Right now the US military is facing a scenario very reminiscent of Korea in July 1950. They're trying to hold on with what they have and trying to get more assets on the scene as quickly as possible. In the meantime, they'll be doing everything they can to convince King Fahd not to tap out and sue for peace before that happens. The next week is going to be crucial for everyone involved on both sides.
Also, I should have the next installment up either tonight or tomorrow.
If U.S. troops are getting fed into the grinder a battalion or three at a time rather than an almighty army-sized wave punching through the Iraqi border like OTL, I can imagine things getting a lot messier. Of course, considering how ludicrously one-sided OTL was, anything different is likely messier.
(Plus the U.S. has a massive advantage in training and gear. The only Iraqi victories would be something resembling "Zulu Dawn" with tanks.)
What kind of bloody nose would the U.S. need to suffer before the Jordanians join the Iraqis in sticking it to the House of Saud and the Wahabis?
Guess who just made my blog?
http://accordingtoquinn.blogspot.com/2013/05/iraq-goes-into-saudi-arabia-with-allies.html
If only I didn't have so much else going on, I'd like to write a story or book from the perspective of Jordanian troops marching through the Hejaz.
http://accordingtoquinn.blogspot.com/2013/05/iraq-goes-into-saudi-arabia-with-allies.html
If only I didn't have so much else going on, I'd like to write a story or book from the perspective of Jordanian troops marching through the Hejaz.
Like stevep mentioned, King Hussein is playing it safe and will only throw his hat in if it looks like a sure thing. If Saddam can manage to throw the 82nd Airborne back from Dhahran before more reinforcements arrive, or if the Saudi government collapses or fragments as a result of the invasions, he can step in and help pick up the pieces he wants with a minimum of effort.
Wow, that's incredibly awesome, thanks so much for the bump! Looks like I have at least one Turtledove vote in the bag.
And now, like any good politician, I'm going to have to work hard to keep that vote.For this installment, we'll be pausing from the ongoing action in Saudi Arabia to take a quick look at the world outside the Gulf.
III
Excerpt from Eye of the Storm*
By General H. Norman Schwarzkopf written with Peter Petre Linda Grey Bantam Books 1993
(*TTL’s version of Schwarzkopf’s autobiography It Doesn’t Take a Hero. Some passages will appear as they did OTL, others will be modified or added to reflect the new situation.)
The day of March 4 turned out to be far busier than any of us had expected. Following our meeting with King Fahd the previous evening, Cheney and I flew to Alexandria, Egypt, to brief President Mubarak on our deployment and ask for his help; we needed rapid transit through the Suez Canal for our warships, as well as use of Egypt’s airfields and airspace, if we were to meet our schedules. We learned of Yemen’s closure of the Bab el Mendab Strait while en route, a development that made me want to scream in frustration. We were already grappling with a situation that was unraveling fast and time was not on our side, and the closure was just one more wrench thrown into the chaotic mess. I was familiar enough with the disposition of Yemen’s naval and air forces that the prospect of clearing and securing the strait wouldn’t be overly difficult, but for the near future we had to rely on whatever forces were in the region. Namely, we had no minesweepers available to Middle East Force and would have to secure some in the immediate future from Vice Admiral William Owens over at Sixth Fleet. I did some mental calculations, and getting the necessary assets on the scene and shielded long enough to re-open the straits would take at least a week, perhaps two, to accomplish. A lot could happen in that time and the delay would cause huge snarls in our shipping timetable until we cleared everything out.
The meeting with Mubarak was quick but fruitful. Mubarak had long since established himself as a strong leader with a major voice in Arab decision making. He was confident enough of his power to have publicly condemned Iraqi/Yemeni aggression while at the same time actively seeking a negotiated settlement. He received us on a balcony of the Alexandria palace overlooking the Mediterranean and was visibly upset over the latest move by Yemen. He spoke for some time about Yemen’s debt owed to Egypt for its assistance during their civil war back in the ‘60s, and how the closure was a slap in the face of that generosity and that it threatened to bring war to the entire region. Cheney and I responded that our visit was to help prevent that event from occurring, and made our requests for access of the Canal and usage of the bases and ports. He only hesitated briefly when we asked for basing rights for our heavy bombers such as the B-52, but finally agreed in the interest of trying to bring the conflict to a successful resolution as soon as possible.He also promised to meet with King Hussein of Jordan, as while Jordan had been on alert and mobilizing over the last few days he had been ominously quiet about making public statements against the invasion. It was a possibility we definitely had to keep an eye on, the last thing we needed was another player throwing his army into the fray to grab what he could.
We were on our way back across the Atlantic that afternoon when the White House informed us that our mission wasn’t yet complete: we had to detour to Morocco. Belatedly, the State Department had realized that, having met with King Fahd and President Mubarak, we would risk alienating the North African Arabs unless we also briefed King Hassan and asked his support. Arriving at his non-air-conditioned Casablanca palace that evening, we waited in a sweltering antechamber for an hour while skeptical government officials asked questions. We couldn’t disclose the nature of our mission, but given the rate at which news traveled in the Arab world, I felt sure they already knew. The closure of the strait and the advance of the Iraqis hung over us while we waited, almost as heavily as the hot Morocco evening. I was eager to get back State-side, and tried my best to keep from pacing. Finally we were summoned into the presence of the king, who turned out to be quite cordial and, in a private session with Cheney, promised his support.
Finally, seven hours later, our plane touched down at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington. It was well after midnight on Tuesday, March 5; a smaller jet waited nearby to take me back to Tampa. We stood for a moment in the muggy Washington night, at the base of the ramp next to Cheney’s sedan. Thanking me for the briefings I’d given, he remarked, “We’re involved in a historic event. The sort of thing that will define nations for years to come.”
“Yes sir. I know.” I felt somewhat awed. We’d set in motion the largest U.S. deployment since Vietnam, an action that would quite probably lead to war – and I was commander in chief. I was also the person who was formulating the defense plan on which we were now staking soldier’s lives and the prestige of the United States. I prayed I had it right.
After spending the following morning coordinating events at MacDill, I was ordered to fly up to the Camp David presidential retreat to brief the President on our responses to the latest developments. As the jet carrying myself and my Air Force commander Lieutenant General Chuck Horner flew north, I thought of the first plane-loads of American troops currently in the process of touching down at the military airbase outside Dhahran. Though that part of the country had yet to be hit by anything the Iraqis had, hostile forces were now only 100 miles north of our soldiers. I could only imagine what must have been going through their minds as they un-boarded and gathered their weapons and supplies, in the path of an enemy that was headed straight for them. I thought back to the Internal Look ’89 planning session, and how our umpires had declared vaguely that, “The diplomats have just negotiated a cease-fire.” before CENTCOM had ever fired an imaginary shot at the invading Soviet armies. I wondered if the same optimistic hopes were in the minds of the 82nd Airborne, wondering if everything would be settled before they had to fire their weapons in anger. It was a sobering thought, and one that continued to prey on me as I was transferred to a helicopter for the final stretch up to the retreat grounds.
We rode in golf carts, the primary mode of transportation at Camp David, from the helipad to the main lodge, a quarter mile up the hill. In a comfortable conference room, President Bush had convened his inner circle: Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary Cheney, General Scowcroft, and General Powell. Baker had returned early that morning from a trip to the Soviet Union, where he and Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh had issued a historic joint condemnation of the Iraqi and Yemeni invasions. Powell, Horner and I were in uniform, but everyone else was casually dressed – the President wore a sport shirt and windbreaker to keep off the chill of the air conditioning. It hardly looked like a council of war.
The President was very much in charge. He repeatedly expressed his concern for Kuwait and the occupied areas of Saudi Arabia, and the plight of Americans trapped there. He also argued that the Iraqi and Yemeni aggression could not be allowed to go unchallenged by the United States and the rest of the world. He asked about the possibility of Iran joining forces with Iraq, which I felt confident in assuring him of it not being a problem in the foreseeable future. When it was my turn to speak, I stood, looked around the table and explained what we were up against. I had already informed the President about Iraq and Yemen’s respective military strengths before the trip to Saudi Arabia, now it was time to give them my thoughts on where things were headed in the coming weeks. In my slide presentation, I noted that Iraq had so far penetrated some 100 miles down the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, about halfway between the border with Kuwait and our airborne forces in Dhahran. I spent a little time highlighting what I saw as Iraq’s military strengths, such as its ability, evinced in the second Al-Faw campaign of the Iran-Iraq war, to wage an offensive with chemical weapons; and its weaknesses, primarily feeble logistics and a centralized system of command and control in which important decisions, even in the heat of battle, could be made only by Saddam personally.
It was these weak points, particularly the logistics factor, that I felt would play a decisive role for events in the coming days and weeks. Iraqi forces were meeting little in the way of resistance, but based on their track record in the Iran-Iraq war it seemed that they would be reaching the end of their operational tether before too much longer and forcing an operational pause while additional fuel and supplies were brought up and their forces regrouped. The President inquired for a clarification on how soon this pause would occur and how long they might take before advancing again, I responded that in all probability we would see a slowdown in the Iraqi advance within the next 48 hours, with a time frame of anywhere from a week to a few months before they could continue. He seemed satisfied with this response, the unspoken thought on everyone’s mind was a Pusan situation with an enclave of our soldiers trapped somewhere on the coast holding out for resupply or evac. I went on to say that based upon our predictions, we could expect to see supporting thrusts from Iraqi forces aimed towards King Khalid Military City and the capital of Riyadh, the first of which appeared to be shaping up based upon the latest satellite intel. Given what forces we would have available in the near future and the lack of aggression thus far against American bases and forces in the region, it was recommended that the 82nd serve as a deterrent force to defend the vicinity of Dhahran. They and the follow-up forces would pull back as necessary towards Qatar should the Iraqis show no sign of slowing down, serving as a potential threat to the Iraqi flank to help prevent a thrust towards Riyadh. In the event of an operational pause occurring as CENTCOM predicted, we would continue to build up forces around Dhahran and create a defensive barrier to stop any further Iraqi progress cold.
In regard to the situation in the south with Yemen, we were less confident about our immediate options for holding back their forces. Our request for assistance from Sixth Fleet had gone through, but there was some concern about the potential threat to naval forces being bottled up in the Red Sea while we were still building up air superiority for the region. The President decided that one of the carrier battle groups on route to the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean would be diverted to the Arabian Sea to help provide air cover while the Air Force got itself established in Saudi Arabia. Once we had supremacy, naval forces would move in to clear the Strait and ensure that it stayed open for the remainder of the crisis. It was this point that was especially complicated in regard to our current rules of engagement with the opposing forces. At the moment we were strictly on a defensive mode of operation, to fire only when fired upon. Moving to clear the Bab el Mendab in light of the Yemeni threat to attack anyone who did so put a near certainty on the situation going hot for our forces. The President asked if we could successfully open the strait within the week without taking unacceptable casualties, and I said that while it was a possibility, I wouldn’t feel confident about undertaking the operation until at least a week had passed to get more assets in the theater.
On the southern front, I explained that there was considerable pressure already on the Saudis for allowing Western troops into their country, and given the proximity of potential southern defensive lines to their holy city of Mecca, I felt it doubtful that we could deploy a significant military presence along the western coast without inviting trouble from the populace. To counter this, I proposed that we work on giving the Egyptians logistical assistance to deploy alongside the Saudis, and see about obtaining military support from some of the other Gulf states to help bolster the defense. Given the terrain and the state of the local roads, it seemed that all significant military operations would be confined to the western coastal area, with a minimal chance for a serious deployment coming from the eastern part of Yemen. From what we knew, the Yemeni forces weren’t as dependent upon central command for every last order, but they probably shared the same logistical restrictions as the Iraqis. We would know for certain in the next few days whether their advance would run out of steam and force a delay to regroup. If we could hold fast until then, we had a real chance of making this work. My estimate was that we needed three months before our forces were sufficiently built up to be absolutely assured of fending off any future attacks.
“What I’ve discussed so far are contingency plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia.” I went on. “If we want to kick these guys out entirely, we’d have to go on the offense – and that would take a whole lot more troops and a whole lot more time.” I put up a slide that showed my back-of-the-envelope calculation: we’d have to more than double the size of the projected force, pulling at least nine additional divisions out of the United States and Europe and transporting them and additional supplies to the gulf. The earliest such an army would be ready to fight was the slide’s bottom line. It read, “Time frame: 8-10 months.”
Excerpt from Mother of All Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Shockwaves
Within hours of Iraq’s invasion south, Kuwaiti diplomats had requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in New York. In a late night session, the UN adopted Resolution 672, demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Of the members on the Security Council, only Cuba and Yemen broke rank to disapprove, with Cuba abstaining from the vote and Yemen, for reasons that would become clear in the coming days, rejecting the measure. On the floor of the General Assembly, there was considerable tension as the representatives from Iraq and Kuwait hurled accusations and insults at each other, finally prompting the security detail to separate and escort both nations from the room. The general consensus among the membership was overwhelming condemnation of Iraq’s invasion, though delegates among the Middle Eastern nations were squaring off into opposing camps. This choosing of sides became more bitter and vocal with Yemen’s invasion into Saudi Arabia on March 3, a move that prompted the adoption of Resolution 673, calling for an immediate ceasefire and the return of all parties to pre-crisis borders. Again, the measure was adopted despite a vote in opposition from Yemen and another abstention from Cuba. Given the unfolding situation, discussion arose over whether to remove Yemen from the Security Council, though the proposal failed to go through thanks to opposition from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. By Monday, news of the closure of the Bab el-Mendab brought about the proposal of Resolution 674, calling for immediate economic sanctions against Iraq and Yemen. Resolution 674 sparked lengthier debate than the two previous ones, but it was ultimately adopted.
Though only a few days old, the invasion and its implications had already hit Wall Street hard. From a peak of 3,257 at the closing bell on Wednesday, February 28, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 100 points by the end of Friday, March 2. With Yemen’s entrance into the war and the announcement of the strait closure over the weekend, by the opening bell Monday morning investors were panicked and the market was in a total freefall, losing an additional 250 points before a forced closure went into effect that afternoon to prevent a total collapse. All eyes were fixated on the price of oil, which leaped from a starting point of $14.7 per barrel on March 1 to $47.2 by March 5 when faced with the loss of some 60% of the Middle East’s oil reserves for the indefinite future, as well as the shutdown of a waterway that saw 40% of the world’s oil tanker traffic pass through an area only 22 miles wide. While plans were made to secure and re-open the strait at the earliest opportunity, the Western nations scrambled to find potential alternatives in the interim, looking to sources in the Soviet Union, Nigeria, and Venezuela to help compensate for the loss. In the United States, brief but serious debate emerged over whether the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and its 470 million barrels worth of oil should be opened for use, with the decision finally being made on March 4 to do so. Opening the SPR gave the U.S. some breathing space of around 60 days, but that number would drop quickly in the event of serious and sustained combat operations. For the moment, panic set in among the population with a surge in gas prices and long lines of cars waiting to fill up at gas stations were a common sight nation-wide by Monday March 5. For many, the memory of the oil shock of 1974-5 had returned with a vengeance.
Outside the United States, the nations of the world were reacting to the events unfolding on the Arabian Peninsula with a mixture of shock and rage. Of the Western nations, Great Britain and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded the most vocally, calling for immediate action to be taken to resolve the issue. From the start of the crisis, Thatcher had ordered British forces on alert and began traveling for a series of meetings with leaders in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy to gather support for a potential military response. The introduction of Yemen to the hostilities only solidified her desire to intervene and resolve the crisis. Among the Western nations, Britain had the most extensive history in dealing with the region, and despite the shutdown of Middle East Land Forces in 1967 during the pullback from empire still maintained a small naval presence out of Bahrain. They had even fewer assets on hand to respond to the invasions, but their considerable experience in Middle East political and military operations made them a natural focal point for obtaining information about the region. By March 5 Thatcher had ordered a task force centered around the carriers Ark Royal and Invincible to sail for the eastern Mediterranean with further orders to proceed through the Red Sea once the straits were secured.
Though not as vocal about the crisis as Thatcher, President Francois Mitterand and France proceeded on a balancing act of promoting a diplomatic solution while preparing a military response should the situation be unable to be resolved. France operated a large military facility on the Gulf of Tadjoura in Djibouti, a small African nation directly facing Yemen across the straits. As France’s largest foreign military base, Djibouti and its several thousand personnel stationed there would be serving as a forward camp quite close to the blockaded straits. While French diplomats shuttled back and forth between Europe and the Middle East, Mitterand asked planners to begin looking into strengthening the force at Djibouti and the potential deployment of a carrier battle group into the region.
Germany for its part, while opposed to the invasions, was notably averse to a military option in the unfolding crisis. With the country having only just reunified on October 3 of the previous year, Chancellor Helmut Kohl found himself trying to absorb the immense economic problems of the eastern provinces and undo decades of damage done by the communist system. In addition, despite a brief contribution to an international fleet in the Gulf during the tanker wars, German forces were limited by their constitution to operate only in a defensive manner and within the confines of NATO, though a more liberal interpretation would allow for the use of military force as part of a collective security force under the Western European Union (WEU). While debate raged in Berlin over whether it was acceptable for German troops to operate outside the country, Chancellor Kohl was able to get approval for US forces to uses bases in Germany to transport men and materials to the Gulf region, loaning civilian aircraft and commercial ships to help with the buildup effort, and financial support in the form of an economic package to help with operational costs for the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Far to the east, Japan was in a state of panic. The island nation had always been a mass importer of resources in its modern incarnation, and received 70% of its oil from sources in the Middle East. With the outbreak of war, Japan suddenly found itself with dwindling stocks and an energy crisis. Much like Germany however, the thought of a military response was strictly taboo among the government. Their defeat in the Second World War had left their nation with a new constitution imposed by the Allied forces forever renouncing warfare and limiting their military to a purely defensive role. While adequate for defending their territory against potential threats from the Soviet Union or North Korea, the idea of deploying even non-combatant support ships overseas to the Gulf was anathema to those in power, with only a small minority advocating the inclusion of Self-Defense Forces in a response effort. They had traditionally relied upon the United States Navy to help defend their interests abroad, and this crisis would prove to be no different. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the Diet approved a resolution to help finance the defense effort, pledging $1 billion in initial funding to support operations in the Middle East.
The Soviet Union found itself in an awkward position. For years they had been the primary supplier for both Iraq and Yemen’s military, delivering the masses of BMPs and T-72s that were currently occupying Kuwait and invading Saudi Arabia. Iraq and Yemen were two of the few remaining Soviet allies in the region, but the collapse of the communist East Bloc and the end of the Cold War had forced Soviet officials to redefine their role in international affairs. Despite the threat to Soviet advisors and citizens still within the countries, as well as the threat of Iraq canceling its substantial debts to the superpower, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev decided to commit his nation to siding with the Western powers against Iraq and Yemen’s aggression. Despite the grumblings of the older generals and Party leadership, the Soviet Union was going to work alongside the Americans in the interests of world peace. The crisis brought Gorbachev an excellent opportunity to showcase Russia’s influence and power at a time when the country was struggling to maintain control of the events set in motion by his reform efforts. The CPSU had lost control of six of the outlying republics in January 1990, and from January 1991 onward Soviet troops were cracking down in the Baltic states to suppress increasingly loud calls for independence. The Union was falling apart from within, and Gorbachev badly needed a diplomatic coup to help restore confidence and prestige in the country. After instructing Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh to issue an unprecedented joint declaration with U.S. Secretary of State Baker to condemn the aggression of Iraq and Yemen, he began efforts to host peace talks for the disputing parties in Geneva.
In the state of Israel, life continued to go on albeit with considerable tension in the air. Repeated Iraqi threats against Israel’s existence were nothing new but the outbreak of hostilities on the Peninsula worried Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. He felt confident of his military’s ability to repel an attempt at land invasion and the Israeli Air Force would be able to bring airstrikes deep into Iraq should Saddam turn his attention west. The direct threat posed by Yemen was minimal, though the closure of Bab el-Mendab put an immediate strain on their economy. It was a repeat of a blockade imposed by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, a grim reminder that Israel’s security in relation to its neighbors was quite relative. In a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Israel William Brown, Shamir agreed to hold off on committing to any offensive action for the time being while the ambassador in turn reiterated U.S. support for the country. Israel would keep its forces on alert and ready to counter any aggression, and would remain watchful of the moves from Jordan, who still had yet to make any public announcements beyond vague calls for peace. As it did so, it in turn was being watched by Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis, who were quietly moving and supplying operatives among the denizens of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan.
Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
III
Excerpt from Eye of the Storm*
By General H. Norman Schwarzkopf written with Peter Petre Linda Grey Bantam Books 1993
(*TTL’s version of Schwarzkopf’s autobiography It Doesn’t Take a Hero. Some passages will appear as they did OTL, others will be modified or added to reflect the new situation.)
The day of March 4 turned out to be far busier than any of us had expected. Following our meeting with King Fahd the previous evening, Cheney and I flew to Alexandria, Egypt, to brief President Mubarak on our deployment and ask for his help; we needed rapid transit through the Suez Canal for our warships, as well as use of Egypt’s airfields and airspace, if we were to meet our schedules. We learned of Yemen’s closure of the Bab el Mendab Strait while en route, a development that made me want to scream in frustration. We were already grappling with a situation that was unraveling fast and time was not on our side, and the closure was just one more wrench thrown into the chaotic mess. I was familiar enough with the disposition of Yemen’s naval and air forces that the prospect of clearing and securing the strait wouldn’t be overly difficult, but for the near future we had to rely on whatever forces were in the region. Namely, we had no minesweepers available to Middle East Force and would have to secure some in the immediate future from Vice Admiral William Owens over at Sixth Fleet. I did some mental calculations, and getting the necessary assets on the scene and shielded long enough to re-open the straits would take at least a week, perhaps two, to accomplish. A lot could happen in that time and the delay would cause huge snarls in our shipping timetable until we cleared everything out.
The meeting with Mubarak was quick but fruitful. Mubarak had long since established himself as a strong leader with a major voice in Arab decision making. He was confident enough of his power to have publicly condemned Iraqi/Yemeni aggression while at the same time actively seeking a negotiated settlement. He received us on a balcony of the Alexandria palace overlooking the Mediterranean and was visibly upset over the latest move by Yemen. He spoke for some time about Yemen’s debt owed to Egypt for its assistance during their civil war back in the ‘60s, and how the closure was a slap in the face of that generosity and that it threatened to bring war to the entire region. Cheney and I responded that our visit was to help prevent that event from occurring, and made our requests for access of the Canal and usage of the bases and ports. He only hesitated briefly when we asked for basing rights for our heavy bombers such as the B-52, but finally agreed in the interest of trying to bring the conflict to a successful resolution as soon as possible.He also promised to meet with King Hussein of Jordan, as while Jordan had been on alert and mobilizing over the last few days he had been ominously quiet about making public statements against the invasion. It was a possibility we definitely had to keep an eye on, the last thing we needed was another player throwing his army into the fray to grab what he could.
We were on our way back across the Atlantic that afternoon when the White House informed us that our mission wasn’t yet complete: we had to detour to Morocco. Belatedly, the State Department had realized that, having met with King Fahd and President Mubarak, we would risk alienating the North African Arabs unless we also briefed King Hassan and asked his support. Arriving at his non-air-conditioned Casablanca palace that evening, we waited in a sweltering antechamber for an hour while skeptical government officials asked questions. We couldn’t disclose the nature of our mission, but given the rate at which news traveled in the Arab world, I felt sure they already knew. The closure of the strait and the advance of the Iraqis hung over us while we waited, almost as heavily as the hot Morocco evening. I was eager to get back State-side, and tried my best to keep from pacing. Finally we were summoned into the presence of the king, who turned out to be quite cordial and, in a private session with Cheney, promised his support.
Finally, seven hours later, our plane touched down at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington. It was well after midnight on Tuesday, March 5; a smaller jet waited nearby to take me back to Tampa. We stood for a moment in the muggy Washington night, at the base of the ramp next to Cheney’s sedan. Thanking me for the briefings I’d given, he remarked, “We’re involved in a historic event. The sort of thing that will define nations for years to come.”
“Yes sir. I know.” I felt somewhat awed. We’d set in motion the largest U.S. deployment since Vietnam, an action that would quite probably lead to war – and I was commander in chief. I was also the person who was formulating the defense plan on which we were now staking soldier’s lives and the prestige of the United States. I prayed I had it right.
After spending the following morning coordinating events at MacDill, I was ordered to fly up to the Camp David presidential retreat to brief the President on our responses to the latest developments. As the jet carrying myself and my Air Force commander Lieutenant General Chuck Horner flew north, I thought of the first plane-loads of American troops currently in the process of touching down at the military airbase outside Dhahran. Though that part of the country had yet to be hit by anything the Iraqis had, hostile forces were now only 100 miles north of our soldiers. I could only imagine what must have been going through their minds as they un-boarded and gathered their weapons and supplies, in the path of an enemy that was headed straight for them. I thought back to the Internal Look ’89 planning session, and how our umpires had declared vaguely that, “The diplomats have just negotiated a cease-fire.” before CENTCOM had ever fired an imaginary shot at the invading Soviet armies. I wondered if the same optimistic hopes were in the minds of the 82nd Airborne, wondering if everything would be settled before they had to fire their weapons in anger. It was a sobering thought, and one that continued to prey on me as I was transferred to a helicopter for the final stretch up to the retreat grounds.
We rode in golf carts, the primary mode of transportation at Camp David, from the helipad to the main lodge, a quarter mile up the hill. In a comfortable conference room, President Bush had convened his inner circle: Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary Cheney, General Scowcroft, and General Powell. Baker had returned early that morning from a trip to the Soviet Union, where he and Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh had issued a historic joint condemnation of the Iraqi and Yemeni invasions. Powell, Horner and I were in uniform, but everyone else was casually dressed – the President wore a sport shirt and windbreaker to keep off the chill of the air conditioning. It hardly looked like a council of war.
The President was very much in charge. He repeatedly expressed his concern for Kuwait and the occupied areas of Saudi Arabia, and the plight of Americans trapped there. He also argued that the Iraqi and Yemeni aggression could not be allowed to go unchallenged by the United States and the rest of the world. He asked about the possibility of Iran joining forces with Iraq, which I felt confident in assuring him of it not being a problem in the foreseeable future. When it was my turn to speak, I stood, looked around the table and explained what we were up against. I had already informed the President about Iraq and Yemen’s respective military strengths before the trip to Saudi Arabia, now it was time to give them my thoughts on where things were headed in the coming weeks. In my slide presentation, I noted that Iraq had so far penetrated some 100 miles down the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, about halfway between the border with Kuwait and our airborne forces in Dhahran. I spent a little time highlighting what I saw as Iraq’s military strengths, such as its ability, evinced in the second Al-Faw campaign of the Iran-Iraq war, to wage an offensive with chemical weapons; and its weaknesses, primarily feeble logistics and a centralized system of command and control in which important decisions, even in the heat of battle, could be made only by Saddam personally.
It was these weak points, particularly the logistics factor, that I felt would play a decisive role for events in the coming days and weeks. Iraqi forces were meeting little in the way of resistance, but based on their track record in the Iran-Iraq war it seemed that they would be reaching the end of their operational tether before too much longer and forcing an operational pause while additional fuel and supplies were brought up and their forces regrouped. The President inquired for a clarification on how soon this pause would occur and how long they might take before advancing again, I responded that in all probability we would see a slowdown in the Iraqi advance within the next 48 hours, with a time frame of anywhere from a week to a few months before they could continue. He seemed satisfied with this response, the unspoken thought on everyone’s mind was a Pusan situation with an enclave of our soldiers trapped somewhere on the coast holding out for resupply or evac. I went on to say that based upon our predictions, we could expect to see supporting thrusts from Iraqi forces aimed towards King Khalid Military City and the capital of Riyadh, the first of which appeared to be shaping up based upon the latest satellite intel. Given what forces we would have available in the near future and the lack of aggression thus far against American bases and forces in the region, it was recommended that the 82nd serve as a deterrent force to defend the vicinity of Dhahran. They and the follow-up forces would pull back as necessary towards Qatar should the Iraqis show no sign of slowing down, serving as a potential threat to the Iraqi flank to help prevent a thrust towards Riyadh. In the event of an operational pause occurring as CENTCOM predicted, we would continue to build up forces around Dhahran and create a defensive barrier to stop any further Iraqi progress cold.
In regard to the situation in the south with Yemen, we were less confident about our immediate options for holding back their forces. Our request for assistance from Sixth Fleet had gone through, but there was some concern about the potential threat to naval forces being bottled up in the Red Sea while we were still building up air superiority for the region. The President decided that one of the carrier battle groups on route to the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean would be diverted to the Arabian Sea to help provide air cover while the Air Force got itself established in Saudi Arabia. Once we had supremacy, naval forces would move in to clear the Strait and ensure that it stayed open for the remainder of the crisis. It was this point that was especially complicated in regard to our current rules of engagement with the opposing forces. At the moment we were strictly on a defensive mode of operation, to fire only when fired upon. Moving to clear the Bab el Mendab in light of the Yemeni threat to attack anyone who did so put a near certainty on the situation going hot for our forces. The President asked if we could successfully open the strait within the week without taking unacceptable casualties, and I said that while it was a possibility, I wouldn’t feel confident about undertaking the operation until at least a week had passed to get more assets in the theater.
On the southern front, I explained that there was considerable pressure already on the Saudis for allowing Western troops into their country, and given the proximity of potential southern defensive lines to their holy city of Mecca, I felt it doubtful that we could deploy a significant military presence along the western coast without inviting trouble from the populace. To counter this, I proposed that we work on giving the Egyptians logistical assistance to deploy alongside the Saudis, and see about obtaining military support from some of the other Gulf states to help bolster the defense. Given the terrain and the state of the local roads, it seemed that all significant military operations would be confined to the western coastal area, with a minimal chance for a serious deployment coming from the eastern part of Yemen. From what we knew, the Yemeni forces weren’t as dependent upon central command for every last order, but they probably shared the same logistical restrictions as the Iraqis. We would know for certain in the next few days whether their advance would run out of steam and force a delay to regroup. If we could hold fast until then, we had a real chance of making this work. My estimate was that we needed three months before our forces were sufficiently built up to be absolutely assured of fending off any future attacks.
“What I’ve discussed so far are contingency plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia.” I went on. “If we want to kick these guys out entirely, we’d have to go on the offense – and that would take a whole lot more troops and a whole lot more time.” I put up a slide that showed my back-of-the-envelope calculation: we’d have to more than double the size of the projected force, pulling at least nine additional divisions out of the United States and Europe and transporting them and additional supplies to the gulf. The earliest such an army would be ready to fight was the slide’s bottom line. It read, “Time frame: 8-10 months.”
Excerpt from Mother of All Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Shockwaves
Within hours of Iraq’s invasion south, Kuwaiti diplomats had requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in New York. In a late night session, the UN adopted Resolution 672, demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Of the members on the Security Council, only Cuba and Yemen broke rank to disapprove, with Cuba abstaining from the vote and Yemen, for reasons that would become clear in the coming days, rejecting the measure. On the floor of the General Assembly, there was considerable tension as the representatives from Iraq and Kuwait hurled accusations and insults at each other, finally prompting the security detail to separate and escort both nations from the room. The general consensus among the membership was overwhelming condemnation of Iraq’s invasion, though delegates among the Middle Eastern nations were squaring off into opposing camps. This choosing of sides became more bitter and vocal with Yemen’s invasion into Saudi Arabia on March 3, a move that prompted the adoption of Resolution 673, calling for an immediate ceasefire and the return of all parties to pre-crisis borders. Again, the measure was adopted despite a vote in opposition from Yemen and another abstention from Cuba. Given the unfolding situation, discussion arose over whether to remove Yemen from the Security Council, though the proposal failed to go through thanks to opposition from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. By Monday, news of the closure of the Bab el-Mendab brought about the proposal of Resolution 674, calling for immediate economic sanctions against Iraq and Yemen. Resolution 674 sparked lengthier debate than the two previous ones, but it was ultimately adopted.
Though only a few days old, the invasion and its implications had already hit Wall Street hard. From a peak of 3,257 at the closing bell on Wednesday, February 28, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 100 points by the end of Friday, March 2. With Yemen’s entrance into the war and the announcement of the strait closure over the weekend, by the opening bell Monday morning investors were panicked and the market was in a total freefall, losing an additional 250 points before a forced closure went into effect that afternoon to prevent a total collapse. All eyes were fixated on the price of oil, which leaped from a starting point of $14.7 per barrel on March 1 to $47.2 by March 5 when faced with the loss of some 60% of the Middle East’s oil reserves for the indefinite future, as well as the shutdown of a waterway that saw 40% of the world’s oil tanker traffic pass through an area only 22 miles wide. While plans were made to secure and re-open the strait at the earliest opportunity, the Western nations scrambled to find potential alternatives in the interim, looking to sources in the Soviet Union, Nigeria, and Venezuela to help compensate for the loss. In the United States, brief but serious debate emerged over whether the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and its 470 million barrels worth of oil should be opened for use, with the decision finally being made on March 4 to do so. Opening the SPR gave the U.S. some breathing space of around 60 days, but that number would drop quickly in the event of serious and sustained combat operations. For the moment, panic set in among the population with a surge in gas prices and long lines of cars waiting to fill up at gas stations were a common sight nation-wide by Monday March 5. For many, the memory of the oil shock of 1974-5 had returned with a vengeance.
Outside the United States, the nations of the world were reacting to the events unfolding on the Arabian Peninsula with a mixture of shock and rage. Of the Western nations, Great Britain and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded the most vocally, calling for immediate action to be taken to resolve the issue. From the start of the crisis, Thatcher had ordered British forces on alert and began traveling for a series of meetings with leaders in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy to gather support for a potential military response. The introduction of Yemen to the hostilities only solidified her desire to intervene and resolve the crisis. Among the Western nations, Britain had the most extensive history in dealing with the region, and despite the shutdown of Middle East Land Forces in 1967 during the pullback from empire still maintained a small naval presence out of Bahrain. They had even fewer assets on hand to respond to the invasions, but their considerable experience in Middle East political and military operations made them a natural focal point for obtaining information about the region. By March 5 Thatcher had ordered a task force centered around the carriers Ark Royal and Invincible to sail for the eastern Mediterranean with further orders to proceed through the Red Sea once the straits were secured.
Though not as vocal about the crisis as Thatcher, President Francois Mitterand and France proceeded on a balancing act of promoting a diplomatic solution while preparing a military response should the situation be unable to be resolved. France operated a large military facility on the Gulf of Tadjoura in Djibouti, a small African nation directly facing Yemen across the straits. As France’s largest foreign military base, Djibouti and its several thousand personnel stationed there would be serving as a forward camp quite close to the blockaded straits. While French diplomats shuttled back and forth between Europe and the Middle East, Mitterand asked planners to begin looking into strengthening the force at Djibouti and the potential deployment of a carrier battle group into the region.
Germany for its part, while opposed to the invasions, was notably averse to a military option in the unfolding crisis. With the country having only just reunified on October 3 of the previous year, Chancellor Helmut Kohl found himself trying to absorb the immense economic problems of the eastern provinces and undo decades of damage done by the communist system. In addition, despite a brief contribution to an international fleet in the Gulf during the tanker wars, German forces were limited by their constitution to operate only in a defensive manner and within the confines of NATO, though a more liberal interpretation would allow for the use of military force as part of a collective security force under the Western European Union (WEU). While debate raged in Berlin over whether it was acceptable for German troops to operate outside the country, Chancellor Kohl was able to get approval for US forces to uses bases in Germany to transport men and materials to the Gulf region, loaning civilian aircraft and commercial ships to help with the buildup effort, and financial support in the form of an economic package to help with operational costs for the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Far to the east, Japan was in a state of panic. The island nation had always been a mass importer of resources in its modern incarnation, and received 70% of its oil from sources in the Middle East. With the outbreak of war, Japan suddenly found itself with dwindling stocks and an energy crisis. Much like Germany however, the thought of a military response was strictly taboo among the government. Their defeat in the Second World War had left their nation with a new constitution imposed by the Allied forces forever renouncing warfare and limiting their military to a purely defensive role. While adequate for defending their territory against potential threats from the Soviet Union or North Korea, the idea of deploying even non-combatant support ships overseas to the Gulf was anathema to those in power, with only a small minority advocating the inclusion of Self-Defense Forces in a response effort. They had traditionally relied upon the United States Navy to help defend their interests abroad, and this crisis would prove to be no different. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the Diet approved a resolution to help finance the defense effort, pledging $1 billion in initial funding to support operations in the Middle East.
The Soviet Union found itself in an awkward position. For years they had been the primary supplier for both Iraq and Yemen’s military, delivering the masses of BMPs and T-72s that were currently occupying Kuwait and invading Saudi Arabia. Iraq and Yemen were two of the few remaining Soviet allies in the region, but the collapse of the communist East Bloc and the end of the Cold War had forced Soviet officials to redefine their role in international affairs. Despite the threat to Soviet advisors and citizens still within the countries, as well as the threat of Iraq canceling its substantial debts to the superpower, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev decided to commit his nation to siding with the Western powers against Iraq and Yemen’s aggression. Despite the grumblings of the older generals and Party leadership, the Soviet Union was going to work alongside the Americans in the interests of world peace. The crisis brought Gorbachev an excellent opportunity to showcase Russia’s influence and power at a time when the country was struggling to maintain control of the events set in motion by his reform efforts. The CPSU had lost control of six of the outlying republics in January 1990, and from January 1991 onward Soviet troops were cracking down in the Baltic states to suppress increasingly loud calls for independence. The Union was falling apart from within, and Gorbachev badly needed a diplomatic coup to help restore confidence and prestige in the country. After instructing Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh to issue an unprecedented joint declaration with U.S. Secretary of State Baker to condemn the aggression of Iraq and Yemen, he began efforts to host peace talks for the disputing parties in Geneva.
In the state of Israel, life continued to go on albeit with considerable tension in the air. Repeated Iraqi threats against Israel’s existence were nothing new but the outbreak of hostilities on the Peninsula worried Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. He felt confident of his military’s ability to repel an attempt at land invasion and the Israeli Air Force would be able to bring airstrikes deep into Iraq should Saddam turn his attention west. The direct threat posed by Yemen was minimal, though the closure of Bab el-Mendab put an immediate strain on their economy. It was a repeat of a blockade imposed by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, a grim reminder that Israel’s security in relation to its neighbors was quite relative. In a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Israel William Brown, Shamir agreed to hold off on committing to any offensive action for the time being while the ambassador in turn reiterated U.S. support for the country. Israel would keep its forces on alert and ready to counter any aggression, and would remain watchful of the moves from Jordan, who still had yet to make any public announcements beyond vague calls for peace. As it did so, it in turn was being watched by Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis, who were quietly moving and supplying operatives among the denizens of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan.
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This will not end well.
How far are you planning on taking this, BTW?
Good start.
Will you explore the pop culture in TTL?
The Saudis could be considered the Asshole Victim (as MerryPrankster points out in his blog post link) in TTL, as long as Saddam (eventually) gets his.
The 1992 election (and the fall of the Soviets ITTL) will be interesting.
How far are you planning on taking this, BTW?
Good start.
Will you explore the pop culture in TTL?
The Saudis could be considered the Asshole Victim (as MerryPrankster points out in his blog post link) in TTL, as long as Saddam (eventually) gets his.
The 1992 election (and the fall of the Soviets ITTL) will be interesting.
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Thanks! At the moment I don't see myself taking it much further than the war's conclusion, mayhap a sort of extended epilogue. I have a fairly good idea of how the timeline will unfold, but input from thread visitors and my own reading may shift things a bit as time goes on.
I'll delve into the pop culture a little bit, but aside from my own vague childhood memories of the period it's an area I don't feel quite as confident about.
I'm quite liking the general response thus far of 'Saddam better go down, but he better take the Saudis with him when he does.'
It's even nicer to be 30+ responses in and no cries of the involvement of winged mammals from beyond the stars.