Lincoln losing in 1864?

[bmac223]

Title is the question. I was inspired by playing the 1864 mod on the New Campaign Trail.

OTL the Civil War began to turn heavily in the Union's favor in 1864, particularly when Sherman captured Atlanta. The Democrats nominated George McClellan, a pro-Civil War Democrat, but had a Copperhead platform and running mate, leading most pro-war Democrats to back Lincoln.

How does Lincoln not win? Any thoughts?

 

[SWS]

Maintaining the Siege of Atlanta through the first week of November would suffice. The gloom of August would have continued into the most melancholy of seasons. Further Republican fracture, mounting Northern inflation, and powerful armies (that had sustained exorbitant casualties earlier in the campaigning season) idling-away before Rebel intrenchments in Virginia and Georgia would more or less damn Lincoln's campaign through general loss of public confidence. A tactically-decisive Cedar Creek for Early's army would further assist the Democratic ascendency to the White House. Nonetheless, I have concluded that the War was ultimately lost to the South on 19 May 1864. A 'March to the Gulf' against Montgomery and Mobile, whilst maintaining the investment of Atlanta, would have been so fatal to the Confederacy's remaining material capacity as to make any notion of negotiation upon the basis of perpetual disunion comedic. McClellan could have very well been the man to have 'restored the Union' in the Spring of 1865, as exhausted Confederate armies, deficient in manpower and transportation, dissolved under pursuit on the road to Danville and Macon.

 

[Hugh Third of Five]

Maintaining the Siege of Atlanta through the first week of November would suffice.

Atlanta fell on the 2nd of September. How are the Confederates there holding out for an extra two months?

 

[Elfwine]

Not by anything either Joe Johnston or Hood seem to have been able to try.

The war was heavily, not to say overwhelmingly, in the Union's favor before the end of 1863. The only chance in 1864 is convincing Union voters otherwise.

 

[Alex Zetsu]

The war was heavily, not to say overwhelmingly, in the Union's favor before the end of 1863

Even by 1862 it was hopeless... without British help the South was never going to beat the North militarily, it is that simple.

Stopping the Atlanta march can be done maybe by a series of trenches like the Battle of Crater style of trenches? That army basically went too far and if it is forced to stop for 3 weeks, they'll just run out of food.

 

[Elfwine]

Even by 1862 it was hopeless... without British help the South was never going to beat the North militarily, it is that simple.

Stopping the Atlanta march can be done maybe by a series of trenches like the Battle of Crater style of trenches? That army basically went too far and if it is forced to stop for 3 weeks, they'll just run out of food.

What stops the trenches from being outflanked?

 

[jmc247]

The only change that you get with a President Little Mac is a negotiated end of the war.

You would need a trifecta to flip the 1864 election not just in front of Atlanta, but in the Shenandoah, and perhaps more draft riots.

That probably means time to rap up slavery with states allowed to pass their own gradual emancipation plans. It also means the states are returned to the Union basically immediately after the war.

 

[daveg1967]

The only change that you get with a President Little Mac is a negotiated end of the war.

You would need a trifecta to flip the 1864 election not just in front of Atlanta, but in the Shenandoah, and perhaps more draft riots.

That probably means time to rap up slavery with states allowed to pass their own gradual emancipation plans. It also means the states are returned to the Union basically immediately after the war.

Even by 1862 it was hopeless... without British help the South was never going to beat the North militarily, it is that simple.

Stopping the Atlanta march can be done maybe by a series of trenches like the Battle of Crater style of trenches? That army basically went too far and if it is forced to stop for 3 weeks, they'll just run out of food.

Alex,
The South didn't need to win the war. It needed to not lose. Keep the war going until the Union gets tired of it. It almost happened. Lincoln thought it likely that he would lose the election as late as August 1864.
The best criticism of Lee is that he sacrificed strategic goals for tactical advantage. Lee invaded the north twice. The campaigns resulted in the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg. Antietam cost the south 10k casualties. Gettysburg cost 28k, almost 10k from Pickett's charge. Say that Lee stayed defensive and preserved his army taking half the casualties. That's 19k veteran soldiers available in 1864.
Criticize Joe Johnston as you will, he was playing for time. He kept his army intact and delayed Sherman. Jefferson Davis got impatient and replaced him with Hood who launched assaults on Sherman and got his army mauled, allowing the capture of Atlanta.

In short, the South had a real chance of winning but a lack of strategic vision in their leadership hampered that ability. It has been opined that if Lincoln had lead the confederacy and Davis the Union, the South would have won.

 

[jmc247]

If the goal was independence then the South needed big wins in the North or at least not to be losing anything in any theater of the war for several years and they were losing a ton since ‘61. If the goal was a negotiated peace then they needed a good attrition strategy.

Davis didn’t want a negotiated peace. He wanted victory on his terms and neither Little Mac nor Lincoln was going to give him that without a total collapse of Union morale or Europe forcing the issue.

 

[marktaha]

Atlanta fell on the 2nd of September. How are the Confederates there holding out for an extra two months?

Not replacing Johnston with Hood.

 

[Jedi Dragon]

Even if McClellan manages to win, the South will probably still lose. Militarily speaking, it's hopeless for them by this point. Little Mac was still pro-war, and the Confederates trying to get independence with all of their claimed territory at this point would just be laughable. They could drag things out a little longer, long enough for Lincoln to not win re-election, but they'll still lose the war. At best, they'll only be independent for a few years before the CSA falls apart and the Union comes in and picks up the pieces.

 

[Elfwine]

Not replacing Johnston with Hood.

What is Johnston going to do to hold Atlanta?

This is a question that Davis had no answer to when he changed commanders, and that bears emphasizing whenever talking about how Johnston shouldn't have been removed.

 

[raharris1973]

I have concluded that the War was ultimately lost to the South on 19 May 1864.

What happened that day?

A 'March to the Gulf' against Montgomery and Mobile, whilst maintaining the investment of Atlanta, would have been so fatal to the Confederacy's remaining material capacity as to make any notion of negotiation upon the basis of perpetual disunion comedic.

When would a straight march south to the Gulf have become a viable option and alternative to a march to the Atlantic via Georgia and South Carolina? What would have made it ever preferable, pre or post 1864 election, to trying 'just one more push' on the axis toward Atlanta and points southeast to the Atlantic? OTL I think Union forces only touched edges of Alabama until big cavalry campaigns in '65.

 

[Arnold d.c]

What happened that day?

Presumably the Cassville counterattack being called off. Cassville is a popular "lost opportunity" where the concentrated Army of Tennessee supposedly could have taken advantage of a divided Federal force and strike a hard blow on two of Sherman's corps - Hooker's XX and Schofield's XXIII. Much ink has been spilled - almost all of it from the Confederate perspective - on this failure, with a whole list of excuses and reasons. However, historian Dave Powell points out that there's a major issue with this story: Sherman never put himself in the trap. His target for concentration was Kingston and if Johnston had struck on the morning of the 19th, he could've mauled half a division but that's far short of the two corps that were expected to be mauled.

When would a straight march south to the Gulf have become a viable option and alternative to a march to the Atlantic via Georgia and South Carolina? What would have made it ever preferable, pre or post 1864 election, to trying 'just one more push' on the axis toward Atlanta and points southeast to the Atlantic? OTL I think Union forces only touched edges of Alabama until big cavalry campaigns in '65.

Grant actually strongly considered a march to Mobile prior to Sherman's March to the Sea. With Sherman's supply lines vulnerable, both Sherman and Grant agreed on the concept of cutting loose and marching to the sea, but differed on the target destination. Mobile was considered because there was substantial forage to feed the march and industrial and railroad targets along the way. Furthermore, the seizure of Mobile would open a second, much safer and shorter axis of advance into Georgia.

 

[marktaha]

What is Johnston going to do to hold Atlanta?

This is a question that Davis had no answer to when he changed commanders, and that bears emphasizing whenever talking about how Johnston shouldn't have been removed.

Stay on the defensive, attack only when fairly safe, frustrate Sherman by keeping him out.

 

[Herucalmo]

Maintaining the Siege of Atlanta through the first week of November would suffice. The gloom of August would have continued into the most melancholy of seasons. Further Republican fracture, mounting Northern inflation, and powerful armies (that had sustained exorbitant casualties earlier in the campaigning season) idling-away before Rebel intrenchments in Virginia and Georgia would more or less damn Lincoln's campaign through general loss of public confidence. A tactically-decisive Cedar Creek for Early's army would further assist the Democratic ascendency to the White House. Nonetheless, I have concluded that the War was ultimately lost to the South on 19 May 1864. A 'March to the Gulf' against Montgomery and Mobile, whilst maintaining the investment of Atlanta, would have been so fatal to the Confederacy's remaining material capacity as to make any notion of negotiation upon the basis of perpetual disunion comedic. McClellan could have very well been the man to have 'restored the Union' in the Spring of 1865, as exhausted Confederate armies, deficient in manpower and transportation, dissolved under pursuit on the road to Danville and Macon.

I feel like for Lincoln to lose you'd need all that *and* Lincoln not consciously shoring up his war government and courting war democrats away from McClellan and his disturbingly weak rejections of the Copperheads, with the whole National Union ticket with Hamlin dumped unceremoniously and ardent War Democrat Johnson picked up as his veep. Even in the very depths of funk in Northern morale, Lincoln never stopped having his finger on the pulse (plus, well, American government has never been very good at responding to pubic opinion in a timely matter).

 

[SWS]

Presumably the Cassville counterattack being called off. Cassville is a popular "lost opportunity" where the concentrated Army of Tennessee supposedly could have taken advantage of a divided Federal force and strike a hard blow on two of Sherman's corps - Hooker's XX and Schofield's XXIII. Much ink has been spilled - almost all of it from the Confederate perspective - on this failure, with a whole list of excuses and reasons. However, historian Dave Powell points out that there's a major issue with this story: Sherman never put himself in the trap. His target for concentration was Kingston and if Johnston had struck on the morning of the 19th, he could've mauled half a division but that's far short of the two corps that were expected to be mauled.

Interesting... how unfortunate for the Army of Tennessee. Indeed, the usual Johnston-Hood acrimony does seem to dominate the depiction of Cassville rather than the actual Federal dispositions.