Limited size of German army at the start of WW1

This is a bit off topic, but there seems to be a belief in history books that if all or part of Paris falls, then France leaves the war. Is this true?

To me, it seems more of a political will issue of the French leaders than a military issues. The Germans had long logistic lines at this point. There flank towards the coast was still open. As the weeks passed, the Russians forces continue to arrive at the Eastern Front. If they Germans enter house to house combat in Paris, casualties will soar.
We will never know if this assumption is correct, but at least a study of the German General Staff from 1910 which was continously updated to 1914 showed that even if the German initial advances had worked as the Germans wanted them to, the assault would most probably come to a grinding halt and would face serious difficulties like the cannons of Paris, the heavily fortified area around it and the open flanks.

Moltke knew quiet well that this plan was everything else than a sure way to victory (although he considered it more or less to be the best alternative for a victory).

What would be more devestating to France would be the annihilation of a really large group of its fighting forces if the envelopment worked. That would be much more crucial to victory than the occupation of Paris which has some symbolic value but is no guarantee for a broken morale.

Kind regards,
G.
 

Anderman

Donor
A second army in the East would also delay the need to transfer forces from the West. IF the other countries don't respond by increasing their military, then 25% more armies is likely decisive. My best guess is that the French and maybe the Russians increase the size of there armies. Extending the enlistment from 2 to 2.5 years would be doable for the French.

What i read on this board is that France already had a 3 year term for conscripts and drafted 83% of all men.
 

Deleted member 1487

What i read on this board is that France already had a 3 year term for conscripts and drafted 83% of all men.

It was only in place since September 1913 and was set to be repealed in 1915 if not later in 1914. In fact it caused major disruption in having extra men without extra leadership in place to actually lead them, which would take some time to develop after having men stay on for longer, yet having to train new soldiers at the same time. NCO and junior officers slots remained unfilled throughout the whole war and caused French infantry units to function poorly in the early years of the war. They really weren't all that great later on either, but the artillery arm made up for A LOT.
 
It was only in place since September 1913 and was set to be repealed in 1915 if not later in 1914. In fact it caused major disruption in having extra men without extra leadership in place to actually lead them, which would take some time to develop after having men stay on for longer, yet having to train new soldiers at the same time. NCO and junior officers slots remained unfilled throughout the whole war and caused French infantry units to function poorly in the early years of the war. They really weren't all that great later on either, but the artillery arm made up for A LOT.

France was short 800 first lieutenants in 1914 before the shooting started... all the money spent on extra cannon fodder made overall pay and equipment miserable
 
The core of the plan was to swing round behind the French who be pushiing towards the Rhineland, then they would collapse, i dont know if Paris was an objective, i think the idea was France would collapse.

However Paris was an important railway juncture and industrial area.

Had the Germans really threatened Paris, the French resistance may become fanatical, the pschology of it can be unpredictable.

On the other hand if the German front line ends up stabiliing with artllery range of Paris, then that would have been difficult.
 
A second army in the East would also delay the need to transfer forces from the West. IF the other countries don't respond by increasing their military, then 25% more armies is likely decisive. My best guess is that the French and maybe the Russians increase the size of there armies. Extending the enlistment from 2 to 2.5 years would be doable for the French.

Assuming that the savings from having a much smaller German navy paid for a much enlarged German army, then a POD might have to be injected around 1898 to side step the OTL naval expansion bills. Regardless, wouldn't this remove the main cause for GB getting too cozy and associating itself with the Entente powers? If so, then Germany might not only initially gain immeasurable advantages in a European ground campaign, but also possibly benefit from a cautious, yet neutral Britain, and not suffer a naval blockade, which in turn might drive less emphasis on uboat construction. Although the German navy was advocated as a way to build nationalism among the relatively recently unified German states, which still maintained separate ground forces, it may have been more wishful thinking and less effective than thought. However, assuming the above is correct, is there cause for concern for the loyalties of the German states had Germany not increased it's navy so heavily? In a world of ultra-nationalism I would think not, but I'm not well read up on the naval arms race and the dynamics at stake to the naval advocates.
 
Assuming that the savings from having a much smaller German navy paid for a much enlarged German army, then a POD might have to be injected around 1898 to side step the OTL naval expansion bills. Regardless, wouldn't this remove the main cause for GB getting too cozy and associating itself with the Entente powers? If so, then Germany might not only initially gain immeasurable advantages in a European ground campaign, but also possibly benefit from a cautious, yet neutral Britain, and not suffer a naval blockade, which in turn might drive less emphasis on uboat construction. Although the German navy was advocated as a way to build nationalism among the relatively recently unified German states, which still maintained separate ground forces, it may have been more wishful thinking and less effective than thought. However, assuming the above is correct, is there cause for concern for the loyalties of the German states had Germany not increased it's navy so heavily? In a world of ultra-nationalism I would think not, but I'm not well read up on the naval arms race and the dynamics at stake to the naval advocates.
As far as I have gathered in researching my TL, the navy was mainly built because the Emperor was fond of navies and wanted his own and Tirpitz, who was an ardent supporter of a battleship navy convinced the Kaiser so got the office of Chief of the Imperial Naval Office. There were different opinions on how a German navy had to look like and Tirpitz was just good in getting the ear of the Emperor. Furthermore Tirpitz initiated a well-oiled and financed propaganda machine which included the foundation of the Navy League. They draw quietly heavily on nationalist feelings. Then there was the notion that Germany should have colonies and since the British Empire had colonies and a big navy Germany would need for its colonies a big navy, too. I doubt the German Empire would splinter again. There was a fear of that, especially in Prussia, therefore Prussia had ambassadors in most of the German states, and there were some real differences in confession or political leaning. Nonetheless there was no real danger at this time of the states leaving the Reich.

You can use all kind of PoDs to do away with the navy: You can have another naval officer succeed in gaining the ear of the Emperor. Gallster for example had a quiet different and interesting view on that subject. Or you can have the Emperor not interested in navies. Or you can have another Emperor. The Emperor is actually a key person in this because he protected Tirpitz (and later on the naval attaché to London Widenmann) for a rather long time.

You can also try with a later PoD, changing one of the chancellors or part of their personalities to get rid of Tirpitz. An alliance with the military might be useful for that.

In removing the naval arms race completely you will have better terms with GB. But the naval arms race was not the only reason for them to cozy up to the Entente. Russia was a threat to the Empire in East-Asia, in India and in Persia. France was a threat in Africa, the Near East and the Mediterranean. That was at least on of the major reasons for Grey to initiate agreements with them. One should remember that those agreements even in OTL never were a formal alliance of any kind. Grey just come to an understanding with France (and at least for some time with Russia) over their respective colonial spheres. That was the "entente cordial". This understanding deepened with each international crisis in which the Germans behaved a little bit erratic on the diplomatic side causing a war scare, namely Morocco 1, Bosnian annexation and Morocco 2. Especially Morocco 2 was responsible for (secret) military talks and informal cooperation agreements. Together with the German naval law of 1912 it led to the agreement that the French fleet should protect the Mediterranean and the British navy the Channel coast. Depending on what or when your PoD is you can butterfly away those problems, too. Besides that there is a school of historians who believe that GB's strategy was to hold up the balance of power which might have been another reason for their support of the entente in the Balkan and Morocco crisis'. Which will again strain GB-German relations. Personally I think that - although some of Grey's thoughts were still bent on this scheme - he was more focused on preservation of the Empire, which of course may include a strategy of holding future rivals at bay. But in my opinion balance of power just for the sake of it was not his strategy.

On a siedenote: It is to say that it was not always Germany alone which was resonsible for those crisis and it had in some respects also good reasons for its stance. It was more often just poor diplomatic behavior which let the German side look more aggressive than she was.

If your aim is a really good relationship with GB than just find a PoD in the 1890ies, which will lead to the alliance GB-Germany, Lord Salisbury sought. For a very late PoD you can have a look into my TL here:https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=189376, which focuses on a slightly different Bethmann Hollweg who is more self-confident and assertive and has a more forceful personality, although these changes there maybe not enough to have really good relations with GB or to stop GB leaning to the Dual Alliance (France-Russia).

Kind regards,
G.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Assuming that the savings from having a much smaller German navy paid for a much enlarged German army, then a POD might have to be injected around 1898 to side step the OTL naval expansion bills. Regardless, wouldn't this remove the main cause for GB getting too cozy and associating itself with the Entente powers? If so, then Germany might not only initially gain immeasurable advantages in a European ground campaign, but also possibly benefit from a cautious, yet neutral Britain, and not suffer a naval blockade, which in turn might drive less emphasis on uboat construction. Although the German navy was advocated as a way to build nationalism among the relatively recently unified German states, which still maintained separate ground forces, it may have been more wishful thinking and less effective than thought. However, assuming the above is correct, is there cause for concern for the loyalties of the German states had Germany not increased it's navy so heavily? In a world of ultra-nationalism I would think not, but I'm not well read up on the naval arms race and the dynamics at stake to the naval advocates.

Hi,
money wasn´t the problem, so the german army in this example (avoiding the mistake not to counter the french enlargement) will get more money...
so this army will be not poorer equipped or trained

...

the german reich spended only 70% of the per-capita-costs for their military of the french... if they raise this to 90% they can rise their army by 20%... interesting, right?

From these two posts, it appears there was no economic need to reduce the size of the navy for the army. the Germans cold have added two new field armies and perhaps even a larger fleet than in OTL. That the Germans crippled themselves economically for a Naval fleet appears to be more British propaganda than hard analysis.

If a person was to go back in time and give advice to the Germans about military spending only. It appears the correct advice would be to match France's per capital spending on either the Army/Navy. BTW, i think the German navy build too many battleships. Torpedo boats, Coastal Fortresses, and U-boats would have defended the coast just as well as the Battleships, for less costs, and less bad blood with the UK

To avoid the reply, yes the best German coarse of action was to have a UK, German, AH central powers. OK, really, the best course of action is for Kaiser Wilhelm II to die as a child. ;)
 
From these two posts, it appears there was no economic need to reduce the size of the navy for the army. the Germans cold have added two new field armies and perhaps even a larger fleet than in OTL. That the Germans crippled themselves economically for a Naval fleet appears to be more British propaganda than hard analysis.

[...]
I beg to differ. According to my sources the budgetary side was always a problem for armament. In fact, Bethmann used the enlargement of the army to counter the naval law of 1912 and further naval laws using the strained finances as an argument that only one could met the budgetary needs. There most gruesome struggles in parliament were fought over financing the navy and the army (the former more so than the latter). The secretary of the treasury Wehrmut was against the navy precisely because it was too expensive (and he was more of an army man). He tried to use these arguments over armament to push through a hereditary tax, which was of course opposed by the old elites. Finally he resigned because of the financial irresponsible laws - as he saw it. And the finances of the German empire were not in a good shape. Later on a general property tax would become law. Again that discussion was going hand in hand with a discussion about army enlargement. Any cut in naval expenditure would have made it much easier to finance an army enlargement. Remember: you need not only to pay the men and train them and the officer corps. You need equipment, ammunition and food for them, too. All of this is expensive, too.

Also the naval enthusiasm had passed its zenith in OTL already in late 1911 / early 1912. The war scare of the 2nd Morocco crisis gave it a last push, but in early 1911 Tirpitz saw no chance to introduce another naval law, although the Navy League wanted one. This changed only in late 1911 because of Agadir. Since 1908/09 and the Bosnian annexation crisis the navy lost appeal and public as well as parliament became more and more aware of the neglect of the army. Therefore Bethmann and Haldane could succeed in stripping down the naval law of 1912. Tirpitz first proposal was much more ambitious.

I think that a bigger battle fleet than OTL would necessitate another PoD and is under OTL circumstances rather improbable.

Kind regards,
G.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I beg to differ. According to my sources the budgetary side was always a problem for armament. In fact, Bethmann used the enlargement of the army to counter the naval law of 1912 and further naval laws using the strained finances as an argument that only one could met the budgetary needs. There most gruesome struggles in parliament were fought over financing the navy and the army (the former more so than the latter). The secretary of the treasury Wehrmut was against the navy precisely because it was too expensive (and he was more of an army man). He tried to use these arguments over armament to push through a hereditary tax, which was of course opposed by the old elites. Finally he resigned because of the financial irresponsible laws - as he saw it. And the finances of the German empire were not in a good shape. Later on a general property tax would become law. Again that discussion was going hand in hand with a discussion about army enlargement. Any cut in naval expenditure would have made it much easier to finance an army enlargement. Remember: you need not only to pay the men and train them and the officer corps. You need equipment, ammunition and food for them, too. All of this is expensive, too.

Also the naval enthusiasm had passed its zenith in OTL already in late 1911 / early 1912. The war scare of the 2nd Morocco crisis gave it a last push, but in early 1911 Tirpitz saw no chance to introduce another naval law, although the Navy League wanted one. This changed only in late 1911 because of Agadir. Since 1908/09 and the Bosnian annexation crisis the navy lost appeal and public as well as parliament became more and more aware of the neglect of the army. Therefore Bethmann and Haldane could succeed in stripping down the naval law of 1912. Tirpitz first proposal was much more ambitious.

I think that a bigger battle fleet than OTL would necessitate another PoD and is under OTL circumstances rather improbable.

Kind regards,
G.

Let me rephrase. It is a taxing issue. Yes, with the fund appropriated by government, there would be a need to cut the Navy to fund the Army, but in some ways, this was a false choice created by the level of taxation.

I am trying to say the Germany had the ability to fund both the larger army and a Navy at least as large as OTL, but decided not to.
 
Let me rephrase. It is a taxing issue. Yes, with the fund appropriated by government, there would be a need to cut the Navy to fund the Army, but in some ways, this was a false choice created by the level of taxation.

I am trying to say the Germany had the ability to fund both the larger army and a Navy at least as large as OTL, but decided not to.
Maybe Germany would have had the general ability to gain even more funds in taxes than in OTL. Although I am a fan of progressive taxes and think they are in general important and a good thing at some level these taxes will become detrimental to the economy. Besides that it would be really difficult to fight this through parliament especially after 1912. "The left" was staunchly opposed to the navy and the Centre was also not a fan of it. Taxes for more naval armament after it became exceedingly clear that the naval arms race was never to be going anywhere I count to the near impossible. Furthermore the Conservatives were against property taxes. It needed their loss in the 1912 election and some further struggles until something like that could be implemented as it was in OTL. Now consider even more of that. Better chances perhaps because of "the left" had kind of a majority but they would not have allowed naval funding.

I think the wrong choice was to go for a battle ship navy and trying to compete with GB. Gallster had better ideas on U-Boats, destroyers and cruisers. In that regard expansion would have been a better idea. But what Germany really needed - especially considering their more or less only war plan and their gloomy prospect of fighting a two-front war - was and will always be a sufficient army. But then you need more officers and NCOs and that again means you have to let socialist workers or liberal thinking citizens into the officer corps and the ruling elite was not ready for that.

Kind regards,
G.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
...

I think the wrong choice was to go for a battle ship navy and trying to compete with GB. Gallster had better ideas on U-Boats, destroyers and cruisers. In that regard expansion would have been a better idea. But what Germany really needed - especially considering their more or less only war plan and their gloomy prospect of fighting a two-front war - was and will always be a sufficient army. But then you need more officers and NCOs and that again means you have to let socialist workers or liberal thinking citizens into the officer corps and the ruling elite was not ready for that.

Kind regards,
G.

Agreed. Germany could have had a more effective fleet for lower costs if less Ego Battleships. The small squadron in China did more for Germany than the entire main battleship fleet. I sometimes imaging what say a full squadron of 8 light cruisers, 20 destroyers, 20 boats and 20 torpedo boats would have done if place at one colony, such as German East Africa. If a fleet like this was at China, German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, and Cameroon. Now perhaps the British would have reacted to this too, but maybe they would have seen it as a reasonable defense force.

The last Kaiser had many flaws. He forgot that a Navy is only useful to Germany if the Army is strong enough to defend Germany. And he seem to take great joy in angering much of the world.

I actually was infantry, and did complete sergeant school for the USA army. A competent sergeant only requires someone in the top half of desirable qualities, a few years experience, and some training. Good officers are a lot harder to train and take a lot longer. The US Army says it takes about 25 years to train a good division commander. I suspect the extra corps would be near to the Austrian Army in quality than the German standard. But in the fall of 1914, the German high command would have loved to have a couple more "low" quality armies to help in the east. An attack out of Posen toward Warsaw could have taken a lot of pressure off AH empire.
 
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